DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
1.This action is responsive to the communication filed on August 19, 2024. At this time, claims 1-17 are pending and addressed below.
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1- 7, 10-15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C 103 as being unpatentable over Sudia, US 5825880 in view of TAKAHASHI, US 20160094348 A1.
1. Sudia discloses a digital signature system (See Sudia, abstract; A multi-step signing system and method uses multiple signing devices to affix a single signature which can be verified using a single public verification key. Each signing device possesses a share of the signature key and affixes a partial signature in response to authorization from a plurality of authorizing agents.) comprising: a first processing apparatus that includes at least a first processor and a first communication interface, (See Sudia, col 7, lines 53-65 and fig 2; the message server 47 connects to the LAN/WAN 21 and provides document queuing and communications services for the signing device 39. The message server 47 includes a system log 49 that maintains an audit trail of messages and documents sent to and from the signing device. As shown, a signing device and its associated message server preferably are divided into two, physically separate computers (computer processor). Although less preferred, the signing device 39 and message server 47 could be implemented as separate tasks on a single computer in a highly secure environment.) wherein the first processing apparatus is configured to execute processing comprising:
receiving a first parameter generated using a first signing key and first biometric information;(See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19; (140) In this example, two authorizing agents are required to authorize their respective signing device 169a to affix its signature. The coordinator 161 sends a first copy 165a of the document to be signed, along with a routing and information header (not shown) to a first authorizing agent 167a, who affixes his signature (--AA1a) and sends the signed copy 175a (i.e, first parameter) to a second authorizing agent 171a.
(141) Two other signing devices (not shown) affix partial signatures to copies of the document to be signed and return the signed copies 181b, 181c to the coordinator. All copies may be processed in parallel. The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum-security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used.) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.)
receiving a second parameter generated using a second signing key and second biometric information, and a second signature generated with the second signing key for a message; (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19; the second authorizing agent 171a adds a second authorizing signature and sends the (twice signed) document 179a to the signing device. The signing device 169a verifies the two authorizing signature, affixes its partial signature (--SD1) to the copy, and returns the signed copy 181a ( second parameter) to the coordinator 161.
(142) After the coordinator has received all copies of the document to be signed, the coordinator multiplies together the partial signatures. The product of the partial signatures is the system wide authority signature (--SWA). (i.e, first signature). See also fig 14 (149) FIG. 14 illustrates a command 213 adding an authorizing agent.
The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum-security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used.) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.)
and using at least the first parameter, the second parameter, and the second signature, computing a first signature for the message, (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19, fig 6s 6, 9 and 10; (142) After the coordinator has received all copies of the document to be signed ( i.e, first parameter, second parameter and second signature), the coordinator multiplies together the partial signatures. The product of the partial signatures is the system wide authority signature (--SWA). (i.e, first signature) ))
Sudia does not appear to explicitly disclose wherein the first signature is able to be verified using a first verification key corresponding to the first signing key. However, TAKAHASHI discloses wherein the first signature is able to be verified using a first verification key corresponding to the first signing key. (See TAKAHASHI, [0042] The biometric digital signature verifying unit 134 verifies the digital signature σ′ included in the biometric digital signature σ using the one-time public key KPs included in the biometric digital signature σ (S403).)
