DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on March 23, 2026 is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
The Applicant argues as follows:
“A proper obviousness determination requires the examiner to make "a searching comparison of the claimed invention - including all its limitations - with the teaching of the prior art." In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Thus, "obviousness requires a suggestion of all limitations in a claim." CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Intern. Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Furthermore, "there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)(emphasis added). See In re Wada and Murphy, BPAI Appeal No. 2007-3733 (January 14, 2008). In the present case, the cited references, whether taken alone or in combination, fail to teach or suggest all of the limitations of the present claims.”
The Examiner acknowledges the Applicant’s comments and the use of case law. The argued specific points will be addressed below.
It is then argued: “Claim 1 is rejected as obvious in view of Islim and Miller. Claim 1 recites, in part, the following:
[...] wherein the sensor is configured to sense vehicle state information, and transmit the vehicle state information as sensed to the domain controller through an end-to-end communication protection protocol;
wherein the domain controller is configured to acquire a control instruction based on the vehicle state information as received, and transmit a corresponding control instruction to a corresponding actuator through the end-to-end communication protection protocol; and
wherein the end-to-end communication protection protocol is additionally provided with a cyclic code that is variable and configured to encrypt information for communication.
The technical solution of Islim relates to end-to-end integrity protection built into ASIC hardware, using a counter-based cyclic redundancy check (CRC) checksum. The technical limitation of Islim is that it provides integrity but not confidentiality.”
The Examiner respectfully disagrees. In response to applicant's argument that the references fail to show certain features of the invention, it is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., “confidentiality”) are not recited in the rejected claim(s). Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The communications between the sensor, domain controller, and actuator are directed towards communicating using end-to-end communication protection protocols, and of including a cyclic code. The CRC or cyclic code (i.e., integrity) in Islim is equivalent to what being claimed by the Applicant, wherein the “E2E module of the control unit (i.e., domain controller) sends protected E2E messages that include error check information using a CRC (i.e., cyclic code), column 24, lines 17-18 & 39-42, wherein the teachings disclose that the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) is based upon a counter value, column 21, lines 26-34 and column 24, lines 39-42” as taught by Islim. The Examiner finds the Applicant’s argument to be non-persuasive.
The Applicant argues: “The Office acknowledges on page 7 of the Office action that Islim "fail[s] to disclose of using [end-to-end] E2E to encrypt the communications." On this basis, Applicant respectfully submits that the purpose of Islim is to migrate end-to-end (E2E) communication protection from traditional microprocessors (software implementation) to ASIC hardware, achieving tamper resistance through hardware isolation. (See col. 3, lines 10-20 of Islim). Islim teaches that the purpose of the end-to-end protection is to ensure that intermediate nodes (such as microcontrollers) cannot tamper with the data during the transmission of data from the ASIC hardware at the transmitting end to the ASIC hardware at the receiving end. Islim does not teach performing confidentiality processing on the communication content itself through encryption algorithms.
Therefore, Islim does not teach the end-to-end communication protection protocol as recited in claim 1.”
The Examiner disagrees with the Applicant’s arguments. The Examiner notes the Applicant’s argument above “Islim teaches that the purpose of the end-to-end protection is to ensure that intermediate nodes (such as microcontrollers) cannot tamper with the data during the transmission of data from the ASIC hardware at the transmitting end to the ASIC hardware at the receiving end” is an admission that Islim discloses for the claimed “end-to-end protection” since it cannot be tampered with, hence it is protected. Furthermore, Islim discloses: “E2E module of the control unit (i.e., domain controller) sends protected E2E messages that include error check information using a CRC (i.e., cyclic code), column 24, lines 17-18 & 39-42, wherein the teachings disclose that the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) is based upon a counter value, column 21, lines 26-34 and column 24, lines 39-42” is another form of protection for the end-to-end protocol since an error check code maintains the integrity or protection the data being transmitted.
