Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
DETAILED ACTION
This Office Action is responsive to the Response to Election/Restriction dated 09/08/2026.
The preliminary amendment filed 07/25/2024, amended claims 3-9, 11, 14, and 17 are amended.
Claims 1-17 are pending.
Priority
This application claims the following priority:
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Specification
The disclosure is objected to because it contains an embedded hyperlink and/or other form of browser-executable code. Applicant is required to delete the embedded hyperlink and/or other form of browser-executable code; references to websites should be limited to the top-level domain name without any prefix such as http:// or other browser-executable code. See MPEP § 608.01.
See, for example, paragraph [0134] of the specification.
Election/Restrictions
Applicant’s election without traverse of Group I, the method of use, and the election of
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as the compound of Formula I in the reply filed on 09/08/2026, is acknowledged.
Claims 3-6, 8-9, 11, 13, and 16 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to a nonelected invention and subject matter, there being no allowable generic or linking claim.
Claims 1-2, 7, 10, 12, 14-15 and 17 are examined on the merits herein.
Claim Objections
Claims 1, 7, 10, 12, 14-15, and 17 are objected to because of the following informalities:
-In claim 7, last line, “the S stereochemistry” should be replaced with - -S stereochemistry- -.
-In claims 1, 10, 12, 14-15, and 17, the term “administrating” should be replaced with - -administering- -
Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(b)
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1-2, 7, 10, 12, 14-15, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
-In claims 1, 12, and 15, it is not clear why R2 and R4 are defined as two separate Markush groups. It is not clear if R2 and R4 can be any one of the members recited in the two Markush groups, or if the first R2 Markush group correlates to the first R4 Markush group and the second R2 Markush group correlates to the second R4 Markush group.
In view of compact prosecution, for the purpose of applying prior art, R2 and R4 are interpreted as being any one of the members recited in both of its Markush groups.
-In claims 1, 12, and 15, the last wherein clause of the claims, the phrase “wherein R3 may be attached to the heterocyclic moiety of the compound of Formula I at either the 4 or 5 position, and accordingly, the remaining portion of the molecule will be attached at the remaining available carbon atoms,” renders the claim indefinite. Since R3 is already attached to heterocyclic moiety of Formula I at the 5 position, it is not clear how it can be attached at either the 4 or 5 position. It is further not clear what “the remaining portion of the molecule will be attached to the remaining available carbon atom,” is referencing. It is not clear if “the remaining portion of the molecule” is referencing the heterocyclic moiety of Formula 1, R3, or another portion of Formula I, and it is not clear if “the remaining available carbon atom” is referencing a carbon on the heterocyclic moiety of Formula I, a carbon on R3, or another carbon in Formula I.
-In claims 1, 12, and 17, the second definition of R4 renders the claims indefinite. In line 5 of the second definition of R4, it is not clear if the phrase “or any C1-C6 alkyl” is part of the R4 Markush group or if it is a substituent group of “phenyl, naphthyl, furyl, thienyl, pyrrolyl.” Further, in line 6 of the second definition of R4, it is not clear if the phrase “which may be unsubstituted or substituted with R6 or with phenyl furyl, thienyl pyrrolyl” is referring solely to phenoxy or if it is referring to both C3-C8 cycloalkyl and phenoxy.
-In claims 1, 10, 12, 14, 15, and 17, it is not clear if the phrase “or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof” is in addition to the Na+, Li+, Ca+, K+ and N+(C1-6)4 recited at the R position of Formula I, or of “or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof” is referencing the Na+, Li+, Ca+, K+ and N+(C1-6) of R.
-Regarding claim 10, the phrase "such as" renders the claim indefinite because it is unclear whether the limitations following the phrase are part of the claimed invention or merely exemplary. See MPEP § 2173.05(d).
For the purpose of applying prior art, the recitation of “Alzheimer’s disease or an amyloid related imaging abnormality (ARIA)” is interpreted as exemplary and as not further limiting the claims.
All other claims not specifically recited are rejected for depending from an indefinite claim and failing to cure the deficiency.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-2, 7 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by US 2018/0153859 to Didsbury (IDS of 04/14/2025).
Regarding claims 1-2, 7, and 10, Didsbury teaches a method of treating a subject having Alzheimer’s disease comprising administering bapineuzumab or solanezumab, and
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, which meets the limitations of Formula I when R is Na+; R1-R2 and R5 are H; R3 is a C2 alkyl; R4 is phenyl substituted with R6, wherein R6 is a C1 alkoxy, X is O (pg. 124-127, claims 1, 4, 9, 14; [0347]).
