DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This is in response to the Applicant’s arguments, and amendments filed on August 17, 2026, in which claims 1-6, 8-16, and 18-20 have been amended, claims 7, and 17 have been canceled. Claims 1-6, 8-16, and 18-20 are currently pending.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-5, 8-9, 11-15, and 18-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Zhang et al. (US 2026/0032524) in view of Wang et al. (US 2025/0142425).
Regarding claim 1, Zhang teaches a method performed by a master node (MN) in a communication system, the method comprising: transmitting, to at least one candidate target secondary node (SN), an SN addition request message including at least one SN counter value per candidate target SN and at least one KSN key corresponding to each of the at least one SN counter value (i.e., sending an SN reconfiguration complete message to the target SN ([0012]). The MN sends an SN Addition Request message to a set of candidate SNs, e.g., the candidate SN 708 and another candidate SN 710 (only one of these candidates is tracked below) to request a preparation /initiation of SCG selective activation procedure ([0064]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])); transmitting, to a user equipment (UE), a first radio resource control (RRC) reconfiguration message including the at least one SN counter value per candidate target SN (i.e., The MN sends the generated RRC reconfiguration message to the UE. [0085] Step 6: The UE responds with an RRC reconfiguration complete message to the MN. [0086] Step 7: The MN may inform the source SN that the SCG selective activation procedure is configured /prepared, via an Xn/X2 message, e.g. an Xn-U Address indication message [0085]-[0086], [0088]-[0089]); and transmitting, to the first target SN, an SN reconfiguration complete message including an SN counter value received from the UE (i.e., sending an SN reconfiguration complete message to the target SN ([0012]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])).
Zhang does not specifically teach receiving, from the UE, an RRC reconfiguration complete message including an SN counter value in the at least one SN counter value of a selected target SN among the at least one candidate target SN; wherein the SN counter value received from the UE is used for choosing a KSN key by the selected target SN for a communication between the UE and the selected target SN.
However, the preceding limitation is known in the art of communications. Wang teaches the circuitry may be configured to determine the security key by: receiving, from the terminal device, information of a first counter value in the set of first counter values, and determining the security key in the set of security keys based on the information of the first counter value… receive, from the terminal device, a RRC reconfiguration complete message to be forwarded to the second network device, the RRC reconfiguration complete message comprising information of a security key in the set of security keys; and forward the RRC reconfiguration complete message to the second network device. In some embodiments, the information of the security key may comprise at least one of the following: a count for the subsequent conditional cell change, or an index of the security key ([0176]-[0177]). The UE sends sending, to the MN, a Radio Resource Control (RRC) Reconfiguration Complete message which includes the first unused SN counter value (claim 48). The terminal device may use the value of the SN counter to generate the security key KsN. The security key KsN is used to derive further RRC and UP keys that are used in communication between the terminal device and the SN ([0062], [0083]-[0090], [0130], [0160]). If there are multiple counter values that are unused, the terminal device 120 may select one from the multiple counter values in a predetermined order or randomly ([0077], [0087]). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, to have implemented the technique of Wang within the system of Zhang in order to ensure that the SN cannot derive the same keys as the MN and provide freshness for security keys (KsN), preventing replay attacks when user data flows through the SN.
Regarding claim 2, Zhang in view of Wang teaches all the limitations above. Wang further teaches receiving, from the at least one candidate target SN, an SN addition request acknowledge message including at least one algorithm information selected by at least one candidate target SN, user plane (UP) integrity indication, or an encryption indication (i.e., The MN transmits a value of the SN counter to the terminal device over a RRC signaling path. The terminal device may use the value of the SN counter to generate the security key KsN. The security key KsN is used to derive further RRC and UP keys that are used in communication between the terminal device and the SN [0062]).
Regarding claim 3, Zhang in view of Wang teaches all the limitations above. Zhang further teaches in case that a new key is established; transmitting, to the UE, a second RRC reconfiguration message including at least one new SN counter value per candidate target SN; or transmitting to the at least one candidate target SN, at least one new SN counter value and at least one new Ksn key corresponding to each of the at least one new SN counter value ([0012]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])). (See also Wang [0062], [0090]).