In response to applicant's argument that the references fail to show certain features of the invention, it is noted that the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., “Islim does not teach performing confidentiality processing”) are not recited in the rejected claim(s). Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). As argued “Islim does not teach performing confidentiality processing on the communication content itself through encryption algorithms,” the Examiner relies upon the teachings of Miller for disclosing of end-to-end (E2E) communication protocol using encryption (argued later in the Examiner’s remarks section below). The Applicant’s arguments are non-persuasive.
The Applicant then argues: “The Office argues on page 6 of the Office action that col. 4, lines 47-60 and col. 5, lines 19-32 of Islim disclose "the sensor is configured to sense vehicle state information, and transmit the vehicle state information as sensed to the domain controller through an end-to-end communication protection protocol" as recited in claim 1.
Applicant respectfully disagrees. Col. 4, lines 47-60 of Islim teach a remote sensor configured to perform measurements and send the obtained data to the control module 60. However, Islim fails to teach that the remote sensor sends data to the control module 60 through an end-to-end communication protection protocol. Therefore, Islim does not teach a "sensor is configured to [...] transmit the vehicle state information as sensed to the domain controller through an end-to-end communication protection protocol" as recited in claim 1.”
The Examiner respectfully disagrees. Islim discloses “remote sensors collect physical measurements and convert the measurements into electronic data, the remote sensors measure vehicle state information such as impact, tire pressure sensors, and to detect impact, column 4, lines 47-60), and transmit the vehicle state information as sensed to the domain controller through an end-to-end communication protection protocol (E2E communications take place while transmitting the vehicle state information sensed to the control unit (i.e., domain controller), column 5, lines 19-32.” As argued above, Islim additionally discloses: “E2E module of the control unit (i.e., domain controller) sends protected E2E messages that include error check information using a CRC (i.e., cyclic code), column 24, lines 17-18 & 39-42, wherein the teachings disclose that the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) is based upon a counter value, column 21, lines 26-34 and column 24, lines 39-42” is another form of protection for the end-to-end protocol since an error check code maintains the integrity or protection the data being transmitted. The Examiner finds the Applicant’s arguments to be non-persuasive.
The Applicant argues: “The Office argues on page 6 of the Office action that col. 5, lines 19-38 of Islim disclose that "the domain controller is configured to acquire a control instruction based on the vehicle state information as received, and transmit a corresponding control instruction to a corresponding actuator through the end-to-end communication protection protocol" as recited in claim 1.
Applicant respectfully disagrees. Col. 5, lines 19-38 of Islim teach that microcontroller 66 (part of the control unit 60) calculates and generates a signal based on data received from the remote sensor 62. Islim does not teach that the generated signal is subsequently issued through an end-to-end communication protection protocol. Islim only teaches that ASIC 68 includes end-to-end hardware logic, but end-to-end hardware logic is not equivalent to an "end-to-end communication protection protocol.
Therefore, Islim does not teach "the domain controller is configured to [...] transmit a corresponding control instruction to a corresponding actuator through the end-to-end communication protection protocol" as recited in claim 1.”
The Examiner disagrees with the Applicant’s assertion. Islim discloses “E2E communications take place while transmitting the vehicle state information sensed to the control unit (i.e., domain controller), a decision is made within the control unit (i.e., domain controller) whether to activate/ deploy the remote actuator using E2E communications, column 5, lines 19-38”. As previously addressed above with respect to Islim, it is taught “E2E module of the control unit (i.e., domain controller) sends protected E2E messages that include error check information using a CRC (i.e., cyclic code), column 24, lines 17-18 & 39-42, wherein the teachings disclose that the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) is based upon a counter value, column 21, lines 26-34 and column 24, lines 39-42”.
In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). As argued “Islim does not teach performing confidentiality processing on the communication content itself through encryption algorithms,” the Examiner relies upon the teachings of Miller for disclosing of end-to-end (E2E) communication protocol using encryption (argued later in the Examiner’s remarks section below). The Examiner finds the Applicant’s arguments to be non-persuasive.
