DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Objections
Claim 1 objected to because of the following informalities: “the first status information”. Suggest changing to “a first status information” Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1, 3-5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Pennapareddy (US 20210035457 A1) in view of Bush (US 20170295031 A1)
Regarding claim 1, Pennapareddy teaches A method performed by an urban air mobility (UAM) aircraft, the method comprising: (Claim 1 method of verifying aircraft position information based on automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) messages, the method comprising. [0075] Any number of other systems may be included in the aircraft 600. Although an aerospace example is shown, the present disclosure can be applied to other industries. For example, the position verification system 634 can be used onboard a manned or unmanned vehicle (such as a satellite, a spacecraft, a watercraft, or a land-based vehicle), or in a building or other structure)
receiving first state information of a first UAM aircraft; ([0031] the first aircraft 102 also receives an ADS-B message 130 from another source 106. The ADS-B message 130 includes an identifier 132 of a third aircraft and a position 134 of the third aircraft.)
verifying the first status information; ([0032] the first aircraft 102 accesses the tamper-resistant distributed public ledger 110 for verification of the ADS-B message 130.)
transmitting anomaly information of the first UAM aircraft to a ground control system (GCS) when the first status information is not verified; ([0017] The flight management system 108 is included or integrated in a ground-based station, such as a station operated by a government agency, a station operated by one or more airlines, an ATC station, or any other type of ground-based station. [0034] In situations where the position information indicated in an ADS-B message fails verification, the first aircraft 102 can perform additional actions to attempt to verify the position. To illustrate, the first aircraft 102 transmits a first message 140 to the flight management system 108.)
receiving rule set update information from the GCS when the GCS determines that the first status information is information transmitted by an attacker; and ([0067] The method 400 improves security of ADS-B technology. For example, by verifying whether position data included in an ADS-B message is correct using a tamper-resistant distributed public ledger provides a method for determining if malicious actors provide inaccurate ADS-B messages. Thus, aircraft, ATC stations, or other recipients of ADS-B messages can verify the position data contained therein and ignore malicious ADS-B messages, which improves security of ADS-B technology without requiring encrypting or other techniques that would reduce the transparency of the ADS-B technology.)
updating a rule set based on the rule set update information. ([0036] if the second message 142 indicates that the third aircraft does not exist or that the position 134 failed verification (e.g., that the ADS-B message 130 is not a legitimate ADS-B message), the first aircraft 102 removes the icon corresponding to the third aircraft from the display device or changes to a third characteristic for display. Thus, if an ADS-B message fails verification by the first aircraft 102 and the flight management system 108, the message is interpreted as malicious and inaccurate, and no icon is displayed at the display device. In other implementations, the icon remains with the second characteristic.)
Pennapareddy does not expressly disclose rule set but Bush discloses rule set ([0059] a firewall, such as firewall 112 may inspect the transmitted network packets to determine if the packet matches the firewall's set of filtering rules based on information contained in the packet, such as a combination of the packet's source and destination address, its protocol, and, for TCP and UDP traffic, the port number.)
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention to modify Pennapareddy with the teachings of Bush with a reasonable expectation of success automatically filtering network messages in an aviation network for an aircraft by as taught by Bush (abstract).
Regarding claim 3, Pennapareddy teaches The method of claim 1, wherein the first state information comprises at least one of header information, payload information, global position system (GPS) information ([0027] the first aircraft 102 is described as receiving ADS-B messages, the first aircraft 102, in some implementations, is also includes a GPS receiver or other positioning system and the first aircraft 102 is configured to determine its position and to indicate the position by transmitting ADS-B messages.), and timestamp information.
Regarding claim 4, Pennapareddy teaches The method of claim 1, wherein the verifying the first status information comprises:
retrieving second status information of the first UAM aircraft, which is present in a storage unit; and ([0038] the position verification system 200 is included or integrated in an aircraft, such as the first aircraft 102 of FIG. 1 [0039] The position verification system 200 includes a processor 202, a receiver 204, a transmitter 206, a memory 210, and a display device 220. [0042] , the receiver 204 is configured to receive ADS-B messages from aircraft (or other sources). For example, the receiver 204 receives the ADS-B message 120 and the ADS-B message 130)
verifying the first status information based on the first status information and the second status information. ([0045] the receiver 204 receives ADS-B messages. For example, the receiver 204 receives the ADS-B message 120 (e.g., from the second aircraft 104 of FIG. 1) and the ADS-B message 130 (e.g., from the other source 106 of FIG. 1). The ADS-B message 120 indicates the identifier 122 of the second aircraft 104 and the position 124 of the second aircraft 104. The ADS-B message 130 indicates the identifier 132 of the third aircraft and the position 134 of the third aircraft. However, as described with reference to FIG. 1, the ADS-B message 130 is generated by a malicious actor, and the third aircraft is not actually located at the position 134.)
