DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claim(s) 1, 3-8, 10-14, 16 and 17 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over TYSOWSKI (US 20120094596 A1) in view of SUGUMAR (US 20220035327 A1).
Regarding claim 1, TYSOWSKI teaches a near field communication device for communicating with a field device (TYSOWSKI teaches a mobile wireless communications device 34 (near field communication device) that communicates with an NFC tag 31 (field device), para.0018-22), the near field communication device comprising:
an electronic circuit configured to control the near field communication device (TYSOWSKI teaches the mobile wireless communications device 34 includes a controller 36 (electronic circuit) that controls establishing NFC communications and transactions, para.0012-22);
a near field communication unit connected to the electronic circuit, and being configured for a near field communication with the field device (TYSOWSKI teaches a second NFC sensor 35 (near field communication unit) coupled to the controller 36 and configured to establish NFC communications with a first NFC sensor 33 of the NFC tag 31, para.0012-22);
wherein the electronic circuit is configured to control the near field communication unit to at least partially enable or at least partially disable the near field communication depending on at least one of: information attributed to the field device or information attributed to the near field communication device (TYSOWSKI teaches the controller 36 retrieves geo-position data (information attributed to the field device) from the NFC tag 31 to authenticate its geographic position, para.0012-22. If the geographic position is not authenticated based on this information, the controller 36 may "discontinue NFC communications with the NFC tag," which teaches at least partially disabling the near field communication depending on information attributed to the field device, para.0023-40).
TYSOWSKI is silent to teaching the field device of a heating, ventilation and air conditioning system.
In the field of endeavor, SUGUMAR teaches a device for communication with the field device of a heating, ventilation and air conditioning system (SUGUMAR teaches a mobile computing device 14 (near field communication device) that communicates with a building automation system (BAS) controller 12 (field device) that is used for the coordination and control of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, para. 0013-14).
Therefore, a person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine the teachings of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR to create a highly secure, location-aware deployment and configuration system for large-scale building automation networks.
The motivation to combine these references is supported by the following rationales:
Enhancing the Security of Sensitive Building Automation Data: SUGUMAR teaches using a mobile computing device to read identity information from a passive NFC tag on a Building Automation System (BAS) controller to access and retrieve sensitive configuration information, such as building floorplans and detailed wiring diagrams. While SUGUMAR relies on user login credentials (username and password) to prevent unauthorized access to this data, a malicious party could potentially steal a physical BAS controller or clone its NFC tag and attempt to access the building's internal floorplans and security configurations off-site using compromised credentials. TYSOWSKI teaches a method of authenticating the geographic position of an NFC tag prior to allowing a transaction, which advantageously ensures that the tag has not been "stolen and re-located from its authorized location by a malicious party". A person of ordinary skill would be motivated to incorporate TYSOWSKI’s geographic position authentication into SUGUMAR’s configuration retrieval system. This combination would ensure that sensitive building floorplans and network wiring diagrams can only be downloaded or accessed when the technician's mobile device is geographically verified to be physically present at the authorized installation site.
Streamlining the Deployment and Tracking of Thousands of Controllers: SUGUMAR notes that large-scale BAS systems can include hundreds or even thousands of controllers that are often delivered and installed while in a powered-off state. Tracking exactly where each specific controller (and its corresponding NFC identity) has been physically installed across a massive facility can be a logistical challenge. TYSOWSKI provides a solution for tracking large numbers of distributed NFC tags by teaching that a mobile device can determine its current geographic location upon reading an NFC tag and automatically update a central "tag geo-position database" with those coordinates. A person of ordinary skill would be motivated to combine this teaching with SUGUMAR. As technicians use their mobile devices to read the unpowered BAS controllers to configure wiring and print cable tags, the mobile device could simultaneously use TYSOWSKI's method to populate a central database with the exact geographic location of each of the thousands of controllers, drastically reducing the time and expense associated with mapping the deployment.