It is then argued: :The Office acknowledges on pages 6-7 of the Office action that Islim only discloses using an end-to-end communication protocol for protection, but does not disclose using an end-to-end communication protocol for encrypting communications. Applicant agrees that Islim does not teach an end-to-end communication protocol for encrypting communications. Islim teaches that the core purpose of the E2E module is to ensure that communication data has not been tampered with, rather than to prevent data from being eavesdropped, see col. 3, lines 10-20. The cyclic redundancy check (CRC) of Islim is a check code, not an encryption algorithm. CRC can only detect whether data has been modified, and cannot hide the data content itself. That is, the state data transmitted in Islim is transmitted in plaintext, and anyone who intercepts the message can directly read the state data.
Therefore, Islim does not teach "end-to-end communication protection protocol is additionally provided with a cyclic code that is variable and configured to encrypt information for communication" as recited in claim 1.”
The Examiner disagrees, Islim teaches “E2E module of the control unit (i.e., domain controller) sends protected E2E messages that include error check information using a CRC (i.e., cyclic code), column 24, lines 17-18 & 39-42, wherein the teachings disclose that the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) is based upon a counter value, column 21, lines 26-34 and column 24, lines 39-42. Since the CRC is based upon a changing counter value, column 24, lines 29-38, the Examiner is interpreting it to be variable since it is dependent upon the changing counter value”. As argued by the Applicant: “Islim teaches that the purpose of the end-to-end protection is to ensure that intermediate nodes (such as microcontrollers) cannot tamper with the data during the transmission of data from the ASIC hardware at the transmitting end to the ASIC hardware at the receiving end” is an admission that Islim discloses for the claimed “end-to-end protection” since it cannot be tampered with, hence it is protected.
In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Examiner relies upon the teachings of Miller for disclosing of end-to-end (E2E) communication protocol using encryption. The Applicant’s arguments are non-persuasive.
It is then argued by the Applicant: “The Office argues that it would be obvious to modify Islim in view of Miller. The technical solution of Miller relates to identity authentication and message signatures based on short-term symmetric keys, requiring a key server and mTLS authentication. The technical limitation of Miller is that, while confidentiality is strong, it has high overhead and high latency, making it unsuitable for vehicle real-time control signals.
The Office further argues on page 7 of the Office action: Miller et al discloses of using E2E communication protocols by encrypting data send between components connected on a CAN bus of an autonomous vehicle, or AV, that includes sensors, actuators, and communication devices, column 3, lines 53-61, column 11, lines 52-58, and column 12, lines 24-34. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have been motivated to protect data sent between devices in a vehicle network to ensure its integrity and reception by authorized devices operating within the vehicle network. Miller et al discloses of verifying messages received from other devices, and certifying messages sent to other devices by encrypting the communications between the sender and receiver using a symmetric key for encryption for the point-to-point (i.e., E2E) communications, column 12, lines 24-34. Although the teachings of Islim et al discloses of using E2E for protection, Miller et al offers further protection by encrypting data sent and received between two devices by usage of encryption using signed messages to verify both parties to each other, column 3, lines 53-61, by offering a level of enhanced protection to the communication process of Islim et al.
Applicant respectfully disagrees. The Office argues that col. 3, lines 53-61 of Miller teaches encrypted data. However, col. 3, lines 53-61 of Miller teaches using symmetric key signatures as an alternative to reduce overhead, and teaches away from using end- to-end communication protection protocol as recited in claim 1. Although Miller uses the term "symmetric encryption key," the "encryption key" described in col. 3, lines 53-61 refers to a key used to generate a digital signature, not a key used for encryption (in cryptography, symmetric keys can be used for both encryption and signature generation). Therefore, the digital signature encryption key of Miller does not teach the end-to-end communication protection protocol as recited in claim 1.”
