DETAILED ACTION
This is a response to the Amendment to Application # 18/878,408 filed on May 21, 2026 in which claims 9, 12, 14, 15, and 17 were amended.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Claims
Claims 9-18 are pending, of which claim 17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101; claim 15 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b); claims 9 and 16-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1); and claims 10-15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Claim Interpretation
These claims repeatedly refer to a “debounce” time. It is the examiner’s duty to give claims “their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” See MPEP § 2111, citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
In the present specification, the debounce time is said to be a “time [that] temporarily prevents activation of the function.” (Spec. ¶ 4). Thus, for purposes of examination, a debounce time shall be interpreted to at least include any time that temporarily prevents activation of a function.
Claim 9 recites a method claim including the limitation “automatically performing lane-keeping steering interventions in response to the lane boundaries having been persistently identified throughout a predetermined debounce time.” The broadest reasonable interpretation of this limitation does not require the lane-keeping be performed. See Ex parte Schulhauser, 2013-007847 (PTAB 2016) (precedential) where the board held that when method steps are to be carried out only upon the occurrence of a condition precedent, the broadest reasonable interpretation holds that those steps are not required to be performed. (id. at *7). See, e.g., Ex parte Circlaeys (PTAB 2026) (App. S.N. 17/878,742) at 6 (“the phrase ‘in response to’ is conditional and therefore synonymous with the term ‘if.’”); Ex parte Heil (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/512,669), at 6; Ex parte Frost (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/785,052) at 7; Ex parte Dawson (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/103,472) at 6; and Ex parte Candelore (PTAB 2017) (App. S.N. 14/281,158) at 5 (supporting the interpretation that “in response to” limitations are conditional).
Claim 12 recites a method claim including the limitation “wherein the debounce time is increased in response to determining that the reliability of the identification is lower than a predetermined value.” (Emphasis added). The broadest reasonable interpretation of this limitation does not require the debounce time to be increased. See Ex parte Schulhauser, 2013-007847 (PTAB 2016) (precedential) where the board held that when method steps are to be carried out only upon the occurrence of a condition precedent, the broadest reasonable interpretation holds that those steps are not required to be performed. (id. at *7). See, e.g., Ex parte Circlaeys (PTAB 2026) (App. S.N. 17/878,742) at 6 (“the phrase ‘in response to’ is conditional and therefore synonymous with the term ‘if.’”); Ex parte Heil (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/512,669), at 6; Ex parte Frost (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/785,052) at 7; Ex parte Dawson (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/103,472) at 6; and Ex parte Candelore (PTAB 2017) (App. S.N. 14/281,158) at 5 (supporting the interpretation that “in response to” limitations are conditional).
Claim 14 recites a method claim including the limitation “ “wherein the debounce time is increased in response to determining that the reliability of the identification is lower than a predetermined value.” (Emphasis added). The broadest reasonable interpretation of this limitation does not require the debounce time to be increased. See Ex parte Schulhauser, 2013-007847 (PTAB 2016) (precedential) where the board held that when method steps are to be carried out only upon the occurrence of a condition precedent, the broadest reasonable interpretation holds that those steps are not required to be performed. (id. at *7). See, e.g., Ex parte Circlaeys (PTAB 2026) (App. S.N. 17/878,742) at 6 (“the phrase ‘in response to’ is conditional and therefore synonymous with the term ‘if.’”); Ex parte Heil (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/512,669), at 6; Ex parte Frost (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/785,052) at 7; Ex parte Dawson (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/103,472) at 6; and Ex parte Candelore (PTAB 2017) (App. S.N. 14/281,158) at 5 (supporting the interpretation that “in response to” limitations are conditional).
