DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on 12/10/2024 & 03/18/2025 is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 54, 56-57, 67 & 69-73 are rejected under 35 U.S.C 103 as being unpatentable over Wiseman et al. (US 2010/0299526), hereon referred to as Wiseman, in view of Maeda et al. (US 2009/0316910), and hereon referred to as Maeda.
In regards to claims 54, 71 & 73 agreeing, between the intermediary device and each of the endpoint devices, a respective QKD key, K., over the corresponding quantum communication channel (KMC1 will transmit a quantum signal to node 2 and establish a quantum key with node 2 as in conventional QKD. It will then use this key to transport some random numbers to node 2 which are used to modulate the quantum signal to the next node in the path, say node 3. KMC1 subsequently agrees a quantum key with node 3 and uses this key tell transport some random numbers to node 3 to use for modulation of the quantum signal transmitted to the next node; Paragraphs 0135-0140); determining a group key for secure communication within the group of endpoint devices ( Nodes that only appear on paths from one KMC need only maintain one identity. Node.sub.3 and Node.sub.4; The KMCs need to maintain the identity of all their end points and any network nodes that are used to reach them. Once each endpoint in a group has been provided with the relevant group key that group key can be used to encrypt communications between them; Paragraphs 0134-0140); sending, from the intermediary device to each of the endpoint devices over the corresponding classical communication channel, respective group key information (It then generates a group key and passes this to the end points using the end point encryption key to protect the group key. Where paths from different KMCs to their end points pass through a network node, that node must have an identity for each KMC; Paragraphs 0135-0140).
However, Wiseman does not disclose wherein the respective group key information comprises information useable by the corresponding endpoint device to derive an identity of the group key, said information being encrypted with the respective QKD key agreed between the intermediary device and the corresponding endpoint device; and deriving, by each of the endpoint devices, the identity of the group key. In an analogous art Maeda discloses wherein the respective group key information comprises information useable by the corresponding endpoint device to derive an identity of the group key, said information being encrypted with the respective QKD key agreed between the intermediary device and the corresponding endpoint device (the center node 10 extracts a quantum key K2.sub.OTP from the random number sequence K2 that has been shared with the remote node RN-2, OTP-encrypts the remote key Kr(1-2) by using the quantum key K2.sub.OTP, and transmits the OTP-encrypted remote key Kr(1-2) to the remote node RN-2 through the classical channel; Paragraphs 0070-0075); and deriving, by each of the endpoint devices, the identity of the group key (The remote node RN-2 extracts the same quantum key K2.sub.OTP from its own random number sequence K2, decrypts the OTP-encrypted remote key Kr(1-2), and stores the remote key Kr(1-2) in the remote key memory; Paragraphs 0070-0075).
At the time before the effective filing date of the invention, it would have been obvious to the one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings disclosed by Wiseman, with the teachings disclosed by Maeda regarding wherein the respective group key information comprises information useable by the corresponding endpoint device to derive an identity of the group key, said information being encrypted with the respective QKD key agreed between the intermediary device and the corresponding endpoint device; and deriving, by each of the endpoint devices, the identity of the group key. The suggestion/motivation of the combination would have been to provide additional security in document record compression/encryption (Liu; Paragraph 0001).
In regards to claim 56 Maeda discloses wherein determining the group key comprises: determining that the QKD key agreed between a or the first endpoint device and the intermediary device is the group key (the center node 10 selects a part to be used as the remote key Kr(1-2) from the random number sequence K1 and notifies the remote node RN-1, through the classical channel, of information indicating the range corresponding to the remote key Kr(1-2); Paragraphs 0070-0075).
In regards to claim 57, Wiseman discloses wherein the information useable to derive the identity of the group key comprises the group key (It then generates a group key and passes this to the end points using the end point encryption key to protect the group key. Where paths from different KMCs to their end points pass through a network node, that node must have an identity for each KMC; Paragraphs 0135-0140).
In regards to claim 67, Maeda discloses wherein the information useable to derive the identity of the group key within the respective group key information is encrypted with the respective QKD key.
