DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment
The amendment filed on July 22nd, 2026 has been entered. Claims 8-14 remain pending.
Applicant’s amendments to the claims do not overcome every 35 U.S.C. 112(b) rejection previously set forth in the Non-Final Office Action mailed on April 29th, 2026, specifically the rejection to claim 8 as an indefinite claim for being unclear where the preamble ends and the body begins, thus this rejection is sustained. Every other 35 U.S.C. 112(b) rejection previously set forth in the Non-Final Action mailed on April 29th, 2026 has been overcome.
The Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) presented with the Applicant’s amendments filed on July 22nd, 2026 addresses the issues of the previously presented IDS raised in the Non-Final Office Action mailed on April 29th, 2026. Thus, the IDS has been considered.
Regarding claim limitations of Claim 8 being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) previously set forth in the Non-Final Office Action mailed on April 29th, 2026, upon further consideration, it was determined that “upper mechanism” and “lower mechanism” do not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) since they are not recited in the means plus function format. That is, no functional language is attached to said phrases. Further, a search of the relevant prior art reveals that “control system” is a term of art known to represent sufficiently definite structure and, consequently, is no longer being interpreted under § 112(f).
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, see pages 5-13 of the Applicant Arguments/Remarks filed on July 22nd, 2026, with respect to the rejections of Claims 8-12 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. 103 as obvious over Paron (EP1048355A1) in view of Lu (CN112808381A) and Kemetter (WO8809211A1) and the rejection of Claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. 103 as obvious over Paron in view of Lu and Kemetter and further in view of Hendrix and further in view of Hendrix (EP2653227A1) have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
On page 6, Applicant points out the technical meaning of “pre-shedder”, the technical meaning, according to this invention, being a machine intended to process scrap metal material before it is fed into a shredder proper, so as to reduce the size and homogenize the material reaching the shredder. It is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., the technical meaning of a pre-shredder) are not recited in the rejected claims. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
On page 6, Applicant argues that while the pre-shedder of the present invention is designed to provide, simultaneously, greater capacity for material processing, greater production, and increased safety in the processing of dangerous elements, by means of a system that regulates the distance between the processing shafts based on predefined parameters, including the power consumed in the process, Paron discloses a "machine for pounding and grinding materials in general, for example on a wooden base", i.e., a machine whose field of use is not scrap metal recycling, but general pounding/grinding, exemplified by a wood-based material. In response to applicant's argument that the references fail to show certain features of the invention, it is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., the material which is shredded by the pre-shredder) are not recited in the rejected claims. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Furthermore, a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim.
On Pages 6-7, Applicant argues that Paron discloses a machine for pounding and grinding materials in general, such as for example on wooden base, that comprises, on a bedplate, an upper loading portion (11) arranged on a frame (35), a central portion for machining the material fed, which is made up of at least two motorized (24, 25) counter-rotating shafts (13), each bearing arrays of cutting and crushing disks (14), and a lower discharge portion (15) associated to a conveyor unit (16) for discharging machined material, wherein at the base of upper loading portion (11) devices (12) are arranged for intercepting material in feeding, and in the central portion at least two counter-rotating shafts (13) are each arranged on bearing structures (17) that are movable with respect to bedplate (19, 41, 42) and are driven to position themselves between a facing position and a distanced position at the sides of the central portion through actuators (20), being furthermore provided a driving unit (33) for actuators (20), for driving motors (24, 25) of shafts (13) and for conveyor unit (16) and that a closer reading of Paron reveals an additional, more fundamental difference that has not been adequately addressed in either of the obviousness rejections based thereon. That is, the function of the actuators (20) of Paron are structurally and operationally different from the function of the linear actuator recited in amended independent claim 8. Applicant further argues that this is because, according to Paragraphs [0018] and [0019] of Paron, actuators (20) rotate bearing structures (17) so as to free a lower aperture (23) of the machine, thereby starting a "self-cleaning cycle". Additionally, Paragraphs [0027] and [0028] of Paron explain that this cycle is triggered by a "self-diagnosis and self-stop device" upon detection of an abnormal cutting stress caused by the presence of a large ferrous or non-ferrous object (element 32, described as "a bar... of large dimensions"), that Paragraph [0035] of Paron confirms that, once triggered, actuators (20) fully separate bearing structures (17), together with shafts (13) and rotating disks (14), to define a discharge opening through which offending object (32) falls by gravity and that the actuators (20) of Paron does not regulate the distance between the shafts across a range of intermediate positions as a function of the