Claim 15 recites a method claim including the limitation “wherein the debounce time is increased in response to determining that the road type is consistent with a freeway.” (Emphasis added). The broadest reasonable interpretation of this limitation does not require the debounce time to be increased. See Ex parte Schulhauser, 2013-007847 (PTAB 2016) (precedential) where the board held that when method steps are to be carried out only upon the occurrence of a condition precedent, the broadest reasonable interpretation holds that those steps are not required to be performed. (id. at *7). See, e.g., Ex parte Circlaeys (PTAB 2026) (App. S.N. 17/878,742) at 6 (“the phrase ‘in response to’ is conditional and therefore synonymous with the term ‘if.’”); Ex parte Heil (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/512,669), at 6; Ex parte Frost (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/785,052) at 7; Ex parte Dawson (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/103,472) at 6; and Ex parte Candelore (PTAB 2017) (App. S.N. 14/281,158) at 5 (supporting the interpretation that “in response to” limitations are conditional).
Claim Objections
Claims 9, 11, 13, 16, and 17 are objected to because of the following informalities: These claims contain “and/or” language. While definite, the preferred verbiage for such language is “at least one of A and B,” See Ex parte Gross (PTAB 2014) (App. S.N. 11/565,411), at Page 4, Footnote 1. Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101
35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claim 17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Regarding claim 17, it recites a “system” for displaying a document comprising a “control unit.” The Specification expressly states that this may be a “computer program.” (emphasis added). (Spec. ¶ 20). Further, the plain and ordinary meaning of a control unit includes software only embodiments, such as “virtual processors” and “virtual computers.” Accordingly, the recited “control unit” is computer software per se and is not a “process,” a “machine,” a “manufacture” or a “composition of matter,” as defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
Claim 15 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
Regarding claim 15, the term “freeway” is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite. The term “freeway” is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention. In other words, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not be able to determine when a road was a freeway as compared to, for example, a highway or a throughway.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 9 and 16-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Hashimoto et al., US Publication 2018/0148060 (hereinafter Hashimoto).
Regarding claim 9, Hashimoto discloses a method for operating a lane guidance assistant of a vehicle, the method comprising the steps of “receiving environment data that describe surroundings of the vehicle” (Hashimoto ¶ 39) where the sensors obtain information about the “situation surrounding the vehicle” (i.e., environment data that describe surroundings of the vehicle). Additionally, Hashimoto discloses “identifying lane boundaries that bound a lane in which the vehicle is currently located” (Hashimoto ¶ 39) by recognizing (i.e., identifying) the lane geometry (i.e., boundaries) of the current lane and the merging lane. Further, Hashimoto discloses “
automatically performing lane-keeping steering interventions in response to the lane boundaries for having been persistently identified throughout a predetermined debounce time” (Hashimoto ¶¶ 41, 89) by delaying the lane change operation (i.e., keeping the vehicle in the lane) for a delay processing time (i.e., a debounce time) that may be at least a standard timing (Hashimoto ¶ 41) and further indicating that the delay time may be set based on how long the white line (i.e., lane markers) have been identified. (Hashimoto ¶ 89). Moreover, Hashimoto discloses “continually determining environmental conditions, the environmental conditions describing a current location of the vehicle, a weather in the surroundings, a current time of day, and/or a road type associated with the lane” (Hashimoto ¶¶ 59, 63) by “repeatedly execut[ing at] every certain cycle” the information acquisition process (Hashimoto ¶ 59), that includes weather information (i.e., weather in the surroundings) and roadwork section information (i.e., road type associated with the lane, Hashimoto ¶ 63). Finally, Hashimoto discloses “adapting the debounce time based on the continually determined environmental conditions” (Hashimoto ¶ 76) by setting the start timing TA to the start timing TB based on the “driving environment information.”
Regarding claim 16, Hashimoto discloses the limitations contained in parent claim 9 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, Hashimoto discloses “wherein the environmental conditions are determined based on the environment data, satellite-based position data, digital map data, and/or weather data” (Hashimoto ¶ 63) where the environmental conditions are determined based on at least weather data.
Regarding claim 17, it merely recites a lane-guidance assistant for performing the method of claim 9. The lane-guidance assistant comprises computer software modules for performing the various functions. Hashimoto comprises computer software modules for performing the same functions. Thus, claim 17 is rejected using the same rationale set forth in the above rejection for claim 9.