Sudia and TAKAHASHI are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor which is digital signature. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the invention of Sudia with the teaching of TAKAHASHI to include the digital signature verification because it would have allowed to and a signature verification device that verifies the digital signature based on the biometric certificate, wherein the registration terminal includes a sensor that acquires biometric information of a user, a feature data extracting unit that extracts the registration feature data from the biometric information, a biometric public key generating unit that generates a pair of a secret key and a public key based on a predetermined digital signature algorithm. (See TAKAHASHI, [0011])
2.The combination of Sudia and TAKAHASHI discloses the digital signature system according to claim 1, wherein the first processing apparatus is configured to execute processing comprising: computing a differential key that is a difference between the first signing key and the second signing key, using the first parameter and the second parameter; (See TAKAHASHI; [0049] Further, according to the present embodiment, the signature verification device can calculate the differential secret key KSd=KSe−KSs (if the user is the same person), but it is difficult to specify the secret key KSe and/or the one-time secret key KSs from the differential secret key KSd=KSe−KSs, and thus it is difficult to forge the digital signature and recover the registration feature data X and/or the digital signature feature data X′.) and computing the first signature, using at least the differential key and the second signature. (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19, fig 6s 6, 9 and 10; (142) After the coordinator has received all copies of the document to be signed, the coordinator multiplies together the partial signatures. The product of the partial signatures is the system wide authority signature (--SWA). (i.e, first signature))) Sudia and TAKAHASHI are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor which is digital signature. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the invention of Sudia with the teaching of TAKAHASHI to include the digital signature verification because it would have allowed to and a signature verification device that verifies the digital signature based on the biometric certificate, wherein the registration terminal includes a sensor that acquires biometric information of a user, a feature data extracting unit that extracts the registration feature data from the biometric information, a biometric public key generating unit that generates a pair of a secret key and a public key based on a predetermined digital signature algorithm. (See TAKAHASHI, [0011])
3. The combination of Sudia and TAKAHASHI discloses the digital signature system according to claim 1, wherein the first processing apparatus is configured to execute processing comprising: receiving a second verification key corresponding to the second signing key; (See TAKAHASHI, [0011])
and verifying the second signature for the message using the second verification key. (See TAKAHASHI, [0042])
4. The combination of Sudia and TAKAHASHI discloses the digital signature system according to claim 1, wherein the first processing apparatus is configured to execute processing comprising: computing a differential key that is a difference between the first signing key and the second signing key, using the first parameter and the second parameter; (See TAKAHASHI; [0049] Further, according to the present embodiment, the signature verification device can calculate the differential secret key KSd=KSe−KSs (if the user is the same person), but it is difficult to specify the secret key KSe and/or the one-time secret key KSs from the differential secret key KSd=KSe−KSs, and thus it is difficult to forge the digital signature and recover the registration feature data X and/or the digital signature feature data X′.)
and computing a second verification key corresponding to the second signing key, using the differential key and the first verification key. (See TAKAHASHI, [0011]) Sudia and TAKAHASHI are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor which is digital signature. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the invention of Sudia with the teaching of TAKAHASHI to include the digital signature verification because it would have allowed to and a signature verification device that verifies the digital signature based on the biometric certificate, wherein the registration terminal includes a sensor that acquires biometric information of a user, a feature data extracting unit that extracts the registration feature data from the biometric information, a biometric public key generating unit that generates a pair of a secret key and a public key based on a predetermined digital signature algorithm. (See TAKAHASHI, [0011])
5. The digital signature system according to claim 1, wherein the first signature is a signature with the first signing key for the message. (See Sudia, fig 14; (141) Two other signing devices (not shown) affix partial signatures to copies of the document to be signed and return the signed copies 181b, 181c to the coordinator. All copies may be processed in parallel. The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum-security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used.) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.))
6. The combination of Sudia and TAKAHASHI discloses the digital signature system according to claim 1, further comprising: a second processing apparatus including at least a second processor and a second communication interface; (See Sudia, col 7, lines 53-65 and fig 2; the message server 47 connects to the LAN/WAN 21 and provides document queuing and communications services for the signing device 39. The message server 47 includes a system log 49 that maintains an audit trail of messages and documents sent to and from the signing device. As shown, a signing device and its associated message server preferably are divided into two, physically separate computers (computer processor). Although less preferred, the signing device 39 and message server 47 could be implemented as separate tasks on a single computer in a highly secure environment.) and a third processing apparatus including at least a third processor and a third communication interface, (See Sudia, col 7, lines 53-65 and figs 2 and 3) wherein the second processing apparatus is configured to execute processing comprising: generating the first signing key and the first verification key corresponding to the first signing key; (See Sudia; (149) FIG. 14 illustrates a command 213 adding an authorizing agent. The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used.) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.) acquiring the first biometric information; (See Sudia; (149) FIG. 14 illustrates a command 213 adding an authorizing agent. The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used.) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.) generating the first parameter by composing the first signing key and the first biometric information; (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19 ; (140) In this example, two authorizing agents are required to authorize their respective signing device 169a to affix its signature. The coordinator 161 sends a first copy 165a of the document to be signed, along with a routing and information header (not shown) to a first authorizing agent 167a, who affixes his signature (--AA1a) and sends the signed copy 175a (i.e, first parameter) to a second authorizing agent 171a.
