DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
1. The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Application
2 This instant Office Action is in response to Original Filing filed on 8/24/24.
3. This Office Action is made Non-Final.
4. Claims 1-20 are pending.
Information Disclosure Statement
5. The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on 12/31/24 and 6/2/25 are in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
1. Claims 1-5, 7-9, and 13-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Rajendran et al. US 20220060901 hereafter Rajendran.
As to Claim 1. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses a cell [i.e. Base Station/eNB/neighbor/cells] handover [i.e. Roaming/Attaching/Handover or Cell Re-selection] method comprising [Abstract, Section 0025: Embodiments herein disclose a method and base station for preventing a User Equipment (UE) from attaching to a false base station. Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable]:
receiving, by an apparatus [i.e. User Equipment-UE], a physical layer parameter for a candidate cell [i.e. Target/Neighbor] and system information [i.e. SI/SIB, Section 0002: System information is divided into MIB and a number of System Information Blocks (SIBs) that includes parameters and a UE acquires system information from a camped cell (i.e. source BS)] for the candidate cell, wherein the system information comprises an identifier of the candidate cell [Fig. 1A (Depicts gNB sends SIB-step1 to UE, Depicts table showing SIB includes Physical Cell ID (identifier)-1, Neighbor Cell Info-3 &4, Cell re-selection info-8), Sections 0005, 0176, 0214: The gNB broadcasts the SIB (system information, see 0002) to the UEs in the cell. The C parameter used in order to provide and support privacy issues for the gNBs and the UEs during handover and before handover procedure is initiated, the C parameter negotiated between the gNBs and the UEs. The source gNB's Access Control List have the UE specific C parameter associated with Cell Id of the target gNB (i.e. candidate cell)];
measuring, by the apparatus [i.e. User Equipment-UE], a signal strength of the candidate cell based on the physical layer parameter, to obtain a measurement result [Sections 0002, 0048, 0114, 0298: Background: the UE performs the signal power (i.e. signal strength) measurement of neighboring cells (i.e. candidate cells) based on Signal Block which carries the MIB (i.e. includes SIB). The method includes determining a power (i.e. signal strength) threshold and a minimum lifetime duration associated with neighboring BSCs (base stations). Sending a measurement command message including the UE specific parameter to the UE. On receiving SIBs from the gNB, the UE logs the Measurement Report based on the SIB and sends the measurement report to the gNB];
and sending, by the apparatus [i.e. User Equipment-UE], a measurement report to an access network device [Sections 0298, 0087: On receiving SIBs from the gNB, the UE logs the Measurement Report based on the SIB and sends the measurement report with a unique encrypted token to the gNB (i.e. access network device). According to the measurement report, the source gNB sends Handover request to the target gNB which has the highest signal strength],
wherein the measurement report [Section 0167: The UE receive system information and send the Measurement Report to source gNB] comprises the measurement result and one or both of the following information: signature obtaining indication information and signature check [i.e. Verify/Determining Valid or Fake/False] result indication information, wherein the signature obtaining indication information indicates whether or not the system information carries a signature, the signature check result indication information indicates whether signature check succeeds or fails, and the signature is used to verify whether the system information is forged or tampered with [Fig. 2A, Fig. 2C (HO request based on MR (measurement Report) which is logged based on tampered SIB-Step 3), Fig. 16, Sections 0026-0027, 0041, 0250, 0298: The UE or the genuine base station can determines that a particular base station is fake (i.e. forged). System information verification using digital signatures, the UEs can obtain the keys and verify their authenticity; and the UE can verify the authenticity of those downlink signaling messages for this helps prevents a false network from spoofing those messages. The message has a signature that the UE can verify using a Network Node Public Key. The UE verifies the C parameter list sent by the gNB, on successful verification UE sends response to the gNB. On receiving SIBs from the gNB, the UE logs the Measurement Report based on the SIB and sends the measurement report with a unique encrypted token to the gNB (i.e. access network device)].