The Examiner disagrees. Miller discloses “However, symmetric cryptography can be advantageous for an AV if the keys are secure. For example, if a sender and receiver both possess a shared key, they can encrypt and/or sign messages using the shared key, which effectively takes the place of the session key as in a TLS transaction,” col. 3, lines 53-61. The Applicant is attacking Miller for solely using symmetric keys for digital signatures, however Miller additionally uses the keys for point to point encryption (i.e., end-to-end) communications protocols, col. 3, lines 53-61; column 11, lines 52-58: and column 12, lines 24-34 on an autonomous vehicle (AV) comprising different AV devices communicating with one another locally within the AV device. The teachings of Miller have been shown to disclose of end-to-end communication protection protocol using encryption.
It is additionally argued: “Moreover, Miller does not teach that the symmetric key is used to encrypt data content. The Office argues on page 7 of the Office action that col. 11, lines 52-58 of Miller teach encrypted communication. However, col. 11, lines 52-58 of Miller only teach that AV device 30 uses the symmetric key encryption technology mentioned throughout the specification. As shown above, the use of symmetric key encryption taught by Miller is not used to encrypt data and is used for digital signatures.
The Office argues on page 7 of the Office action that col. 12, lines 24-34 of Miller teach using symmetric keys to encrypt point-to-point communication. However, col. 12, lines 24-34 of Miller teach allocating independent symmetric signature keys for each point-to-point communication channel, rather than encryption keys. As shown above, the use of symmetric key encryption taught by Miller is not used to encrypt data and is used for digital signatures.
Therefore, Miller does not teach several recited elements of claim 1.”
As addressed in the previous section, the Examiner disagrees. Miller discloses “However, symmetric cryptography can be advantageous for an AV if the keys are secure. For example, if a sender and receiver both possess a shared key, they can encrypt and/or sign messages using the shared key, which effectively takes the place of the session key as in a TLS transaction,” col. 3, lines 53-61. The Applicant is attacking Miller for solely using symmetric keys for digital signatures, however Miller additionally uses the keys for point to point encryption (i.e., end-to-end) communications protocols, col. 3, lines 53-61; column 11, lines 52-58: and column 12, lines 24-34 on an autonomous vehicle (AV) comprising different AV devices communicating with one another locally within the AV device. The teachings of Miller have been shown to disclose of end-to-end communication protection protocol using encryption.
It is argued: “Furthermore, Applicant respectfully submits that the combination of Islim and Miller is improper. First, one of ordinary skill in the art would not be motivated to combine the references. The technical goal of Islim is "low latency", whereas the symmetric keys of Miller introduce complex key management and increase latency. Therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art would not increase the latency of Islim by incorporating the symmetric keys of Miller.
Second, Miller teaches away from using encryption. Miller teaches avoiding encryption to reduce overhead. Col. 3, lines 17-35 of Miller describes the overhead cost of encryption being incompatible with autonomous vehicles:
Symmetric encryption may be preferred for encryption of larger payloads because
it has less overhead and uses fewer resources than asymmetric encryption. While TLS provides highly secure communication, it may be sub-optimal for an AV application. In such a vehicle, sensors may need to stream data to the control computer with low overhead, and the control computer may need to stream instructions to actuators with low overhead. Furthermore, in at least some embodiments, encryption may be an unnecessary overhead because, in some AV contexts, data integrity may be more important than data security. Thus, it may be sufficient to verify the source of the data via an appended signature using a symmetric key known to both devices. To this end, an AV may prefer symmetric cryptography for encrypting or signing data. One method is to use a pre-shared key (PSK) for symmetric
cryptography. Therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art would not apply the signature-only and no-encryption process of Miller to Islim.”