(141) Two other signing devices (not shown) affix partial signatures to copies of the document to be signed and return the signed copies 181b, 181c to the coordinator. All copies may be processed in parallel. The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum-security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used.)
and transmitting the first parameter to the first processing apparatus, (See Sudia, Figs 9 and 10 section; (129) 7) Signing Device 2 receives the signed document 149, strips off the header and verifies that the certificate bears the necessary number of signatures of its registered authorizing agents (in this example, two). If so, Signing Device 2 strips off the signatures of its authorizing agents and modifies the partial SWA signature to complete the SWA signature. As shown in FIG. 10, the completed SWA signature (--SWA) is determined by exponentiating the partial signature affixed by Signature Device 1 (--SD1) using Signature Device 2's SWA signature key share 95. Signing Device 2 then affixes a new header, and sends the partially signed certificate 151 to AA1a (the originating authorizing agent).) wherein the third processing apparatus is configured to execute processing comprising: acquiring the second biometric information; The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum-security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used)
generating the second signing key and a second verification key corresponding to the second signing key; (See Sudia, figs 9 and 10; (129) 7) Signing Device 2 receives the signed document 149, strips off the header and verifies that the certificate bears the necessary number of signatures of its registered authorizing agents (in this example, two). If so, Signing Device 2 strips off the signatures of its authorizing agents and modifies the partial SWA signature to complete the SWA signature. As shown in FIG. 10, the completed SWA signature (--SWA) is determined by exponentiating the partial signature affixed by Signature Device 1 (--SD1) using Signature Device 2's SWA signature key share 95. Signing Device 2 then affixes a new header, and sends the partially signed certificate 151 to AA1a (the originating authorizing agent). )
generating the second parameter by composing the second signing key and the second biometric information; (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19; the second authorizing agent 171a adds a second authorizing signature and sends the (twice signed) document 179a to the signing device. The signing device 169a verifies the two authorizing signature, affixes its partial signature (--SD1) to the copy, and returns the signed copy 181a ( 2nd parameter) to the coordinator 161. (142) After the coordinator has received all copies of the document to be signed, the coordinator multiplies together the partial signatures. The product of the three partial signatures is the system wide authority signature (--SWA). (i.e, first signature). See also fig 14 (149) FIG. 14 illustrates a command 213 adding an authorizing agent.
generating the second signature for the message using the second signing key; (See Sudia, figs 9 and 10; (129) 7) Signing Device 2 receives the signed document 149, strips off the header and verifies that the certificate bears the necessary number of signatures of its registered authorizing agents (in this example, two). If so, Signing Device 2 strips off the signatures of its authorizing agents and modifies the partial SWA signature to complete the SWA signature. As shown in FIG. 10, the completed SWA signature (--SWA) is determined by exponentiating the partial signature affixed by Signature Device 1 (--SD1) using Signature Device 2's SWA signature key share 95. Signing Device 2 then affixes a new header, and sends the partially signed certificate 151 to AA1a (the originating authorizing agent).)
and transmitting the message, the second parameter, and the second signature to the first processing apparatus. (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19, fig 6s 6, 9 and 10; (142) After the coordinator has received all copies of the document to be signed ( i.e, first parameter, second parameter and second signature), the coordinator multiplies together the partial signatures. The product of the partial signatures is the system wide authority signature (--SWA). (i.e, first signature) ))
7. The combination of Sudia and TAKAHASHI discloses the digital signature system according to claim 6, wherein the second processing apparatus transmits the first verification key to a verification apparatus that verifies a signature or to a Key-server, and the first processing apparatus transmits the first signature to the verification apparatus. (See Sudia, fig 25; Upon receipt of the signature request, the primary user's card will verify that the requesting user's signature(s) match(es) the public key(s) that were originally specified in the substitution certificate, apply the primary user's signature 419, and forward the signed document on to a signing device 421 (or other destination) in the usual manner.)