68. (New) The computer-implemented method according to claim 67, wherein the information useable to derive the identity of the group key is encrypted by performing an XOR operation of said information with the respective QKD key ( the center node 10 extracts a quantum key K2.sub.OTP from the random number sequence K2 that has been shared with the remote node RN-2, OTP-encrypts the remote key Kr(1-2) by using the quantum key K2.sub.OTP, and transmits the OTP-encrypted remote key Kr(1-2) to the remote node RN-2 through the classical channel; Paragraphs 0070-0075).
In regards to claim 69, Maeda discloses wherein deriving the identity of the group key comprises decrypting, by each of the endpoint devices, the respectively received group key information using the respective QKD key agreed between the intermediary device and the corresponding endpoint device (The remote node RN-2 extracts the same quantum key K2.sub.OTP from its own random number sequence K2, decrypts the OTP-encrypted remote key Kr(1-2), and stores the remote key Kr(1-2) in the remote key memory 205 (Step S307). Here, the range (file number) of the quantum key K2.sub.OTP used for OTP-encryption can also be designated by the key management server; Paragraphs 0070-0075).
In regards to claim 70, Maeda discloses wherein decrypting the respectively received group key information comprises performing an XOR operation of the respectively received group key information and the respective QKD key agreed between the intermediary device and the corresponding endpoint device (The one-time pad (OTP) encryption is an encryption scheme that uses a cryptographic key equal to plain text in quantity and guarantees that cipher text is unbreakable unless the cryptographic key has periodicity. The remote key Kr(1-2) is OTP-encrypted by using the quantum key K2.sub.OTP and OTP-delivered, whereby the remote node RN-2 can securely share the remote key Kr(1-2); Paragraphs 0070-0076).
In regards to claim 72, Wiseman discloses further comprising determining a group key for secure communication within the group of endpoint devices (It then generates a group key and passes this to the end points using the end point encryption key to protect the group key. Where paths from different KMCs to their end points pass through a network node, that node must have an identity for each KMC. In the example, Node.sub.2 and Node.sub.5 are in this position. Both KMCs use them to reach their end points and so the nodes need to maintain a separate identity with each; Paragraphs 0130-0130).
Claims 55, 58-66 are rejected under 35 U.S.C 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Wiseman and Maeda, in view of Ko et al. (US 2022/0006627), hereon referred to as Ko.
In regards to claim 55, the combination of Wiseman and Maeda does not disclose the group of endpoint devices further comprises a first endpoint device; determining the group key comprises determining the group key at the first endpoint device; and respective group key information is not sent to the first endpoint device. In an analogous art Ko discloses the group of endpoint devices further comprises a first endpoint device; determining the group key comprises determining the group key at the first endpoint device; and respective group key information is not sent to the first endpoint device (The quantum key orchestration module 130a generates a group key using a random number, assigns a group key ID thereto at step S503, and delivers the group key and the group key ID to the secure application 10a. The secure application 10a of the site A that starts the first group cryptographic communication transmits the group key ID to all of the secure applications 10b and 10c with which the secure application 10a performs group cryptographic communication; Paragraphs 0165-0170).
At the time before the effective filing date of the invention, it would have been obvious to the one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings disclosed by the combination of Wiseman and Maeda, with the teachings disclosed by Ko regarding the group of endpoint devices further comprises a first endpoint device; determining the group key comprises determining the group key at the first endpoint device; and respective group key information is not sent to the first endpoint device. The suggestion/motivation of the combination would have been to provide additional security in quantum key distribution (Ko; Paragraph 0001).
In regards to claim 58 Ko discloses wherein determining the group key comprises: determining a new encryption key, Ko, as being the group key (The quantum key orchestration module 130a generates a group key using a random number, assigns a group key ID thereto at step S503, and delivers the group key and the group key ID to the secure application 10a. The secure application 10a of the site A that starts the first group cryptographic communication transmits the group key ID to all of the secure applications 10b and 10c with which the secure application 10a performs group cryptographic communication; Paragraphs 0165-0170).