Enabling Location-Specific Floorplan and Instruction Retrieval: SUGUMAR teaches retrieving floorplans and manual instructions tailored to a specific BAS controller based on identity data stored on the controller's NFC tag. TYSOWSKI teaches that storing geographic position information on an NFC tag is highly advantageous for conveying precise indoor directions (e.g., whether to turn right or left in an airport) when satellite GPS is unavailable, because the system knows the exact physical orientation of the tag. A person of ordinary skill would be motivated to combine TYSOWSKI's localized, indoor geographic orientation capabilities with SUGUMAR's floorplan retrieval. This would allow a technician's mobile device to not only pull up the correct floorplan or wiring diagram for a specific BAS controller, but to dynamically orient that floorplan or provide specific wiring routing instructions based on the exact physical location and orientation of the controller within the building.
Regarding claim 3, the combination of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR teaches the near field communication device according to claim 1, further comprising a position detecting unit, which is configured to determine a current geographical position attributed to the near field communication device (TYSOWSKI teaches the mobile device 34 includes a position determining device 38, such as a GPS receiver (position detecting unit), that determines a current geographic position of the mobile device, para.0018-28), wherein the electronic circuit is configured to compare the determined current geographical position with a predefined geographical region and to control the near field communication unit to at least partially enable the near field communication in case the determined current geographical position is within the predefined geographical region, or to at least partially disable the near field communication in case the determined current geographical position is outside the predefined geographical region (TYSOWSKI teaches the controller 36 compares the current geographic position provided by the position determining device 38 with position coordinates retrieved from the tag, and authenticates the position if the sets of coordinates are "within a threshold distance of one another", para.0026. A threshold distance around a coordinate defines a predefined geographical region. If the device's position is outside this threshold distance (unauthenticated), the controller may "discontinue NFC communications," teaching disabling the communication when the position is outside the region, para.0034).
Regarding claim 4, the combination of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR teaches the near field communication device according to claim 1, wherein the electronic circuit is configured to receive a current geographical position attributed to the field device (TYSOWSKI teaches the controller 36 retrieves geo-position data, such as position coordinates, from the NFC tag 31, para.0012-22), and wherein the electronic circuit is configured to compare the received current geographical position with a predefined geographical region and to control the near field communication unit to at least partially enable the near field communication in case the received current geographical position is within the predefined geographical region, or at least partially disable the near field communication in case the received current geographical position is outside the predefined geographical region (TYSOWSKI teaches the controller compares the received position coordinates of the NFC tag with the mobile device's current location to determine if they are within a threshold distance of one another, where the mobile device's location and threshold act as the predefined geographical region, para.0026. If the coordinates are unauthenticated because they fall outside the defined threshold region, the controller may "discontinue NFC communications", para.0034).
Regarding claim 5, the combination of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR teaches the near field communication device according to claim 3, wherein the electronic circuit is configured to retrieve the predefined geographical region from a memory unit of the near field communication device (TYSOWSKI teaches that geographic position coordinates for the NFC tag (which establish the basis for the predefined geographical region/threshold) can be stored in and retrieved from an authentication server 40 by the controller 36 via a wireless communications network, para.0018-28) or from a remote server, or wherein the electronic circuit is configured to receive the predefined geographical region from the field device (TYSOWSKI also teaches that the position coordinates can be stored directly in the memory 32 of the NFC tag 31 (the field device) and retrieved by the controller 36, para. 0018-28).
Regarding claim 6, the combination of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR teaches the near field communication device according to claim 1, wherein the electronic circuit is configured to receive field device type data attributed to the field device (SUGUMAR teaches the mobile computing device receives identity information 24 from the NFC tag 20, which can include a "model type" of the BAS controller 12 (field device type data), para. 0017,58), and wherein the electronic circuit is configured to compare the received field device type data with a predefined list of field device types and to control the near field communication unit to at least partially enable the near field communication in case the field device type positively matches with at least one of the predefined field device types listed, or to at least partially disable the near field communication in case the determined field device type does not match with at least one of the predefined field device types listed (SUGUMAR teaches that the identity information (which includes the model type) is utilized as a "map to give mobile computing device 14 the location where the configuration information is stored" in a storage medium, para. 0017,58. Using this model type to map to a file inherently requires the system to compare the received field device type data with a predefined list/database of stored configuration files associated with different field device models. If the model type positively matches a file in the database, the mobile device retrieves it (enabling communication of the data). If the model type does not match any supported files (e.g., an invalid or unsupported model type), the retrieval is prevented/fails, inherently disabling that communication/access).
