DETAILED ACTION
Notice of AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Election/Restrictions
Applicant’s election without traverse of Invention I (claims 1, 2, 10, and 11) in the reply filed on 2026-03-18 is acknowledged.
Priority
Receipt is acknowledged of applicant’s claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. 119 (a)-(d) and of certified copies of papers required by 37 CFR 1.55.
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on 2024-10-25 is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter; specifically, it is directed towards transitory propagating signals, per se.
Claim 11 is directed towards transitory propagating signals, per se. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is obliged to give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification during proceedings before the USPTO. See In re ZIetz, 893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (during patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow). The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim drawn to a recording medium (also called machine-readable medium and other such variations) typically covers forms of non-transitory media, transitory propagating signals per se, and combinations thereof in view of the ordinary and customary meaning of recording media, particularly when the specification is silent; See MPEP 2111.01. When the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim covers a signal per se, the claim must be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as covering non-statutory subject matter. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (transitory embodiments are not directed to statutory subject matter) and Interim Examination Instructions for Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, Aug. 24, 2009; p. 2.
A claim drawn to such a recording medium that covers both transitory and non-transitory embodiments may be amended to narrow the claim to cover only statutory embodiments to avoid a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 by adding the limitation “non-transitory” to the claim. Cf Animals - Patentability, 1077 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 24 (April 21, 1987) (suggesting that applicants add the limitation “non-human” to a claim covering a multi-cellular organism to avoid a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101). Such an amendment would typically not raise the issue of new matter, even when the specification is silent because the broadest reasonable interpretation relies on the ordinary and customary meaning that includes signals per se. The limited situations in which such an amendment could raise issues of new matter occur, for example, when the specification does not support a non-transitory embodiment because a signal per se is the only viable embodiment such that the amended claim is impermissibly broadened beyond the supporting disclosure. See, e.g., Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Claims 1, 10, and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea (35 U.S.C. 101 Judicial Exception) without significantly more. The claims recite iris registration that is associated with identification information of a person based on a code transferred from facial authentication, a form of observation, evaluation, judgment, and/or opinion, which is a concept performed in the human mind and thus grouped as Mental processes. This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application because the generically recited computer elements do not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because they amount to simply implementing the abstract idea on a computer. The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the additional elements, when considered separately and in combination, do not add significantly more to the abstract idea, as they are well-understood, routine, conventional computer functions as recognized by the courts.
Based upon consideration of all the relevant factors with respect to the claimed invention as a whole, the claims are determined to be directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. The rationale for this determination is explained infra:
The following are Principles of Law:
A patent may be obtained for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof”; 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has consistently held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable; See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”). Notwithstanding that a law of nature or an abstract idea, by itself, is not patentable, an application of these concepts may be deserving of patent protection; See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012). In Mayo, the Court stated that “to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply it.’” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citation omitted).
In Alice, the Court reaffirmed the framework set forth previously in Mayo “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of these concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The test for determining subject matter eligibility requires a first step of determining whether the claims are directed to a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. If the claims are directed to one of the four patent-eligible subject matter categories, then the Examiner must perform a two-part analysis to determine whether a claim that is directed to a judicial exception recites additional elements that amount to significantly more than the exception. The first part of the second step in the analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, then the second part of the second step in the analysis is to consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298, 1297). In other words, the second step in the analysis is to “search for an ‘inventive concept’‒ i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent on the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). The prohibition against patenting an abstract idea “cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment or adding insignificant post-solution activity.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court in Alice noted that “[s]imply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality,” was not “enough” [in Mayo] to supply an “‘inventive concept.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300, 1297, 1294).
In the “2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance” (2019 PEG), the USPTO has prepared revised guidance for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility based upon rulings by the courts.
The Examiner is bound by and applies the framework as set forth by the Court in Mayo and reaffirmed by the Court in Alice and follows the 2019 PEG for determining whether the claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
Step 1: Are the claims at issue directed to a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter?
The Examiner finds that claims 1-2 and 10 are directed to one of the four statutory categories, and claim 11 could be amended such that it is directed to one of the four statutory categories.
Step 2A – Prong One: Does the claim recite an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon?
The Examiner finds that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of iris registration that is associated with identification information of a person based on a code transferred from facial authentication, a form of observation, evaluation, judgment, and/or opinion, which is a concept performed in the human mind and thus grouped as Mental processes.
Step 2A – Prong Two: Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the Judicial Exception into a practical application?
The abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application because the generically recited computer elements do not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because they amount to simply implementing the abstract idea on a computer.
In determining whether the abstract idea was integrated into a practical application, the Examiner has considered whether there were any limitations indicative of integration into a practical application, such as:
(1) Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field; See MPEP § 2106.05(a)
(2) Applying or using a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition; See Vanda Memo (Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision: Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals)
(3) Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine; See MPEP § 2106.05(b)
(4) Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing; See MPEP § 2106.05(c)
(5) Applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception; See MPEP § 2106.05(e) and Vanda Memo
The Examiner notes that clam features of: iris registration that is associated with identification information of a person based on a code transferred from facial authentication do not improve the functioning of a computer or technical field, do not effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, do not apply or use a particular machine, do not effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing, and do not apply or use the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.