As to Claim 2. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses the cell handover method according to claim 1 [Section 0025: Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable],
wherein the method further comprises in a case in which the system information carries the signature, checking [i.e. Verify/Determining Valid or Fake/False], by the apparatus, the signature [Figs. 2A, Sections 0027, 0041: System information verification using digital signatures, the UEs can obtain the keys and verify their authenticity; and the UE can verify the authenticity of those downlink signaling message. The message has a signature that the UE can verify using a Network Node Public Key].
As to Claim 3. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses the cell handover method according to claim 2 [Section 0025: Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable]:
in a case in which the signature check [i.e. Verify/Determining Valid or Fake/False] succeeds, the measurement report comprises the measurement result and the signature check result indication information, and the signature check result indication information indicates that the signature check succeeds [Figs. 2A, Fig. 16, Sections 0027, 0167, 0250: System information verification using digital signatures, the UEs can obtain the keys and verify their authenticity; and the UE can verify the authenticity of those downlink signaling message. The UE receive system information and send the Measurement Report to source gNB. The UE verifies the C parameter list sent by the gNB, on successful verification UE sends response to the gNB].
As to Claim 4. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses the cell handover method according to claim 2 [Section 0025: Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable], in a case in which the signature check fails, the measurement report comprises the measurement result and the signature check result indication information, and the signature check result indication information indicates that the signature check fails [Figs. 2A, Fig. 2C (HO request based on MR (measurement Report) which is logged by UE based on tampered SIB-Step 3), Sections 0153, 0161, 0167: In an embodiment, the negotiating the UE specific Challenge Parameter with the UE includes: further, in response to determining that the negotiation is unsuccessful considering the target base station as a fake base station. The proposed method verify base station’s legitimacy by UE and ensure/check system information block (SIB) has been tampered. The UE receive system information and send the Measurement Report to source gNB].
As to Claim 5. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses the cell handover method according to claim 3[Section 0025: Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable]:
wherein the measurement report [Section 0167: The UE receive system information and send the Measurement Report to source gNB] further comprises the signature obtaining indication information, and the signature obtaining indication information indicates that the system information carries the signature [Figs. 2A, Fig. 16, Sections 0027, 0041, 0167: System information verification using digital signatures, the UEs can obtain the keys and verify their authenticity; and the UE can verify the authenticity of those downlink signaling message. The message has a signature that the UE can verify using a Network Node Public Key. The UE receive system information and send the Measurement Report to source gNB].
As to Claim 7. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses the cell handover method according to claim 1 [Section 0025: Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable]:
wherein the method further comprises: receiving, by the apparatus, signature check indication information from the access network device, wherein the signature check indication information indicates any one of the following: that the apparatus is to check the signature carried in the received system information; that the apparatus is to report a signature check result to the access network device; that the access network device supports determining a cell handover policy based on a signature check result; or that the access network device has been upgraded [Fig. 2A, Sections 0027, 0041, 0161, 0290: System information verification using digital signatures, the UEs can obtain the keys and verify their authenticity. The message has a signature that the UE can verify using a Network Node Public Key. The proposed method verify base station’s legitimacy by UE and ensure/check system information block (SIB) has been tampered. Every gNB generates a unique secure token for each broadcasted System Information Block (SIB encrypted using the Network Key].
As to Claim 8. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses the cell handover method according to claim 7[Section 0025: Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable],
wherein the method further comprises: checking, by the apparatus based on the signature check indication information, whether the system information carries the signature [Figs. 2A, Sections 0027, 0041: System information verification using digital signatures, the UEs can obtain the keys and verify their authenticity; and the UE can verify the authenticity of those downlink signaling message. The message has a signature that the UE can verify using a Network Node Public Key].
