DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claims 1-11 are pending and examined on the merits.
Allowable Subject Matter
SEQ ID NO:s 1 and 2 are free of the prior art of record. Claims 1-11 are free of the prior art of record.
Cao et al. (Microbiology Spectrum, 2023, Vol, 11, No. 1, pages 1-11) teach the generation of a nanobody specific for the E2 protein of CSFV (nanobody Nb1). [see figure 2 and figure 4] However, this nanobody binds to a different CSFV protein epitope compared to the presently claimed nanobody.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 2 and 3 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as containing subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention.
Applicant broadly claims a host cell or expression vector or nucleic acid containing the nucleic acids of claims 2 and 3. The claims read on a cell within a transgenic animal or a transgene therein given that the term "isolated" is not denoted in describing the nucleic acid, or expression vector.
With respect to the unisolated host cells and transgenes as “nucleic acids” or “expression vectors “of the instant claims discussed above, the state of the art at the time of filing was such that one of skill could not predict the phenotype of transgenics. The art of transgenic animals has for many years stated that the unpredictability lies, in part, with the site or sites of transgene integration into the target genome and that "the position effect" as well as unidentified control elements are recognized to cause aberrant expression of a transgene (Wall et Al., Theriogenology, Vol. 45, Pg. 57-68, 1996).
The elements of the particular construct used to make transgenic animals are also held to be critical, and they must be designed case by case without general rules to obtain good expression of a transgene; e.g., specific promoters, presence or absence of introns, etc. (Houdebine et Al., Journal of Biotechnology, Vol. 34, Pg. 269- 287, 1994). Furthermore, transgenic animals are regarded to have within their cells, cellular mechanisms that prevent expression of the transgene, such as methylation or deletion from the genome (Kappell et Al., Current Opinions in Biotechnology, Vol. 3, Pg. 548-553, 1992). Houdebine (Comparative Immunology, Microbiology, and Infectious Diseases, Vol. 32, Pg. 107-121, 2009) teaches progress has been made in the field of transgenic animals for production of foreign proteins (Abstract); however, constructing an efficient expression vector to produce a therapeutic protein is not a standard operation (Pg. 116, Paragraph, second). Therefore, undue experimentation is required to make and use a transgene and transgenic animal to produce the nanobody of the instant claims.
Examples in the literature aptly demonstrate that even closely related species carrying the same transgene construct can exhibit widely varying phenotypes. Mullins (1993, Hypertension, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 630-633) states that not all animals express a transgene sufficiently to provide a model for a disease as the integration of a transgene into different species of animal has been reported to give divergent phenotypes. For example, several animal models of human diseases have relied on transgenic rats when the development of mouse models was not feasible. Mullins (1990, Nature, Vol. 344, 541-544) produced outbred Sprague-Dawley x WKY rats with hypertension caused by expression of a mouse Ren-2 renin transgene. Hammer (1990, Cell, Vol. 63, 1099- 1112) describes spontaneous inflammatory disease in inbred Fischer and Lewis rats expressing human class I major histocompatibility allele HLA-B27 and human 02- microglobulin transgenes. Both investigations were preceded by the failure to develop human disease-like symptoms in transgenic mice expressing the same transgenes that successfully caused the desired symptoms in transgenic rats (Mullins, 1989, EMBO J., Vol. 8, pages 183-191). Thus, the use of nonmurine species for transgenesis will continue to reflect the suitability of a particular species for the specific questions being addressed, bearing in mind that a given construct may react very differently from one species to another.
The examiner notes here, in addition to these issues, even assuming arguendo a person having ordinary skill in the art could make a host organism with functional transgene that encodes the instantly recited SEQ ID NO: 1, there is no predictability that the host will survive its expression. The transgene depends on the host for function and harm to the host, including death, renders the transgene nonfunctional and thus not enabled.