Instead of a practical application, the claim features of iris registration that is associated with identification information of a person based on a code transferred from facial authentication merely use a general-purpose computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea (See MPEP § 2106.05(f)) and merely generally link the use of the abstract idea to a field of use (See MPEP § 2106.05(h)). Thus, the Examiner finds that the claimed invention does not recite additional elements that integrate the Judicial Exception into a practical application.
Step 2B: Is there something else in the claims that ensures that they are directed to significantly more than a patent-ineligible concept?
The claims, as a whole, require nothing significantly more than generic computer implementation or can be performed entirely by a human. The additional element(s) or combination of element(s) in the claims other than the abstract idea per se amount to no more than recitation of generic computer structure (e.g. processing apparatus and recording medium) that serves to perform generic computer functions (e.g. output a code and register iris information) that are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the pertinent industry. The claimed target person code, face information, and iris information are all numbers, data structures, or datum. Each of these elements are individually dispositive of patent eligibility because of the following legal holdings:
“Data in its ethereal, non-physical form is simply information that does not fall under any of the categories of eligible subject matter under section 101.” Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
The Supreme Court has also explained that “[a]bstract software code is an idea without physical embodiment,” i.e., an abstraction. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 449 (2007).
A claim that recites no more than software, logic, or a data structure (i.e., an abstract idea) – with no structural tie or functional interrelationship to an article of manufacture, machine, process or composition of matter does not fall within any statutory category and is not patentable subject matter; data structures in ethereal, non-physical form are non-statutory subject matter. In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1357.
Furthermore, the claimed invention does not have a specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities, nor is it a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts; See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Rather, the claims are merely directed towards iris registration that is associated with identification information of a person based on a code transferred from facial authentication, which is similar to ideas that the courts have found to be abstract, as noted supra, and the claims are without a “practical application” or anything “significantly more”.
Considering each of the claim elements in turn, the function performed by the computer system at each step of the process does no more than require a generic computer to perform a well-understood, routine, and conventional activity at a high level of generality. For example, “outputs a target person code to a target person” and “registers iris information collected” are merely forms of storing and retrieving information in memory, which has been found by the courts to be a well-understood, routine, conventional activity in computers; See e.g. Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363, 115 USPQ2d at 1092-93; and they are also forms of electronic recordkeeping, which has also been found by the courts to be a well-understood, routine, conventional activity in computers; See e.g. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 225, 110 USPQ2d 1984 (2014) (creating and maintaining “shadow accounts”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log).
The prohibition against patenting an abstract idea “cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment or adding insignificant post-solution activity.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court in Alice noted that “[s]imply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality,” was not “enough” [in Mayo] to supply an “‘inventive concept.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300, 1297, 1294).
Viewed as a whole, the claims simply recite the steps of using generic computer components. The claims do not purport, for example, to improve the functioning of the computer system itself. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, the claims amount to nothing significantly more than an instruction to implement the abstract idea using generic computer components. This is insufficient to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
35 USC § 112(f)
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
ELEMENT IN CLAIM FOR A COMBINATION.—An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f). The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f). The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), because the claim limitations use a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitations are: “a code output unit that outputs a target person code”, “an iris information registration unit that registers iris information”, and “an alert output unit that outputs an alert” in claims 1 and 2.
Because these claim limitations are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), they are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claim
A review of the specification is unclear as to the corresponding structure or acts described in the specification for the 35 U.S.C. 112(f) limitations.
If applicant does not intend to have these limitations interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitations to avoid them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitations recite sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
Claims 1 and 2 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. Specifically, with regard to claims 1 and 2, claim elements “a code output unit that outputs a target person code”, “an iris information registration unit that registers iris information”, and “an alert output unit that outputs an alert” are limitations that invoke 35 U.S.C. 112(f). However, the written description fails to disclose the corresponding structure, material, or acts for performing the entire claimed function(s) and to clearly link the structure, material, or acts to the function(s). In particular, the Specification does not explicitly disclose what structure performs the claimed function(s).
Applicant may:
(a) Amend the claim so that the claim limitations will no longer be interpreted as a limitation under 35 U.S.C. 112(f);
(b) Amend the written description of the specification such that it expressly recites what structure, material, or acts perform the entire claimed functions, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. 132(a)); or
(c) Amend the written description of the specification such that it clearly links the structure, material, or acts disclosed therein to the functions recited in the claim, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. 132(a)).