Regarding claim 4, Zhang in view of Wang teaches all the limitations above. Zhang further teaches wherein the MN maintains a largest SN counter value among the at least one SN counter value per candidate target SN (i.e., The security key KsN is used to derive further RRC and UP keys that are used in communication between the terminal device and the SN [0062], [0090]).
Regarding claim 5, Zhang teaches a method performed by a first target secondary node (SN) in a communication system, the method comprising: receiving, from a master node (MN), an SN addition request message including one SN counter value, wherein each target SN includes the first target SN and a second target SN (i.e., sending an SN reconfiguration complete message to the target SN ([0012]). The MN sends an SN Addition Request message to a set of candidate SNs, e.g., the candidate SN 708 and another candidate SN 710 (only one of these candidates is tracked below) to request a preparation /initiation of SCG selective activation procedure ([0064]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])); transmitting, to the MN, a SN addition request acknowledge message including at least one algorithm information, or user plane (UP) integrity and encryption information (i.e., The candidate SN replies the SN addition request acknowledge message to the candidate MN [0077], [0090], [0093], [0149]); and receiving, from the MN, an SN reconfiguration complete message including an SN counter value received from a user equipment (UE) (i.e., sending an SN reconfiguration complete message to the target SN ([0012]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])).
Zhang does not specifically teach receiving, from the UE, an RRC reconfiguration complete message including an SN counter value in the at least one SN counter value of a selected target SN among the at least one candidate target SN; wherein the SN counter value received from the UE is used for choosing a KSN key by the selected target SN for a communication between the UE and the selected target SN.
However, the preceding limitation is known in the art of communications. Wang teaches the circuitry may be configured to determine the security key by: receiving, from the terminal device, information of a first counter value in the set of first counter values, and determining the security key in the set of security keys based on the information of the first counter value… receive, from the terminal device, a RRC reconfiguration complete message to be forwarded to the second network device, the RRC reconfiguration complete message comprising information of a security key in the set of security keys; and forward the RRC reconfiguration complete message to the second network device. In some embodiments, the information of the security key may comprise at least one of the following: a count for the subsequent conditional cell change, or an index of the security key ([0176]-[0177]). The UE sends sending, to the MN, a Radio Resource Control (RRC) Reconfiguration Complete message which includes the first unused SN counter value (claim 48). The terminal device may use the value of the SN counter to generate the security key KsN. The security key KsN is used to derive further RRC and UP keys that are used in communication between the terminal device and the SN ([0062], [0083]-[0090], [0130], [0160]). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, to have implemented the technique of Wang within the system of Zhang in order to ensure that the SN cannot derive the same keys as the MN and provide freshness for security keys (KsN), preventing replay attacks when user data flows through the SN.
Regarding claim 8, Zhang in view of Wang teaches all the limitations above. Wang further teaches transmitting, to the MN, an SN addition request acknowledge message including at least one of algorithm information selected by the SN, a user plane (UP) integrity indication, or an encryption indication (i.e., sending an acknowledgement message to the MN, the acknowledgement message comprising the first list of cell identifiers. The source SN or/and candidate SNs may send a response message (e.g., an SN Release Request Acknowledge message) to the MN. [0077], [0093], [0149]).
Regarding claim 9, Zhang teaches a method performed by a user equipment (UE) in a communication system, the method comprising: receiving, from a master node (MN), a first radio resource control (RRC) reconfiguration message including at least one secondary node (SN) counter value (i.e., The MN sends the generated RRC configuration message to the UE. ([0084]-[0089]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])); and transmitting, to the MN, a RRC reconfiguration complete message including the SN counter value (i.e., sending an SN reconfiguration complete message to the target SN ([0012]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])).
Zhang does not specifically teach receiving, from the UE, an RRC reconfiguration complete message including an SN counter value in the at least one SN counter value of a selected target SN among the at least one candidate target SN; wherein the SN counter value received from the UE is used for choosing a KSN key by the selected target SN for a communication between the UE and the selected target SN.