Regarding claim 5, Pennapareddy teaches The method of claim 4, wherein the second status information is equivalent to information received before the receiving of the first status information. ([0023] some systems receive the first entry while other systems receive the second entry before the first entry)
Claims 2, 6-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Pennapareddy (US 20210035457 A1) in view of Bush (US 20170295031 A1) in further view of Carmack (US 9725171 B1)
Regarding claim 2, Pennapareddy does not expressly disclose but Carmack discloses The method of claim 1, wherein, based on the rule set being updated, information from the attacker is blocked. (Col 16 Line 15-18 At operation 508, a corrective action may be performed upon detection of the spoofing. For example, the UAV may perform a combination of corrective actions to confirm, avoid, and/or report the GPS spoofing.)
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention to modify Pennapareddy with the teachings of Carmack with a reasonable expectation of success by determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of an unmanned vehicle may be trusted as taught by Carmack (abstract).
Regarding claim 6, Pennapareddy teaches A method performed by a ground control system (GCS), the method comprising: (Claim 1 method of verifying aircraft position information based on automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) messages, the method comprising. [0017] The flight management system 108 is included or integrated in a ground-based station, such as a station operated by a government agency, a station operated by one or more airlines, an ATC station, or any other type of ground-based station.)
receiving first status information of a first UAM aircraft; ([0031] the first aircraft 102 also receives an ADS-B message 130 from another source 106. The ADS-B message 130 includes an identifier 132 of a third aircraft and a position 134 of the third aircraft.)
retrieving second state information present in a storage unit; ([0038] the position verification system 200 is included or integrated in an aircraft, such as the first aircraft 102 of FIG. 1 [0039] The position verification system 200 includes a processor 202, a receiver 204, a transmitter 206, a memory 210, and a display device 220. [0042] , the receiver 204 is configured to receive ADS-B messages from aircraft (or other sources). For example, the receiver 204 receives the ADS-B message 120 and the ADS-B message 130)
obtaining verification information based on a difference between the first state information and the second state information; ([0045] the receiver 204 receives ADS-B messages. For example, the receiver 204 receives the ADS-B message 120 (e.g., from the second aircraft 104 of FIG. 1) and the ADS-B message 130 (e.g., from the other source 106 of FIG. 1). The ADS-B message 120 indicates the identifier 122 of the second aircraft 104 and the position 124 of the second aircraft 104. The ADS-B message 130 indicates the identifier 132 of the third aircraft and the position 134 of the third aircraft. However, as described with reference to FIG. 1, the ADS-B message 130 is generated by a malicious actor, and the third aircraft is not actually located at the position 134.)
verifying the first state information based on the verification information([0032] the first aircraft 102 accesses the tamper-resistant distributed public ledger 110 for verification of the ADS-B message 130.) and a flight plan of the first UAM aircraft; and ([0025] the flight management system 108 generates a single entry that includes the first flight plan data 112, the second flight plan data 114, and the third flight plan data 116.)
Pennapareddy does not expressly disclose but Carmack discloses determining whether the first state information is equivalent to information transmitted by an attacker when the first state information is not verified. (Col 6 Line 1-18 the GPS data may be determined to be spoofed. Different types of discrepancies may exist and may indicate that the GPS data may be spoofed. In an example, the discrepancy may be direct or instantaneous (e.g., a sudden change in the GPS data indicating that the UAV 110 instantaneously flew a distance beyond what may be possible). In another example, the discrepancy may be over time (e.g., the GPS data more subtly change, but may indicate that UAV 110 flew a distance for a time period beyond what may be possible for that time period). In yet another example, the discrepancy may relate to a pre-stored flight route. For instance, the UAV 110 may have received and stored a flight route from the servers 122. If the flight state indicates an unacceptable deviation from that route, the GPS data may be spoofed. An example of this GPS data-based technique is further illustrated in FIG. 8)
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention to modify Pennapareddy with the teachings of Carmack with a reasonable expectation of success by determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of an unmanned vehicle may be trusted as taught by Carmack (abstract).