material being processed during normal operation, that it rather operates in a substantially binary manner - a normal working position, and a fully open discharge position triggered exclusively by an abnormal, unwanted event (jamming caused by an oversized foreign object) and that given this, as well as the remaining disclosure contained therein, Paron contains no disclosure, teaching, or even suggestion whatsoever of continuously modulating the shaft distance according to predefined operating parameters (such as power consumption) in order to select a processing configuration suited to the material being fed, which is precisely the object of amended independent claim 8 (emphasis supplied). In response to applicant's argument that the references fail to show certain features of the invention, it is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., regulating the distance between the shafts across a range of intermediate positions as a function of the material being processed during normal operation) are not recited in the rejected claims. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Furthermore, a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
On Page 8, Applicant argues that applying a problem-solution framework, starting from Paron as the closest cited art, the objective technical problem solved by amended independent claim 8 can be formulated as follows - how to adapt a single pre-shredding machine, during normal operation, to different types of incoming scrap material (loose or baled) and to different desired final processing sizes, while maintaining a suitable balance between processing capacity, production throughput, and safety against explosive elements, without needing to acquire different machines with fixed clearances for each use case, and while allowing the use of a comparatively less powerful drive motor (emphasis supplied). And that it is clear that Paron does not pose, let alone solve, this objective technical problem. Applicant further argues that this is because Paron's self-cleaning/self-diagnosis mechanism does not solve this problem, nor does it even pose it, as Paron's mechanism is a reactive safety mechanism against an anomalous jamming event, not a proactive regulation mechanism responsive to the ordinary variability of scrap metal composition. Applicant argues that one of skill in the art would upon reading and understanding Paron while confronted with the objective technical problem defined by the present invention would find no teaching or motivation in Paron that would point toward converting the binary self-cleaning mechanism of Paron into a continuous regulation system and that this is because Paron does not even recognize the existence of such a problem. In response to applicant's argument that the references fail to show certain features of the invention, it is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., the objective technical problem solved by amended independent claim 8) are not recited in the rejected claims. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Furthermore, a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim.
On pages 8-9, Applicant argues that the solution recited in amended independent claim 8, that is "a control system that continuously regulates the distance between the shafts based on predefined parameters, including the power consumed in the process" is neither disclosed, taught, or even suggested by Paron, and, as such, claim 8 is both novel and non-obvious over Paron. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
On pages 9-10, Applicant argues that as to the combination of Paron with that of Lu, Kemetter, and/or Hendrix, even accepting, for the sake of argument, that Lu and/or Kemetter disclose a control system regulating a gap based on detected parameters, it is respectfully submit that the Examiner's combination of Paron with Lu and Kemetter, and additionally Hendrix for claim 13, is the result of hindsight impermissible hindsight and states the reasons for arriving at that conclusion. In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).
On page 10, Applicant argues that none of Paron, Lu, Kemetter, and Hendrix belongs to the specific field of pre-shredders for end-of-life scrap metal recycling that constitutes the technical field of the present application (see Paragraph [0003] of the as-filed disclosure as published in US 2025/0177992). In response to applicant's argument that Paron, Lu, Kemetter, and Hendrix are non-analogous arts, it has been held that a prior art reference must either be in the field of the inventor’s endeavor or, if not, then be reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was concerned, in order to be relied upon as a basis for rejection of the claimed invention. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 24 USPQ2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, as stated in the Non-Final Office Action mailed on April 29th, 2026 and below Paron, Lu, Kemetter, and Hendrix are considered analogous art to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of endeavor of material processing.
On Page 10, Applicant argues given the disclosures contained on Paron, Lu, Kemetter, and Hendrix, it is clear that all of the devices disclosed in Paron, Lu, Kemetter, and Hendrix have different purposes, as well as different operating principles than the device recited in amended independent claim 8. Once again, a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim.
On page 11, Applicant argues that the element of Hendrix that actually interconnects the two roller frame sections is the separate "gap adjusting cylinder" (21) (see claim 2 of Hendrix), which the Examiner has not cited to nor relied upon and that as such, this is a structural mismatch between the element cited and the claim limitation it purports to disclose. However, the Examiner does cited and relied upon Element 21 as stated in the Non-Final Office Action mailed on April 29th, 2026 and below (see Claim 13 rejection).