However, the preceding limitation is known in the art of communications. Wang teaches the circuitry may be configured to determine the security key by: receiving, from the terminal device, information of a first counter value in the set of first counter values, and determining the security key in the set of security keys based on the information of the first counter value… receive, from the terminal device, a RRC reconfiguration complete message to be forwarded to the second network device, the RRC reconfiguration complete message comprising information of a security key in the set of security keys; and forward the RRC reconfiguration complete message to the second network device. In some embodiments, the information of the security key may comprise at least one of the following: a count for the subsequent conditional cell change, or an index of the security key ([0176]-[0177]). The UE sends sending, to the MN, a Radio Resource Control (RRC) Reconfiguration Complete message which includes the first unused SN counter value (claim 48). The terminal device may use the value of the SN counter to generate the security key KsN. The security key KsN is used to derive further RRC and UP keys that are used in communication between the terminal device and the SN ([0062], [0083]-[0090], [0130], [0160]). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, to have implemented the technique of Wang within the system of Zhang in order to ensure that the SN cannot derive the same keys as the MN and provide freshness for security keys (KsN), preventing replay attacks when user data flows through the SN.
Regarding claim 11, Zhang teaches a master node (MN) in a communication system, the MN comprising: a transceiver (typical feature of MN); and a controller operably coupled to the transceiver (typical feature of MN), the controller configured to: transmit, to at least one target secondary node (SN), an SN addition request message including at least one SN counter value, wherein each target SN includes a first target SN and a second target SN (i.e., sending an SN reconfiguration complete message to the target SN ([0012]). The MN sends an SN Addition Request message to a set of candidate SNs, e.g., the candidate SN 708 and another candidate SN 710 (only one of these candidates is tracked below) to request a preparation /initiation of SCG selective activation procedure ([0064]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next /subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])); transmitt, to a user equipment (UE), a first radio resource control (RRC) reconfiguration message including the at least one SN counter value (i.e., The MN sends the generated RRC reconfiguration message to the UE. [0085] Step 6: The UE responds with an RRC reconfiguration complete message to the MN. [0086] Step 7: The MN may inform the source SN that the SCG selective activation procedure is configured /prepared, via an Xn/X2 message, e.g. an Xn-U Address indication message [0085]-[0086], [0088]-[0089]); and transmit, to the first target SN, an SN reconfiguration complete message including an SN counter value received from the UE (i.e., sending an SN reconfiguration complete message to the target SN ([0012]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])).
Zhang does not specifically teach receiving, from the UE, an RRC reconfiguration complete message including an SN counter value in the at least one SN counter value of a selected target SN among the at least one candidate target SN; wherein the SN counter value received from the UE is used for choosing a KSN key by the selected target SN for a communication between the UE and the selected target SN.
However, the preceding limitation is known in the art of communications. Wang teaches the circuitry may be configured to determine the security key by: receiving, from the terminal device, information of a first counter value in the set of first counter values, and determining the security key in the set of security keys based on the information of the first counter value… receive, from the terminal device, a RRC reconfiguration complete message to be forwarded to the second network device, the RRC reconfiguration complete message comprising information of a security key in the set of security keys; and forward the RRC reconfiguration complete message to the second network device. In some embodiments, the information of the security key may comprise at least one of the following: a count for the subsequent conditional cell change, or an index of the security key ([0176]-[0177]). The UE sends sending, to the MN, a Radio Resource Control (RRC) Reconfiguration Complete message which includes the first unused SN counter value (claim 48). The terminal device may use the value of the SN counter to generate the security key KsN. The security key KsN is used to derive further RRC and UP keys that are used in communication between the terminal device and the SN ([0062], [0083]-[0090], [0130], [0160]). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, to have implemented the technique of Wang within the system of Zhang in order to ensure that the SN cannot derive the same keys as the MN and provide freshness for security keys (KsN), preventing replay attacks when user data flows through the SN.
Regarding claim 12, Zhang in view of Wang teaches all the limitations above. Wang further teaches receiving, from the at least one target SN, an SN addition request acknowledge message including at least one algorithm information or user plane (UP) integrity and encryption information; and receiving, from the UE, an RRC reconfiguration complete message including the SN counter value, wherein the SN counter value is used for deriving the KSN key (i.e., The MN transmits a value of the SN counter to the terminal device over a RRC signaling path. The terminal device may use the value of the SN counter to generate the security key KsN. The security key KsN is used to derive further RRC and UP keys that are used in communication between the terminal device and the SN [0062]).
Regarding claim 13, Zhang in view of Wang teaches all the limitations above. Zhang further teaches in case that a new key is established, derive a new SN counter value for each target SN; and transmitting, to the UE, a second RRC reconfiguration message including the new SN counter value for each target SN (i.e., sending an SN reconfiguration complete message to the target SN ([0012]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])). (See also Wang [0062], [0090]).
