DETAILED ACTION
Status of Claims
Claims 1 – 20, which are currently pending, are fully considered below.
Priority
This application is a 371 of PCT/US2023/015009 03/10/2023.
PCT/US2023/015009 has PRO 63/269,186 03/11/2022.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1 – 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to the judicial exception of an abstract idea without significantly more.
Claim 1 recites:
a molecular color center having a ground state with non-zero spin and an excited state, the ground state having at least first and second sublevels; and
a host matrix that is non-isostructural with the molecular color center, the molecular color center being diluted in the host matrix;
wherein: an optical transition between the ground state and the excited state lies in the optical region of the electromagnetic spectrum;
a spin transition between the at least first and second sublevels lies in the microwave or millimeter-wave regions of the electromagnetic spectrum; and
each of the first and second sublevels is first-order insensitive to magnetic fields near zero magnetic.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 1 limitations of “a molecular color center having a ground state with non-zero spin and an excited state, the ground state having at least first and second sublevels” and “a host matrix that is non-isostructural with the molecular color center, the molecular color center being diluted in the host matrix” recite abstract ideas as mathematical concepts or mental processes.
MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS
The mathematical concepts grouping is defined as mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, and mathematical calculations. MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(I). The Supreme Court has identified a number of concepts falling within this grouping as abstract ideas including: a procedure for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65, 175 USPQ2d 673, 674 (1972); a mathematical formula for calculating an alarm limit, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588-89, 198 USPQ2d 193, 195 (1978); the Arrhenius equation, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191, 209 USPQ 1, 15 (1981); and a mathematical formula for hedging, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611, 95 USPQ 2d 1001, 1004 (2010).
The Court’s rationale for identifying these "mathematical concepts" as judicial exceptions is that a ‘‘mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our patent laws,’’ Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191, 209 USPQ at 15 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ 673), and thus ‘‘the discovery of [a mathematical formula] cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.’’ Flook, 437 U.S. at 594, 198 USPQ at 199. In the past, the Supreme Court sometimes described mathematical concepts as laws of nature, and at other times described these concepts as judicial exceptions without specifying a particular type of exception. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 65, 175 USPQ2d at 674; Flook, 437 U.S. at 589, 198 USPQ2d at 197; Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94, 40 USPQ 199, 202 (1939) (‘‘[A] scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention[.]’’). More recent opinions of the Supreme Court, however, have affirmatively characterized mathematical relationships and formulas as abstract ideas. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 218, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1981 (2014) (describing Flook as holding "that a mathematical formula for computing ‘alarm limits’ in a catalytic conversion process was also a patent-ineligible abstract idea."); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611-12, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (noting that the claimed "concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea,").
It is important to note that a mathematical concept need not be expressed in mathematical symbols, because "[w]ords used in a claim operating on data to solve a problem can serve the same purpose as a formula." In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 837 and n.1, 12 USPQ2d 1824, 1826 and n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See, e.g., SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163, 127 USPQ2d 1597, 1599 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that claims to a ‘‘series of mathematical calculations based on selected information’’ are directed to abstract ideas); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350, 111 USPQ2d 1717, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that claims to a ‘‘process of organizing information through mathematical correlations’’ are directed to an abstract idea); and Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1280, 103 USPQ2d 1425, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (identifying the concept of ‘‘managing a stable value protected life insurance policy by performing calculations and manipulating the results’’ as an abstract idea).
MENTAL PROCESSES MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(III).
The courts consider a mental process (thinking) that "can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper" to be an abstract idea. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372, 99 USPQ2d 1690, 1695 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As the Federal Circuit explained, "methods which can be performed mentally, or which are the equivalent of human mental work, are unpatentable abstract ideas the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’ that are open to all.’" 654 F.3d at 1371, 99 USPQ2d at 1694 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972)). See also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965 (2012) ("‘[M]ental processes[] and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work’" (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67, 175 USPQ at 675)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 198 USPQ 193, 197 (1978) (same).
Accordingly, the "mental processes" abstract idea grouping is defined as concepts performed in the human mind, and examples of mental processes include observations, evaluations, judgments, and opinions.