In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Applicant again focuses only the signing aspect of Miller. Miller discloses “However, symmetric cryptography can be advantageous for an AV if the keys are secure. For example, if a sender and receiver both possess a shared key, they can encrypt and/or sign messages using the shared key, which effectively takes the place of the session key as in a TLS transaction,” col. 3, lines 53-61. The Applicant is attacking Miller for solely using symmetric keys for digital signatures, however Miller additionally uses the keys for point to point encryption (i.e., end-to-end) communications protocols, col. 3, lines 53-61; column 11, lines 52-58: and column 12, lines 24-34 on an autonomous vehicle (AV) comprising different AV devices communicating with one another locally within the AV device. The teachings of Miller have been shown to disclose of end-to-end communication protection protocol using encryption. The combination of Islim in view of Miller has been properly applied with respect to the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 by making a prima facie case, the Examiner hereby maintains the current grounds of the rejection.
With respect to claim 7, the Applicant argues: “Independent claim 7 includes subject matter similar to the elements discussed in response to the rejection of claim 1. Therefore, Applicant submits that even a combination of the cited references does not disclose or render obvious the recited elements of claim 7 for at least the reasons provided in the response to the rejection of claim 1.
Accordingly, the cited art, whether taken individually or in combination, cannot and does not teach every feature of the amended claims. For at least this reason, the independent claims, and therefore the dependent claims as well, are distinguishable over the art of record. Applicant respectfully requests withdrawal of the present rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and the issuance of a Notice of Allowance.
The Examiner acknowledges the Applicant’s arguments, that have been addressed with respect to independent claim 1 above. The combination of Islim in view of Miller has been properly applied with respect to the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 by making a prima facie case, the Examiner hereby maintains the current grounds of the rejection.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Islim et al, U.S. Patent 11,964,660 in view of Miller et al, U.S. Patent 11,917,086.
As per claim 1, it is disclosed by Islim et al of a communication system based on end-to-end data communications, comprising a domain controller (control unit #60 of Figure 1); an actuator (actuator type A #54 and actuator type B #58 of Figure); and a sensor (remote sensor #62 and central sensor #64 of Figure 1)(system comprises components of an end-to-end (E2E) communication implemented in a vehicle, column 3, lines 47-52, actuators, a control unit (i.e., domain controller), and a remote sensor are connected by a communication bus, col. 4, lines 15-21 & 47-52);
wherein the sensor is configured to sense vehicle state information (remote sensors collect physical measurements and convert the measurements into electronic data, the remote sensors measure vehicle state information such as impact, tire pressure sensors, and to detect impact, column 4, lines 47-60), and transmit the vehicle state information as sensed to the domain controller through an end-to-end communication protection protocol (E2E communications take place while transmitting the vehicle state information sensed to the control unit (i.e., domain controller), column 5, lines 19-32);
wherein the domain controller is configured to acquire a control instruction based on the vehicle state information as received, and transmit a corresponding control instruction to a corresponding actuator through the end-to-end communication protection protocol (E2E communications take place while transmitting the vehicle state information sensed to the control unit (i.e., domain controller), a decision is made within the control unit (i.e., domain controller) whether to activate/deploy the remote actuator using E2E communications, column 5, lines 19-38);
and wherein the end-to-end communication protection protocol is additionally provided with a cyclic code that is variable and protected (E2E module of the control unit (i.e., domain controller) sends protected E2E messages that include error check information using a CRC (i.e., cyclic code), column 24, lines 17-18 & 39-42, wherein the teachings disclose that the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) is based upon a counter value, column 21, lines 26-34 and column 24, lines 39-42. Since the CRC is based upon a changing counter value, column 24, lines 29-38, the Examiner is interpreting it to be variable since it is dependent upon the changing counter value).
Although Islim et al discloses of using end-to-end (or E2E) communication protocol for protection (column 24, lines 17-18), they fail to disclose of using E2E to encrypt the communications.