Regarding claim 14, Zhang in view of Wang teaches all the limitations above. Zhang further teaches wherein the MN maintains a largest SN counter value among the at least one SN counter value each of which corresponds to each target SN (i.e., The security key KsN is used to derive further RRC and UP keys that are used in communication between the terminal device and the SN [0062], [0090]).
Regarding claim 15, Zhang teaches a target secondary node (SN) in a communication system, the SN comprising: a transceiver (i.e., typical feature in SN); and a controller operably coupled to the transceiver (i.e., typical feature in SN), the controller configured to: receive, from a master node (MN), an SN addition request message including one SN counter value for the SN and at least one Ksn corresponding to each of the least one SN counter (i.e., sending an SN reconfiguration complete message to the target SN ([0012]). The MN sends an SN Addition Request message to a set of candidate SNs, e.g., the candidate SN 708 and another candidate SN 710 (only one of these candidates is tracked below) to request a preparation /initiation of SCG selective activation procedure ([0064]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])); and receive, from the MN, an SN reconfiguration complete message including an SN counter value received from a user equipment (UE) (i.e., sending an SN reconfiguration complete message to the target SN ([0012]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])).
Zhang does not specifically teach message from MN includes at least one SN counter value and KSN key corresponding to at least one SN counter value; receive, from the MN, an SN reconfiguration complete message including an SN counter value received from a user equipment (UE); wherein the SN counter value received from the UE is used for choosing a KSN key by the selected target SN for a communication between the UE and the selected target SN.
However, the preceding limitation is known in the art of communications. Wang teaches the MN 110 may transmit the set of security keys to SN. In some embodiments, the MN 110 may transmit the set of security keys to a target SN in a SN addition request message ([0098]); the circuitry may be configured to determine the security key by: receiving, from the terminal device, information of a first counter value in the set of first counter values, and determining the security key in the set of security keys based on the information of the first counter value… receive, from the terminal device, a RRC reconfiguration complete message to be forwarded to the second network device, the RRC reconfiguration complete message comprising information of a security key in the set of security keys; and forward the RRC reconfiguration complete message to the second network device. In some embodiments, the information of the security key may comprise at least one of the following: a count for the subsequent conditional cell change, or an index of the security key ([0176]-[0177]). The UE sends sending, to the MN, a Radio Resource Control (RRC) Reconfiguration Complete message which includes the first unused SN counter value (claim 48). The terminal device may use the value of the SN counter to generate the security key KsN. The security key KsN is used to derive further RRC and UP keys that are used in communication between the terminal device and the SN ([0062], [0083]-[0090], [0130], [0160]). If there are multiple counter values that are unused, the terminal device 120 may select one from the multiple counter values in a predetermined order or randomly ([0077], [0087]). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, to have implemented the technique of Wang within the system of Zhang in order to ensure that the SN cannot derive the same keys as the MN and provide freshness for security keys (KsN), preventing replay attacks when user data flows through the SN.
Regarding claim 18, Zhang in view of Wang teaches all the limitations above. Wang further teaches transmitting, to the MN, an SN addition request acknowledge message including at least one of algorithm information selected by the SN, a user plane (UP) integrity indication, or an encryption indication (i.e., sending an acknowledgement message to the MN, the acknowledgement message comprising the first list of cell identifiers. The source SN or/and candidate SNs may send a response message (e.g., an SN Release Request Acknowledge message) to the MN. [0077], [0093], [0149]).
Regarding claim 19, Zhang teaches a user equipment (UE) in a communication system, the UE comprising: a transceiver; and a controller configured to: receive, from a master node (MN), an SN additional request message including at least one SN counter value (i.e., The MN sends the generated RRC configuration message to the UE ([0084]-[0089]). The message may include at least one of the following information: [0074] a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; [0075] a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for the SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0081]-[0082])).