Regarding claim 7, Pennapareddy does not expressly disclose but Carmack discloses The method of claim 6, further comprising:
discarding the first state information when the first state information is equivalent to the information transmitted by the attacker. (Col 3 Line 22-23 Upon detection that data associated with an autonomous operation is untrusted, an unmanned vehicle may perform various corrective actions, some of which may be autonomously performed independently of the untrusted data)
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention to modify Pennapareddy with the teachings of Carmack with a reasonable expectation of success by determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of an unmanned vehicle may be trusted as taught by Carmack (abstract).
Regarding claim 8, Pennapareddy does not expressly disclose but Carmack discloses The method of claim 6, further comprising:
controlling the first UAM aircraft when the first status information is not equivalent to the information transmitted by the attacker. (Col 3 Line 20-38 Upon detection that data associated with an autonomous operation is untrusted, an unmanned vehicle may perform various corrective actions, some of which may be autonomously performed independently of the untrusted data. In an example, the unmanned vehicle may perform a certain maneuver independent of the untrusted data. In another example, the unmanned vehicle may report the untrusted data and/or the associated location to another unmanned vehicle. In yet another example, the unmanned vehicle may report the untrusted data to a central station and may enable remote control from the central station over operations of the unmanned vehicle. The central station may also collect reports of untrusted data and associated locations from different unmanned vehicles to generate a map. The map may enable deploying unmanned vehicles according to paths that may avoid hot spots corresponding to locations or areas of untrusted data. The map may also help with identifying and tracking such hot spots. These and other features and functionalities are described herein next.)
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention to modify Pennapareddy with the teachings of Carmack with a reasonable expectation of success by determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of an unmanned vehicle may be trusted as taught by Carmack (abstract).
Regarding claim 9, Pennapareddy teaches The method of claim 6, wherein the first state information comprises at least one of header information, payload information, global position system (GPS) information ([0027] the first aircraft 102 is described as receiving ADS-B messages, the first aircraft 102, in some implementations, is also includes a GPS receiver or other positioning system and the first aircraft 102 is configured to determine its position and to indicate the position by transmitting ADS-B messages.), and timestamp information, and
wherein a determination is made whether the first status information is equivalent to the information transmitted by the attacker based on status information periodically received from the first UAM aircraft. ([0067] The method 400 improves security of ADS-B technology. For example, by verifying whether position data included in an ADS-B message is correct using a tamper-resistant distributed public ledger provides a method for determining if malicious actors provide inaccurate ADS-B messages. Thus, aircraft, ATC stations, or other recipients of ADS-B messages can verify the position data contained therein and ignore malicious ADS-B messages, which improves security of ADS-B technology without requiring encrypting or other techniques that would reduce the transparency of the ADS-B technology.)
Regarding claim 10, Pennapareddy teaches The method of claim 6, wherein the second status information is equivalent to information received before the receiving of the first status information. ([0023] some systems receive the first entry while other systems receive the second entry before the first entry)
Regarding claim 11, Pennapareddy teaches A method performed by a ground control system (GCS), the method comprising: (Claim 1 method of verifying aircraft position information based on automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) messages, the method comprising. [0017] The flight management system 108 is included or integrated in a ground-based station, such as a station operated by a government agency, a station operated by one or more airlines, an ATC station, or any other type of ground-based station.)
receiving, from one or more first UAM aircraft, anomaly information of a second UAM aircraft ([0017] The flight management system 108 is included or integrated in a ground-based station, such as a station operated by a government agency, a station operated by one or more airlines, an ATC station, or any other type of ground-based station. [0034] In situations where the position information indicated in an ADS-B message fails verification, the first aircraft 102 can perform additional actions to attempt to verify the position. To illustrate, the first aircraft 102 transmits a first message 140 to the flight management system 108.) when the one or more first UAM aircraft receive first status information of the second UAM aircraft and the first status information is not verified by the one or more first UAM aircraft; and ([0067] The method 400 improves security of ADS-B technology. For example, by verifying whether position data included in an ADS-B message is correct using a tamper-resistant distributed public ledger provides a method for determining if malicious actors provide inaccurate ADS-B messages. Thus, aircraft, ATC stations, or other recipients of ADS-B messages can verify the position data contained therein and ignore malicious ADS-B messages, which improves security of ADS-B technology without requiring encrypting or other techniques that would reduce the transparency of the ADS-B technology.)