Regarding claim 7, the combination of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR teaches the near field communication device according to claim 1, wherein the electronic circuit is configured to receive unique identification data information attributed to the field device, which uniquely identifies the field device (SUGUMAR teaches the mobile computing device retrieves identity information 24 from the NFC tag, which can include a "unique serial number" or "MAC address" (unique identification data information) of the BAS controller 12, para. 0017), and wherein the electronic circuit is configured to control the near field communication unit to enable the near field communication in case permissions of the near field communication device positively match with the unique identification data, or to disable the near field communication in case the permissions of the near field communication device do not match with the unique identification data (SUGUMAR teaches verifying login information (which represents the permissions of the near field communication device) to ensure the user has the proper security clearance/authority to access the configuration files tied to the field device's identity information, para. 0021,29. Furthermore, "identity information 24 provides some security to system 10" because configuration info cannot be accessed without it. The system evaluates whether the mobile device's login clearance (permissions) positively matches the clearance required to access the specific files designated by the unique identification data (the identity information acting as the secure map). If they match, access is enabled; if they do not match, access is disabled).
Regarding claim 8, TYSOWSKI teaches a method of controlling a near field communication via a near field communication unit of a near field communication device with a field device (TYSOWSKI teaches a mobile wireless communications device 34 (near field communication device) that communicates with an NFC tag 31 (field device), para.0018-22), the method comprising:
receiving, by an electronic circuit of the near field communication device, information attributed to the field device and / or retrieving, by the electronic circuit, information attributed to the near field communication device (TYSOWSKI teaches the controller 36 retrieves geo-position data (information attributed to the field device) from the NFC tag 31 to authenticate its geographic position, para.0012-22), and
controlling, by the electronic circuit, the near field communication unit connected to the electronic circuit, to at least partially enable or to at least partially disable the near field communication depending on at least one of: the received information or the retrieved information (TYSOWSKI teaches that if the geographic position is not authenticated based on this information, the controller 36 may "discontinue NFC communications with the NFC tag," which teaches at least partially disabling the near field communication depending on information attributed to the field device, para. 0023-40).
TYSOWSKI is silent to teaching the field device of a heating, ventilation and air conditioning system.
In the field of endeavor, SUGUMAR teaches a device for communication with the field device of a heating, ventilation and air conditioning system (SUGUMAR teaches a mobile computing device 14 (near field communication device) that communicates with a building automation system (BAS) controller 12 (field device) that is used for the coordination and control of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, para. 0013-14).
Therefore, a person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine the teachings of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR to create a highly secure, location-aware deployment and configuration system for large-scale building automation networks.
The motivation to combine these references is supported by the following rationales:
Enhancing the Security of Sensitive Building Automation Data: SUGUMAR teaches using a mobile computing device to read identity information from a passive NFC tag on a Building Automation System (BAS) controller to access and retrieve sensitive configuration information, such as building floorplans and detailed wiring diagrams. While SUGUMAR relies on user login credentials (username and password) to prevent unauthorized access to this data, a malicious party could potentially steal a physical BAS controller or clone its NFC tag and attempt to access the building's internal floorplans and security configurations off-site using compromised credentials. TYSOWSKI teaches a method of authenticating the geographic position of an NFC tag prior to allowing a transaction, which advantageously ensures that the tag has not been "stolen and re-located from its authorized location by a malicious party". A person of ordinary skill would be motivated to incorporate TYSOWSKI’s geographic position authentication into SUGUMAR’s configuration retrieval system. This combination would ensure that sensitive building floorplans and network wiring diagrams can only be downloaded or accessed when the technician's mobile device is geographically verified to be physically present at the authorized installation site.
Streamlining the Deployment and Tracking of Thousands of Controllers: SUGUMAR notes that large-scale BAS systems can include hundreds or even thousands of controllers that are often delivered and installed while in a powered-off state. Tracking exactly where each specific controller (and its corresponding NFC identity) has been physically installed across a massive facility can be a logistical challenge. TYSOWSKI provides a solution for tracking large numbers of distributed NFC tags by teaching that a mobile device can determine its current geographic location upon reading an NFC tag and automatically update a central "tag geo-position database" with those coordinates. A person of ordinary skill would be motivated to combine this teaching with SUGUMAR. As technicians use their mobile devices to read the unpowered BAS controllers to configure wiring and print cable tags, the mobile device could simultaneously use TYSOWSKI's method to populate a central database with the exact geographic location of each of the thousands of controllers, drastically reducing the time and expense associated with mapping the deployment.