10. Sudia discloses a digital signature method (See Sudia, abstract; A multi-step signing system and method uses multiple signing devices to affix a single signature which can be verified using a single public verification key. Each signing device possesses a share of the signature key and affixes a partial signature in response to authorization from a plurality of authorizing agents.) comprising:
receiving, by a first node, a first parameter generated using a first signing key and first biometric information; (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19; (140) In this example, two authorizing agents are required to authorize their respective signing device 169a to affix its signature. The coordinator 161 sends a first copy 165a of the document to be signed, along with a routing and information header (not shown) to a first authorizing agent 167a, who affixes his signature (--AA1a) and sends the signed copy 175a (i.e, first parameter) to a second authorizing agent 171a. (141) Two other signing devices (not shown) affix partial signatures to copies of the document to be signed and return the signed copies 181b, 181c to the coordinator. All copies may be processed in parallel. The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum-security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used.) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.)
receiving, by the first node, a second parameter generated using a second signing key and second biometric information; (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19; the second authorizing agent 171a adds a second authorizing signature and sends the (twice signed) document 179a to the signing device. The signing device 169a verifies the two authorizing signature, affixes its partial signature (--SD1) to the copy, and returns the signed copy 181a (second parameter) to the coordinator 161.
(142) After the coordinator has received all copies of the document to be signed, the coordinator multiplies together the partial signatures. The product of the three partial signatures is the system wide authority signature (--SWA). (i.e, first signature). See also fig 14 (149) FIG. 14 illustrates a command 213 adding an authorizing agent.
The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum-security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.))
and a second signature generated with the second signing key for a message; (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19; the second authorizing agent 171a adds a second authorizing signature and sends the (twice signed) document 179a to the signing device. The signing device 169a verifies the two authorizing signature, affixes its partial signature (--SD1) to the copy, and returns the signed copy 181a ( second parameter) to the coordinator 161.
(142) After the coordinator has received all copies of the document to be signed, the coordinator multiplies together the partial signatures. The product of the partial signatures is the system wide authority signature (--SWA). (i.e, first signature). See also fig 14 (149) FIG. 14 illustrates a command 213 adding an authorizing agent.)
and using at least the first parameter, the second parameter, and the second signature, computing, by the first node, (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19, fig 6s 6, 9 and 10; (142) After the coordinator has received all copies of the document to be signed ( i.e, first parameter, second parameter and second signature), the coordinator multiplies together the partial signatures. The product of the partial signatures is the system wide authority signature (--SWA). (i.e, first signature))
Sudia does not appear to explicitly disclose a first signature for the message that is able to be verified using a first verification key corresponding to the first signing key.
However, TAKAHASHI discloses a first signature for the message that is able to be verified using a first verification key corresponding to the first signing key. (See TAKAHASHI, [0042] The biometric digital signature verifying unit 134 verifies the digital signature σ′ included in the biometric digital signature σ using the one-time public key KPs included in the biometric digital signature σ (S403).)