Pennapareddy does not expressly disclose but Carmack discloses determining whether the one or more first UAM aircraft have falsely transmitted the anomaly information. (Col 3 Line 22-23 Upon detection that data associated with an autonomous operation is untrusted, an unmanned vehicle may perform various corrective actions, some of which may be autonomously performed independently of the untrusted data)
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention to modify Pennapareddy with the teachings of Carmack with a reasonable expectation of success by determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of an unmanned vehicle may be trusted as taught by Carmack (abstract).
Regarding claim 12, Pennapareddy does not expressly disclose but Carmack discloses The method of claim 11, further comprising:
discarding the anomaly information when the one or more first UAM aircraft have falsely transmitted the anomaly information; and (Col 3 Line 22-23 Upon detection that data associated with an autonomous operation is untrusted, an unmanned vehicle may perform various corrective actions, some of which may be autonomously performed independently of the untrusted data)
blocking information transmitted by the one or more first UAM aircraft. (Col 16 Line 15-18 At operation 508, a corrective action may be performed upon detection of the spoofing. For example, the UAV may perform a combination of corrective actions to confirm, avoid, and/or report the GPS spoofing.)
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention to modify Pennapareddy with the teachings of Carmack with a reasonable expectation of success by determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of an unmanned vehicle may be trusted as taught by Carmack (abstract).
Regarding claim 13, Pennapareddy teaches The method of claim 11, further comprising:
transmitting rule set update information to the one or more first UAM aircraft when the one or more first UAM aircraft did not falsely transmit the anomaly information. ([0036] The first aircraft 102 updates display of the icon corresponding to the third aircraft based on the second message 142. For example, if the second message 142 indicates that the position 134 is verified, the first aircraft 102 modifies the characteristic of the icon (e.g., changes the icon from the second color to the first color) to indicate that the position of the third aircraft is verified.)
Regarding claim 14, Pennapareddy teaches The method of claim 11, wherein the determining whether the one or more first UAM aircraft having been falsely transmitted the anomaly information comprises:
determining whether the one or more first UAM aircraft are present in a same area; and ([0014] The present disclosure describes systems and methods to verify aircraft position information based on ADS-B messages. The position information included in ADS-B messages is verified through accessing of a tamper-resistant distributed public ledger (e.g., a blockchain) that is used to store flight plan data for flights in a related geographical area.)
determining whether the one or more first UAM aircraft have transmitted the anomaly information during a same time period. ([0019] Each entry in the tamper-resistant distributed public ledger 110 includes flight plan data for one or more aircraft during a particular time period.)
Regarding claim 15, Pennapareddy teaches The method of claim 11, wherein the determining the one or more first UAM aircraft having been falsely transmitted the anomaly information comprises:
verifying the first status information of the second UAM aircraft. ([0032] the first aircraft 102 accesses the tamper-resistant distributed public ledger 110 for verification of the ADS-B message 130.)
Regarding claim 16, Pennapareddy teaches A ground control system (GCS), comprising: (Claim 1 method of verifying aircraft position information based on automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) messages, the method comprising. [0017] The flight management system 108 is included or integrated in a ground-based station, such as a station operated by a government agency, a station operated by one or more airlines, an ATC station, or any other type of ground-based station.)
receive first status information of a first UAM aircraft, ([0031] the first aircraft 102 also receives an ADS-B message 130 from another source 106. The ADS-B message 130 includes an identifier 132 of a third aircraft and a position 134 of the third aircraft.)
retrieve second state information present in a storage unit, ([0038] the position verification system 200 is included or integrated in an aircraft, such as the first aircraft 102 of FIG. 1 [0039] The position verification system 200 includes a processor 202, a receiver 204, a transmitter 206, a memory 210, and a display device 220. [0042] , the receiver 204 is configured to receive ADS-B messages from aircraft (or other sources). For example, the receiver 204 receives the ADS-B message 120 and the ADS-B message 130)
obtain verification information based on a difference between the first state information and the second state information, ([0045] the receiver 204 receives ADS-B messages. For example, the receiver 204 receives the ADS-B message 120 (e.g., from the second aircraft 104 of FIG. 1) and the ADS-B message 130 (e.g., from the other source 106 of FIG. 1). The ADS-B message 120 indicates the identifier 122 of the second aircraft 104 and the position 124 of the second aircraft 104. The ADS-B message 130 indicates the identifier 132 of the third aircraft and the position 134 of the third aircraft. However, as described with reference to FIG. 1, the ADS-B message 130 is generated by a malicious actor, and the third aircraft is not actually located at the position 134.)