Further regarding claim 7, Didsbury specifically teaches c-1’ as having S stereochemistry (pg. 125, claim 3).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102/103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 12 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) as anticipated by US 2018/0153859 to Didsbury (IDS of 04/14/2025), as evidenced by Wang (Vasogenic edema in the frontostriatal tract and the anterior limb of the internal capsule predict cognitive decline in Alzheimer disease, published 2020, PTO-892) or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. 103 as obvious over US 2018/0153859 to Didsbury (IDS of 04/14/2025) in view of Wang (Vasogenic edema in the frontostriatal tract and the anterior limb of the internal capsule predict cognitive decline in Alzheimer disease, published 2020, PTO-892).
102
Didsbury is applied as discussed above and incorporated herein.
As evidenced by Wang, vasogenic edema is a concurrent characteristic/condition of Alzheimer’s disease in Alzheimer’s patients (title, abstract).
While Didsbury does not explicitly teach the treatment of vasogenic edema, it is reasonable to assume that administering
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to Alzheimer’s patients would treat vasogenic edema since it is administered in the same dosage amount (the instant specification teaches 0.0001mg/kg-10mg/kg [096] and Didsbury teaches 0.001mg/kg-200mg/kg ([0303])) to the same population (Alzheimer’s patients) as that taught by the instant specification and claims. Thus, while the prior art does not explicitly teach these properties, burden is on Applicant to show that the prior art does not have these properties. See MPEP 2112.02, Under the principles of inherency, if a prior art device, in its normal and usual operation, would necessarily perform the method claimed, then the method claimed will be considered to be anticipated by the prior art device. When the prior art device is the same as a device described in the specification for carrying out the claimed method, it can be assumed the device will inherently perform the claimed process.
Applicants are reminded that the office does not have the facilities and resources to provide the factual evidence needed in order to establish that the product of the prior art does not possess the same material, structural and functional characteristics of the claimed product. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the burden is on the applicant to prove that the claimed product is different from those taught by the prior art and to establish patentable differences. See In re Best 562F.2d 1252, 195 USPQ 430 (CCPA 1977) and Ex parte Gray 10 USPQ 2d 1922 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).
103
Didsbury is applied as discussed above and incorporated herein.
While Disbury teaches a method of treating Alzheimer’s disease by administering a compound of instant Formula I, it differs in that it does not explicitly teach its methods as treating vasogenic edema.
Wang teaches that the frontostriatial tract and the anterior limb of the internal capsule play important roles in cognitive function and teaches that vasogenic edema in these areas predict cognitive decline in Alzheimer disease (title, abstract).
Thus, Wang teaches vasogenic edema as a concurrent symptom of or characteristic of Alzheimer’s disease.
As such, an ordinary skilled artisan, prior to the effective filing date of the instantly claimed invention, would have reasonably expected the methods of Didsbury which teaches administering
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to Alzheimer’s patients, to also treat vasogenic edema, since Wang teaches vasogenic edema as a characteristic/co-symptom of Alzheimer’s disease. Thus, since Didsbury teaches administering the same compound in the same dosage amounts (the instant specification teaches 0.0001mg/kg-10mg/kg [096] and Didsbury teaches 0.001mg/kg-200mg/kg ([0303])), to the same patient population, an ordinary skilled artisan would reasonably expect the methods of Didsbury to treat vasogenic edema, a symptom/co-symptom of Alzheimer’s disease.
Applicants are reminded that the office does not have the facilities and resources to provide the factual evidence needed in order to establish that the product of the prior art does not possess the same material, structural and functional characteristics of the claimed product. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the burden is on the applicant to prove that the claimed product is different from those taught by the prior art and to establish patentable differences. See In re Best 562F.2d 1252, 195 USPQ 430 (CCPA 1977) and Ex parte Gray 10 USPQ 2d 1922 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).
Claims 15 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) as anticipated by US 2018/0153859 to Didsbury (IDS of 04/14/2025), as evidenced by US2008/0292625 to Schroeter (published 2008, PTO-892) or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. 103 as obvious over US 2018/0153859 to Didsbury (IDS of 04/14/2025) in view of US2008/0292625 to Schroeter (published 2008, PTO-892).
102
Didsbury is applied as discussed above and incorporated herein.
As evidenced by Schroeter, cerebral amyloid angiopathy is a concurrent characteristic/condition of Alzheimer’s disease in Alzheimer’s patients ([0057]).