Regarding claim 18, it merely recites a vehicle comprising the lane-guidance assistant of claim 17. The vehicle comprises computer software modules for performing the various functions. Hashimoto comprises a vehicle comprising a lane-guidance assistant performing the same functions. Thus, claim 18 is rejected using the same rationale set forth in the above rejection for claim 17.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims, the Examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicants are advised of the obligation under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 10-14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hashimoto in view of Fang et al., US Publication 2022/0297635 (hereinafter Fang).
Regarding claim 10, Hashimoto discloses the limitations contained in parent claim 9 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, Hashimoto does not appear to explicitly disclose “wherein the current location of the vehicle is taken as a basis for determining a country-specific stipulation for the debounce time, and the debounce time is adapted based on the country-specific stipulation.”
However, Fang discloses a vehicle control method that generates a delay before processing vehicle functionality “wherein the current location of the vehicle is taken as a basis for determining a country-specific stipulation for the debounce time, and the debounce time is adapted based on the country-specific stipulation” (Fang ¶ 140) where trigger descriptions including delay periods (i.e., debounce times) are set based on geographic and jurisdictional map data including the country.
Hashimoto and Fang are analogous art because they are from the “same field of endeavor,” namely that of vehicle control systems.
Prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, having the teachings of Hashimoto and Fang before him or her to modify the delay time of Hashimoto to include the country based factors of Fang.
The motivation for doing so would have been that a person of ordinary skill in the art prior to the effective filing date would have recognized that doing so would allow the vehicle to comply with all laws, which is a known desirable feature.
Regarding claim 11, the combination of Hashimoto and Fang discloses the limitations contained in parent claim 10 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, the combination of Hashimoto and Fang discloses “wherein the weather and/or the current time of day is/are taken as a basis for determining a reliability of the identification of the lane boundaries based on the environment data, and the debounce time is adapted based on the reliability of the identification” (Fang ¶¶ 73-74) by repeating an operation until an observed behavior meets a confidence level (Fang ¶ 74), which may include time of day and weather. A person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that when Fang was combined with Hashimoto, this would be for the “identification of the lane boundaries,” as taught by Hashimoto.
Regarding claim 12, the combination of Hashimoto and Fang discloses the limitations contained in parent claim 11 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, the combination of Hashimoto and Fang discloses “wherein the debounce time is increased in response to the reliability of the identification is lower than a predetermined value” (Fang ¶ 74) where a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that when the value does not meet a confidence (i.e., reliability) threshold (i.e., lower than a predetermined average value) and is repeated, the act of repetition is increasing the delay time.
Regarding claim 13, Hashimoto discloses the limitations contained in parent claim 9 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, Hashimoto does not appear to explicitly disclose “wherein the weather and/or the current time of day is/are taken as a basis for determining a reliability of the identification of the lane boundaries based on the environment data, and the debounce time is adapted based on the reliability of the identification.”
However, Fang discloses a vehicle control method that generates a delay before processing vehicle functionality “wherein the weather and/or the current time of day is/are taken as a basis for determining a reliability of the identification of the lane boundaries based on the environment data, and the debounce time is adapted based on the reliability of the identification” (Fang ¶¶ 73-74) by repeating an operation until an observed behavior meets a confidence level (Fang ¶ 74), which may include time of day and weather. A person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that when Fang was combined with Hashimoto, this would be for the “identification of the lane boundaries,” as taught by Hashimoto.
Hashimoto and Fang are analogous art because they are from the “same field of endeavor,” namely that of vehicle control systems.
Prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, having the teachings of Hashimoto and Fang before him or her to modify the delay time of Hashimoto to include the reliability measure of Fang.
The motivation for doing so would have been that a person of ordinary skill in the art prior to the effective filing date would have realized that such a modification would reduce the risk of false positives and/or false negatives.