verify the first state information based on the verification information ([0032] the first aircraft 102 accesses the tamper-resistant distributed public ledger 110 for verification of the ADS-B message 130.) and a flight plan of the first UAM aircraft, and ([0025] the flight management system 108 generates a single entry that includes the first flight plan data 112, the second flight plan data 114, and the third flight plan data 116.)
determine whether the first state information is equivalent to information transmitted by an attacker when the first state information is not verified, and ([0067] The method 400 improves security of ADS-B technology. For example, by verifying whether position data included in an ADS-B message is correct using a tamper-resistant distributed public ledger provides a method for determining if malicious actors provide inaccurate ADS-B messages. Thus, aircraft, ATC stations, or other recipients of ADS-B messages can verify the position data contained therein and ignore malicious ADS-B messages, which improves security of ADS-B technology without requiring encrypting or other techniques that would reduce the transparency of the ADS-B technology.)
wherein the second status information is equivalent to information received before the receiving of the first status information. ([0023] some systems receive the first entry while other systems receive the second entry before the first entry)
Pennapareddy does not expressly disclose but Carmack discloses a memory; and (Col 12 Line 59-64 the central station 430 (or the hosting computer system) may include at least one memory 432 and one or more processing units (or processor(s)) 434. The processor(s) 434 may be implemented as appropriate in hardware, computer-executable instructions, software, firmware, or combinations thereof.)
at least one processor, (Col 12 Line 59-64 the central station 430 (or the hosting computer system) may include at least one memory 432 and one or more processing units (or processor(s)) 434. The processor(s) 434 may be implemented as appropriate in hardware, computer-executable instructions, software, firmware, or combinations thereof.)
wherein the at least one processor is configured to: (Col 12 Line 59-64 the central station 430 (or the hosting computer system) may include at least one memory 432 and one or more processing units (or processor(s)) 434. The processor(s) 434 may be implemented as appropriate in hardware, computer-executable instructions, software, firmware, or combinations thereof.)
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention to modify Pennapareddy with the teachings of Carmack with a reasonable expectation of success by determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of an unmanned vehicle may be trusted as taught by Carmack (abstract).
Regarding claim 17, Pennapareddy does not expressly disclose but Carmack discloses The GCS of claim 16, wherein the at least one processor is configured to:
discard the first state information when the first state information is equivalent to the information transmitted by the attacker. (Col 3 Line 22-23 Upon detection that data associated with an autonomous operation is untrusted, an unmanned vehicle may perform various corrective actions, some of which may be autonomously performed independently of the untrusted data)
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention to modify Pennapareddy with the teachings of Carmack with a reasonable expectation of success by determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of an unmanned vehicle may be trusted as taught by Carmack (abstract).
Regarding claim 18, Pennapareddy does not expressly disclose but Carmack discloses The GCS of claim 16, wherein the at least one processor is configured to:
control the first UAM aircraft when the first status information is not equivalent to the information transmitted by the attacker. (Col 3 Line 20-38 Upon detection that data associated with an autonomous operation is untrusted, an unmanned vehicle may perform various corrective actions, some of which may be autonomously performed independently of the untrusted data. In an example, the unmanned vehicle may perform a certain maneuver independent of the untrusted data. In another example, the unmanned vehicle may report the untrusted data and/or the associated location to another unmanned vehicle. In yet another example, the unmanned vehicle may report the untrusted data to a central station and may enable remote control from the central station over operations of the unmanned vehicle. The central station may also collect reports of untrusted data and associated locations from different unmanned vehicles to generate a map. The map may enable deploying unmanned vehicles according to paths that may avoid hot spots corresponding to locations or areas of untrusted data. The map may also help with identifying and tracking such hot spots. These and other features and functionalities are described herein next.)
Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention to modify Pennapareddy with the teachings of Carmack with a reasonable expectation of success by determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of an unmanned vehicle may be trusted as taught by Carmack (abstract).
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to SARAH TRAN whose telephone number is (313)446-6642. The examiner can normally be reached 8am-5pm M-F.
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/S.A.T./Examiner, Art Unit 3656
/KHOI H TRAN/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3656
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