Sudia and TAKAHASHI are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor which is digital signature. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the invention of Sudia with the teaching of TAKAHASHI to include the digital signature verification because it would have allowed to and a signature verification device that verifies the digital signature based on the biometric certificate, wherein the registration terminal includes a sensor that acquires biometric information of a user, a feature data extracting unit that extracts the registration feature data from the biometric information, a biometric public key generating unit that generates a pair of a secret key and a public key based on a predetermined digital signature algorithm. (See TAKAHASHI, [0011])
11. The combination of Sudia and TAKAHASHI discloses the digital signature method according to claim 10, comprising: computing, by the first node, a differential key that is a difference between the first signing key and the second signing key, using the first parameter and the second parameter; (See TAKAHASHI; [0049] Further, according to the present embodiment, the signature verification device can calculate the differential secret key KSd=KSe−KSs (if the user is the same person), but it is difficult to specify the secret key KSe and/or the one-time secret key KSs from the differential secret key KSd=KSe−KSs, and thus it is difficult to forge the digital signature and recover the registration feature data X and/or the digital signature feature data X′.) and computing, by the first node, the first signature, using at least the differential key and the second signature. (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19, fig 6s 6, 9 and 10; (142) After the coordinator has received all copies of the document to be signed, the coordinator multiplies together the partial signatures. The product of the partial signatures is the system wide authority signature (--SWA). (i.e, first signature))) Sudia and TAKAHASHI are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor which is digital signature. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the invention of Sudia with the teaching of TAKAHASHI to include the digital signature verification because it would have allowed to and a signature verification device that verifies the digital signature based on the biometric certificate, wherein the registration terminal includes a sensor that acquires biometric information of a user, a feature data extracting unit that extracts the registration feature data from the biometric information, a biometric public key generating unit that generates a pair of a secret key and a public key based on a predetermined digital signature algorithm. (See TAKAHASHI, [0011])
12. The combination of Sudia and TAKAHASHI discloses the digital signature method according to claim 10, comprising: receiving, by the first node, a second verification key corresponding to the second signing key (See TAKAHASHI, [0011]) and verifying, by the first node, the second signature for the message, using the second verification key. (See TAKAHASHI, [0042]) Sudia and TAKAHASHI are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor which is digital signature. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the invention of Sudia with the teaching of TAKAHASHI to include the digital signature verification because it would have allowed to and a signature verification device that verifies the digital signature based on the biometric certificate, wherein the registration terminal includes a sensor that acquires biometric information of a user, a feature data extracting unit that extracts the registration feature data from the biometric information, a biometric public key generating unit that generates a pair of a secret key and a public key based on a predetermined digital signature algorithm. (See TAKAHASHI, [0011])
13. The combination of Sudia and TAKAHASHI discloses the digital signature method according to claim 10, comprising: computing, by the first node, a differential key that is a difference between the first signing key and the second signing key, using the first parameter and the second parameter; (See TAKAHASHI; [0049] Further, according to the present embodiment, the signature verification device can calculate the differential secret key KSd=KSe−KSs (if the user is the same person), but it is difficult to specify the secret key KSe and/or the one-time secret key KSs from the differential secret key KSd=KSe−KSs, and thus it is difficult to forge the digital signature and recover the registration feature data X and/or the digital signature feature data X′.)
and computing, by the first node, a second verification key corresponding to the second signing key, using the differential key and the first verification key. (See TAKAHASHI, [0011]) Sudia and TAKAHASHI are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor which is digital signature. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the invention of Sudia with the teaching of TAKAHASHI to include the digital signature verification because it would have allowed to and a signature verification device that verifies the digital signature based on the biometric certificate, wherein the registration terminal includes a sensor that acquires biometric information of a user, a feature data extracting unit that extracts the registration feature data from the biometric information, a biometric public key generating unit that generates a pair of a secret key and a public key based on a predetermined digital signature algorithm. (See TAKAHASHI, [0011])
14. The combination of Sudia and TAKAHASHI discloses the digital signature method according to claim 10, wherein the first signature is a signature with the first signing key for the message. (See Sudia, fig 14; (141) Two other signing devices (not shown) affix partial signatures to copies of the document to be signed and return the signed copies 181b, 181c to the coordinator. All copies may be processed in parallel. The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum-security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used.) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.))
15. The combination of Sudia and TAKAHASHI discloses the digital signature method according to claim 10, comprising: generating, by a second node, the first signing key and the first verification key corresponding to the first signing key; (See Sudia; (149) FIG. 14 illustrates a command 213 adding an authorizing agent. The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.)
acquiring, by the second node, the first biometric information; (See Sudia; (149) FIG. 14 illustrates a command 213 adding an authorizing agent. The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is is used) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.)
generating, by the second node, the first parameter by composing the first signing key and the first biometric information; (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19 ; (140) In this example, two authorizing agents are required to authorize their respective signing device 169a to affix its signature. The coordinator 161 sends a first copy 165a of the document to be signed, along with a routing and information header (not shown) to a first authorizing agent 167a, who affixes his signature (--AA1a) and sends the signed copy 175a (i.e, first parameter) to a second authorizing agent 171a.
