DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The Office Action is in response to an AMENDMENT entered 12/3/2025.
Status of Claims
Claims 1-16 are pending.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with this application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement.
Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).
Claims 1, 6-9 and 14-16 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1 and 12-15 of conflicting Patent No. 10,791,353 B2 in view of US Patent No. 10,956,945 B1 to Lewis in view of US Pub. No. 20170279757 A1 to Kereth
Claims 1, 6-9 and 14-16 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1 and 12-15 of conflicting Patent No. 11,388,462 B2 in view of US Patent No. 10,956,945 B1 to Lewis in view of US Pub. No. 20170279757 A1 to Kereth
Table 1 illustrates the conflicting claim pairs:
Conflicting Patent No. 10,791,353 B2
1 and 15
12
13
14
1 and 15
Conflicting Patent No. 11,388,462 B2
1 and 15
12
13
14
1 and 15
Pending Application 18/817127
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Conflicting Patent No. 10,791,353 B2
12
13
14
Conflicting Patent No. 11,388,462 B2
12
13
14
Pending Application 18/817127
11
12
13
14
15
16
Table 2 illustrates a mapping between the limitations claims 1 and 9 of the pending application and claims 1 and 15 of the conflicting Patent No. 10,791,353 B2 and 11,388,462 B2. Additionally, the dependent claims are analyzed similarly.
Conflicting Patent No. 10,791,353 B2
Claims 1 and 15 of Conflicting Application
Serial Number (18/817127)
Claim 1 of Pending Application
1. A method, comprising:
buffering a live stream broadcast in a cloud system;
processing, in the cloud system, the buffered live stream broadcast with one or more special purpose hardware processors configured with a machine learning algorithm for detecting a policy violation;
for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in the buffered live stream broadcast, causing the buffered live stream broadcast to be modified;
wherein transmission of the live stream broadcast is continued while causing the buffered live stream broadcast to be modified, wherein a portion of the transmission of the live stream broadcast corresponding to the modified buffered live stream broadcast is modified;
wherein, for the causing the buffered live stream broadcast to be modified exceeding a threshold period of time;
ending the processing on the buffered live stream;
transmitting the buffered live stream without modification to client devices; and
flagging the buffered live stream for review.
15. The method of claim 1, wherein the causing the live stream broadcast to be modified comprises demonetizing the live stream broadcast.
1. A video publishing method, comprising:
publishing a video for public access;
processing the publicly accessible published video with an algorithm configured to detect a policy violation, the policy violation comprising audio keywords or visual depictions indicated as a policy violation; and
for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time, setting a status of the video as being demonetized while maintaining the published video as publicly accessible.
As Table 2 clearly illustrates, the only limitation not taught by claims 1 and 15 of the conflicting patent No. 10,791,353 B2 and 11,388,462 B2 is:
for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time, setting a status of the video as being demonetized while maintaining the published video as publicly accessible
Lewis discloses for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video, setting a status of the video as being demonetized while maintaining the published video as publicly accessible (Lewis Fig. 1, 2, 4, col. 6 lines 17-col. 7 lines 10, col. 9, lines 15-29, excluding revenue by the uploading user while allowing the uploaded video to be available for viewing for video the uploading user does not have the rights to).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify conflicting patent No. 10,791,353 B2 and 11,388,462 B2 by for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time as disclosed by Lewis. The suggestion/motivation would have been in order to prevent uploaders who do not have the rights to the video from receiving revenue providing protection to the rightful owners.
Conflicting patent No. 10,791,353 B2 and 11,388,462 B2 and Lewis do not expressly disclose for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time
Kereth discloses for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time (Kereth ¶0034, 0039, copyright/infringing violation if the content is more than a threshold amount of time e.g. 30 seconds).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify conflicting patent No. 10,791,353 B2 and 11,388,462 B2 and Lewis by for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time as disclosed by Kereth. The suggestion/motivation would have been in order to identify copyright/infringing content using a threshold amount of time increasing the accuracy of content that determined to be potentially infringing copyrighted content.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1, 2, 9 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US Patent No. 10,956,945 B1 to Lewis in view of US Pub. No. 20170279757 A1 to Kereth.