On page 11, Applicant argues that due to the fact that the Examiner must combine three documents from three different technical sub-fields (a general pounding/grinding machine, a metallurgical mining roll-gap adjuster, and an oscillating-tool material preparation device) to arrive at the invention recited in pending claims 8-12 and 14, and a fourth document from yet another sub-field (a mineral/cement roller crusher) to arrive at the invention recited in pending claim 13, is itself a strong indicator that the claimed combination could only be arrived at through using the presently pending claims as an impermissible blueprint. Applicant further argues that as is well settled, impermissible hindsight must be avoided in rejecting a claimed invention, and the legal conclusion of prima facie obviousness must be reached on the basis of the facts gleaned from the prior art. See MPEP § 2142. In response to applicant's argument that the examiner has combined an excessive number of references, reliance on a large number of references in a rejection does not, without more, weigh against the obviousness of the claimed invention. See In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 18 USPQ2d 1885 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).
On page 11, Applicant argues that as is well known, the MPEP places the burden of showing that the prior art discloses, teaches, or suggests each and every claimed feature, as well as the motivation that would cause one of skill in the art to combine the cited art in the manner alleged by the Examiner. Applicant further argues that it is clear that the Examiner has failed to meet such burden here and that this is because the Examiner uses the either three, or four, pieces of cited art from very dissimilar art fields and then combines same to arrive at the conclusion that the invention of claims 8-12 and 14, or even claim 13, are obvious without providing anything but reasoning/motivation to do so based on improper hindsight gleaned from the present invention's disclosure. In response to applicant’s argument that there is no teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references, the examiner recognizes that obviousness may be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988), In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). In this case, the Examiner has provided the motivation to combine the three or the four references for the rejection of claims 8-12 and 14 as well as the rejection of claim 13 as stated in the Non-Final Action mailed on April 29th, 2026 and below.
On page 12, Applicant argues that the specific elements required by claim 8 of the present invention are clearly novel and non-obvious over any combination of Paron, Lu, and Kemetter as such a pre-shredder as recited in pending claim 8 is neither taught nor suggested by Paron, Lu, and/or Kemetter, nor does the Examiner's contention that such a modification to Paron, Lu, and/or Kemetter to arrive at the present invention would be motivated by the respective disclosures of Paron, Lu, and Kemetter disclosure hold water as this contention is clearly based on impermissible hindsight. In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).
On page 12, Applicant argues that given that it is a well-established that a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 may not be based on a combination of references assembled using the patent application under examination as a roadmap, at least claim 8 is both novel and non-obvious over any combination of Paron, Lu, and/or Kemetter. Given that the specific "power consumed in the process" parameter recited in pending claim 8 appears verbatim in only Kemetter - a document from an even more remote technical field than either Paron and/or Lu, that is ceramic/aggregate preparation which expressly excludes scrap metal, one of skill in the pre-shredder arts for scrap metal recycling would not look to Paron, Lu, or even Kemetter. Applicant further argues that this is because the Examiner's reasoning that a person skilled in pre-shredder arts for scrap metal recycling would, absent impermissible hindsight, have searched specifically within ceramic/aggregate-preparation literature for this teaching, and then imported it into a wood- pounding machine already modified with a mining-industry roll-gap sensor, is not persuasive and rests on the sort of after-the-fact reconstruction / impermissible hindsight that is expressly forbidden by the examination guidelines contained in the MPEP. In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971). In response to applicant's argument that Paron, Lu, and/or Kemetter are nonanalogous arts, it has been held that a prior art reference must either be in the field of the inventor’s endeavor or, if not, then be reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was concerned, in order to be relied upon as a basis for rejection of the claimed invention. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 24 USPQ2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, as stated in the Non-Final Office Action mailed on April 29th, 2026 and below Paron, Lu, and Kemetter are considered analogous art to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of endeavor of material processing.