While Didsbury does not explicitly teach the treatment of cerebral amyloid angiopathy (CAA), it is reasonable to assume that administering
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to Alzheimer’s patients would treat CAA since it is administered in the same dosage amount (the instant specification teaches 0.0001mg/kg-10mg/kg [096] and Didsbury teaches 0.001mg/kg-200mg/kg ([0303])), to the same population (Alzheimer’s patients) as that taught by the instant specification and claims. Thus, while the prior art does not explicitly teach these properties, burden is on Applicant to show that the prior art does not have these properties. See MPEP 2112.02, Under the principles of inherency, if a prior art device, in its normal and usual operation, would necessarily perform the method claimed, then the method claimed will be considered to be anticipated by the prior art device. When the prior art device is the same as a device described in the specification for carrying out the claimed method, it can be assumed the device will inherently perform the claimed process.
Applicants are reminded that the office does not have the facilities and resources to provide the factual evidence needed in order to establish that the product of the prior art does not possess the same material, structural and functional characteristics of the claimed product. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the burden is on the applicant to prove that the claimed product is different from those taught by the prior art and to establish patentable differences. See In re Best 562F.2d 1252, 195 USPQ 430 (CCPA 1977) and Ex parte Gray 10 USPQ 2d 1922 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).
103
Didsbury is applied as discussed above and incorporated herein.
While Disbury teaches a method of treating Alzheimer’s disease by administering a compound of instant Formula I, it differs in that it does not explicitly teach its methods as treating CAA.
Schroeter teaches that most Alzheimer’s patients are affected by at least mild CCA and teaches its methods as treating both CAA alone and CAA concurrently with Alzheimer’s disease ([0057]).
Thus, Schroeter teaches CAA as a concurrent symptom of or characteristic of Alzheimer’s disease.
As such, an ordinary skilled artisan, prior to the effective filing date of the instantly claimed invention, would have reasonably expected the methods of Didsbury which teaches administering
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to Alzheimer’s patients, to also treat CAA, since Schroeter teaches CAA as a characteristic/co-symptom of Alzheimer’s disease. Thus, since Didsbury teaches administering the same compound in the same dosage amounts (the instant specification teaches 0.0001mg/kg-10mg/kg [096] and Didsbury teaches 0.001mg/kg-200mg/kg ([0303])), to the same patient population, an ordinary skilled artisan would reasonably expect the methods of Didsbury to additionally treat vasogenic edema, a symptom/co-symptom of Alzheimer’s disease.
Applicants are reminded that the office does not have the facilities and resources to provide the factual evidence needed in order to establish that the product of the prior art does not possess the same material, structural and functional characteristics of the claimed product. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the burden is on the applicant to prove that the claimed product is different from those taught by the prior art and to establish patentable differences. See In re Best 562F.2d 1252, 195 USPQ 430 (CCPA 1977) and Ex parte Gray 10 USPQ 2d 1922 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 1-2, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, and 17 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 21-34, 40-41 of copending Application No. 19/504,181 (claim set dated 01/21/2026, reference application), as evidenced by Wang (Vasogenic edema in the frontostriatal tract and the anterior limb of the internal capsule predict cognitive decline in Alzheimer disease, published 2020, PTO-892).
Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
‘181 claims a method of treating a disease associated with endothelial cell dysfunction comprising administering a therapeutically effective amount of a compound of instant Formula I (claims 21-28).
‘181 claims further administering an anti-amyloid body antibody such as bapineuzumab, solanezumab and others (claims 34 and 40).
‘181 claims the method as treating ARIA or CAA (claim 41) and ‘181 teaches Alzheimer’s disease as “a disease associated with endothelial cell dysfunction” ([0153] of the specification).
Specifically regarding claims 10 and 17, ‘181 claims a subgenus of this compound in its claim 26, wherein it would have been obvious to modify any of the compounds of its claim 28 by substituting the H at the R position of any of the compounds with Na+, to arrive at the compound of claims 10, 14, and 17, since ‘181 claims R as H or Na+.
Regarding claims 12 and 14, as evidenced by Wang, vasogenic edema is a concurrent characteristic/condition of Alzheimer’s disease in Alzheimer’s patients (title, abstract).
While ‘181 does not explicitly claim the treatment of vasogenic edema, it is reasonable to assume that administering
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to Alzheimer’s patients would treat vasogenic edema since it is administered in the same dosage amount (the instant specification teaches 0.0001mg/kg-10mg/kg [096] and ‘181 claims 15-45mg (claims 29-33)) to the same population (Alzheimer’s patients) as that taught by the instant specification and claims. Thus, while the prior art does not explicitly teach these properties, burden is on Applicant to show that the prior art does not have these properties. See MPEP 2112.02, Under the principles of inherency, if a prior art device, in its normal and usual operation, would necessarily perform the method claimed, then the method claimed will be considered to be anticipated by the prior art device. When the prior art device is the same as a device described in the specification for carrying out the claimed method, it can be assumed the device will inherently perform the claimed process.