(141) Two other signing devices (not shown) affix partial signatures to copies of the document to be signed and return the signed copies 181b, 181c to the coordinator. All copies may be processed in parallel. The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum-security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is is used)
transmitting, by the second node, the first parameter to the first node; (See Sudia, Figs 9 and 10 section; (129) 7) Signing Device 2 receives the signed document 149, strips off the header and verifies that the certificate bears the necessary number of signatures of its registered authorizing agents (in this example, two). If so, Signing Device 2 strips off the signatures of its authorizing agents and modifies the partial SWA signature to complete the SWA signature. As shown in FIG. 10, the completed SWA signature (--SWA) is determined by exponentiating the partial signature affixed by Signature Device 1 (--SD1) using Signature Device 2's SWA signature key share 95. Signing Device 2 then affixes a new header, and sends the partially signed certificate 151 to AA1a (the originating authorizing agent).) wherein the third processing apparatus is configured to execute processing comprising: acquiring the second biometric information; The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum-security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is is used)
acquiring, by a third node, the second biometric information; (See Sudia; (149) FIG. 14 illustrates a command 213 adding an authorizing agent. The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is is used) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.)
generating, by the third node, the second signing key and a second verification key corresponding to the second signing key; (See Sudia, figs 9 and 10; (129) 7) Signing Device 2 receives the signed document 149, strips off the header and verifies that the certificate bears the necessary number of signatures of its registered authorizing agents (in this example, two). If so, Signing Device 2 strips off the signatures of its authorizing agents and modifies the partial SWA signature to complete the SWA signature. As shown in FIG. 10, the completed SWA signature (--SWA) is determined by exponentiating the partial signature affixed by Signature Device 1 (--SD1) using Signature Device 2's SWA signature key share 95. Signing Device 2 then affixes a new header, and sends the partially signed certificate 151 to AA1a (the originating authorizing agent).)
generating, by the third node, the second parameter by composing the second signing key and the second biometric information; (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19; the second authorizing agent 171a adds a second authorizing signature and sends the (twice signed) document 179a to the signing device. The signing device 169a verifies the two authorizing signature, affixes its partial signature (--SD1) to the copy, and returns the signed copy 181a ( second parameter) to the coordinator 161. (142) After the coordinator has received all copies of the document to be signed, the coordinator multiplies together the partial signatures. The product of the three partial signatures is the system wide authority signature (--SWA). (i.e, first signature). See also fig 14 (149) FIG. 14 illustrates a command 213 adding an authorizing agent.)
generating, by the third node, the second signature for the message, using the second signing key; (See Sudia, figs 9 and 10; (129) 7) Signing Device 2 receives the signed document 149, strips off the header and verifies that the certificate bears the necessary number of signatures of its registered authorizing agents (in this example, two). If so, Signing Device 2 strips off the signatures of its authorizing agents and modifies the partial SWA signature to complete the SWA signature. As shown in FIG. 10, the completed SWA signature (--SWA) is determined by exponentiating the partial signature affixed by Signature Device 1 (--SD1) using Signature Device 2's SWA signature key share 95. Signing Device 2 then affixes a new header, and sends the partially signed certificate 151 to AA1a (the originating authorizing agent).)
and transmitting, by the third node, the message, the second parameter, and the second signature to the first node. (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19, fig 6s 6, 9 and 10; (142) After the coordinator has received all copies of the document to be signed ( i.e, first parameter, second parameter and second signature), the coordinator multiplies together the partial signatures. The product of the partial signatures is the system wide authority signature (--SWA). (i.e, first signature) ))
Claims 8 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C 103 as being unpatentable over Sudia, US 5825880 in view of TAKAHASHI, US 20160094348 A1 in view of PETKOVIC, WO 2012025866 A1.