In regards to claim 59, Ko discloses wherein the new encryption key, Ko, is a randomly generated string of bits (The quantum key orchestration module 130a generates a group key using a random number, assigns a group key ID thereto at step S503, and delivers the group key and the group key ID to the secure application 10a. The secure application 10a of the site A that starts the first group cryptographic communication transmits the group key ID to all of the secure applications 10b and 10c with which the secure application 10a performs group cryptographic communication; Paragraphs 0165-0170).
In regards to claim 60, Ko discloses sending, from the first endpoint device to the intermediary device, a copy of the group key, Ko, encrypted with the QKD key agreed between the first endpoint device and the intermediary device; and creating, by the intermediary device, the respective group key information to be sent to each endpoint device other than the first endpoint device, wherein the respective group key information comprises the group key (The quantum key orchestration module 130a of the site A encrypts the group key with the outbound quantum key pertaining to the site B; Paragraphs 0170-0175).
In regards to claim 61, Ko discloses after receiving an encrypted copy of the encryption key, and before creating the respective group key information: decrypting the encrypted copy of the group key to obtain a copy of the group key, Ko ( the quantum key orchestration module 130b of the site B decrypts the group key included in the packet with the inbound quantum key; Paragraphs 01710-0175).
In regards to claims 62 & 65, Ko discloses wherein encrypting and/or decrypting the copy of the group key comprises performing an XOR operation of the group key or encrypted group key with the QKD key agreed between the first endpoint device and the intermediary device (The encryption modules 133a and 133b and the decryption modules 135a and 135b use an exclusive-OR operation or a block cipher; an exclusive-OR operation may be used when the number of keys that are generated at the quantum key generation rate is greater than the number of keys required by a secure application. Also, because a one-time pad (OTP) is used, the information-theoretic security of the quantum key may be ensured; Paragraphs 0110-0115).
In regards to claim 63, Wiseman discloses sending, from the first endpoint device to each of the other endpoint devices over corresponding inter-endpoint device communication channels, a copy of the group key, Ko, encrypted with the QKD key agreed between the first endpoint device and the intermediary device, wherein the information useable to derive the identity of the group key comprises the QKD key agreed between the first endpoint device and the intermediary device (KMC1 will transmit a quantum signal to node 2 and establish a quantum key with node 2 as in conventional QKD. It will then use this key to transport some random numbers to node 2 which are used to modulate the quantum signal to the next node in the path, say node 3; Paragraphs 0135-0140).
In regards to claim 64, Maeda discloses wherein deriving, by each of the endpoint devices other than the first endpoint device, the identity of the group key comprises: obtaining, based on the respective group key information and the respective QKD key, a copy of the QKD key agreed between the first endpoint device and the intermediary device; and deriving the identity of the group key from an encrypted copy of the group key received from the first endpoint device based on the copy of the QKD key agreed between the first endpoint device and the intermediary device (the center node 10 extracts a quantum key K2.sub.OTP from the random number sequence K2 that has been shared with the remote node RN-2, OTP-encrypts the remote key Kr(1-2) by using the quantum key K2.sub.OTP, and transmits the OTP-encrypted remote key Kr(1-2) to the remote node RN-2 through the classical channel (Step S306).
[0075] The remote node RN-2 extracts the same quantum key K2.sub.OTP from its own random number sequence K2, decrypts the OTP-encrypted remote key Kr(1-2), and stores the remote key Kr(1-2) in the remote key memory 205 (Step S307). Here, the range (file number) of the quantum key K2.sub.OTP used for OTP-encryption can also be designated by the key management server; Paragraphs 0070-0075).
In regards to claim 66, Wiseman discloses wherein the inter-endpoint device communication channels are classical communication channels (All five nodes are connected to a common classical channel 625 which carries messages between the various sub-systems to discuss the outcome of the transmission on the quantum channels, in accordance with the well-known principles of quantum key distribution; Paragraphs 0140-0145).
Conclusion
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/SHARIF E ULLAH/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2495
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