Applicants are reminded that the office does not have the facilities and resources to provide the factual evidence needed in order to establish that the product of the prior art does not possess the same material, structural and functional characteristics of the claimed product. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the burden is on the applicant to prove that the claimed product is different from those taught by the prior art and to establish patentable differences. See In re Best 562F.2d 1252, 195 USPQ 430 (CCPA 1977) and Ex parte Gray 10 USPQ 2d 1922 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Claims 1-2, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15 and 17 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 6-23 of copending Application No. 19/517,153 (claim set dated 03/06/2026, reference application), as evidenced by Wang (Vasogenic edema in the frontostriatal tract and the anterior limb of the internal capsule predict cognitive decline in Alzheimer disease, published 2020, PTO-892) and as evidenced by US2008/0292625 to Schroeter (published 2008, PTO-892).
Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.
‘153 claims a method of modifying brain plaque levels in a patient with Alzheimer’s disease by administering a compound of instant Formula I (claims 6, 22) and further administering an anti-amyloid beta antibody, such as aducanumab (claim 23).
‘153 additionally claims a pharmaceutical composition comprising a compound of instant Formula I (claims 7-14).
‘153 claims the composition as further comprising aducanumab, bapineuzumab, crenezumab, gantenerumab, or solanezumab (claim 23).
Consistent with Sun Pharmaceutical Industries v. Eli Lilly and Col, 611 F. 3d 1381, 1387 (CAFC 2010), it is permissible to use a compound claim to reject a method of use claim where that method of use is disclosed in the specification of the application claiming the compound. According to the Sun Pharma. Court, “[i]t would shock one’s sense of justice if an inventor could receive a patent upon a composition of matter, setting out at length in the specification the useful purposes of such composition, . . .and then prevent the public from making any beneficial use of such product by securing patents upon each of the uses to which it may be adapted. . .”.
‘153 teaches its compositions for use in the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease (claims 21, 22).
Specifically regarding claim 10, ‘153 claims a subgenus of this compound in its claim 12, wherein it would have been obvious to modify any of the compounds of its claim 14 by substituting the H at the R position of any of the compounds with Na+, to arrive at the compound of claim 10, since ‘153 claims R as H or Na+.
Regarding claims 12 and 14, as evidenced by Wang, vasogenic edema is a concurrent characteristic/condition of Alzheimer’s disease in Alzheimer’s patients (title, abstract).
While ‘153 does not explicitly claim the treatment of vasogenic edema, it is reasonable to assume that administering
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to Alzheimer’s patients would treat vasogenic edema since it is administered in the same dosage amount (the instant specification teaches 0.0001mg/kg-10mg/kg [096] and ‘153 claims 15-45mg (claims 15-19)) to the same population (Alzheimer’s patients) as that taught by the instant specification and claims. Thus, while the prior art does not explicitly teach these properties, burden is on Applicant to show that the prior art does not have these properties. See MPEP 2112.02, Under the principles of inherency, if a prior art device, in its normal and usual operation, would necessarily perform the method claimed, then the method claimed will be considered to be anticipated by the prior art device. When the prior art device is the same as a device described in the specification for carrying out the claimed method, it can be assumed the device will inherently perform the claimed process.
Regarding claims 15 and 17, as evidenced by Schroeter, cerebral amyloid angiopathy is a concurrent characteristic/condition of Alzheimer’s disease in Alzheimer’s patients ([0057]).
While ‘153 does not explicitly claim the treatment of cerebral amyloid angiopathy (CAA), it is reasonable to assume that administering
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to Alzheimer’s patients would treat CAA since it is administered in the same dosage amount (the instant specification teaches 0.0001mg/kg-10mg/kg [096] and ‘153 claims 15-45mg (claims 15-45)), to the same population (Alzheimer’s patients) as that taught by the instant specification and claims. Thus, while the prior art does not explicitly teach these properties, burden is on Applicant to show that the prior art does not have these properties. See MPEP 2112.02, under the principles of inherency, if a prior art device, in its normal and usual operation, would necessarily perform the method claimed, then the method claimed will be considered to be anticipated by the prior art device. When the prior art device is the same as a device described in the specification for carrying out the claimed method, it can be assumed the device will inherently perform the claimed process.
Applicants are reminded that the office does not have the facilities and resources to provide the factual evidence needed in order to establish that the product of the prior art does not possess the same material, structural and functional characteristics of the claimed product. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the burden is on the applicant to prove that the claimed product is different from those taught by the prior art and to establish patentable differences. See In re Best 562F.2d 1252, 195 USPQ 430 (CCPA 1977) and Ex parte Gray 10 USPQ 2d 1922 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Conclusion
No claims are allowed.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to LAUREN WELLS whose telephone number is (571)272-7316. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 7:00-4:30.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
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/LAUREN WELLS/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1622