DETAILED ACTION
This is a response to Application # 18/944,004 filed on November 12, 2024 in which claims 1-20 were presented for examination.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Claims
Claims 1-20 are pending, of which 9 and 15-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101; 3, 5, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b); claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103; and claims 7 and 8 are objected to.
Priority
Receipt is acknowledged of certified copies of papers required by 37 C.F.R. § 1.55.
Specification
The disclosure is objected to because of the following informalities: Paragraphs 5-7 and 9-19 do not conform to English syntax; these sections are labeled as separate paragraphs but do not include full sentences beginning with a capital letter and ending with the appropriate stop mark such as a period, question mark, or exclamation point.
Appropriate correction is required.
Drawings
Page 7 of the presently filed drawings is blank. Because each of the drawings referenced in the presently filed specification are present in the drawings, this page shall be interpreted as being a mere typographic error.
Claim Interpretation
Claim 1 recites a method claim including the limitations “in response to an illuminating state of a vehicle lamp, acquiring a vehicle lamp instruction, a vehicle lamp temperature, vehicle lamp luminance, a cooling fan state, a liquid cooling state, and an external environmental temperature of the vehicle lamp;” “based on the vehicle lamp instruction, the vehicle lamp temperature, the vehicle lamp luminance, the cooling fan state, the liquid cooling state, the external environmental temperature of the vehicle lamp and a preset first temperature threshold, adjusting heat dissipation data of the vehicle lamp;” and “adjusting the cooling fan state according to the vehicle lamp temperature in the vehicle lamp instruction: in response to passive heat dissipation and the vehicle lamp temperature being greater than the preset first temperature threshold, starting a cooling fan to lower the vehicle lamp temperature to the preset first temperature threshold or below, and adjusting the liquid cooling state according to the vehicle lamp temperature in the vehicle lamp instruction: in response to a maximum rotational speed of the cooling fan and the vehicle lamp temperature still being greater than a second temperature threshold, starting liquid cooling to further lower the vehicle lamp temperature to the second temperature threshold or below, and regardless of a value of the vehicle lamp temperature, when the external environmental temperature reaches an environmental temperature threshold, starting the cooling fan and the liquid cooling simultaneously.” (Emphasis added). Each of the emphasized portion is a condition precedent that is not required to occur. As a result the broadest reasonable interpretation of this claim does not require the associated dependent clauses to occur. See Ex parte Schulhauser, 2013-007847 (PTAB 2016) (precedential) where the board held that when method steps are to be carried out only upon the occurrence of a condition precedent, the broadest reasonable interpretation holds that those steps are not required to be performed. (id. at *7). See, e.g., Ex parte Circlaeys (PTAB 2026) (App. S.N. 17/878,742) at 6 (“the phrase ‘in response to’ is conditional and therefore synonymous with the term ‘if.’”); Ex parte Heil (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/512,669), at 6; Ex parte Frost (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/785,052) at 7; Ex parte Dawson (PTAB 2018) (App. S.N. 12/103,472) at 6; and Ex parte Candelore (PTAB 2017) (App. S.N. 14/281,158) at 5 (supporting the interpretation that “in response to” limitations are conditional). See, e.g., Reactive Surfaces v. Toyota Motor Corp., IPR2016-01914 (PTAB 2018) (“[t]he use of ‘when’ instead of ‘if’ does not change whether the method step is conditional”) (citing Ex parte Kaundinya, No. 2016-000917, 2017 WL 5510012, at *5-6 (PTAB Nov. 14, 2017) ("when" may indicate a conditional method step); Ex parte Zhou, No. 2016-004913, 2017 WL 5171533, at *2 (PTAB Nov. 1, 2017) (same); Ex parte Lee, No. 2014-009364, 2017 WL 1101681, at *2 (PTAB Mar. 16, 2017) (same)). See, e.g., Ex parte Sabin (PTAB 2023) (App. S.N. 16/723,088), at 2-3; Ex parte Baltar (PTAB 2023) (App. S.N. 15/714,480) at *5; Ex parte Silvestre (PTAB 2023) (App. S.N. 15/532,953) at *11; and Ex parte Banescu (PTAB 2021) (App. S.N. 14/898,856) at *12 Ex parte Mehta, PTAB Appeal No. 2017-011252 at *20–22 (Application No. 13/422,647, Aug. 23, 2019) (“identifying, by the insurance computer system, the online group for an insurance offering update based on a size of the online group changing beyond a threshold amount”), Ex parte Carasso, PTAB Appeal No. 2018-005963 at *17–20 (Application No. 14/611,093) (Jan. 24, 2019) (“based on user input indicating that development of a text extraction rule is complete”), Ex parte Xiu, PTAB Appeal 2025-000743 at *5, ft. 3 (Application 17/211,498) (Aug. 29, 2025) (in the footnote, the Board recommends that the Examiner treat, as conditional language, the limitation of “based on the adaptive color space transform enablement indication indicating that the adaptive color space transform is disabled”) (supporting the interpretation that “based on” limitations are conditional).