The courts do not distinguish between mental processes that are performed entirely in the human mind and mental processes that require a human to use a physical aid (e.g., pen and paper or a slide rule) to perform the claim limitation. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67, 65, 175 USPQ at 674-75, 674 (noting that the claimed "conversion of [binary-coded decimal] numerals to pure binary numerals can be done mentally," i.e., "as a person would do it by head and hand."); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1139, 120 USPQ2d 1473, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims to a mental process of "translating a functional description of a logic circuit into a hardware component description of the logic circuit" are directed to an abstract idea, because the claims "read on an individual performing the claimed steps mentally or with pencil and paper").
Nor do the courts distinguish between claims that recite mental processes performed by humans and claims that recite mental processes performed on a computer. As the Federal Circuit has explained, "[c]ourts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind." Versata Dev. Group v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1702 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318, 120 USPQ2d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (‘‘[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.’’); Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324, 117 USPQ2d 1693, 1699 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that computer-implemented method for "anonymous loan shopping" was an abstract idea because it could be "performed by humans without a computer").
Because both product and process claims may recite a "mental process", the phrase "mental processes" should be understood as referring to the type of abstract idea, and not to the statutory category of the claim. The courts have identified numerous product claims as reciting mental process-type abstract ideas, for instance the product claims to computer systems and computer-readable media in Versata Dev. Group. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 115 USPQ2d 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 1, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception.
The limitations of “an optical transition between the ground state and the excited state lies in the optical region of the electromagnetic spectrum” and “a spin transition between the at least first and second sublevels lies in the microwave or millimeter-wave regions of the electromagnetic spectrum” and “each of the first and second sublevels is first-order insensitive to magnetic fields near zero magnetic” appear to be mere observations about the qubit.
There is no system or technical problem solved.
Integration of a Judicial Exception Into A Practical Application 2106.04(d)
The Supreme Court has long distinguished between principles themselves (which are not patent eligible) and the integration of those principles into practical applications (which are patent eligible). See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 80, 84, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1968-69, 1970 (2012) (noting that the Court in Diamond v. Diehr found ‘‘the overall process patent eligible because of the way the additional steps of the process integrated the equation into the process as a whole,’’ but the Court in Gottschalk v. Benson ‘‘held that simply implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely a computer, was not a patentable application of that principle’’). Similarly, in a growing body of decisions, the Federal Circuit has distinguished between claims that are ‘‘directed to’’ a judicial exception (which require further analysis to determine their eligibility) and those that are not (which are therefore patent eligible), e.g., claims that improve the functioning of a computer or other technology or technological field. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209 USPQ 1 (1981); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972). See, e.g., MPEP § 2106.06(b) (summarizing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 118 USPQ2d 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2016), McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 120 USPQ2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and other cases that were eligible as improvements to technology or computer functionality instead of being directed to abstract ideas).
The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have identified a number of considerations as relevant to the evaluation of whether the claimed additional elements demonstrate that a claim is directed to patent-eligible subject matter. The list of considerations here is not intended to be exclusive or limiting. Additional elements can often be analyzed based on more than one type of consideration and the type of consideration is of no import to the eligibility analysis. Additional discussion of these considerations, and how they were applied in particular judicial decisions, is provided in MPEP § 2106.05(a) through (c) and MPEP § 2106.05(e) through (h).
Limitations the courts have found indicative that an additional element (or combination of elements) may have integrated the exception into a practical application include:
An improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field, as discussed in MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a);
Applying or using a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.04(d)(2); [AltContent: rect]
Implementing a judicial exception with, or using a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(b);
Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(c); and
Applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(e).
The courts have also identified limitations that did not integrate a judicial exception into a practical application:
Merely reciting the words "apply it" (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(f);
Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
Generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(h).
Step 2B
The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the limitation of “an optical transition between the ground state and the excited state lies in the optical region of the electromagnetic spectrum,” “a spin transition between the at least first and second sublevels lies in the microwave or millimeter-wave regions of the electromagnetic spectrum,” and “each of the first and second sublevels is first-order insensitive to magnetic fields near zero magnetic” appears to be mere observations about the quibit.
THE SEARCH FOR AN INVENTIVE CONCEPT MPEP 2106.05(I)
The second part of the Alice/Mayo test is often referred to as a search for an inventive concept. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 217, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1981 (2014) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71-72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1966 (2012)).