Enabling Location-Specific Floorplan and Instruction Retrieval: SUGUMAR teaches retrieving floorplans and manual instructions tailored to a specific BAS controller based on identity data stored on the controller's NFC tag. TYSOWSKI teaches that storing geographic position information on an NFC tag is highly advantageous for conveying precise indoor directions (e.g., whether to turn right or left in an airport) when satellite GPS is unavailable, because the system knows the exact physical orientation of the tag. A person of ordinary skill would be motivated to combine TYSOWSKI's localized, indoor geographic orientation capabilities with SUGUMAR's floorplan retrieval. This would allow a technician's mobile device to not only pull up the correct floorplan or wiring diagram for a specific BAS controller, but to dynamically orient that floorplan or provide specific wiring routing instructions based on the exact physical location and orientation of the controller within the building.
Regarding claims 10-14, the dependent claims are interpreted and rejected for the same reasons as set forth above in claims 3-7, respectively.
Regarding claim 16, the combination of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR teaches a computer program product comprising computer program code configured to direct a near field communication device or an application running on the near field communication device such that the near field communication device or the application performs the steps according to the method of claim 8 (TYSOWSKI, para. 0082).
Regarding claim 17, the combination of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR teaches a non-transitory computer-readable medium, in particular a non-transitory computer-readable medium, having stored therein computer program code which, when executed by configured to direct a near field communication device or an application running on the near field communication device, causes the near field communication device to perform such that the near field communication device or the application performs the steps according to the method of claim 8 (TYSOWSKI, para. 0082).
Claim(s) 2 and 9 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR as applied to claims 1 and 8 above, and further in view of HASLINGER (US 20230216543 A1).
Regarding claim 2, the combination of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR teaches the near field communication device according to claim 1.
The combination of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR is silent to teaching that wherein the electronic circuit is configured to receive power supply information attributed to the field device, and wherein the electronic circuit is configured to control the near field communication unit to at least partially enable the near field communication in case the power supply information indicates that the field device is currently supplied with electrical energy, or at least partially disable the near field communication in case the power supply information indicates that the field device is currently not supplied with electrical energy.
In the same field of endeavor, HASLINGER teaches a device wherein the electronic circuit is configured to receive power supply information attributed to the field device (HASLINGER teaches a detection unit that detects whether the external device is a "passive" device (which "does not have a battery but is powered by the field") or an "active" device ("which has an internal power source, such as a battery"). To do this, the detection unit measures characteristics like the resonant frequency or complex load at different field strengths to see if the relationship is linear (active device) or non-linear (passive device), para. 0033-36. Measuring these load/frequency characteristics to derive whether the external device possesses its own internal power source/battery acts as "receiving power supply information attributed to the field device."), and wherein the electronic circuit is configured to control the near field communication unit to at least partially enable the near field communication in case the power supply information indicates that the field device is currently supplied with electrical energy, or at least partially disable the near field communication in case the power supply information indicates that the field device is currently not supplied with electrical energy (HASLINGER teaches that the controller is configured to "prevent the charging unit from charging the external device if the detection unit has detected that the external device is a passive NFC device". Determining the device is a passive device (meaning it has no internal battery) equates to the power supply information indicating the field device is "currently not supplied with electrical energy." Preventing the charging unit from transferring power to avoid damaging the passive device acts as "at least partially disabling the near field communication”, para. 0034).
Therefore, a person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine the teachings of TYSOWSKI and HASLINGER to create a multi-functional near field communication (NFC) system that is both secure against fraudulent transactions and safe from accidental hardware damage.