As to claims 1 and 9, Lewis discloses a video publishing method, comprising:
publishing a video for public access (Lewis Fig. 1, 2, 4, col. 2 lines 65-col. 3 lines 15, col. 3 lines 27-67, col. 4 lines 10-24, uploading video for access by users of the system, e.g. Youtube);
processing the publicly accessible published video with an algorithm configured to detect a policy violation, the policy violation comprising audio keywords or visual depictions indicated as a policy violation (Lewis Fig. 1, 2, 4, col. 6 lines 17-col. 7 lines 10, analyzing the uploaded video with an analysis module to detect policy violation such as the rights of the video content, the policy rights having audio and video); and
for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video, setting a status of the video as being demonetized while maintaining the published video as publicly accessible (Lewis Fig. 1, 2, 4, col. 6 lines 17-col. 7 lines 10, col. 9, lines 15-29, excluding revenue by the uploading user while allowing the uploaded video to be available for viewing for video the uploading user does not have the rights to).
Lewis does not expressly disclose for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time.
Kereth discloses for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time (Kereth ¶0034, 0039, copyright/infringing violation if the content is more than a threshold amount of time e.g. 30 seconds).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Lewis by for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time as disclosed by Kereth. The suggestion/motivation would have been in order to identify copyright/infringing content using a threshold amount of time increasing the accuracy of content that determined to be potentially infringing copyrighted content.
As to claims 2 and 10, Lewis discloses wherein the publicly accessible published video is maintained as unmodified (Lewis Fig. 1, 2, 4, col. 6 lines 17-col. 7 lines 10, col. 9, lines 15-29, storing the uploaded video at the video database for users/viewers access e.g. Youtube)
Claims 3, 4, 11, 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US Patent No. 10,956,945 B1 to Lewis in view of US Pub. No. 20170279757 A1 to Kereth and in further view of US Patent No. 9,621,953 B1 to Holcomb.
As to claims 3 and 11, Lewis and Kereth do not expressly disclose wherein the policy violation comprises audio keywords or visual depictions of swear words.
Holcomb discloses wherein the policy violation comprises audio keywords or visual depictions of swear words (Holcomb col. 39, lines 1-17, col. 42, lines 46-64, profanity).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Lewis and Kereth by wherein the policy violation comprises audio keywords or visual depictions of swear words as disclosed by Holcomb. The suggestion/motivation would have been in order prevent profanity in videos allowing appropriate videos to be viewed thereby enhancing the user’s experience.
As to claims 4 and 12, Holcomb discloses muting portions of the published video indicated as having the swear words (Holcomb col. 39, lines 1-17, col. 42, lines 46-64, muting profanity).
Claims 5 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US Patent No. 10,956,945 B1 to Lewis in view of US Pub. No. 20170279757 A1 to Kereth in further view of US Patent No. 9,621,953 B1 to Holcomb and in further view of US Pub. No. 20110161999 A1 to Klappert.
As to claims 5 and 13, Lewis, Kereth and Holcomb do not expressly disclose blurring portions of the published video indicated as having the swear words.
Klappert discloses blurring portions of the published video indicated as having the swear words (Klappert ¶0026, 0056, 0061, 0109), blur/obscuring profanity.
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Lewis, Kereth and Holcomb by blurring portions of the published video indicated as having the swear words as disclosed by Klappert. The suggestion/motivation would have been in order prevent profanity in videos allowing appropriate videos to be viewed thereby enhancing the user’s experience.
Claims 6, 7, 14 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US Patent No. 10,956,945 B1 to Lewis in view of US Pub. No. 20170279757 A1 to Kereth and in further view of US Pub. Patent No. 10,614,059 B1 to Strauss.
As to claims 6 and 14, Lewis and Kereth do not expressly disclose wherein the policy violation comprises audio keywords or visual depictions associated with nudity.
Strauss discloses wherein the policy violation comprises audio keywords or visual depictions associated with nudity (Strauss col. 5, lines 17-36, col. 8, lines 28-55, nudity).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Lewis and Kereth by wherein the policy violation comprises audio keywords or visual depictions associated with nudity as disclosed by Strauss. The suggestion/motivation would have been in order prevent nudity in videos allowing appropriate videos to be viewed thereby enhancing the user’s experience.
As to claims 7 and 15, Lewis and Kereth do not expressly disclose wherein the policy violation comprises audio keywords or visual depictions associated with hate speech.
Strauss discloses wherein the policy violation comprises audio keywords or visual depictions associated with hate speech (Strauss col. 5, lines 17-36, col. 8, lines 28-55, hate speech).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Lewis and Kereth by wherein the policy violation comprises audio keywords or visual depictions associated with hate speech as disclosed by Strauss. The suggestion/motivation would have been in order prevent hate speech in videos allowing appropriate videos to be viewed thereby enhancing the user’s experience.
