Prosecution Insights
Last updated: April 19, 2026
Application No. 18/902,728

MITIGATION OF ROGUE WI-FI 6E COMPATIBLE ACCESS POINTS

Non-Final OA §101§112§DP
Filed
Sep 30, 2024
Examiner
TRUONG, LAN DAI T
Art Unit
2444
Tech Center
2400 — Computer Networks
Assignee
Fortinet Inc.
OA Round
1 (Non-Final)
91%
Grant Probability
Favorable
1-2
OA Rounds
3y 1m
To Grant
99%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 91% — above average
91%
Career Allow Rate
701 granted / 770 resolved
+33.0% vs TC avg
Moderate +12% lift
Without
With
+11.6%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
3y 1m
Avg Prosecution
20 currently pending
Career history
790
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
16.9%
-23.1% vs TC avg
§103
44.7%
+4.7% vs TC avg
§102
2.1%
-37.9% vs TC avg
§112
22.5%
-17.5% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 770 resolved cases

Office Action

§101 §112 §DP
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . DETAILED ACTION 1. This action is response to application filed on 09/30/2024. Claims 1-7 are pending. Allowable Subject Matter 2. There are no prior arts of record, singly or in combination teaches the feature of claim(s) limitations in context of the claims 1, 6-7 as a whole. However, the claims 1, 6-7 are not in allowance condition yet because of existing double patenting issue, and objection issues in those claims. 3. For claims 1, 6-7, Nakanishi et al. (US 20220030665) teaches the 6 GHz radio may be configured to provide both a fourth LAN interface and a wide area network (WAN) interface with the router of the gateway device, and provide wireless connectivity to network devices (e.g., wireless extenders and/or client devices) that are configured to operate in the 6 GHz band (also referred to as ‘Wi-Fi 6E’ devices). The fourth LAN interface and the WAN interface may be configured as virtual interfaces provided over a single physical connection (e.g., the 6 GHz radio). The virtual interfaces may also be referred to as logical interfaces. A virtual LAN interface and a virtual WAN interface may be distinguished from each other by using different service set identifiers or SSIDs (e.g., 6G-LAN and 6G-WAN, Wi-Fi 6E LAN and Wi-Fi 6E WAN, NetworkName-LAN-6 GHz and NetworkName-WAN-6 GHz, etc.), according to example embodiments of the present disclosure. Each SSID is configured to connect to either the WAN side of the gateway device or the LAN side of the gateway device. In contrast to the gateway device according to example embodiments of the present disclosure, the Wi-Fi radio in currently existing RGs, GWs, and APs is always serving the LAN side only (not the WAN side). Thus, the SSID is implicitly associated with the LAN side of the known RG, GW, or AP (Nakanishi [0098]). But, Nakanishi does not teach in a Wi-Fi controller, a method for coordinated channel switch announcement (CSA) disruption of rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point connections with Wi-Fi 6E stations, the method comprising: identifying authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points; on-wire monitoring of SSID/BSSID data including a channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic, and generating an SSID/BSSID scan table of on-wire SSID/BSSID combinations of the Wi-Fi 6E access points; Wi-Fi monitoring of SSID/BSSID data including channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic, from RF scanning by the authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points managed over wire by the Wi-Fi controller, wherein the Wi-Fi data packets are encapsulated within on-wire data packets for transmission from the Wi-Fi access points to the Wi-Fi controller; detecting the rogue Wi-Fi access point from an unregistered BSSID combined with a registered SSID within RF range of a first Wi-Fi 6E access point from the SSID/BSSID scan table; at a subsequent time, detecting the rogue access point from the unregistered BSSID within range of a second Wi-Fi 6E access point, physically distinct from the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, communicating with a Wi-Fi 6E station; and transmitting the SSID/BSSID data for the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point from the scan table to the second Wi-Fi 6E access point for disruption, wherein, in response to the transmission, the second Wi-Fi 6E access point generates an action frame modified for the Wi-Fi 6E station with a spoofed BSSID associated with the rogue Wi-Fi access point as scanned by the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, and including CSA values, causing the Wi-Fi 6E station to change a channel used to communicate with the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point as claimed. Claims 2-5 is also objected because they depend on objected claim 1. Double patenting 4. A rejection based on double patenting of the “same invention” type finds its support in the language of 35 U.S.C. 101 which states that “whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process... may obtain a patent therefor...” (Emphasis added). Thus, the term “same invention,” in this context, means an invention drawn to identical subject matter. See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186 (1894); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Ockert, 245 F.2d 467, 114 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1957). 