Prosecution Insights
Last updated: November 17, 2026
Application No. 18/893,848

DRUG DELIVERY SYSTEMS COMPRISING A NEUROTROPHIC AGENT, AN APOPTOSIS SIGNALING FRAGMENT INHIBITOR (FAS) OR FAS LIGAND (FASL) INHIBITOR, A TUMOR NECROSIS FACTOR-ALPHA (TNF-ALPHA) OR TNF RECEPTOR INHIBITOR, A MITOCHONDRIAL PEPTIDE, AN OLIGONUCLEOTIDE, A CHEMOKINE INHIBITOR, OR A CYSTEINE-ASPARTIC PROTEASE INHIBITOR

Non-Final OA §102§103§112§DOUBLEPATENT
Filed
Sep 23, 2024
Priority
Jun 19, 2018 — provisional 62/687,173 +5 more
Examiner
ARNOLD, ERNST V
Art Unit
1613
Tech Center
1600 — Biotechnology & Organic Chemistry
Assignee
Cella Therapeutics LLC
OA Round
1 (Non-Final)
48%
Grant Probability
Moderate
1-2
OA Rounds
61%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 48% of resolved cases
48%
Career Allowance Rate
674 granted / 1398 resolved
-11.8% vs TC avg
Moderate +13% lift
Without
With
+12.6%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
Avg Prosecution
59 currently pending
Career history
1482
Total Applications
across all art units

Office Action

§102 §103 §112 §DOUBLEPATENT
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Claim Status Claims 1-20 are pending. Priority PNG media_image1.png 386 1334 media_image1.png Greyscale Nucleotide and/or Amino Acid Sequence Disclosures Applicant’s submission appears complaint. Information Disclosure Statement The information disclosure statements (IDSs) submitted on 2/7/25, 3/18/25, 6/25/25 and 4/8/26 are in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statements are being considered by the examiner. Claim Objections Claim 19 is objected to because of the following informalities: In line 26, “aids” should be capitalized as AIDS. Appropriate correction is required. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112: The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The specification does not enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the invention commensurate in scope with these claims without an undue amount of experimentation. The factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure meets the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, have been described in In re Wands, 8 USPQ2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Among these factors are: 1) scope or breadth of the claims; 2) nature of the invention; 3) relative level of skill possessed by one of ordinary skill in the art; 4) state of, or the amount of knowledge in, the prior art; 5) level or degree of predictability, or a lack thereof, in the art; 6) amount of guidance or direction provided by the inventor; 7) presence or absence of working examples; and 8) quantity of experimentation required to make and use the claimed invention based upon the content of the supporting disclosure. When the above factors are weighed, it is the Examiner’s position that one skilled in the art could not practice the invention without undue experimentation. While all of the factors have been considered, only those required for a prima facie case are set forth below. The artisan in this art is a pharmaceutical formulation artisan with knowledge of drug delivery systems and pharmaceutical formulations to treat medical conditions. The chemical arts involve chemical reactions which are inherently unpredictable. MPEP 2164.03: “In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity, more may be required. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970).” The specification discloses covalently bound first and second API compounds by a “linking group” “L” (pages 11, 31) represented by the empirical formula CaHbOcNd or CaHbOc (page 30) or CeHfOgNh or CeHtOg (page 32). However, there are no examples of bonding any API compounds to another API compound. The only examples in the specification link a peptide to a resin (Examples 1-2) and not another API, which does not reasonably provide written description for covalently bonding one API to another API. There is no reference to the prior art on how to covalently bond any of the claimed API compounds to another of the claimed API compounds, which appears to be the job for a PhD level medicinal research chemist. Weighing all the factors, one of ordinary skill in the art would not recognize from the disclosure that the applicant is not enabled for covalently bonding any first API with a second API. Applicant has an idea for others to test. The specification simply directs those skilled in the art to go figure out for themselves how to covalently bond a first API to a second API as claimed. See Genetech, 108 F.3d at 1366 states that “a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for search, but compensation for its successful conclusion” and “patent protection is granted in return for an enabling disclosure of an invention, not for vague intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable.” (Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365, 42 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). In order to actually achieve the claimed invention, it is clear from the discussion above that the skilled artisan could not rely upon Applicant's disclosure as required by 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, and would have no alternative recourse but the impermissible burden of undue experimentation in order to practice the full scope of the embodiments presently claimed. The enablement requirement is not satisfied. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(d): (d) REFERENCE IN DEPENDENT FORMS.—Subject to subsection (e), a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers. The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, fourth paragraph: Subject to the following paragraph [i.e., the fifth paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112], a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers. Claim 19 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(d) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, 4th paragraph, as being of improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of the claim upon which it depends, or for failing to include all the limitations of the claim upon which it depends. Claim 16 states: “wherein the medical condition comprises a neurologic or CNS disorder that is not an inherited or age-related choroid, retina, optic nerve disorder or degeneration, or an otic disorder. However, claim 19 names medical conditions including at least vision related conditions Leber’s optic neuropathy and neuromletitis optica, as well as Tay-Sachs disease and Kearn-Sayer syndrome, which are characterized by hearing loss and thus an otic condition, which appear to be excluded from claim 16. Consequently, claim 19 does not further limit claim 16 but broadens the scope. Applicant may cancel the claim(s), amend the claim(s) to place the claim(s) in proper dependent form, rewrite the claim(s) in independent form, or present a sufficient showing that the dependent claim(s) complies with the statutory requirements. Correction is required. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action: A person shall be entitled to a patent unless – (a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. Claims 1 and 3 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Mohtaram et al. (Biomed. Mater. 2013;8:13 pages; of record). Regarding claim 1, Mohtaram et al. disclose a drug delivery system of controlled release systems for neurotrophic factors (Abstract; Figure 1). Regarding claim 3, Mohtaram et al. disclose a controlled release system of microspheres, nanofibers or hydrogels, hence sustained delivery components, comprising a first neurotrophic factor BDNF and a second not covalently bound API NT-3 (page 3, right column second paragraph). Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Cao et al. (Biomaterials 1999;20:329-339; of record). Regarding claim 1, Cao et al. discloses a drug delivery system of a sustained release of nerve growth factor, a neurotrophic factor, from PLGA microspheres sustained delivery components (Abstract). Claims 1-3 and 7-12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Kolomeyer et al. (US 20120237473; of record) as evidenced by Yamagashi et al. (Journal of Molecular and Cellular Cardiology 37 (2004) 497–506; of record). Regarding claim 1, Kolomeyer et al. disclose a drug delivery system of a sustained release delivery composition comprising a sustained release carrier and neurotrophic factor BDNF (claims 1 and 4). Regarding claims 2-3, Kolomeyer et al. disclose neurotrophic factor HGF in combination with non-covalently bound second API PEDF. As evidenced by Yamagashi et al., PEDG is an inhibitor of TNF-α (Abstract). Regarding claims 7-10, Kolomeyer et al. disclose methods of treating age-related macular degeneration, retinitis pigmentosa, glaucoma, optic atrophy, ocular inflammation, retinopathy, diabetic retinopathy, retinal ganglion cell dysfunction, and retinal detachment by administration of the pharmaceutical composition (claims 5-7). Regarding claim 11, Kolomeyer et al. disclose intraocular administration (claim 6). Regarding claim 12, the patient is ostensibly a human because the conditions treated in claim 7 are human diseases. Claims 1 and 13-14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Gillespie et al. (Journal of Neuroscience Research 2003;71:785-790; of record). Regarding claim 1, Gillespie et al. discloses a drug delivery system comprising an osmotic pump sustained delivery component and neurotrophic factor BDNF (Abstract; page 786, pump and cannular preparation). Regarding claims 13 and 14, Gilespie et al. disclose treating deafness, which is an otic disorder, in a subject made deaf, hence in need thereof, by injecting the drug delivery system into a cochlea of the guinea pig mammal (page 786, Animal Surgery). Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. 