8. The combination of Sudia and TAKAHASHI discloses the digital signature system according to claim 1, wherein the first processing apparatus is configured to execute processing comprising: computing a difference between the first signing key and the second signing key, using the first parameter and the second parameter; (See TAKAHASHI; [0049] Further, according to the present embodiment, the signature verification device can calculate the differential secret key KSd=KSe−KSs (if the user is the same person), but it is difficult to specify the secret key KSe and/or the one-time secret key KSs from the differential secret key KSd=KSe−KSs, and thus it is difficult to forge the digital signature and recover the registration feature data X and/or the digital signature feature data X′.)
The combination of Sudia and TAKAHASHI does not appear to explicitly disclose and converting the second signature with the second signing key for the message to the first signature with the first signing key for the message, by a Key homomorphic operation receiving at least the difference between the first signing key and the second signing key and the second signature with the second signing key for the message, as inputs.
However, PETKOVIC discloses and converting the second signature with the second signing key for the message to the first signature with the first signing key for the message, by a Key homomorphic operation receiving at least the difference between the first signing key and the second signing key and the second signature with the second signing key for the message, as inputs. (See PETKOVIC, section Summary: the re-signing key generator may be arranged for further generating the first signature key based on the second signature key, wherein the first signature key and the re-signing key are generated as a key pair, and the first signature key is provided to the first signature generating unit and the re-signing key is provided to the re-signing unit. This scheme makes it possible to enable a user who does not have any key, to sign documents with the second set of attributes. A dedicated first signature key may be given to the user to prepare the first signature, which first signature may then be converted into the signature associated with the second set of attributes by the re-signature unit and re-signature key. This way, the re-signing key generator does not need to know about any existing keys in the possession of the delegatee user, because the delegatee gets a new first signature key from the re-signing key generator, which first signature key can be used in conjunction with the re-signing unit and re-signing key for signing messages on behalf of the delegator.) Sudia, TAKAHASHI and PETKOVIC are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor which is digital signature. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the invention of Sudia and TAKAHASHI with the teaching of PETKOVIC to include the re-signature because it would have allowed to provide delegation capabilities.
16. As to claim 16, the claim is rejected under the same rationale as claim 8. See the rejection of claim 8 above.
Claims 9 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C 103 as being unpatentable over Sudia, US 5825880 in view of PETKOVIC, WO 2012025866 A1.
9. Sudia discloses a signature conversion apparatus (See Sudia, abstract; A multi-step signing system and method uses multiple signing devices to affix a single signature which can be verified using a single public verification key. Each signing device possesses a share of the signature key and affixes a partial signature in response to authorization from a plurality of authorizing agents.) comprising: at least one processor; (See Sudia, col 7, lines 53-65 and fig 2; computer processor) a memory storing program instructions executable by the at least one processor; and a communication interface, wherein the at least one processor, when executing the program instructions, (See Sudia, col 7, lines 53-65 and fig 2; the message server 47 connects to the LAN/WAN 21 and provides document queuing and communications services for the signing device 39. The message server 47 includes a system log 49 that maintains an audit trail of messages and documents sent to and from the signing device. As shown, a signing device and its associated message server preferably are divided into two, physically separate computers (computer processor). Although less preferred, the signing device 39 and message server 47 could be implemented as separate tasks on a single computer in a highly secure environment.) performs processing comprising:
receiving a first parameter generated using a first signing key and first biometric information; (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19 ; (140) In this example, two authorizing agents are required to authorize their respective signing device 169a to affix its signature. The coordinator 161 sends a first copy 165a of the document to be signed, along with a routing and information header (not shown) to a first authorizing agent 167a, who affixes his signature (--AA1a) and sends the signed copy 175a (i.e, first parameter) to a second authorizing agent 171a.
(141) Two other signing devices (not shown) affix partial signatures to copies of the document to be signed and return the signed copies 181b, 181c to the coordinator. All copies may be processed in parallel. The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum-security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.)
receiving, as a signature including a parameter, a second parameter generated using a second signing key and second biometric information, and a second signature that is a digital signature generated with the second signing key for a message, together with the message; (See Sudia, col 18, lines 58-67 and col 19, lines 1-19; the second authorizing agent 171a adds a second authorizing signature and sends the (twice signed) document 179a to the signing device. The signing device 169a verifies the two authorizing signature, affixes its partial signature (--SD1) to the copy, and returns the signed copy 181a (second parameter) to the coordinator 161.