The art is well-aware of side effects caused by expressing proteins, such as therapeutic antibodies. In a transgenic cell or animal that expresses the same, the antibody will exert any possible side effect it can. It is not administered but chronically present and so such side effects are chronic and potentially more serious than any from an administered antibody. Hansel (Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, Vol. 9, Pg. 325-337, 2010) teaches in their table 1 on page 328 numerous exemplary side effects from licensed monoclonal antibodies to include: increased bleeding risk, infection, heart failure, cancer, thyroid disorder, autoimmune reactions, and cytokine release syndrome (CRS) to name only a few. One or more such effects, or similar, may occur with the therapeutic antibody instantly recited when administered and indeed be exacerbated by chronic exposure due to internal expression. The instantly encoded antibody binds a mammalian protein and so may very well target related or unrelated proteins in the transgenic host, leading to such side effects. For all these reasons, previously raised and new, transgenes are not enabled.
At the time of filing, the phenotype of a transgene and transgenic cell contained within any animal was unpredictable. The claims as written, encompassing a transgene and cell in a transgenic animal, is not adequately described in the specification as to prevent excessive experimentation by the public to generate and use the invention. Applicants can obviate the instant rejection by amending the claim to recite the term "isolated" before the recitation, "host cell" and by amending the vector and polynucleotide claims to specify they are not in a transgenic animal. Applicant may consider using purified in such claims if description is appropriate for such a term and it is not redefined away from standard meaning. Method claims using these products should also carry the appropriate adjectives above.
In view of the lack of the predictability of the art to which the invention pertains as evidenced by the art above, the lack of guidance and direction provided by Applicant, and the absence of working examples, undue experimentation would be required to make and use transgenic animals possessing the claimed host cells, nucleic acid, or expression vector, with a reasonable expectation of success, absent a specific and detailed description in Applicant’s specification of how to effectively practice this and absent working examples providing evidence which is reasonably predictive that the claimed host cell, nucleic acid, or expression vector, commensurate in scope with the claimed invention. The same can be said for the transgenes and transgenic animals encompassed by the instant claims. Thus, the claims are rejected here.
Claims 7-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, because the specification, while being enabling for a CSFV E2 protein nanobody CSFV-E2-Nb1, does not reasonably provide enablement for an undefined nanobody that is specific for CSFV E2 protein. The specification does not enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make the invention commensurate in scope with these claims.
Factors to be considered in determining whether undue experimentation is required to practice the claimed invention are summarized In re Wands (858 F2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). The factors most relevant to this rejection are the scope of the claim, the amount of direction or guidance provided, the lack of sufficient working examples, the unpredictability in the art and the amount of experimentation required to enable one of skill in the art to practice the claimed invention.
The claimed invention is drawn to an immunochromatographic test strip that uses a nanobody specific for CSFV E2 protein, but the claim does not provide a specific amino acid sequence for this nanobody.
Applicants have tested the ability of nanobody CSFV-E2-Nb1 to bind to CSFV E2 protein. [see paragraph 57] However, this appears to be the only nanobody disclosed specific for CSFV E2 and therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art would be exposed to undue experimentation to determine if such an undefined nanobody can be specific for CSFV E2 and be used in the claimed immunochromatographic test strip.
Thus, the claim is are directed to a broad class of nanobodies, only defined by its function. However, relative to the claimed openness to fragments of the CDRs, the specification does not give one of ordinary skilled in the art enough information to choose candidate antigen binding structures from the vast number of options that fall within the fragments of the claimed CDRs, and therefore required scientists to engage in a great deal of experimentation and failure. “That is not enablement”—it is a “hunting license.”
In Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023), the Supreme Court held that claims drawn to a genus of monoclonal antibodies, which were functionally claimed by their ability to bind to a specific protein, PCSK9, were invalid due to lack of enablement. The claims at issue were functional, in that they defined the genus by its function (the ability to bind to specific residues of PCSK9) as opposed to reciting a specific structure (the amino acid sequence of the antibodies in the genus). The Supreme Court concluded that the patents at issue failed to adequately enable the full scope of the genus of antibodies that performed the function of binding to specific amino acid residues on PCSK9 and blocking the binding of PCSK9 to a particular cholesterol receptor, LDLR. This decision reaffirmed the prior decision made by the Federal District Court in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC., 987 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
The Court clarified that the specification does not always need to "describe with particularity how to make and use every single embodiment within a claimed class." Id. at 610-11. However, "[i]f a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class….The more one claims, the more one must enable." Id.