Regarding claim 14, the combination of Hashimoto and Fang discloses the limitations contained in parent claim 13 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, the combination of Hashimoto and Fang discloses “wherein the debounce time is increased in response to determining that the reliability of the identification is lower than a predetermined value” (Fang ¶ 74) where a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that when the value does not meet a confidence (i.e., reliability) threshold (i.e., lower than a predetermined average value) and is repeated, the act of repetition is increasing the delay time.
Claim 15 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hashimoto in view of Banvait et al., US Publication 2019.
Regarding claim 15, Hashimoto discloses the limitations contained in parent claim 9 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, Hashimoto does not appear to explicitly disclose “wherein the debounce time is increased in response to determining that the road type is consistent with a freeway.”
However, Banvait discloses an autonomous vehicle control method including the step of “wherein the debounce time is increased in response to determining that the road type is consistent with a freeway” (Banvait ¶ 71) by setting the delay (i.e., debounce time) in a lane change event from 0 to 10-20 seconds when exiting a freeway.
Hashimoto and Banvait are analogous art because they are from the “same field of endeavor,” namely that of autonomous vehicle control.
Prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, having the teachings of Hashimoto and Banvait before him or her to modify the delay calculation of Hashimoto to include the consideration of freeway driving in the delay calculation of Banvait.
The motivation for doing so would have been that such a features is part of an improved method for dealing with rapidly occurring situations. (Banvait ¶ 4).
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments filed May 21, 2026, with respect to the rejection of claims 12 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (Remarks 5) have been fully considered and are persuasive. The rejection of claims 12 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) have been withdrawn.
Applicant's remaining arguments filed May 21, 2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Regarding the Information Disclosure Statement, Applicant submits that the statement of relevance was provided in the transmittal letter that accompanied the Information Disclosure Statement. (Remarks 4).
Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive because, as indicated in the Non-Final Office Action dated February 24, 2026, the English language translation was not provided as required by 37 C.F.R. § 1.98.
Regarding the objection to claims 9, 11, 13, 16, and 17, Applicant argues this objection is improper because “[t]he Office Action cites no statue, rule [sic.] or caselaw authorizing the imposition of ‘preferred language.’” (Remarks 4, emphasis added). The examiner disagrees.
Applicant has made a clear false statement on the record. Caselaw was expressly cited in both the objection in the Non-Final Action dated February 24, 2026 and again in the present objection above. Therefore, Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive.
Regarding the rejection of claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, Applicant argues that the recitation of a control unit overcomes the rejection. (Remarks 5). The examiner disagrees.
As discussed above, the recitation of a “control unit” does not exclude software per se embodiments. Therefore, Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive.
Regarding the rejection of claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), Applicant argues that “freeway has a well-understood meaning in the automotive and driver assistance system technical fields, which is akin to the ‘autobahn’ concept” and “state and federal records identify road types for the various freeways, highways, etc.” (Remarks 5). The examiner disagrees.
It is well settled that the arguments of counsel cannot take the place of evidence in the record. In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602, 145 USPQ 716, 718 (CCPA 1965); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, Applicant provides no evidence of a non-relative meaning of a freeway. Instead, the Applicant merely submits that a person of ordinary skill would understand what it means.
Additionally, even if Applicant’s arguments without evidence were taken at face value, such an interpretation of the “autobahn concept” would limit the term to federally controlled roads were portions of the road contain no speed limit. Based on the examiner’s understanding of the invention, this appears to be an overly narrow reading of the term. However, if this is Applicant’s intended interpretation, the examiner recommends amending the claim to include this subject matter.
Therefore, Applicant’s argument is unpersuasive.
Regarding the rejection of claims 9-18 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, Applicant argues that Hashimoto fails to disclose the newly amended subject matter. (Remarks 6-7). Applicant’s arguments are unpersuasive for the reasons discussed in the updated rejection above.
Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ANDREW R DYER whose telephone number is (571)270-3790. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Thursday 7:30-4:30.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Aniss Chad can be reached on 571-270-3832. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/ANDREW R DYER/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3662
Prosecution Insights