5. A statutory type (35 U.S.C. 101) double patenting rejection can be overcome by canceling or amending the claims that are directed to the same invention so they are no longer coextensive in scope. The filing of a terminal disclaimer cannot overcome a double patenting rejection based upon 35 U.S.C. 101. 6. Claims 1-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 as claiming the same invention as that of claims 1-7 are of prior U.S. Patent No. 12,382,292. This is a statutory double patenting rejection. The current application 18902728 U.S. Patent # 12,382,292 Explanation 1.In a Wi-Fi controller, a method for coordinated channel switch announcement (CSA) disruption of rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point connections with Wi-Fi 6E stations, the method comprising: identifying authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points; on-wire monitoring of SSID/BSSID data including a channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic, and generating an SSID/BSSID scan table of on-wire SSID/BSSID combinations of the Wi-Fi 6E access points; Wi-Fi monitoring of SSID/BSSID data including channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic, from RF scanning by the authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points managed over wire by the Wi-Fi controller, wherein the Wi-Fi data packets are encapsulated within on-wire data packets for transmission from the Wi-Fi access points to the Wi-Fi controller; detecting the rogue Wi-Fi access point from an unregistered BSSID combined with a registered SSID within RF range of a first Wi-Fi 6E access point from the SSID/BSSID scan table; at a subsequent time, detecting the rogue access point from the unregistered BSSID within range of a second Wi-Fi 6E access point, physically distinct from the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, communicating with a Wi-Fi 6E station; and transmitting the SSID/BSSID data for the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point from the scan table to the second Wi-Fi 6E access point for disruption, wherein, in response to the transmission, the second Wi-Fi 6E access point generates an action frame modified for the Wi-Fi 6E station with a spoofed BSSID associated with the rogue Wi-Fi access point as scanned by the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, and including CSA values, causing the Wi-Fi 6E station to change a channel used to communicate with the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point. 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: at a second subsequent time, detecting a neighboring access point from an unregistered BSSID combined with a unregistered SSID within range of the first Wi-Fi access point, wherein no action frame is generated based on the detection. 3. The method of claim 1, further comprising: enabling a suppress rogue access points mode at the Wi-Fi controller. 4. The method of claim 1, further comprising: enabling a suppress rogue access points mode at the first and second Wi-Fi 6E access points. 5. The method of claim 1, wherein the second Wi-Fi 6E station generates a second modified action fame with an updated, modified CSA value. 6. A non-transitory computer-readable medium in a Wi-Fi 6E access point, at least partially implemented in hardware, storing instructions that, when executed by a processor, perform a computer-implemented method for coordinated channel CSA disruption of rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point connections with Wi-Fi 6E stations, the method comprising: an access point tracking module identifying authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points; an on-wire monitoring module to monitor of SSID/BSSID data including a channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic from on-wire data traffic, and generate an SSID/BSSID scan table of on-wire SSID/BSSID combinations of the Wi-Fi 6E access points; a Wi-Fi monitoring module to monitor Wi-Fi traffic for SSID/BSSID data including channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic, from RF scanning by the authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points managed over wire by the Wi-Fi controller, wherein the Wi-Fi data packets are encapsulated within on-wire data packets for transmission from the Wi-Fi access points to the Wi-Fi controller; wherein the access point tracking module detects the rogue Wi-Fi access point from an unregistered BSSID combined with a registered SSID within RF range of a first Wi-Fi 6E access point from the SSID/BSSID scan table, wherein at a subsequent time, the access point tracking module detects the rogue access point from the unregistered BSSID within range of a second Wi-Fi 6E access point, physically distinct from the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, communicating with a Wi-Fi 6E station; transmitting the SSID/BSSID data for the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point from the scan table to the second Wi-Fi 6E access point for disruption, wherein, in response to the transmission, the second Wi-Fi 6E access point generates an action frame modified for the Wi-Fi 6E station with a spoofed BSSID associated with the rogue Wi-Fi access point as scanned by the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, and including CSA values, causing the Wi-Fi 6E station to change a channel used to communicate with the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point. 