Miller et al discloses of using E2E communication protocols by encrypting data send between components connected on a CAN bus of an autonomous vehicle, or AV, that includes sensors, actuators, and communication devices, column 3, lines 53-61, column 11, lines 52-58, and column 12, lines 24-34. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have been motivated to protect data sent between devices in a vehicle network to ensure its integrity and reception by authorized devices operating within the vehicle network. Miller et al discloses of verifying messages received from other devices, and certifying messages sent to other devices by encrypting the communications between the sender and receiver using a symmetric key for encryption for the point-to-point (i.e., E2E) communications, column 12, lines 24-34. Although the teachings of Islim et al discloses of using E2E for protection, Miller et al offers further protection by encrypting data sent and received between two devices by usage of encryption using signed messages to verify both parties to each other, column 3, lines 53-61, by offering a level of enhanced protection to the communication process of Islim et al.
As per claim 2, it is disclosed by Islim et al wherein data in the end-to-end communication protection protocol comprises a plurality of data identifiers arranged in sequence (E2E communication protection protocol messages comprise data ID values, column 32, lines 8-20, the data ID values are based upon a counter, column 24, lines 29-38 and column 32, lines 15-18), that which is interpreted as being arranged in sequence based upon the progression of the calculation of the specific counter value, column 24, lines 29-38), and wherein a first data identifier of the plurality of data identifiers is configured to identify a cyclic redundancy check code (the first data identifier of a plurality of data identifiers (each data identifier of Islim et al is based upon a counter value, column 24, lines 29-38 and column 32, lines 15-18) is used to identify a CRC (i.e., cyclic redundancy check code), column 24, lines 29-42 and column 32, lines 15-18).
As per claim 3, it is taught by Islim et al wherein a second data identifier of the plurality of data identifiers is configured to identify the cyclic code and a counter code (message component includes data ID that identify the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) and a counter, column 32, lines 47-54, wherein the second data identifier is interpreted as being arranged in sequence based upon the progression of the calculation of the specific counter value, column 24, lines 29-38), and wherein first four data sub-bits of the second data identifier are configured to identify the cyclic code (second data ID identifies a CRC (i.e., cyclic code as a 4 bit value (i.e., first four data sub-bits), column 32, lines 47-54), and last four data sub-bits of the second data identifier are configured to identify the counter code (second data ID identifies a counter code as a 4 bit value (i.e., last four data sub-bits), column 32, lines 47-54).
As per claim 4, it is disclosed by Islim et al wherein a third data identifier of the plurality of data identifiers is configured to identify protected data (message component includes data ID that identify the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) and a counter, column 32, lines 47-54, wherein the third data identifier is interpreted as being arranged in sequence based upon the progression of the calculation of the specific counter value to determine that the protected data is verified, column 24, lines 29-38 and column 28, lines 55-64), Miller et al is relied upon for disclosing that a message is encrypted based a correct hash and correct signature (i.e., data identifiers)(column 3, lines 53-61 and column 5, lines 35-39).
As per claim 5, it is taught by Islim et al wherein the sensor is specifically configured to determine data of a second data identifier based on the cyclic code in combination with an XOR logic (CRC calculation is transmitted as part of the E2E protected message, and calculating as an 8 bit value based upon a profile, counter value, and data ID, column 24, lines 41-51, the control circuit (comprising a sensor) uses a logic gate (XOR logic), column 14, lines 38-44); and acquire data of the third data identifier based on the data of the second data identifier in combination with the XOR logic (the third data is acquired from a message component that includes data ID that identify the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) and a counter, column 32, lines 47-54, the third data identifier is interpreted as being arranged in sequence based upon the progression of the calculation of the specific counter value to determine that the protected data is verified, column 24, lines 29-38 and column 28, lines 55-64, furthermore the control circuit (comprising a sensor) uses a logic gate (XOR logic) to make the determination, column 14, lines 38-44).