The motivation to combine these references is supported by the following rationales:
Creating a Comprehensive, Safe, and Secure NFC Terminal Modern: NFC technology is utilized for a variety of use cases, ranging from contactless smart card transactions to wireless power transfer for charging active devices like mobile phones. TYSOWSKI teaches a security mechanism for an NFC system that reads geo-position data from an NFC tag to authenticate its location before performing a transaction, which prevents users from being defrauded by stolen or maliciously relocated tags. However, TYSOWSKI does not address the physical hardware risks if the reading device also features wireless charging capabilities. HASLINGER teaches an NFC device equipped with a charging unit that detects whether an external device is a passive NFC device (such as a smart card without a battery) or an active device. Because a passive device can be quickly damaged or destroyed if exposed to the high currents of a wireless charger, HASLINGER's system prevents the charging unit from transferring power to passive devices. A person of ordinary skill would be motivated to combine these teachings to construct an NFC terminal (such as a point-of-sale system or smart poster) that first safely detects the hardware type to prevent frying a passive tag with a charging field (HASLINGER), and then geographically authenticates the tag to prevent digital fraud (TYSOWSKI).
Enhancing Mobile Device Capabilities: TYSOWSKI teaches that a mobile wireless communications device can act as the NFC reader that authenticates the geographic position of a tag. Modern mobile devices increasingly incorporate both NFC reading capabilities and wireless power sharing (charging other devices). Integrating HASLINGER's detection unit into the mobile device described by TYSOWSKI would motivate an improvement where the mobile device can dynamically manage its wireless functions. When a user brings their mobile device near an NFC tag, the combined system would use HASLINGER's complex load detection to ensure the mobile device does not accidentally initiate a wireless power transfer that destroys the tag, while simultaneously using TYSOWSKI's GPS and geographic authentication to verify the tag is safe to transact with. By combining these references, an engineer would successfully address two of the primary vulnerabilities of proximity-based NFC interactions: digital security vulnerabilities (mitigated by TYSOWSKI's geographic authentication) and physical hardware vulnerabilities (mitigated by HASLINGER's passive device detection and charging shutoff).
Regarding claim 9, the dependent claim is interpreted and rejected for the same reasons as set forth above in claim 2.
Claim(s) 15 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR as applied to claim 8 above, and further in view of GUO (US 20160227348 A1)
Regarding claim 15, the combination of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR teaches the method according to claim 8.
The combination of TYSOWSKI and SUGUMAR is silent to teaching that further comprising:
providing, by the electronic circuit, a code and transmitting, via the near field communication unit, the code to the field device;
receiving, by the electronic circuit, information of a verification of the code from the field device; and
at least partially disabling, by the electronic circuit, the near field communication via the near field communication unit in case the verification information indicates a failed verification; or at least partially enabling, by the electronic circuit, the near field communication via the near field communication unit in case the verification information indicates a successful verification.
In the same field of endeavor, GUO teaches a method comprising
providing, by the electronic circuit, a code and transmitting, via the near field communication unit, the code to the field device (GUO teaches an NFC target device 102 (near field communication device) comprising a processing circuit 2102 (electronic circuit) and an NFC communication interface 2108 (near field communication unit). During the mutual authentication verification process, GUO teaches the NFC card 102 generates and transmits a message to the server 106a / WCD 104 (field device) that includes a random number and helper data. This random number transmitted as part of a cryptographic challenge acts as "providing and transmitting a code to the field device”, para. 0064-72);
receiving, by the electronic circuit, information of a verification of the code from the field device (GUO teaches the server 106a receives the random number and utilizes it to cryptographically compute a value u, which it then transmits back to the NFC card 102. The NFC card 102 receives this message containing u. Because the value u is mathematically derived from the transmitted code, receiving u constitutes receiving "information of a verification of the code from the field device”, para. 0074-90); and
at least partially disabling, by the electronic circuit, the near field communication via the near field communication unit in case the verification information indicates a failed verification; or at least partially enabling, by the electronic circuit, the near field communication via the near field communication unit in case the verification information indicates a successful verification (GUO teaches the NFC card 102 verifies the received value u (verification information) by generating its own value u and verifying whether u matches. Enabling upon successful verification: GUO teaches that "assuming u 1 =u 2" (indicating a successful verification), the server is authenticated and the NFC card 102 "applies the privilege mask... and transmits the value u 3 and the first provider sensitive data". Applying the privilege mask to release and transmit the secured data constitutes "at least partially enabling the near field communication." Disabling upon failed verification: Inherently, if u 1 does not equal u 2(indicating a failed verification), the server is not authenticated and the NFC card 102 will not apply the privilege mask or transmit the sensitive data, which constitutes "at least partially disabling the near field communication").