7. A Wi-Fi 6E access point, at least partially implemented in hardware, for coordinated channel CSA disruption of rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point connections with Wi-Fi 6E stations, Wi-Fi 6E access point comprising: a processor; a network interface communicatively coupled to the processor and to the WLAN; and a memory, communicatively coupled to the processor and storing: identifying authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points; an access point tracking module identifying authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points; an on-wire monitoring module to monitor of SSID/BSSID data including a channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic from on-wire data traffic, and generate an SSID/BSSID scan table of on-wire SSID/BSSID combinations of the Wi-Fi 6E access points; a Wi-Fi monitoring module to monitor Wi-Fi traffic for SSID/BSSID data including channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic, from RF scanning by the authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points managed over wire by the Wi-Fi controller, wherein the Wi-Fi data packets are encapsulated within on-wire data packets for transmission from the Wi-Fi access points to the Wi-Fi controller; wherein the access point monitoring module detects the rogue Wi-Fi access point from an unregistered BSSID combined with a registered SSID within RF range of a first Wi-Fi 6E access point from the SSID/BSSID scan table, wherein at a subsequent time, the access point tracking module detects the rogue access point from the unregistered BSSID within range of a second Wi-Fi 6E access point, physically distinct from the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, communicating with a Wi-Fi 6E station; and wherein the network interface transmits the SSID/BSSID data for the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point from the scan table to the second Wi-Fi 6E access point for disruption, wherein, in response to the transmission, the second Wi-Fi 6E access point generates an action frame modified for the Wi-Fi 6E station with a spoofed BSSID associated with the rogue Wi-Fi access point as scanned by the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, and including CSA values, causing the Wi-Fi 6E station to change a channel used to communicate with the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point. 1.In a Wi-Fi controller, a method for coordinated channel switch announcement (CSA) disruption of rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point connections with Wi-Fi 6E stations, the method comprising: identifying authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points; on-wire monitoring of SSID/BSSID data including a channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic, and generating an SSID/BSSID scan table of on-wire SSID/BSSID combinations of the Wi-Fi 6E access points; Wi-Fi monitoring of SSID/BSSID data including channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic, from RF scanning by the authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points managed over wire by the Wi-Fi controller, wherein the Wi-Fi data packets are encapsulated within on -wire data packets for transmission from the Wi-Fi 6E access points to the Wi-Fi controller; detecting the rogue Wi-Fi access point from an unregistered BSSID combined with a registered SSID within RF range of a first Wi-Fi 6E access point from the SSID/BSSID scan table; at a subsequent time, detecting the rogue access point from the unregistered BSSID within range of a second Wi-Fi 6E access point, physically distinct from the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, communicating with a Wi-Fi 6E station; and transmitting the SSID/BSSID data for the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point from the SSID/BSSID scan table to the second Wi-Fi 6E access point for disruption, wherein, in response to the transmission, the second Wi-Fi 6E access point generates an action frame modified for the Wi-Fi 6E station with a spoofed BSSID associated with the rogue Wi-Fi access point as scanned by the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, and including CSA values, causing the Wi-Fi 6E station to change a channel used to communicate with the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point. 