An inventive concept "cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself." Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1376, 118 USPQ2d 1541, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See also Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 21-18, 110 USPQ2d at 1981 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 101 USPQ2d at 1968 (after determining that a claim is directed to a judicial exception, "we then ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?") (emphasis added)); RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327, 122 USPQ2d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ("Adding one abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea (encoding and decoding) does not render the claim non-abstract"). Instead, an "inventive concept" is furnished by an element or combination of elements that is recited in the claim in addition to (beyond) the judicial exception, and is sufficient to ensure that the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 27-18, 110 USPQ2d at 1981 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73, 101 USPQ2d at 1966).
Claim 2 recites:
wherein each of the first and second sublevels is first-order insensitive to magnetic fields near a nominal magnetic field of zero.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 2’s limitation “wherein each of the first and second sublevels is first-order insensitive to magnetic fields near a nominal magnetic field of zero” may be an observation as a mental process, in the human mind.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 2, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 2 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 3 recites:
the ground state is a spin-triplet state with three magnetic sublevels having magnetic quantum numbers m=−1, m=0, and m=+1; and the first and second sublevels are selected from the group consisting of the three magnetic sublevels.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 3’s limitation “the ground state is a spin-triplet state with three magnetic sublevels having magnetic quantum numbers m=−1, m=0, and m=+1; and the first and second sublevels are selected from the group consisting of the three magnetic sublevels” may be an observation as a mental process, in the human mind.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 3, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 3 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 4 recites:
wherein a spin-lattice relaxation time of the ground state is greater than a lifetime of the excited state.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 4’s limitation “wherein a spin-lattice relaxation time of the ground state is greater than a lifetime of the excited state” may be an observation as a mental process, in the human mind.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 4, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 4 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 5 recites:
wherein the optical transition is a zero-phonon line.
The limitation of “wherein the optical transition is a zero-phonon line” appears to be mere observation of the qubit.
Therefore, the claim does not recite limitations which amount to significantly more than the abstract idea.
Claim 6 recites:
the molecular color center comprising a plurality of strong-field ligands bound to a metal-atom center.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 6 limitation “the molecular color center comprising a plurality of strong-field ligands bound to a metal-atom center” recite mathematical concepts although they are not expressed in mathematical symbols.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 6, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 6 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 7 recites:
the metal-atom center being a metal ion with a d.sup.2 configuration.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 7 limitations of “the metal-atom center being a metal ion with a d.sup.2 configuration” recite mathematical concepts although they are not expressed in mathematical symbols.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 7, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception.
The limitation of “the metal-atom center being a metal ion with a d.sup.2 configuration” appears to be mere observation about a qubit.
Step 2B
The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 8 recites:
the metal ion being a Cr.sup.4+ ion.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 8 limitation of the metal ion being a Cr.sup.4+ ion” may be done as a mental process, in the human mind.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 8, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 8 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 9 recites:
the host matrix comprising a crystal.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 9’s limitation “the host matrix comprising a crystal” may be an observation as a mental process, in the human mind.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 9, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 9 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 10 recites:
wherein the host matrix has a lower symmetry than a host matrix that is isostructural with the molecular color center.
The limitation of “wherein the host matrix has a lower symmetry than a host matrix that is isostructural with the molecular color center” appears to be mere descriptive material.
Therefore, the claim does not recite limitations which amount to significantly more than the abstract idea.
Claim 11 recites:
the molecular color center comprises a first plurality of strong-field ligands bound to a first metal-atom center; and the host matrix comprises a second plurality of strong-field ligands bound to a second metal-atom center.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 11’s limitation “ the molecular color center comprises a first plurality of strong-field ligands bound to a first metal-atom center; and the host matrix comprises a second plurality of strong-field ligands bound to a second metal-atom center” may be an observation as a mental process, in the human mind.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 11, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 11 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 12 recites:
wherein each of the first and second metal-atom centers is selected from the group consisting of: Ti.sup.2+, Ti.sup.4+, V.sup.3+, Cr.sup.4+, Mo.sup.4+, W.sup.4+, Mn.sup.4+, Fe.sup.2+, Co.sup.1+, Ge.sup.4+, Si.sup.4+, Sn.sup.4+, and Ni.sup.2+.
The limitation of “wherein each of the first and second metal-atom centers is selected from the group consisting of: Ti.sup.2+, Ti.sup.4+, V.sup.3+, Cr.sup.4+, Mo.sup.4+, W.sup.4+, Mn.sup.4+, Fe.sup.2+, Co.sup.1+, Ge.sup.4+, Si.sup.4+, Sn.sup.4+, and Ni.sup.2+” appears to be mere instructions to apply this on a computer as a generic CNN.