As to Claim 9. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses a cell [i.e. Base Station/eNB/neighbor/cells] handover [i.e. Roaming/Attaching/Handover or Cell Re-selection] method comprising [Abstract, Section 0025: Embodiments herein disclose a method and base station for preventing a User Equipment (UE) from attaching to a false base station. Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable]:
receiving, by an access network device [i.e. Base Station/eNB], a measurement report for a candidate cell from a terminal device [Fig. 1A (Depicts gNB sends SIB-step1 to UE, Depicts table showing SIB includes Physical Cell ID (identifier)-1, Neighbor Cell Info-3 &4, Cell re-selection info-8), Sections 0002, 0298: Background: the UE performs the signal power (i.e. signal strength) measurement of neighboring cells (i.e. candidate cells) based on Signal Block which carries the MIB (i.e. includes SIB). On receiving SIBs from the gNB, the UE sends the measurement report to the gNB],
wherein the measurement report [Section 0167: The UE receive system information and send the Measurement Report to source gNB] comprises a measurement result of a signal strength of the candidate cell and one or both of the following information: signature obtaining indication information and signature check [i.e. Verify/Determining Valid or Fake/False] result indication information, wherein the signature obtaining indication information indicates whether or not system information for the candidate cell carries a signature, the signature check result indication information indicates whether signature check succeeds or fails, and the signature is used to verify whether the system information for the candidate cell is forged or tampered with [Fig. 2A, Fig. 2C (HO request based on MR (measurement Report) which is logged based on tampered SIB-Step 3), Fig. 16, Sections 0026-0027, 0041, 0250, 0298: The UE or the genuine base station can determines that a particular base station is fake (i.e. forged). System information verification using digital signatures, the UEs can obtain the keys and verify their authenticity; and the UE can verify the authenticity of those downlink signaling messages for this helps prevents a false network from spoofing those messages. The message has a signature that the UE can verify using a Network Node Public Key. The UE verifies the C parameter list sent by the gNB, on successful verification UE sends response to the gNB. On receiving SIBs from the gNB, the UE logs the Measurement Report based on the SIB and sends the measurement report with a unique encrypted token to the gNB (i.e. access network device)];
and determining, by the access network device based on the measurement report for the candidate cell, whether to hand over the terminal device from a serving cell to the candidate cell [Sections 0298, 0087: On receiving SIBs from the gNB, the UE logs the Measurement Report based on the SIB and sends the measurement report with a unique encrypted token to the gNB (i.e. access network device). According to the measurement report, the source gNB sends Handover request to the target gNB (i.e. candidate cell)].
As to Claim 13. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses the cell handover method according to claim 9 [Section 0025: Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable], in a case in which the measurement report comprises the measurement result and the signature check result indication information, the determining, by the access network device based on the measurement report for the candidate cell, of whether to hand over the terminal device from a serving cell to the candidate cell comprises [Sections 0005, 0041, 0167: The gNB broadcasts the SIB (system information, see 0002) to the UEs in the cell. The message has a signature that the UE can verify using a Network Node Public Key. The UE receive system information and send the Measurement Report to source gNB]
in a case in which the signature check result indication information indicates that the signature check of the candidate cell succeeds, and the measurement result of the candidate cell meets the handover condition, determining, by the access network device, to hand over the terminal device from the serving cell to the candidate cell [Figs. 2A, Fig. 16, Sections 0027, 0087, 0167, 0250: System information verification using digital signatures, the UEs can obtain the keys and verify their authenticity; and the UE can verify the authenticity of those downlink signaling message. According to the measurement report, the source gNB sends Handover request to the target gNB (i.e. candidate cell. The UE receive system information and send the Measurement Report to source gNB. The UE verifies the C parameter list sent by the gNB, on successful verification UE sends response to the gNB].