2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness. Claims 5 and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kolomeyer et al. (US 20120237473) as evidenced by Yamagashi et al. (Journal of Molecular and Cellular Cardiology 37 (2004) 497–506) as applied to claims 1-3 above. This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims under 35 U.S.C. 103, the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned at the time any inventions covered therein were made absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and invention dates of each claim that was not commonly owned at the time a later invention was made in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 103(c) and potential 35 U.S.C. 102(e), (f) or (g) prior art under 35 U.S.C. 103. Applicant claims: PNG media_image2.png 273 1298 media_image2.png Greyscale Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art (MPEP 2141.03) MPEP 2141.03 (I) states: “The “hypothetical ‘person having ordinary skill in the art’ to which the claimed subject matter pertains would, of necessity have the capability of understanding the scientific and engineering principles applicable to the pertinent art.” Ex parte Hiyamizu, 10 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988). The level of skill is that of a pharmaceutical research scientist, as is the case here, then one can assume comfortably that such an educated artisan will draw conventional ideas from drug delivery systems and pharmaceutical formulations to treat medical conditions — without being told to do so. In addition, the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level (MPEP 2141.03(II)). Determination of the scope and content of the prior art (MPEP 2141.01) It is well settled that “a disclosure that anticipates under § 102 also renders the claim invalid under §103, for anticipation is the epitome of obviousness. See MPEP 1207.03(a)(II) states: “"lack of novelty is the epitome of obviousness." May, 574 F.2d at 1089, 197 USPQ at 607 (citing In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402, 181 USPQ 641, 644 (CCPA 1974))”. Accordingly, the claims rejected under §102 above are also invalid under §103. Kolomeyer et al. and Yamagashi et al. are discussed above and that discussion is incorporated by reference. Regarding claims 5 and 6, Kolomeyer et al. teach that: “Using routine methods in the art, one with ordinary skill in the art can optimize the relative ratios of the trophic factors to decrease retinal degeneration.” [0030] and offer preferred concentrations in [0029] and suggest the daily dose of the compound of the present invention varies depending on the condition and body weight of patient, the kind of the compound, administration route and the like, in regards to intraocular administration, for example, 0.01 to 100 mg/patient/day. [0047] Thus, Kolomeyer et al. provide at least a starting point for optimization of the API amounts. Ascertainment of the difference between the prior art and the claims (MPEP 2141.02) and Finding of prima facie obviousness Rational and Motivation (MPEP 2142-2143) The difference between the instant application and Kolomeyer et al. is that Kolomeyer et al. do not expressly teach about 100 µg to about 1 mg of the first API and about 100 µg to about 1 mg of the second API. However, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have about 100 µg to about 1 mg of the first API and about 100 µg to about 1 mg of the second API in the drug delivery system of Kolomeyer et al. for use in the methods of Kolomeyer et al., and produce the instant invention. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to do this because it is merely routine optimization of the amount of each API depending upon the conditions being treated, the severity of the condition and the patient’s response to therapy by the ordinary artisan. Pharmaceutical dose has been recognized as a result-effective parameter susceptible to routine optimization. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1989) Accordingly, the ordinary artisan would formulate the drug delivery system with an effective amount of each API with a reasonable expectation of success especially when Kolomeyer et al. provide guidance for at least a starting point for optimization. Claim 15 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Gillespie et al. (Journal of Neuroscience Research 2003;71:785-790) as applied to claims 1, 13 and 14, and Wall et al. (Theriogenology 2008;69:2-9; of record). Applicant claims: PNG media_image3.png 75 1002 media_image3.png Greyscale Gillespie et al. is discussed above and that discussion is incorporated by reference. Gellespie et al. do not expressly teach treating a human. However, such is obvious to the ordinary artisan in this art because Wall et al. teach that animal studies must precede human trials and is mandated by United State’s law when requesting approval for sale of a biomedical drug or device (page 5, left column last paragraph). Therefore, the animal studies performed by Gillespie et al. are an obvious precursor to administration to humans to treat humans so affected with otic medical conditions treatable