On page 12, Applicant further argues that this same reasoning applies to the four-document combination use by the Examiner to reject as obvious pending claim 13, where Hendrix, an equally technically remote document must be introduced, and where, as explained above, the specific element relied upon by the Examiner does not even correspond structurally to the claim limitation it is meant to disclose. In response to applicant's argument that Paron, Lu, Kemetter, and Hendrix are nonanalogous arts, it has been held that a prior art reference must either be in the field of the inventor’s endeavor or, if not, then be reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was concerned, in order to be relied upon as a basis for rejection of the claimed invention. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 24 USPQ2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, as stated in the Non-Final Office Action mailed on April 29th, 2026 and below Paron, Lu, Kemetter, and Hendrix are considered analogous art to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of endeavor of material processing.
Finally, on Pages 12-13, Applicant argues that for at least the above reasons, the combination of Paron, Lu, and Kemetter fails to disclose, teach, or even suggest each and every element recited by pending claims 8-12 and 14, and the combination of Paron, Lu, Kemetter, and Hendrix fails to disclose, teach, or even suggest each and every element recited by pending claim 13. In response to applicant’s argument that there is no teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references, the examiner recognizes that obviousness may be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988), In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). In this case, the Examiner has provided the motivation to combine the three or the four references for the rejection of claims 8-12 and 14 as well as the rejection of claim 13 as stated in the Non-Final Action mailed on April 29th, 2026 and below.
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on July 22nd, 2026 is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the Examiner.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 8-14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 8 recites the limitation “A pre-shredder comprising an upper mechanism with an upper shaft comprising at least one upper sprocket and a lower mechanism with a lower shaft comprising at least one lower sprocket, wherein the pre-shredder comprises” in Lines 1-3. It is unclear where the preamble ends and the body begins, thus rendering the claim indefinite.
Claims 9-14, which depend on Claim 8, are equally rejected.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or non-obviousness.
Claims 8-12 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Paron (EP1048355A1), hereinafter "Paron" in view of Lu et al. (CN112808381A), hereinafter "Lu" and Kemetter (WO8809211A1), hereinafter Kemetter. For text citation of Lu and Kemetter refer to the machine translations provided by the Examiner with the Non-Final Action mailed on April 29th, 2026.
Regarding Claim 8, Paron discloses a pre-shredder (Figs. 1-7, Element 10) comprising an upper mechanism (see annotated Fig. 4 of Paron reproduced below) with an upper shaft (Figs. 1-7, Element 13; Abstract, Lines 5-7) comprising at least one upper sprocket (Figs. 1-7, Element 14; Abstract, Lines 5-8) and a lower mechanism (see annotated Fig. 4 of Paron reproduced below) with a lower shaft (Figs. 1-7, Element 13; Abstract, Lines 5-7) comprising at least one lower sprocket (Figs. 1-7, Element 14; Abstract, Lines 5-8), wherein the pre-shredder (Figs. 1-7, Element 10) comprises: at least one linear actuator (Figs. 1-7, Element 20); a chassis (see annotated Fig. 4 of Paron reproduced below), wherein at least one of the mechanisms (see annotated Fig. 4 of Paron reproduced below) is mobile (Abstract, Lines 5-12), being joined to the chassis of the pre-shredder (¶0018, Lines 5-7) through an articulated attachment (Figs. 1-7, Element 18; ¶0018, Lines 5-7) and to the linear actuator (Figs. 1-7, Element 20) through a floating joint (Figs. 1-7, Element 22), so that the distance between the shafts (Figs. 1-7, Element 13; Abstract, Lines 5-7) is variable (Figs. 3-4; Abstract, Lines 5-12).
Paron fails to disclose a control system configured to regulate the distance between the shafts based on a series of previously defined parameters.
Nonetheless, Lu teaches a control system (¶n0038-¶n0041) configured to regulate the distance between the shafts (¶n0038) based on a series of previously defined parameters (¶n0039).
Paron and Lu are considered analogous art to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of endeavor of material processing. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claim invention to incorporate the teachings of Lu of using a control system configured to regulate the distance between the shafts based on a series of previously defined parameters into the pre-shredder disclosed by Paron to provide a control system that controls the adjustment mechanism to operate based on detected signals (¶n0010) and ultimately ensure both the shredding effect of the pre-shredder and the uniform force on the upper and lower mechanisms, thereby reducing uneven wear, improving the reliability of the pre-shredder operation, and extending its service life (¶n0004).