Claims 8 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over US Patent No. 10,956,945 B1 to Lewis in view of US Pub. No. 20170279757 A1 to Kereth and in further view of US Pub. No. 20160350675 A1 to Laks
As to claims 8 and 16, Lewis and Kereth do not expressly disclose wherein the algorithm is a machine learning algorithm trained against a database of content flagged as having audio keywords or visual depictions indicated as a policy violation.
Laks discloses wherein the algorithm is a machine learning algorithm trained against a database of content flagged as having audio keywords or visual depictions indicated as a policy violation (Laks ¶0054-0056, 0061-0063).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Lewis and Kereth by wherein the algorithm is a machine learning algorithm trained against a database of content flagged as having audio keywords or visual depictions indicated as a policy violation as disclosed by Laks. The suggestion/motivation would have been in order to efficiently/accurately train the machine learning algorithm to identify objectionable content thereby enhancing the user’s experience.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 12/3/2025 related to claims 1-16 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
In reference to Applicant's arguments:
Claims 1, 2, 9 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lewis in view of Kereth. Office Action, page 8. Claims 3, 4, 11, 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lewis in view of Kereth and in further view of Holcomb. Office Action, page 10. Claims 5 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lewis in view of Kereth in further view of Holcomb and in further view of Klappert. Office Action, page 11. Claims 6, 7, 14 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lewis in view of Kereth and in further view of Strauss. Office Action, page 11. Claims 8 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lewis in view of Kereth and in further view of Laks. Office Action, page 13.
Claims 1 and 9, as amended, recite a video publishing method comprising publishing a video for public access, processing the publicly accessible published video with an algorithm configured to detect a policy violation comprising audio keywords or visual depictions indicated as a policy violation, and for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time, setting a status of the video as being demonetized while maintaining the published video as publicly accessible.
The Examiner has alleged that the combination of Lewis and Kereth teaches or suggests all elements of claims 1 and 9, including the limitation of setting a status of the video as being demonetized while maintaining the published video as publicly accessible for policy violations existing beyond a threshold for a specified period of time.
Applicant respectfully submits that the combination of Lewis and Kereth fails to teach or suggest the claimed invention and that the prior art actually teaches away from the claimed approach of maintaining public accessibility while applying demonetization status based on time-threshold policy violations.
Lewis teaches monetizing uploaded videos that match reference content, where “only the content owner of the reference content and the video hosting site are to share the revenue generated from the matching uploaded content, to the exclusion of the uploading user.” Lewis, Column 7, Lines 4-10. However, Lewis teaches that when a policy of allowing the uploaded video is applied, “the policy application module keeps the uploaded video in the video hosting site and may mark the uploaded video as not eligible for generating revenue.” Lewis, Column 11, Lines 57-64. This disclosure in Lewis relates to copyright matching scenarios, not policy violations detected through algorithmic analysis of content for inappropriate material as recited in the claims.
Kereth teaches that when “portions of the second live content stream that match the copyrighted content included in the first live content stream satisfy a threshold duration of time,” the system can “cause the second live content stream to be inaccessible through the social networking system.” Kereth, paragraph [0012]. Specifically, Kereth discloses that “if the broadcaster’s live content stream was determined to include infringing content for more than a threshold amount of time (e.g., 30 seconds, 30 minutes, etc.), then the content provider can automatically disable the broadcaster’s live content stream from being broadcasted through the content provider.” Kereth, paragraph [0039].
The combination of Lewis and Kereth teaches away from maintaining the published video as publicly accessible as recited by claims 1 and 9. A prima facie case of obviousness may also be rebutted by showing that the art, in any material respect, teaches away from the claimed invention. U.S. v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51-2 (1966). Lewis teaches revenue exclusion for copyright matching scenarios but does not address time-threshold determinations for policy violations. Kereth teaches disabling or making content inaccessible when threshold durations are exceeded, which is the opposite of maintaining public accessibility. The combination would suggest takedown or disabling of content rather than the claimed approach of continued public access with demonetization status changes.