with neurotrophic factors and the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success. Claims 1 and 16-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Francis et al. (US20060246036; of record). Applicant claims: PNG media_image4.png 248 1335 media_image4.png Greyscale PNG media_image5.png 239 1305 media_image5.png Greyscale Regarding claims 1 and 16-18, Francis et al. teach drug delivery systems with sustained release formulations into the brain or spinal cord ([0074, 0080]; claims 1 and 43), thus a sustained release component, and neurotrophic factors, for example, GDNF or BDNF (claims 2 and 45). Regarding claims 19 and 20, Francis et al. teach that the subject has a neurological disorder selected from the group consisting of cerebrovascular accidents (stroke), amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, Parkinson's disease, Huntington's disease, Alzheimer's disease, multiple sclerosis, olivopontocerebellar atrophy, multiple system atrophy, progressive supranuclear palsy, diffuse Lewy body disease, corticodentatonigral degeneration, progressive familial myoclonic epilepsy, striatonigral degeneration, torsion dystonia, familial tremor, Down's Syndrome, Gilles de la Tourette syndrome, Hallervorden Spatz disease, peripheral neuropathies, dementia pugilistica, AIDS dementia, age-elated dementia, age-associated memory impairment, amyloidosis related neurodegenerative diseases, traumatic brain and spinal cord injury, cerebral edema, schizophrenia, peripheral nerve damage, spinal cord injury, and Wemicke Korsakoff's related dementia (claims 85-87, 97 and 106), which are human being conditions. Francis et al. do not expressly teach in one embodiment using the sustained release drug delivery system to treat the claimed medical conditions. However, it would be obvious to do because Francis et al. teach and suggest not only using sustained release components for injection into the brain or CSF but also treating the majority of the claimed medical conditions with at least the neurotrophic factor BDNF. Accordingly, the ordinary artisan would have a reasonable expectation of success in treating a medical condition with a drug delivery system comprising a sustained delivery component by administering by injection into the brain or CSF fluid of a human being a neurotrophic agent. Furthermore, the ordinary artisan in this art is aware of other disorders than would benefit from neurotrophic factor administration thus rendering the other medical condition species of instant claim 19 obvious to the artisan in this art and the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success. Even Francis et al. teach: “other disorders characterized by degeneration of the brain and spinal cord” [0036]. See also [0058]. Claims 1-3, 5-6 and 16-20 are further rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Francis et al. (US20060246036), as applied to claims 1 and 16-20 above, and Beech et al. (Journal of Cerebral Blood Flow and Metabolism 2001;21:683-689; of record) and Khan et al. (BioMed Research International Volume 2015, Article ID 379817, 9 pages; of record) and Chang et al. (Journal of Central Nervous System Disease 2017; Volume 9:1–5; of record) and Planells-Ferrer et al. (Journal of Neurochemistry 2016;139:11-21; of record) and Gong et al. (Frontiers in Endocrinology 2014;5(article 210): 10 pages; of record). Francis et al. is discussed in detail above and that discussion is incorporated by reference. Francis et al. do not expressly teach adding a chemokine inhibitor in the drug delivery system or method. However, Francis et al. do teach treating cerebrovascular accidents including stroke (claim 106) and using anti-inflammatory drugs [0084]. Beech et al. teach neuroprotection in ischemia-reperfusion injury with chemokine inhibitors with anti-inflammatory action (title; summary). Accordingly, the ordinary artisan would add non-covalently bound chemokine inhibitors with anti-inflammatory action to treat at least stroke in the drug delivery system and method of Francis et al. with a reasonable expectation of success. Francis et al. do not expressly teach using a caspase inhibitor in the drug delivery system or method. However, Francis et al. do teach treating Alzheimer’s disease (AD), Parkinson’s disease (PD), Huntington’s disease (HD), and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) (claim 106) and Khan et al. teach inhibitors of caspase include peptidyl and non-peptidly compounds (Abstract and page 2 right column) as a therapeutic target in multi-neurodegenerative disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s disease and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Abstract). Accordingly, the ordinary artisan would add non-covalently bound caspase inhibitors to treat at least Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s disease and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis in the drug delivery system and method of Francis et al. for at least an additive effect with a