Therefore, a person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine the teachings of TYSOWSKI and GUO to create a highly secure, multi-purpose near field communication (NFC) system that protects against both digital cloning and physical theft, while safeguarding highly sensitive user data.
The motivation to combine these references is supported by the following rationales:
Comprehensive Protection Against Both Cloning and Physical Theft: GUO identifies a critical security vulnerability regarding NFC card "cloning," where a nefarious third party copies data from an original card onto an imposter card to gain unauthorized access. To thwart cloning, GUO teaches using a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) to uniquely identify and cryptographically authenticate the hardware of the NFC device. However, even if an NFC device is mathematically proven to be genuine hardware, it remains vulnerable to physical theft. TYSOWSKI teaches that valid NFC tags can be "stolen and re-located from its authorized location by a malicious party" to trick users into unauthorized transactions. A person of ordinary skill would be motivated to combine GUO's PUF-based anti-cloning authentication with TYSOWSKI's geographic position authentication. This combination yields a robust security protocol that guarantees an NFC device is both cryptographically authentic (not a clone) and physically present in its correct, authorized location (not stolen or relocated) before any transaction is permitted.
Adding Location-Based Access Control to Unified Sensitive Data: GUO teaches a "unified" NFC card architecture where a single card stores a wide variety of highly sensitive data for multiple different providers, such as birthdates, social security numbers, credit card numbers, and merchant rewards accounts. While GUO uses privilege masks to restrict providers to only accessing their designated portion of this sensitive data, a compromised provider terminal could still attempt to interrogate the card remotely or in an unauthorized context. TYSOWSKI teaches that authenticating a geographic position ensures that a transaction is only performed when the device is at a trusted, known location. A person of ordinary skill would be motivated to apply TYSOWSKI's geographic authentication to GUO's unified data architecture. By doing so, the NFC card would only release specific sensitive data (like a secure access credential or credit card) if the mobile device also verifies it is physically located at that specific provider's authorized geographic coordinates, providing a powerful, location-aware layer of data privacy.
Enhanced Server-Side Mutual Authentication: GUO describes a mutual authentication infrastructure where a central provider server securely verifies the identity of the NFC target device using cryptographic challenges and responses. TYSOWSKI similarly teaches relying on an authentication server to authenticate the geographic position of an NFC tag by comparing retrieved unique IDs or coordinates against a trusted database. A person of ordinary skill would recognize the natural synergy between these architectures and be motivated to integrate TYSOWSKI's geographic tracking into GUO's server-based verification protocols. This would allow the provider's server to simultaneously evaluate a PUF cryptographic response and a geographic GPS coordinate during the verification process, instantly flagging if a uniquely identified NFC card suddenly attempts to authenticate from an impossible or unauthorized geographic location.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claim 16 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. The claim(s) does/do not fall within at least one of the four categories of patent eligible subject matter because software/computer program by itself is not one of the four categories.
While the underlying method for controlling near field communication presents practical utility and a concrete application, the specific drafting of Claim 16 categorizes it as software per se, which falls outside the scope of patent-eligible subject matter.
Claim 16 is explicitly directed to a "computer program product comprising computer program code." Under current United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) guidance (MPEP § 2106.03), a computer program per se (i.e., the software, a set of instructions, or data itself) is an intangible entity that does not fit into any of these four statutory categories.
Although the claim recites that the code is "configured to direct a near field communication device," the claim itself is not directed to the device, nor is it directed to the process the device performs. Rather, the claim is directed strictly to the "computer program code" standing alone. Because computer instructions or software code are considered mere information or abstract ideas when untethered from a physical medium, the claim as currently drafted is non-statutory.
To overcome this rejection, the Applicant is gently advised to amend the claim language so that the software is explicitly tied to a statutory category, such as an article of manufacture. This is conventionally achieved by amending the preamble to recite a tangible, physical medium.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
CIBULKA (US 20240060672 A1) and GOULD (US 20170006051 A1) teach HVAC systems.
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/WEN W HUANG/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2648
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