If applicant is of the opinion that the written description of the specification already implicitly or inherently discloses the corresponding structure, material, or acts and clearly links them to the functions so that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize what structure, material, or acts perform the claimed functions, applicant should clarify the record by either:
(a) Amending the written description of the specification such that it expressly recites the corresponding structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed functions and clearly links or associates the structure, material, or acts to the claimed functions, without introducing any new matter (35 U.S.C. 132(a)); or
(b) Stating on the record what the corresponding structure, material, or acts, which are implicitly or inherently set forth in the written description of the specification, perform the claimed functions. For more information, see 37 CFR 1.75(d) and MPEP §§ 608.01(o) and 2181.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1 and 10-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Bigdeli et al. (US Pre-Grant Publication No. 20130138652-A1, hereinafter “Bigdeli”).
With respect to independent claim 1, Bigdeli discloses an information processing apparatus comprising:
a code output unit that outputs a target person code to a target person in at least one of a case where face information on the target person is registered and a case where face authentication of the target person is successful {paras. 0052-0055: “captured face image is compared to the records of the reference face image database 121 by computing a distance between the captured face and the faces from the reference face image database 121. If a candidate matching record is found that meets a satisfactory level of confidence” then “this face and the related employee id” is obtained; note that the limitation is a contingent limitation that has an optional precedent (i.e., “a case where”), and the broadest reasonable interpretation does not require the limitation (at least for process claim 10); See MPEP § 2111.04(II)}.
an iris information registration unit that registers iris information collected from the target person, in association with identification information capable of identifying the target person and the registered face information on the target person, in a case where the target person code is inputted by the target person when registering the iris information on the target person {paras. 0052-0055: “A second biometric identifier, in this example the iris image, is used and the aim is to associate a biometric identifier of the iris image to the respective employee”, and “If a candidate matching record [of the face] is found that meets a satisfactory level of confidence, such as has a distance below a predefined threshold, then the iris image is associated with this face and the related employee id in the iris image database 122”; note that the limitation is a contingent limitation that has an optional precedent (i.e., “a case where”), and the broadest reasonable interpretation does not require the limitation (at least for process claim 10); See MPEP § 2111.04(II)}.
With respect to claims 10-11, a corresponding reasoning as given earlier in this section with respect to claim 1 applies, mutatis mutandis, to the subject matter of claims 10-11; therefore, claims 10-11 are rejected, for similar reasons, under the grounds as set forth for claim 1.
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being clearly anticipated by a general-purpose computer.
The Examiner notes that the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is obliged to give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification during proceedings before the USPTO; See In re ZIetz, 893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (during patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow); See also MPEP 2111.01. It is noted that claims are directed towards “a computer program that allows a computer to execute an information processing method” to perform the recited acts. As opposed to, e.g., a processor and memory with instructions that, when executed by the processor, causes the processor to perform acts, the instant claim merely recites a program that “allows” (i.e., an intended use) performing the following steps. That is, the claim does not require that the computer be programmed to perform the steps that follow (i.e., the claim does not require that the memory actually store the instructions that when executed perform the steps); instead, the claim encompasses embodiments such as a generic, non-programmed computer with an operating system that could be programmed or operated to perform the steps. Thus, the claim is met by any general-purpose computer with sufficient hardware and instruction set that could be operable to perform the claimed acts vs a computer programmed to perform the recited acts. Therefore, the claims are clearly anticipated by any general-purpose computing machine with sufficient hardware and instruction set that is operable to perform the claimed steps.
Allowable Subject Matter
Claim 2 would be allowable if rewritten to overcome the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) set forth in this Office action and to include all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter:
In interpreting the claims, in light of the specification, the Examiner finds the claimed invention to be patentably distinct from the prior art of record.
Bigdeli et al. (US Pre-Grant Publication No. 20130138652-A1, hereinafter “Bigdeli”) teaches enrolling biometric identifiers of a user.
Nicholls et al. (US Pre-Grant Publication No. 20250061177-A1, hereinafter “Nicholls”) teaches enrolling new biometric data received for a user during registration.
The prior art of record fails to teach or suggest, individually or in combination, each and every limitation of the claimed invention. For example, Bigdeli-Nicholls in combination do not anticipate or render obvious the claimed invention as a whole, as recited in claim 2.
Although Bigdeli and Nicholls both disclose facial and retinal registration, neither disclose the features of claim 2 (i.e., alerting the user and failing to register their retina if the facial information for the code they imputed does not match their own face). Further, although halting registration when the user does not match their registration information (e.g., not permitting a user to enroll when they do not match their ID), this falls short of the claim limitation, and the prior art of record does not provide sufficient motivation to be modified and combined in such a way as to render obvious the claimed feature without the usage of impermissible hindsight reasoning.
Thus, the Examiner finds that the prior art does not provide sufficient teaching or motivation for anticipating or rendering obvious the claimed invention as a whole, without the usage of impermissible hindsight reasoning.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Kevin Bechtel whose telephone number is 571-270-5436. The examiner can normally be reached Monday - Friday, 09:00 - 17:00 ET.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, William (“Bill”) Korzuch can be reached at 571-272-7589. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/Kevin Bechtel/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2491
Prosecution Insights