As to Claim 14. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses the cell handover method according to claim 9, wherein the method further comprises [Section 0025: Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable]:
sending, by the access network device, signature check indication information to the terminal device, wherein the signature check indication information indicates any one of the following: the terminal device to check the signature carried in the received system information; the terminal device to report a signature check result to the access network device; that the access network device supports determining a handover policy for the candidate cell based the signature check result; or that the access network device has been upgraded [Figs. 2A, Fig. 16, Sections 0027, 0167, 0250: System information verification using digital signatures, the UEs can obtain the keys and verify their authenticity; and the UE can verify the authenticity of those downlink signaling message. The UE receive system information and send the Measurement Report to source gNB. The UE verifies the C parameter list sent by the gNB, on successful verification UE sends response to the gNB].
As to Claim 15. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses a communication apparatus [i.e. User Equipment-UE], comprising at least one processor [Controller-14] coupled to at least one memory [Memory-15] storing instructions and configured to execute the instructions to cause the apparatus to at least be configured to [Fig. 17, Section 0307: FIG. 17 illustrating the main components of a UE and have combination of hardware, software and firmware, as appropriate; Software installed in a memory-15; controller 14 controls the operation of the UE in accordance with software stored in the memory; controller-14 may be realized by Central Processing Unit (CPU)]:
receive a physical layer parameter for a candidate cell and system information for the candidate cell, wherein the system information comprises an identifier of the candidate cell [Fig. 1A (Depicts gNB sends SIB-step1 to UE, Depicts table showing SIB includes Physical Cell ID (identifier)-1, Neighbor Cell Info-3 &4, Cell re-selection info-8), Sections 0005, 0176, 0214: The gNB broadcasts the SIB (system information, see 0002) to the UEs in the cell. The C parameter used in order to provide and support privacy issues for the gNBs and the UEs during handover and before handover procedure is initiated, the C parameter negotiated between the gNBs and the UEs. The source gNB's Access Control List have the UE specific C parameter associated with Cell Id of the target gNB (i.e. candidate cell)];
measure a signal strength of the candidate cell based on the physical layer parameter, to obtain a measurement result [Sections 0002, 0048, 0114, 0298: Background: the UE performs the signal power (i.e. signal strength) measurement of neighboring cells (i.e. candidate cells) based on Signal Block which carries the MIB (i.e. includes SIB). The method includes determining a power (i.e. signal strength) threshold and a minimum lifetime duration associated with neighboring BSCs (base stations). Sending a measurement command message including the UE specific parameter to the UE. On receiving SIBs from the gNB, the UE logs the Measurement Report based on the SIB and sends the measurement report to the gNB];
and send a measurement report to an access network device [Sections 0298, 0087: On receiving SIBs from the gNB, the UE logs the Measurement Report based on the SIB and sends the measurement report with a unique encrypted token to the gNB (i.e. access network device). According to the measurement report, the source gNB sends Handover request to the target gNB which has the highest signal strength],
wherein the measurement report [Section 0167: The UE receive system information and send the Measurement Report to source gNB] comprises the measurement result and one or both of the following information: signature obtaining indication information and signature check [i.e. Verify/Determining Valid or Fake/False]result indication information, wherein the signature obtaining indication information indicates whether or not the system information carries a signature, the signature check result indication information indicates whether signature check succeeds or fails, and the signature is used to verify whether the system information is forged or tampered with [Fig. 2A, Fig. 2C (HO request based on MR (measurement Report) which is logged based on tampered SIB-Step 3), Fig. 16, Sections 0026-0027, 0041, 0250, 0298: The UE or the genuine base station can determines that a particular base station is fake (i.e. forged). System information verification using digital signatures, the UEs can obtain the keys and verify their authenticity; and the UE can verify the authenticity of those downlink signaling messages for this helps prevents a false network from spoofing those messages. The message has a signature that the UE can verify using a Network Node Public Key. The UE verifies the C parameter list sent by the gNB, on successful verification UE sends response to the gNB. On receiving SIBs from the gNB, the UE logs the Measurement Report based on the SIB and sends the measurement report with a unique encrypted token to the gNB (i.e. access network device)].