Claims 2 and 10 depend from claims 1 and 9 respectively and are allowable for the same reasons, as they further specify that the publicly accessible published video is maintained as unmodified while the demonetization status is applied. Claims 3, 4, 11, and 12 depend from claims 1 and 9 respectively and are allowable for the same reasons as their respective independent claims. The addition of Holcomb does not cure the fundamental deficiency in the Lewis-Kereth combination regarding setting a status of the video as being demonetized while maintaining the published video as publicly accessible for policy violations beyond a threshold period. Claims 5 and 13 depend from claims 1 and 9 respectively and are allowable for the same reasons as their respective independent claims. The addition of Klappert’s blurring functionality does not cure the fundamental deficiency in the Lewis-Kereth combination regarding maintaining public accessibility while applying demonetization status for time-threshold policy violations. Claims 6, 7, 14 and 15 depend from claims 1 and 9 respectively and are allowable for the same reasons as their respective independent claims. The addition of Strauss teaching specific types of policy violations does not address the core deficiency in the Lewis-Kereth combination regarding setting a status of the video as being demonetized while maintaining the published video as publicly accessible for policy violations existing beyond a threshold period. Claims 8 and 16 depend from claims 1 and 9 respectively and are allowable for the same reasons as their respective independent claims. The addition of Laks teaching machine learning algorithms for detecting policy violations does not cure the fundamental deficiency in the Lewis-Kereth combination regarding maintaining public accessibility while applying demonetization status based on time-threshold determinations.
Accordingly, Applicant respectfully submits that claims 1-16 are allowable over the cited prior art and requests withdrawal of the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejections.
Examiners Response:
The examiner respectfully disagrees. Lewis and Kereth in combination do disclose for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time, setting a status of the video as being demonetized while maintaining the published video as publicly accessible.
Lewis discloses excluding revenue by the uploading user while allowing the uploaded video to be available for viewing for video the uploading user does not have the rights to (Lewis Fig. 1, 2, 4, col. 6 lines 17-col. 7 lines 10, col. 9, lines 15-29).
Kereth discloses copyright/infringing violation if the content is more than a threshold amount of time e.g. 30 seconds (Kereth ¶0034, 0039).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Lewis by for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time as disclosed by Kereth. The suggestion/motivation would have been in order to identify copyright/infringing content using a threshold amount of time increasing the accuracy of content that determined to be potentially infringing copyrighted content.
In response to applicant's argument that the references fail to show certain features of the invention, it is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., This disclosure in Lewis relates to copyright matching scenarios, not policy violations detected through algorithmic analysis of content for inappropriate material as recited in the claims) are not recited in the rejected claim(s). Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Furthermore, “the prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed….” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201, 73 USPQ2d 1141, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Labs, UT, Inc., 65 F.4th 679, 692, 2023 USPQ2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“a reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed.”).
Therefore, the applicant’s arguments are not persuasive and the examiner respectfully disagrees.
In reference to Applicant's arguments:
The Examiner has alleged that claims 1, 6-9, and 14-16 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1 and 12-15 of conflicting Patent Nos. 10,791,353 B2 and 11,388,462 B2 in view of Lewis and Kereth. Office Action, page 4. Applicant respectfully traverses the non-statutory double patenting rejections and submits that claims 1, 6-9, and 14-16 are patentably distinct from the conflicting patents for the reasons set forth below.
The combination of the conflicting patents with Lewis and Kereth fails to render the pending claims obvious because the references do not teach or suggest the specific technical approach of maintaining public accessibility of a published video while selectively demonetizing based on policy violations exceeding a threshold period. The conflicting patents teach modification of live streams during transmission, which is fundamentally different from the post-publication demonetization approach recited in the pending claims.
Claims 6-8 and 14-16 depend from claims 1 and 9 respectively and are allowable for the same reasons as their respective independent claims. Claims 6-8 further specify particular types of policy violations, while claims 14-16 recite the same limitations in the context of a non-transitory computer readable medium. These dependent claims inherit the patentable distinctions of their respective independent claims.
Accordingly, Applicant respectfully submits that claims 1, 6-9, and 14-16 are patentably distinct from the conflicting patents and requests withdrawal of the non-statutory double patenting rejections.
Examiners Response:
The examiner respectfully disagrees. The nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s).
Lewis and Kereth in combination do disclose for the processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time, setting a status of the video as being demonetized while maintaining the published video as publicly accessible as argued above in the examiner’s response. Furthermore, it would have been obvious over the prior art of Lewis and Kereth to prevent uploaders who do not have the rights to the video from receiving revenue providing protection to the rightful owners and to identify copyright/infringing content using a threshold amount of time increasing the accuracy of content that determined to be potentially infringing copyrighted content, respectively. Therefore, the combination of references of the conflicting patents with Lewis and Kereth discloses processing indicative of the policy violation existing in a video beyond a threshold for a specified period of time, setting a status of the video as being demonetized while maintaining the published video as publicly accessible. Therefore, applicant’s arguments are not persuasive and the examiner respectfully disagrees.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Claims 1-16 have been rejected.
Correspondence Information
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to KYU CHAE whose telephone number is (571)270-5696. The examiner can normally be reached on 8:00am -4:30pm.
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/KYU CHAE/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2426