Zhang does not specifically teach receive, from the MN, an SN reconfiguration complete message including an SN counter value received from a user equipment (UE), wherein the SN counter value received from the UE is used for choosing a KSN key for a communication between the UE and the SN
However, the preceding limitation is known in the art of communications. Wang teaches the MN 110 may transmit the set of security keys to SN. In some embodiments, the MN 110 may transmit the set of security keys to a target SN in a SN addition request message ([0098]); the circuitry may be configured to determine the security key by: receiving, from the terminal device, information of a first counter value in the set of first counter values, and determining the security key in the set of security keys based on the information of the first counter value… receive, from the terminal device, a RRC reconfiguration complete message to be forwarded to the second network device, the RRC reconfiguration complete message comprising information of a security key in the set of security keys; and forward the RRC reconfiguration complete message to the second network device. In some embodiments, the information of the security key may comprise at least one of the following: a count for the subsequent conditional cell change, or an index of the security key ([0176]-[0177]). The UE sends sending, to the MN, a Radio Resource Control (RRC) Reconfiguration Complete message which includes the first unused SN counter value (claim 48). The terminal device may use the value of the SN counter to generate the security key KsN. The security key KsN is used to derive further RRC and UP keys that are used in communication between the terminal device and the SN ([0062], [0083]-[0090], [0130], [0160]). If there are multiple counter values that are unused, the terminal device 120 may select one from the multiple counter values in a predetermined order or randomly ([0077], [0087]). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, to have implemented the technique of Wang within the system of Zhang in order to ensure that the SN cannot derive the same keys as the MN and provide freshness for security keys (KsN), preventing replay attacks when user data flows through the SN.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 08/17/2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
The Applicant argues that Claim 1, as amended renders the rejection moot because the proposed combination of references as cited in the Office Action does not teach or suggest at least to "receiving, from the UE, an RRC reconfiguration complete message including an SN counter value in the at least one SN counter value of a selected target SN among the at least one candidate target SN; wherein the SN counter value received from the UE is used for choosing a KSN key by the selected target SN for a communication between the UE and the selected target SN" as recited in the amended claim 1.
However, the Examiner disagrees with the preceding argument and maintains that the preceding limitation reads on the disclosure of Wang wherein: the circuitry may be configured to determine the security key by: receiving, from the terminal device, information of a first counter value in the set of first counter values, and determining the security key in the set of security keys based on the information of the first counter value… receive, from the terminal device, a RRC reconfiguration complete message to be forwarded to the second network device, the RRC reconfiguration complete message comprising information of a security key in the set of security keys ([0176]-[0177]). The UE sends sending, to the MN, a Radio Resource Control (RRC) Reconfiguration Complete message which includes the first unused SN counter value (claim 48). The terminal device may use the value of the SN counter to generate the security key KsN. The security key KsN is used to derive further RRC and UP keys that are used in communication between the terminal device and the SN ([0062], [0083]-[0090], [0130], [0160]). If there are multiple counter values that are unused, the terminal device 120 may select one from the multiple counter values in a predetermined order or randomly ([0077], [0087]).
The Applicant further argues that while Zhang discloses the usage of the SN key, Zhang never discloses that the SN counter value received from the UE is used by the selected target SN to select a KSN key as recited in the amended claim 1. However, the Examiner disagrees with the preceding arguments and maintains that the limitation reads on the combination of Zhang and Wang wherein: Zhang teaches the request message comprises at least one of an indication to the candidate SN that the candidate SN is allowed to suggest subsequent candidate cells for a next/subsequent CPC for the wireless terminal; a list of SN key or an SN key range to be used for the next/subsequent CPC; or a counter value or a list of counter value to be used for SN key derivation for the next/subsequent CPC ([0006]-[0008]), and Wang teaches A set of counter values in the at least one set of counter values is used for a candidate cell. The terminal device 120 may select one counter value from the set of counter values that is unused before the subsequent CPC ([0074]). With reference to FIG. 2, the terminal device 120 may determine 233, as the first counter value, a counter value in the set of counter values that is unused before the subsequent CPC. If there are multiple counter values that are unused, the terminal device 120 may select one from the multiple counter values in a predetermined order or randomly ([0077], [0098]-[0101]).
The Applicant further argues that for at least these reasons, Claim 1 and its dependent claims are patentable over the proposed combination of references as cited in the Office Action. For one or more of these reasons, Claims 5, 9, 11, 15, and 19 and their respective dependent claims are allowable. The Applicant respectfully requests that the § 103 rejection be withdrawn. However, the Examiner disagrees with preceding arguments and maintains the rejections for the same reasons recited above. Therefore, this office action is final.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/JEAN A GELIN/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2643