As to Claim 16. (Currently Amended) The communication apparatus according to claim 15, wherein the instructions further cause the apparatus to be further configured to: when the system information carries the signature, check the signature [See Claim 2 and Fig. 17 because both claims have similar subject matter therefore similar rejection applies herein].
As to Claim 17. (Currently Amended) The communication apparatus according to claim 16, wherein when the signature check succeeds, the measurement report comprises the measurement result and the signature check result indication information, and the signature check result indication information indicates that the signature check succeeds [See Claim 3 because both claims have similar subject matter therefore similar rejection applies herein].
As to Claim 18. (Currently Amended) The communication apparatus according to claim 16, wherein when the signature check fails, the measurement report comprises the measurement result and the signature check result indication information, and the signature check result indication information indicates that the signature check fails. [See Claim 4 because both claims have similar subject matter therefore similar rejection applies herein].
As to Claim 19. (Currently Amended) The communication apparatus according to claim 17, wherein the measurement report further comprises the signature obtaining indication information, and the signature obtaining indication information indicates that the system information carries the signature [See Claim 5 because both claims have similar subject matter therefore similar rejection applies herein].
As to Claim 20. (Currently Amended) The communication apparatus according to claim 15, the instructions further cause the apparatus to be further configured to: receive signature check indication information from the access network device, wherein the signature check indication information indicates any one of the following: to check the signature carried in the received system information; to report a signature check result to the access network device; that the access network device supports determining a cell handover policy based on the signature check result; or that the access network device has been upgraded [See Claim 7 and Fig. 17 because both claims have similar subject matter therefore similar rejection applies herein].
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
2. Claims 6, 10-12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over
Rajendran et al. US 20220060901 hereafter Rajendran in view of Da Silva et al. US 20220272539 hereafter DaSilva.
As to Claim 6. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses the cell handover method according to claim 1 [Section 0025, 0027, 0167: Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable. System information verification using digital signatures, the UEs can obtain the keys and verify their authenticity. The UE receive system information and send the Measurement Report to source gNB]:
Rajendran does not explicitly state in a case in which the system information does not carry the signature, the measurement report comprises the measurement result and the signature obtaining indication information, and the signature obtaining indication information indicates that the system information does not carry the signature.
However, DaSilva teaches in a case in which the system information does not carry the signature, the measurement report comprises the measurement result and the signature obtaining indication information, and the signature obtaining indication information indicates that the system information does not carry the signature [Fig. 6 (Depicts UE Measurement Report sent to Access Node-601), Sections 0083, 0174, 0200: The access node obtains information associated to the occurrence of a SI signature verification failure from the UE. The UE receive the request to report the failure with an indication for this specific report, e.g. SI signature verification failure report. Fields acquired by the UE of the cell for which report CGI procedure was requested by the network in case SIB1 was not broadcast by the cell].
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one skilled int eh art before the effective filing date of the invention to have combined the methods of Rajendran relating to UE checking SI/SIB (system information) for signatures or key to verify authenticity or determine if fake/false and send measurement report or report to the base station/network node with the teaching of DaSilva relating to the access node/base station obtains report from UE that includes filed pertaining to the SIB or signature was not received and/or the SI signature failed. By combining the methods/systems the UE can send an indication information to the source base station/network node relating to signature verification which includes pass, fail, and missing in the measurement report thereby enabling the base station/access node to take counter measures as suggested by DaSilva.