(142) After the coordinator has received all copies of the document to be signed, the coordinator multiplies together the partial signatures. The product of the three partial signatures is the system wide authority signature (--SWA). (i.e, first signature). See also fig 14 (149) FIG. 14 illustrates a command 213 adding an authorizing agent.
The additional information includes: a) the agent's name 217; b) the agent's title 219; c) the ID number 221 of the signing device for which the agent is authorized 221; d) an administrative class 225 indicating powers for which the agent is authorized; e) an expiration date 223 for the new agent's authority; f) identification codes 227 for the master key or keys which the authorizing agent may instruct the signing device to apply; g) ID code 229 of the agent's trusted device; and h) a certificate 231 with the trusted device's public signature verification key. Preferably, the pubic key of the new agent is certified 233 under the authority of the SWA signature key and the certificate is included with the command. The device certificate 231, signed by the manufacturer of the trusted device associated with the authorizing agent, also includes an assurance that the authorizing agent's private signature key is permanently confined in a smart card or other trusted device having approved minimum security properties. (Preferably, the device's minimum-security properties will also include the fact that biometric information is used to link the smart card to a physical characteristic of the human user. For example, the manufacturer might state that the card will not create its user signatures unless the user activates an attached fingerprint reader, where the matching fingerprint data is used) After receiving a properly-signed request (i.e., after SWA multi-step signing has been completed), the signing device will add the new agent's information to its internal lists of authorizing agents.)
Sudia does not appear to explicitly disclose converting the second signature to a first signature using the first parameter and the second parameter, the first signature being a signature for the message that is able to be verified using a first verification key corresponding to the first signing key;
and transmitting the first signature, as a signature not including a parameter that depends on biometric information, to a node that verifies the first signature using the first verification key.
However, PETKOVIC discloses converting the second signature to a first signature using the first parameter and the second parameter, the first signature being a signature for the message that is able to be verified using a first verification key corresponding to the first signing key; (See PETKOVIC, section Summary: the re-signing key generator may be arranged for further generating the first signature key based on the second signature key, wherein the first signature key and the re-signing key are generated as a key pair, and the first signature key is provided to the first signature generating unit and the re-signing key is provided to the re-signing unit. This scheme makes it possible to enable a user who does not have any key, to sign documents with the second set of attributes. A dedicated first signature key may be given to the user to prepare the first signature, which first signature may then be converted into the signature associated with the second set of attributes by the re-signature unit and re-signature key. This way, the re-signing key generator does not need to know about any existing keys in the possession of the delegatee user, because the delegatee gets a new first signature key from the re-signing key generator, which first signature key can be used in conjunction with the re-signing unit and re-signing key for signing messages on behalf of the delegator.)
and transmitting the first signature, as a signature not including a parameter that depends on biometric information, to a node that verifies the first signature using the first verification key. (See PETKOVIC, section: DETAILED DESCRIPTION and Fig. 2: the first signature is transmitted to the re-signing unit for conversion. In step 207, the re-signing unit receives the first signature and identifies the re-signature key in its storage means, e.g. by means of a database look-up. The re-signing unit further may verify whether the first signature and the re-signing key match, i.e., whether the first signature is allowed to be converted into the second signature using the re-signing key and also verifies the first signature to make sure that is a well- formed (or constructed) signature.)
Sudia and PETKOVIC are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor which is digital signature. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the invention of Sudia with the teaching of PETKOVIC to include the re-signature because it would have allowed to provide delegation capabilities.
17. As to claim 17, the claim is rejected under the same rationale as claim 9. See the rejection of claim 9 above.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
Lepeshenkov, US 9485098, title “ System And Method Of User Authentication Using Digital Signatures. “
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Date: 1/20/2026
/JOSNEL JEUDY/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2438