The specification may require a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use the invention and what is reasonable will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. For example, "it may suffice to give an example (or a few examples) if the specification also discloses some general quality … running through the class that gives it a peculiar fitness for the particular purpose" and "disclosing that general quality may reliably enable a person skilled in the art to make and use all of what is claimed, not merely a subset." Id. at 611 (internal quotations omitted). However, the Supreme Court found that Amgen failed to enable all that it claimed, even if allowing for a reasonable degree of experimentation. Id. at 613; see also Baxalta Inc. v Genentech, Inc., 81 F.4th 1362, 1367, 2023 USPQ2d 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ("[t]he facts of this case are more analogous to—and are, in fact, indistinguishable from—those in Amgen. We do not interpret Amgen to have disturbed our prior enablement case law, including Wands and its factors."). Moreover, "[w]e see no meaningful difference between Wands' ‘undue experimentation’ and Amgen's ‘[un]reasonable experimentation’ standards. Id. at footnote 4. See also Guidelines for Assessing Enablement in Utility Applications and Patents in View of the Supreme Court Decision in Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 89 FR 1563 (January 10, 2024), which explains that regardless of the technology the Wands factors should be used when assessing enablement.
However, while the specification in Amgen identified 26 exemplary antibodies that performed the claimed function by their amino acid sequences, the claims at issue were directed to a class which included "a ‘vast’ number of additional antibodies" that Amgen had not described by their amino acid sequences. Id. at 613. The Court found that Amgen sought to monopolize an entire class by their function, even though that class was much broader than the 26 exemplary antibodies disclosed by their amino acid structure. Id. at 613.
In Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC, 987 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2021), which the Supreme Court affirmed, the Federal Circuit explicitly applied the Wands factors to assess whether the specification of Amgen’s patent provided sufficient enablement, for purposes of 35 U.S.C. 112(a), to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention. The court relied on evidence showing that the scope of the claims encompassed millions of antibodies and that it was necessary to screen each candidate antibody in order to determine whether it met the functional limitations of the claim. Id. at 1088. Consequently, the Federal Circuit concluded that there was a lack of enablement. See also the following cases across various technology areas: McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 959 F.3d 1091, 2020 USPQ2d 10550 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 720 F.3d 1380, 107 USPQ2d 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Enzo Life Sciences, Inc. v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 928 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019); and Idenix Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Gilead Sciences Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 2019 USPQ2d 415844 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Amgen attempted to claim an entire class of compounds by their function, namely antibodies that bind to the “sweet spot” of PCSK9 thereby inhibiting it from binding to LDL, while only describing 26 amino acid sequences in its specification. The two processes, the “roadmap” and “conservative substitution” did not save Amgen. According to the Court, these amounted to “little more than two research assignments” which forced scientists to conduct “painstaking experimentation” to see what worked. (citing Incandescent Lamp). The Court therefore held that Amgen’s specification did not enable the claims.
This case is akin to the issue in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC, in which the court relied on evidence showing that the scope of the claims encompassed millions of antibodies and that it was necessary to screen each candidate antibody in order to determine whether it met the functional limitations of the claim. Sanofi-Aventisub at 1088. Consequently, the Federal Circuit concluded that there was a lack of enablement. While the specification in Amgen identified 26 exemplary antibodies that performed the claimed function by their amino acid sequences, the claims at issue were directed to a class that included “a ‘vast' number of additional antibodies” that Amgen had not described by their amino acid sequences. Id. at 1256. The Supreme Court found that Amgen sought to monopolize an entire class of antibodies by their function, which was much broader than the 26 exemplary antibodies disclosed by their amino acid structure.