As to Claim 10. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses the cell handover method according to claim 9 [Section 0025: Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable], wherein in a case in which the measurement report comprises the measurement result and the signature obtaining indication information, the determining, by the access network device based on the measurement report for the candidate cell, of whether to hand over the terminal device from a serving cell to the candidate cell comprises [Sections 0041, 0167, 0217-0218: The message has a signature that the UE can verify using a Network Node Public Key. The UE receive system information and send the Measurement Report to source gNB. If the correlation is successful, the source gNB sends the Handover request to the target gNB (i.e. candidate cell) along with the security context. If the correlation is successful, the handover request is sent by the source gNB to the target gNB with the security context, ciphering and integrity technique used]:
and the measurement result of the candidate cell meets a handover condition, determining, by the access network device, to hand over the terminal device from the serving cell to the candidate cell [Sections 0003, 0169: A source gNB (access network device) receives the measurement report from the UE and according to the measurement report, sends a handover request to the target gNB (i.e. candidate cell) which has the highest signal strength (i.e. a handover condition). The source gNB checks for the correlation associated with the Cell ID and other target gNB related information and if successful, the source gNB will send Handover request to the target gNB and the Handover procedure proceeds]
Rajendran does not explicitly state determining, by the access network device, whether the signature obtaining indication information matches signing capability information of the candidate cell, wherein the signing capability information indicates whether the candidate cell supports signing the system information; and in a case in which the signature obtaining indication information matches the signing capability information,
However, DaSilva teaches determining, by the access network device [i.e. Base Station/eNB], whether the signature obtaining indication information matches signing capability information of the candidate cell, wherein the signing capability information indicates whether the candidate cell supports signing the system information; and in a case in which the signature obtaining indication information matches the signing capability information [Sections 0030, 0069, 0079, 0301: Determine proper SU capabilities, it shall send SI information to the UE. The access node detect a potential failure in the security framework for the SI signatures and identify fake access node based on measurements on fake access nodes (i.e. candidate cells). Note that a SI signature may be considered invalid when the SI signature does not match the expected SI signature calculated using the public key and referred to as an integrity protection failure. Consider the cell detected associated measObject with physical cell identity matching the value of the cellForWhichToReportCGI included in the corresponding reportConfig to be applicable, except if the SI signature verification has failed].
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one skilled int eh art before the effective filing date of the invention to have combined the methods of Rajendran relating to a source gNB (access network device) receives the measurement report from the UE checks for the correlation associated with the Cell ID and other target gNB related information along with the security context and if successful, the source gNB will send Handover request to the target gNB and the Handover procedure proceeds with the teaching of DaSilva relating to the access node/base station checks cell ID matching values corresponding to the report including SI signatures and capacity/capabilities and if not match determine the candidate cell/target node to be fake and if match determine to be genuine. By combining the methods/systems the Base Station/Access Node determine based on multiple information and checking/matching data whether a neighbor/target cell/BS referred to as candidate cell to be fake or genuine as suggested by both Rajendran and DaSilva.
As to Claim 11. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses the cell handover method according to claim 10[Section 0025: Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable],
Rajendran does not explicitly state wherein the determining, by the access network device, of whether the signature obtaining indication information matches signing capability information of the candidate cell comprises one or more of the following cases: in a case in which the signature obtaining indication information indicates that the system information carries the signature, and the signing capability information indicates that the candidate cell supports signing the system information, determining, by the access network device, that the signature obtaining indication information matches the signing capability information of the candidate cell; in a case in which the signature obtaining indication information indicates that the system information does not carry the signature, and the signing capability information indicates that the candidate cell docs not support signing the system information, determining, by the access network device, that the signature obtaining indication information matches the signing capability information of the candidate cell; in a case in which the signature obtaining indication information indicates that the system information carries the signature, but the signing capability information indicates that the candidate cell does not support signing the system information, determining, by the access network device, that the signature obtaining indication information does not match the signing capability information of the candidate cell; or in a case in which the signature obtaining indication information indicates that the system information does not carry the signature, but the signing capability information indicates that the candidate cell supports signing the system information, determining, by the access network device, that the signature obtaining indication information does not match the signing capability information of the candidate cell.