As per claim 6, it is disclosed by Islim et al wherein the domain controller is specifically configured to determine whether a verification is qualified based on the vehicle state information as received (E2E communications take place while transmitting the vehicle state information sensed to the control unit (i.e., domain controller), a decision is made within the control unit (i.e., domain controller) whether to activate/deploy the remote actuator using E2E communications, column 5, lines 19-38, integrity of the data (i.e., vehicle state information) is verified (i.e., determining whether a verification is qualified), column 28, lines 55-64); and acquire, in response to the verification being qualified, the control instruction by decoding (in response to the data being verified (i.e., determining whether a verification is qualified), the enabling of read/write access is permitted (i.e., decoding the control instruction) by acquisition at the actuator, column 5, lines 19-38 and column 28, lines 55-64).
As per claim 7, it is taught by Islim et al of a communication method based on end-to-end data communications, comprising:
sensing, by a sensor (remote sensor #62 and central sensor #64 of Figure 1), vehicle state information (remote sensors collect physical measurements and convert the measurements into electronic data, the remote sensors measure vehicle state information such as impact, tire pressure sensors, and to detect impact, column 4, lines 47-60), and transmitting the vehicle state information as sensed to a domain controller (control unit #60 of Figure 1) through an end-to-end communication protection protocol (E2E communications take place while transmitting the vehicle state information sensed to the control unit (i.e., domain controller), column 5, lines 19-32); and
acquiring, by the domain controller, a control instruction based on the vehicle state information as received and transmitting a corresponding control instruction to a corresponding actuator (actuator type A #54 and actuator type B #58 of Figure 1) through the end-to-end communication protection protocol (E2E communications take place while transmitting the vehicle state information sensed to the control unit (i.e., domain controller), a decision is made within the control unit (i.e., domain controller) whether to activate/deploy the remote actuator using E2E communications, column 5, lines 19-38),
wherein the end-to-end communication protection protocol is additionally provided with a cyclic code that is variable (E2E module of the control unit (i.e., domain controller) sends protected E2E messages that include error check information using a CRC (i.e., cyclic code), column 24, lines 17-18 & 39-42, wherein the teachings disclose that the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) is based upon a counter value, column 21, lines 26-34 and column 24, lines 39-42. Since the CRC is based upon a changing counter value, column 24, lines 29-38, the Examiner is interpreting it to be variable since it is dependent upon the changing counter value).
Although Islim et al discloses of using end-to-end (or E2E) communication protocol for protection (column 24, lines 17-18), they fail to disclose of using E2E to encrypt the communications.
Miller et al discloses of using E2E communication protocols by encrypting data send between components connected on a CAN bus of an autonomous vehicle, or AV, that includes sensors, actuators, and communication devices, column 3, lines 53-61, column 11, lines 52-58, and column 12, lines 24-34. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have been motivated to protect data sent between devices in a vehicle network to ensure its integrity and reception by authorized devices operating within the vehicle network. Miller et al discloses of verifying messages received from other devices, and certifying messages sent to other devices by encrypting the communications between the sender and receiver using a symmetric key for encryption for the point-to-point (i.e., E2E) communications, column 12, lines 24-34. Although the teachings of Islim et al discloses of using E2E for protection, Miller et al offers further protection by encrypting data sent and received between two devices by usage of encryption using signed messages to verify both parties to each other, column 3, lines 53-61, by offering a level of enhanced protection to the communication process of Islim et al.
As per claim 8, it is disclosed by Islim et al wherein data in the end-to-end communication protection protocol comprises a plurality of data identifiers arranged in sequence (E2E communication protection protocol messages comprise data ID values, column 32, lines 8-20, the data ID values are based upon a counter, column 24, lines 29-38 and column 32, lines 15-18), that which is interpreted as being arranged in sequence based upon the progression of the calculation of the specific counter value, column 24, lines 29-38), and wherein a first data identifier of the plurality of data identifiers is configured to identify a cyclic redundancy check code (the first data identifier of a plurality of data identifiers (each data identifier of Islim et al is based upon a counter value, column 24, lines 29-38 and column 32, lines 15-18) is used to identify a CRC (i.e., cyclic redundancy check code), column 24, lines 29-42 and column 32, lines 15-18).