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: at a second subsequent time, detecting a neighboring access point from an unregistered BSSID combined with a unregistered SSID within range of the first Wi-Fi access point, wherein no action frame is generated based on the detection. 3. The method of claim 1, further comprising: enabling a suppress rogue access points mode at the Wi-Fi controller. 4. The method of claim 1, further comprising: enabling a suppress rogue access points mode at the first and second Wi-Fi 6E access points. 5. The method of claim 1, wherein a second Wi-Fi 6E station generates a second modified action fame with an updated, modified CSA value. 6. A non-transitory computer-readable medium in a Wi-Fi controller, at least partially implemented in hardware, storing instructions that, when executed by a processor, perform a computer -implemented method for coordinated channel CSA disruption of rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point connections with Wi-Fi 6E stations, the method comprising: an access point tracking module identifying authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points; an on-wire monitoring module to monitor SSID/BSSID data including a channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic from on-wire data traffic, and generate an SSID/BSSID scan table of on-wire SSID/BSSID combinations of the Wi-Fi 6E access points; a Wi-Fi monitoring module to monitor Wi-Fi traffic for SSID/BSSID data including channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic, from RF scanning by the authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points managed over wire by the Wi-Fi controller, wherein Wi-Fi data packets are encapsulated within on-wire data packets for transmission from the Wi-Fi access points to the Wi-Fi controller; wherein the access point tracking module detects the rogue Wi-Fi access point from an unregistered BSSID combined with a registered SSID within RF range of a first Wi-Fi 6E access point from the SSID/BSSID scan table, wherein at a subsequent time, the access point tracking module detects the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point from the unregistered BSSID within range of a second Wi-Fi 6E access point, physically distinct from the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, communicating with a Wi-Fi 6E station; transmitting the SSID/BSSID data for the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point from the scan table to the second Wi-Fi 6E access point for disruption, wherein, in response to the transmission, the second Wi-Fi 6E access point generates an action frame modified for the Wi-Fi 6E station with a spoofed BSSID associated with the rogue Wi-Fi access point as scanned by the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, and including CSA values, causing the Wi-Fi 6E station to change a channel used to communicate with the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point. 7. A Wi-Fi 6E controller, at least partially implemented in hardware, for coordinated channel CSA disruption of rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point connections with Wi-Fi 6E stations, Wi-Fi 6E controller comprising: a processor; a network interface communicatively coupled to the processor and to a WLAN; and a memory, communicatively coupled to the processor and storing: identifying authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points; an access point tracking module identifying authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points; an on-wire monitoring module to monitor of SSID/BSSID data including a channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic from on-wire data traffic, and generate an SSID/BSSID scan table of on-wire SSID/BSSID combinations of the Wi-Fi 6E access points; a Wi-Fi monitoring module to monitor Wi-Fi traffic for SSID/BSSID data including channel occupied for Wi-Fi traffic, from RF scanning by the authorized Wi-Fi 6E access points managed over wire by the Wi-Fi controller, wherein Wi-Fi data packets are encapsulated within on-wire data packets for transmission from the Wi-Fi 6E access points to the Wi-Fi controller; wherein the access point tracking module detects the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point from an unregistered BSSID combined with a registered SSID within RF range of a first Wi-Fi 6E access point from the SSID/BSSID scan table, wherein at a subsequent time, the access point tracking module detects the rogue access point from the unregistered BSSID within range of a second Wi-Fi 6E access point, physically distinct from the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, communicating with a Wi-Fi 6E station; and wherein the network interface transmits the SSID/BSSID data for the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point from the SSID/BSSID scan table to the second Wi-Fi 6E access point for disruption, wherein, in response to the transmission, the second Wi-Fi 6E access point generates an action frame modified for the Wi-Fi 6E station with a spoofed BSSID associated with the rogue Wi-Fi access point as scanned by the first Wi-Fi 6E access point, and including CSA values, causing the Wi-Fi 6E station to change a channel used to communicate with the rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point. Claim Objection 7. Claim 1 is objected to because of the following informalities: There is a typo error at this limitation “…the rogue Wi-Fi access point” in the claim (lines 17, 31-32). It respectfully notes that its ancient is “rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point”. Appropriate correction is requested. 