Lu further teaches wherein the control system (¶n0038-¶n0041) is configured to adjust the distance between the shafts based on pressure (¶n0041). Thus, failing to teach wherein the control system is configured to adjust the distance between the shafts based on power consumed in the process.
Nonetheless, Kemetter teaches a control system (¶0023) configured to adjust the distance between the shafts (¶0023) based on pressure or power consumed in the process (¶0018; ¶0023).
Paron, Lu, and Kemetter are considered analogous art to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of endeavor of material processing. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claim invention to incorporate the teachings of Kemetter of using a control system configured to regulate the distance between the shafts based not only in pressure but on a power consumed in the process into the pre-shredder disclosed by Paron and modified by Lu since pressure and the power can both be easily measured using a measuring device and entered into the control system (¶0018, Lines 15-17). This is because it has been held that applying known techniques to yield predictable results requires only routine skill in the art (MPEP § 2143, subsection I.D).
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Annotated Fig. 4 of Paron
Regarding Claim 9, the prior art combination of Paron, Lu, and Kemetter renders the pre-shredder as claimed in Claim 8 unpatentable as explained above.
Paron further discloses wherein the upper mechanism (see annotated Fig. 4 of Paron reproduced above) is articulated (Figs. 1-7, Element 18; ¶0018, Lines 5-7).
Regarding Claim 10, the prior art combination of Paron, Lu, and Kemetter renders the pre-shredder as claimed in Claim 8 unpatentable as explained above.
Paron further discloses wherein the lower mechanism (see annotated Fig. 4 of Paron reproduced above) is articulated (Figs. 1-7, Element 18; ¶0018, Lines 5-7).
Regarding Claim 11, the prior art combination of Paron, Lu, and Kemetter renders the pre-shredder as claimed in Claim 8 unpatentable as explained above.
Paron further discloses wherein both the upper mechanism (see annotated Fig. 4 of Paron reproduced above) and the lower mechanism (see annotated Fig. 4 of Paron reproduced above) are articulated (Figs. 1-7, Element 18; ¶0018, Lines 5-7).
Regarding Claim 12, the prior art combination of Paron, Lu, and Kemetter renders the pre-shredder as claimed in Claim 11 unpatentable as explained above.
Paron further discloses two linear actuators (Figs. 1-7, Element 20), with each linear actuator (by means of Element 22, see Figs. 1-7) being linked to the upper mechanism (see annotated Fig. 4 of Paron reproduced above) or to the lower mechanism (see annotated Fig. 4 of Paron reproduced above).
Regarding Claim 14, the prior art combination of Paron, Lu, and Kemetter renders the pre-shredder as claimed in Claim 12 unpatentable as explained above.
Paron further discloses wherein the linear actuator (Figs. 1-7, Element 20) is attached to the chassis of the pre-shredder (¶0018, Lines 1-10).
Claim 13 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Paron in view of Lu and Kemetter as applied to claim 11 above, and further in view of Hendrix (EP2653227A1), hereinafter "Hendrix".
Regarding Claim 13, the prior art combination of Paron, Lu, and Kemetter renders the pre-shredder as claimed in Claim 11 unpatentable as explained above.
The prior art combination of Paron, Lu, and Kemetter fail to teach wherein the linear actuator is linked to the two mechanisms by both ends.
Nonetheless, Hendrix teaches wherein the linear actuator (Fig. 1, Element 21) is linked to the two mechanisms (see annotated Fig. 1 of Hendrix reproduced below) by both ends (see annotated Fig. 1 of Hendrix reproduced below) of the linear actuator.
Paron, Lu, Kemetter, and Hendrix are considered analogous art to the claimed invention because they are in the same field of endeavor of material processing. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claim invention to further modified the pre-shredder disclosed by Parson and modified by Lu and Kemetter to incorporate the teachings of Hendrix of using a linear actuator linked to the two mechanisms by both ends of the linear actuator to provide an interconnection between the upper and lower mechanisms arranged to adjust the distance between the upper and lower shafts (¶0005, Lines 1-4).
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Annotated Fig. 1 of Hendrix
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ALONDRA MICHELLE ORTIZ-ORTIZ whose telephone number is (571)272-9539. The examiner can normally be reached M-Th 7-5PM ET.
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/A.M.O./Examiner, Art Unit 3725
/JARED O BROWN/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3725 29 September 2026
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