As per claim 9, it is taught by Islim et al wherein a second data identifier of the plurality of data identifiers is configured to identify the cyclic code and a counter code (message component includes data ID that identify the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) and a counter, column 32, lines 47-54, wherein the second data identifier is interpreted as being arranged in sequence based upon the progression of the calculation of the specific counter value, column 24, lines 29-38), and wherein first four data sub-bits of the second data identifier are configured to identify the cyclic code (second data ID identifies a CRC (i.e., cyclic code as a 4 bit value (i.e., first four data sub-bits), column 32, lines 47-54), and last four data sub-bits of the second data identifier are configured to identify the counter code (second data ID identifies a counter code as a 4 bit value (i.e., last four data sub-bits), column 32, lines 47-54).
As per claim 10, it is disclosed by Islim et al wherein a third data identifier of the plurality of data identifiers is configured to identify protected data (message component includes data ID that identify the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) and a counter, column 32, lines 47-54, wherein the third data identifier is interpreted as being arranged in sequence based upon the progression of the calculation of the specific counter value to determine that the protected data is verified, column 24, lines 29-38 and column 28, lines 55-64). Miller et al is relied upon for disclosing that a message is encrypted based a correct hash and correct signature (i.e., data identifiers)(column 3, lines 53-61 and column 5, lines 35-39). Please refer above for the motivational reasons of applying the encryption of end to end communications of Miller et al with Islim et al.
As per claim 11, it is taught by Islim et al wherein the sensor determines data of a second data identifier based on the cyclic code in combination with an XOR logic (CRC calculation is transmitted as part of the E2E protected message, and calculating as an 8 bit value based upon a profile, counter value, and data ID, column 24, lines 41-51, the control circuit (comprising a sensor) uses a logic gate (XOR logic), column 14, lines 38-44); and acquires data of the third data identifier based on the data of the second data identifier in combination with the XOR logic (the third data is acquired from a message component that includes data ID that identify the CRC (i.e., cyclic code) and a counter, column 32, lines 47-54, the third data identifier is interpreted as being arranged in sequence based upon the progression of the calculation of the specific counter value to determine that the protected data is verified, column 24, lines 29-38 and column 28, lines 55-64, furthermore the control circuit (comprising a sensor) uses a logic gate (XOR logic) to make the determination, column 14, lines 38-44).
As per claim 12, it is disclosed by Islim et al wherein the domain controller determines whether a verification is qualified based on the vehicle state information as received (E2E communications take place while transmitting the vehicle state information sensed to the control unit (i.e., domain controller), a decision is made within the control unit (i.e., domain controller) whether to activate/deploy the remote actuator using E2E communications, column 5, lines 19-38, integrity of the data (i.e., vehicle state information) is verified (i.e., determining whether a verification is qualified), column 28, lines 55-64); and acquires, in response to the verification being qualified, the control instruction by decoding (in response to the data being verified (i.e., determining whether a verification is qualified), the enabling of read/write access is permitted (i.e., decoding the control instruction) by acquisition at the actuator, column 5, lines 19-38 and column 28, lines 55-64).
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
Meyer, US 2022/0237331 is relied upon for disclosing of a motor vehicle has at least one control device, which is designed as explained with reference to FIG. 1. In the present case, the control device also communicates with a communication device of the motor vehicle, which is in communication with at least one computer device external to the vehicle, in this case a back-end device that supplies communication data for more precise execution of the GNSS function, for example communication data on current atmospheric fluctuations and/or to a dGPS function, which are already suitably E2E-encrypted in the computing device, so that they can be delivered directly to the control device by the communication device and to the first microprocessor by means of the switch, see paragraph 0027.
Mahdavi et al, U.S. Patent 11,050,723 is relied upon for disclosing of a message being end-to-end encrypted (E2E), so that the contents of the message are not visible, except to the device that originates the message and the device that receives the message, see column 10, lines 56-60.
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/CHRISTOPHER A REVAK/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2407
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