Therefore, the claim does not recite limitations which amount to significantly more than the abstract idea.
Claim 13 recites:
wherein each of the first and second pluralities of strong-field ligands is a monodentate ligand independently selected from the group consisting of cyano, nitro, amido, aryl, deuterated aryl, heteroaryl, and deuterated heteroaryl, wherein said aryl, deuterated aryl, heteroaryl, and deuterated heteroaryl are optionally substituted by one, two, or three substituents independently selected from the group consisting of C.sub.1-6 alkyl, deuterated C.sub.1-6 alkyl, halo, C.sub.1-6 alkoxy, deuterated C.sub.1-6 alkoxy, C.sub.1-6 haloalkyl, and deuterated C.sub.1-6 haloalkyl.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 13’s limitation “wherein each of the first and second pluralities of strong-field ligands is a monodentate ligand independently selected from the group consisting of cyano, nitro, amido, aryl, deuterated aryl, heteroaryl, and deuterated heteroaryl, wherein said aryl, deuterated aryl, heteroaryl, and deuterated heteroaryl are optionally substituted by one, two, or three substituents independently selected from the group consisting of C.sub.1-6 alkyl, deuterated C.sub.1-6 alkyl, halo, C.sub.1-6 alkoxy, deuterated C.sub.1-6 alkoxy, C.sub.1-6 haloalkyl, and deuterated C.sub.1-6 haloalkyl” may be an observation as a mental process, in the human mind.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 13, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 13 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 14 recites:
a number of the first plurality of strong-field ligands is 4, 5, or 6; and a number of the second plurality of strong-field ligands is 4, 5, or 6.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 14’s limitation “a number of the first plurality of strong-field ligands is 4, 5, or 6; and a number of the second plurality of strong-field ligands is 4, 5, or 6” may be an observation as a mental process, in the human mind.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 14, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 14 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 15 recites:
wherein the strong-field ligands of the first plurality are identical.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 15 limitations of “wherein the strong-field ligands of the first plurality are identical” may be done as a mental process, in the human mind.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 15, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception.
Step 2B
The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 16 recites:
wherein the strong-field ligands of the second plurality are identical.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 16’s limitation “wherein the strong-field ligands of the second plurality are identical” may be an observation as a mental process, in the human mind.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 16, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 16 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 17 recites:
the molecular color center comprises Cr(IV)(o-toyl).sub.4; and the host matrix comprises Sn(IV)(4-fluoro-2-methylphenyl).sub.4.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 17’s limitation “the molecular color center comprises Cr(IV)(o-toyl).sub.4; and the host matrix comprises Sn(IV)(4-fluoro-2-methylphenyl).sub.4” may be an observation as a mental process, in the human mind.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 17, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 17 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 18 recites:
a first metal-ligand complex; and a host matrix comprising a second metal-ligand complex that is not isostructural with the first metal-ligand complex; wherein the first metal-ligand complex is diluted in the host matrix.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 18’s limitation “a first metal-ligand complex; and a host matrix comprising a second metal-ligand complex that is not isostructural with the first metal-ligand complex; wherein the first metal-ligand complex is diluted in the host matrix” may be an observation as a mental process, in the human mind.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 18, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 18 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Claim 19 recites:
wherein the ratio of the first metal-ligand complex to the second metal-ligand complex is less than or equal to 10%.
The limitation of “wherein the ratio of the first metal-ligand complex to the second metal-ligand complex is less than or equal to 10%” appears to be merely descriptive.
Therefore, the claim does not recite limitations which amount to significantly more than the abstract idea.
Claim 20 recites:
wherein the ratio of the first metal-ligand complex to the second metal-ligand complex is less than or equal to 1%.
Step 2A Prong One
Claim 20 limitation “wherein the ratio of the first metal-ligand complex to the second metal-ligand complex is less than or equal to 1%” recite mathematical concepts although they are not expressed in mathematical symbols.
Step 2A Prong 2
Claim 20, as a whole, fails to integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 2B
Claim 20 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Conclusion/Contact Information
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ALEXANDRIA Y BROMELL whose telephone number is (571)270-3034. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 8-4.
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/ALEXANDRIA Y BROMELL/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2156 September 25, 2026
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