However, DaSilva teaches wherein the determining, by the access network device, of whether the signature obtaining indication information matches signing capability information of the candidate cell comprises one or more of the following cases: in a case in which the signature obtaining indication information indicates that the system information carries the signature, and the signing capability information indicates that the candidate cell supports signing the system information, determining, by the access network device, that the signature obtaining indication information matches the signing capability information of the candidate cell; in a case in which the signature obtaining indication information indicates that the system information does not carry the signature, and the signing capability information indicates that the candidate cell docs not support signing the system information, determining, by the access network device, that the signature obtaining indication information matches the signing capability information of the candidate cell; in a case in which the signature obtaining indication information indicates that the system information carries the signature, but the signing capability information indicates that the candidate cell does not support signing the system information, determining, by the access network device, that the signature obtaining indication information does not match the signing capability information of the candidate cell; or in a case in which the signature obtaining indication information indicates that the system information does not carry the signature, but the signing capability information indicates that the candidate cell supports signing the system information, determining, by the access network device, that the signature obtaining indication information does not match the signing capability information of the candidate cell [Sections 0030, 0069, 0079, 0301: Determine proper SU capabilities, it shall send SI information to the UE. The access node detect a potential failure in the security framework for the SI signatures and identify fake access node based on measurements on fake access nodes (i.e. candidate cells). Note that a SI signature may be considered invalid when the SI signature does not match the expected SI signature calculated using the public key and referred to as an integrity protection failure. Consider the cell detected associated measObject with physical cell identity matching the value of the cellForWhichToReportCGI included in the corresponding reportConfig to be applicable, except if the SI signature verification has failed].
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one skilled int eh art before the effective filing date of the invention to have combined the methods of Rajendran relating to a source gNB (access network device) receives the measurement report from the UE checks for the correlation associated with the Cell ID and other target gNB related information along with the security context and if successful, the source gNB will send Handover request to the target gNB and the Handover procedure proceeds with the teaching of DaSilva relating to the access node/base station checks cell ID matching values corresponding to the report including SI signatures and capacity/capabilities and if not match determine the candidate cell/target node to be fake and if match determine to be genuine. By combining the methods/systems the Base Station/Access Node determine based on multiple information and checking/matching data whether a neighbor/target cell/BS referred to as candidate cell to be fake or genuine as suggested by both Rajendran and DaSilva.
As to Claim 12. (Currently Amended) Rajendran discloses The cell handover method according to claim 10 [Section 0025: Therefore, a first problem to solve is proper verification of the base station before handover and unprotected SIBs, for if the UE gets attached to a false base station, the UE may be provided downgraded services or become vulnerable],
wherein the method further comprises: obtaining, by the access network device, the signing capability information of the candidate cell by using local configuration information; or sending, by the access network device, a request message to a network management system wherein the request message comprises an identifier of the candidate cell, and the request message is used to request to obtain the signing capability information corresponding to the candidate cell; and receiving, by the access network device, a response message from the network management system, wherein the response message comprises the signing capability information [Fig. 19, Sections 0051, 0157, 0311: Further, methods, apparatuses and a program for fake base station detection with core network (i.e. network management system) support and it is proposed to use core network support to increase the reliability of the detection, gets connection and context information from the core network from a network service. In an embodiment, the when the source base station receives the negotiation response associated with at least one of a target cell identifier, a neighboring cell list, and a mobility information. The core network node, provides mobility management and registration management in the network; provides anchor key in the network include authentication credential Repository and Processing Functions and operable to transmit signals to and to receive signals from other nodes using appropriately formatted signaling messages relating to the procedures described herein].
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure: Kolekar et al. US 20210235264.
Furthermore, each additional prior arts cited on PTO-892 but not applied in rejection contains a disclosed description related to the claimed subject matter found either in the Figures, description summary and/or disclosure.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JAEL M ULYSSE whose telephone number is (571)272-1228. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday 9am-5pm.
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July 9, 2026
/JAEL M ULYSSE/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2477
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