reasonable expectation of success. Francis et al. do not expressly teach using a TNF-α inhibitor in the drug delivery system or method. However, Francis et al. do teach treating Alzheimer’s disease (claim 106). Chang et al. teach using TNF-α inhibitors to treat Alzheimer’s disease (Abstract). Accordingly, the ordinary artisan would add non-covalently bound TNF-α inhibitors to treat Alzheimer’s disease in the drug delivery system and method of Francis for at least an additive effect with a reasonable expectation of success. Francis et al. do not expressly teach using a FAS inhibitor in the drug delivery system or method. However, Francis et al. do teach treating Alzheimer’s disease (claim 106). Planells-Ferrer et al. teach that FAS inhibitory molecules such as FAIM1, FAIM2 and FAIM3 inhibit Fas-induced cell death (Abstract) where Alzheimer’s disease is characterized by decreased FAIM1 levels thus sensitizing neurons to TNFα and prompting neuronal loss (Abstract). Accordingly, the ordinary artisan would add non-covalently bound FAS inhibitors to treat Alzheimer’s disease in the drug delivery system and method of Francis for at least an additive effect with a reasonable expectation of success. Francis et al. do not expressly teach using a mitochondrial peptide in the drug delivery system or method. However, Francis et al. do teach treating Alzheimer’s disease (claim 106). Gong et al. teach that the mitochondrial peptide humanin and its potent analogs have been shown to have beneficial effects in many age-related diseases including Alzheimer’s disease (Abstract). Accordingly, the ordinary artisan would add non-covalently bound mitochondrial peptide such as humanin to treat Alzheimer’s disease in the drug delivery system and method of Francis for at least an additive effect with a reasonable expectation of success. Francis et al. do not expressly teach about 100 µg to about 1 mg of the first API and about 100 µg to about 1 mg of the second API. However, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have about 100 µg to about 1 mg of the first API and about 100 µg to about 1 mg of the second API in the drug delivery system of Francis et al. for use in the methods of Francis et al., and produce the instant invention. One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to do this because it is merely routine optimization of the amount of each API depending upon the conditions being treated, the severity of the condition and the patient’s response to therapy by the ordinary artisan. Pharmaceutical dose has been recognized as a result-effective parameter susceptible to routine optimization. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1989) Accordingly, the ordinary artisan would formulate the drug delivery system of Francis et al. with an effective amount of each API to treat the medical condition where the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success In light of the forgoing discussion, the Examiner concludes that the subject matter defined by the instant claims would have been obvious within the meaning of 35 USC 103(a). From the combined teachings of the references, it is apparent that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in producing the claimed invention. Therefore, the invention as a whole was prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, as evidenced by the combined references, especially in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Double Patenting The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969). A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b). The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13. The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer. Claims 1, 2, 4-20 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-17 of U.S. Patent No. 12128104; of record. The instant application is a continuation of the patent with the same inventors and assignee. The patented subject matter is a species of the instantly claimed subject matter. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because patented subject matter is also directed to a drug delivery system and methods of treating a medical condition as shown below: PNG media_image6.png 790 1124 media_image6.png Greyscale Accordingly, the ordinary artisan would have recognized the obvious variation of the instantly claimed subject matter over the patented subject matter. Claims 1, 2, 4-20 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-5 and 7-20 of application 19238317 (NOA filed 6/2/26 but an issue number has not yet been assigned). The instant application is a continuation of the patent with the same inventors and assignee. The patented subject matter is a species of the instantly claimed subject matter. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because patented subject matter is also directed to a drug delivery system and methods of treating a medical condition as shown below: PNG media_image7.png 590 762 media_image7.png Greyscale PNG media_image8.png 214 770 media_image8.png Greyscale PNG media_image9.png 632 846 media_image9.png Greyscale PNG media_image10.png 376 810 media_image10.png Greyscale PNG media_image11.png 398 794 media_image11.png Greyscale Accordingly, the ordinary artisan would have recognized the obvious variation of the instantly claimed subject matter over the allowed but not yet issued subject matter. Claims 1-20 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 44-46, 49-55, 58-63 of copending Application No. 17787228. This application and the copending application have the same inventors and the same assignee. The copending application is also directed to a drug delivery system comprising a neurotrophic agent first API such as DGGL or a slat thereof and a FAS/FASL inhibitor second API (Claims 44-46, 49-50) that are covalently bonded together through a linker (Claim 55) in the amounts of about 100 ug to about 1 mg of the first API (Claim 51) and about 100 ug to about 1 mg of the second API (Claim 52). The copending also teaches methods treating the medical conditions to mammals by injection of the drug delivery system into the eye, intraarterially or intravenously, the CNS and subarachnoid spaces or into the cerebral spinal fluid wherein the medical condition comprises: 1) an inherited or age-related choroid, retina, or optic nerve disorder or degeneration; 2) an otic disorder; or 3) a neurologic or CNS disorder (Claims 58-63). The copending does not expressly teach wherein the mammal is a human. However, the ordinary artisan understands that humans are mammals and would treat a human with a reasonable expectation of success. The copending does not expressly teach injection into a cochlea or brain of the mammal. However, treatment of otic disorders would render obvious injection into the inner ear (cochlea) of a mammal and the brain is part of the CNS and therefore injection into the brain to treat a CNS disorder would include brain disorders. The copending does not expressly teach all of the medical conditions of claim 19. However, the copending teaches broad categories of medical conditions which renders obvious at least the common medical disorders of, for example, dementia, stroke, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, epilepsy and traumatic brain injury. Consequently, the ordinary artisan would have recognized the obvious variation of the instantly claimed subject matter over the copending subject matter in view of Mosler et al. This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection. Claims 1-12 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-3, 6-16, 18-21, 23-27 of copending Application No. 17843796. This application and the copending application have the same inventors and the same assignee. The copending application is also directed to a drug delivery system comprising a DGGL CNTF compound first API and a FAS/FASL inhibitor second API and a sustained delivery component (Claims 1-3) where the CNTF compound and the FAS/FASL inhibitor combination is not covalently bonded or covalently linked (Claim 13) or is linked to the sustained delivery component (Claims 14, 15 and 24-26), thus providing CNTF covalently boned to the FAS/FASL inhibitor through a linking sustained delivery component (Claims 23). The copending teaches treating glaucoma or ocular hypertension by administration to the eye of a mammal (Claim 16), which reads on an inherited or age-related choroid, retina, or optic nerve disorder or degeneration. The copending does not expressly teach injection into the eye of a human or the amount of each component. However, injection of the drug delivery system to the eye of a human to treat the eye is obvious to the artisan in this art. Further, optimization of the dosage amount is routine for the artisan in this art depending upon the severity of the condition and the patient’s response to treatment. This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection. Conclusion No claims are allowed. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ERNST V ARNOLD whose telephone number is (571)272-8509. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 7-3:30. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Brian Y Kwon can be reached at 571-272-0581. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /ERNST V ARNOLD/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1613
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Prosecution Timeline

Sep 23, 2024
Application Filed
Oct 09, 2026
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §102, §103, §112 (current)

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Study what changed to get past this examiner. Based on 5 most recent grants.

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Prosecution Projections

1-2
Expected OA Rounds
48%
Grant Probability
61%
With Interview (+12.6%)
Low
PTA Risk
Based on 1398 resolved cases by this examiner. Grant probability derived from career allowance rate.

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