The instant claims are directed to a nanobody specific for CSFV E2 protein without also requiring a specific amino acid sequence that would provide specific structure to this nanobody, which possesses CDRs enabling the specificity to the E2 protein. This results in “a ‘vast’ number of antibodies comprising an undefined and still be able to bind the claimed CSFV E2 protein, in view of teachings for the specification. It would be necessary to first generate and then screen each candidate antibody and fragments thereof, with the recited function to determine whether it met the functional limitations of “specific for CSFV E2 protein”. The Federal Circuit concluded that there was a lack of enablement, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Amgen.
The instant claims simply direct skilled artisans to engage in the same iterative, trial-and-error process the inventors followed to discover the antigen binding CDRs they elected to disclose and that “[u]nder Amgen, such random trial-and-error discovery, without more, constitutes unreasonable experimentation that falls outside the bounds required by § 112(a).” Id. at *8, *10.
The Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Amgen v. Sanofi, which mainly involves the enablement requirement, states that “where a patentee purports to invent an entire genus, it must enable the entire genus”; “disclosing how to produce some antibodies that perform a specified function is not equivalent to disclosing how to produce all such antibodies – and it is the latter that petitioners claim as their invention”; S. Ct.
The specification does not reasonably provide enablement to make the invention of claims 7-11 as it is currently written. The specification does reasonably provide enablement to make and use the invention of nanobody CSFV-E2-Nb1 as discussed above.
Reasonable correlation must exist between the scope of the claims and scope of the enablement set forth. In view on the quantity of experimentation necessary, the limited working examples, the nature of the invention, the state of the prior art, the unpredictability of the art and the breadth of the claims, it would take undue trials and errors to practice the claimed invention.
In addition, any CDR mutation, which can happen when you recombine all these CDRs into different species is not predictable. This is evidenced by the fact that even minor changes in the amino acid sequences of the heavy and light variable regions, particularly in the CDRs, may dramatically affect antigen-binding function as evidenced by Rudikoff (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 1982 Vol 79 page 1979). Rudikoff teaches that the alteration of a single amino acid in a single CDR of a phosphocholine-binding myeloma protein resulted in the loss of antigen-binding function (entire article, Abstract).)
Moreover, claims not containing elements critical or essential to the practice of the invention, such as nanobodies not having all of the relevant functional complementarity determining regions (CDRs) in the proper site on an appropriate nanobody framework, are not enabled by the disclosure. See In re Mayhew, 527 F.2d 1229, 188 USPQ 356 (CCPA 1976).
Note that an enabling disclosure for the preparation and use of only a few analogs of a product does not enable all possible analogs where the characteristics of the analogs are unpredictable. See Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (18 USPQ 2d 1027 (CAFC 1991)).
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1-11 rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 10 and 11 contains the trademark/trade name “nanobody”. Where a trademark or trade name is used in a claim as a limitation to identify or describe a particular material or product, the claim does not comply with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph. See Ex parte Simpson, 218 USPQ 1020 (Bd. App. 1982). The claim scope is uncertain since the trademark or trade name cannot be used properly to identify any particular material or product. A trademark or trade name is used to identify a source of goods, and not the goods themselves. Thus, a trademark or trade name does not identify or describe the goods associated with the trademark or trade name. In the present case, the trademark/trade name is used to identify/describe an antibody-like protein and, accordingly, the identification/description is indefinite. Claims 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 are also rejected because they depend from claims 1, 4 or 7, but do not remedy these deficiencies.
Claim 8 recites, “incubating a resulting first incubated product with B-mercaptoethanol and a protein…”. Since claim 8 depend from claim 7, and claim 7 mentions more than one protein (E0 and E2 of CSFV), it is unclear which protein is being referred to in claim 8. Claim 9 is also reject since it depends form claim 8, but does not remedy this deficiency.
Claim 10 recites, “the control line is labeled with 75ug/line to 175 ug/line of the nanobody.” However, claim 10 depends from claim 7, which requires more than one nanobody being present on the control line. Therefore, it is unclear which nanobody claim 10 is referring to.
Conclusion
No claims are allowed.
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/BENJAMIN P BLUMEL/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1671
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