8. Claim 1 is objected to because of the following informalities: There is a typo error at this limitation “…the rogue access point” in the claim (line 21). It respectfully notes that its ancient is “rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point”. Appropriate correction is requested. 9. Claim 2 is objected to because of the following informalities: There is a typo error at this limitation “…the first Wi-Fi access point” in the claim (lines 4-5). It respectfully notes that its ancient is “a first Wi-Fi 6E access point”. Appropriate correction is requested. 10. Claim 5 is objected to because of the following informalities: There is a typo error at this limitation “…the second Wi-Fi 6E station” in the claim (lines 4-5). It respectfully notes that its ancient is “a second Wi-Fi 6E access point”. Appropriate correction is requested. 11. Claim 6 is objected to because of the following informalities: There is a typo error at this limitation “…the Wi-Fi access points” in the claim (line 20). It respectfully notes that its ancient is “a Wi-Fi 6E access points”. Appropriate correction is requested. 12. Claim 6 is objected to because of the following informalities: There is a typo error at this limitation “…the rogue Wi-Fi access point” in the claim (lines 22-23). It respectfully notes that its ancient is “a rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point”. Appropriate correction is requested. 13. Claim 6 is objected to because of the following informalities: There is a typo error at this limitation “…the rogue access point” in the claim (lines 27, 37-38). It respectfully notes that its ancient is “a rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point”. Appropriate correction is requested. 14. Claim 7 is objected to because of the following informalities: There is a typo error at this limitation "the Wi-Fi access points" in line 22. It respectfully notes that its ancient is “the Wi-Fi 6E access points”. 15. Claim 7 is objected to because of the following informalities: There is a typo error at this limitation “…the rogue Wi-Fi access point” in the claim (lines 26-27). It respectfully notes that its ancient is “a rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point”. Appropriate correction is requested. 16. Claim 7 is objected to because of the following informalities: There is a typo error at this limitation “…the rogue access point” in the claim (line 32). It respectfully notes that its ancient is “a rogue Wi-Fi 6E access point”. Appropriate correction is requested. 17. Claim 7 is objected to because of the following informalities: There is a typo error at this limitation “…the scan table” in the claim (line 32). It respectfully notes that its ancient is “SSID/BSSID scan table”. Appropriate correction is requested. Claim rejections-35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. 18. Claim 6 recites the limitation "the Wi-Fi controller" in lines 17-18, 20-21. There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim. 19. Claim 6 recites the limitation "the Wi-Fi data packets" in line 18. There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim. 20. Claim 7 recites the limitation "the WLAN" in line 7. There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim. 21. Claim 7 recites the limitation "the Wi-Fi controller" in lines 21-22, 24-25. There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim. 22. Claim 7 recites the limitation "the access point monitoring module" in line 26. There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim. It respectfully notes that its ancient is “an access point tracking module”. Conclusions 23. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to LAN DAI T TRUONG whose telephone number is (571)272-7959. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday 7:00 Am to 3:00 PM. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Follansbee John A can be reached on 571-272-3964. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /LAN DAI T TRUONG/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2444
Read full office action

Prosecution Timeline

Sep 30, 2024
Application Filed
Mar 16, 2026
Non-Final Rejection — §101, §112, §DP (current)

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Study what changed to get past this examiner. Based on 5 most recent grants.

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Prosecution Projections

1-2
Expected OA Rounds
91%
Grant Probability
99%
With Interview (+11.6%)
3y 1m
Median Time to Grant
Low
PTA Risk
Based on 770 resolved cases by this examiner. Grant probability derived from career allow rate.

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