Claims 3, 12, 16, and 20 each refer to “the step of …” Ordinarily, the use of the word “step”)in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). However, based on the usage in the present claims, the recitation of the steps are not being interpreted to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but instead to refer back to previous method steps in a manner that clearly indicates the reader that a previous method step is being referenced.
However, if this is not the intended interpretation, the examiner recommends amending these claims to better define the intended interpretation.
Claim 3 recites a method claim including the limitation “when the vehicle lamp temperature is adjusted to reach a preset standard, allowing a system to stop increasing the flow velocity of the cooling liquid.” (Emphasis added).
The broadest reasonable interpretation of this limitation does not require the allowance of a system to stop increasing the flow velocity to be performed. See Ex parte Schulhauser, 2013-007847 (PTAB 2016) (precedential) where the board held that when method steps are to be carried out only upon the occurrence of a condition precedent, the broadest reasonable interpretation holds that those steps are not required to be performed. (id. at *7). See, e.g., Reactive Surfaces v. Toyota Motor Corp., IPR2016-01914 (PTAB 2018) (“[t]he use of ‘when’ instead of ‘if’ does not change whether the method step is conditional”) (citing Ex parte Kaundinya, No. 2016-000917, 2017 WL 5510012, at *5-6 (PTAB Nov. 14, 2017) ("when" may indicate a conditional method step); Ex parte Zhou, No. 2016-004913, 2017 WL 5171533, at *2 (PTAB Nov. 1, 2017) (same); Ex parte Lee, No. 2014-009364, 2017 WL 1101681, at *2 (PTAB Mar. 16, 2017) (same)).
Claims 4, 5, 13, 14, 17, and 18 each refer to “gradual” control or “gradually” adjusting features of the system. For purposes of examination, “gradual” and “gradually” shall be interpreted as any change that has at least one intermediate point for which the feature is purposely set in between the intended start and stop points.
Claim 5 recites a method claim including the limitations “automatically determining, by a system, an optimal illuminating mode” and “a difference between present luminance and target luminance to ensure that a transition is proceeded according to a preset gradient curve” and “when a deviation is detected, allowing a control unit to change a current adjustment strategy to ensure that final luminance is as expected.” (Emphasis added).
The recitation of “an optimal illuminating mode,” in this limitation, is a label by the system according to the system’s judgement and is not a relative term.
Additionally, the broadest reasonable interpretation of this limitation does not require the allowance of a control unit to change an adjustment strategy to be performed. See Ex parte Schulhauser, 2013-007847 (PTAB 2016) (precedential) where the board held that when method steps are to be carried out only upon the occurrence of a condition precedent, the broadest reasonable interpretation holds that those steps are not required to be performed. (id. at *7). See, e.g., Reactive Surfaces v. Toyota Motor Corp., IPR2016-01914 (PTAB 2018) (“[t]he use of ‘when’ instead of ‘if’ does not change whether the method step is conditional”) (citing Ex parte Kaundinya, No. 2016-000917, 2017 WL 5510012, at *5-6 (PTAB Nov. 14, 2017) ("when" may indicate a conditional method step); Ex parte Zhou, No. 2016-004913, 2017 WL 5171533, at *2 (PTAB Nov. 1, 2017) (same); Ex parte Lee, No. 2014-009364, 2017 WL 1101681, at *2 (PTAB Mar. 16, 2017) (same)).
Further, the statements that the difference is “to ensure that a transition is proceeded according to a preset gradient curve“ and that the adjustment is allowed “to ensure that final luminance is as expected” is a statement of the intended use of the allowance. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (‘The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.’). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim 7 includes one or more claim limitations that use the word “means” or “step” but are nonetheless not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) because the claim limitations recite sufficient structure, materials, or acts to entirely perform the recited function. Such claim limitations are: the “preset module,” “first acquisition unit,” “second data acquisition unit,” and “control module.”
Because these claim limitations are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), they are not being interpreted to cover only the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If Applicant intends to have these limitations interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), Applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitations to remove the structure, materials, or acts that performs the claimed function; or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitations do not recite sufficient structure, materials, or acts to perform the claimed function.
Claim 8 includes one or more claim limitations that use the word “means” or “step” but are nonetheless not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) because the claim limitations recite sufficient structure, materials, or acts to entirely perform the recited function. Such claim limitations are: the “air condition control module” and the “liquid cooling control module.”
Because these claim limitations are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), they are not being interpreted to cover only the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If Applicant intends to have these limitations interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), Applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitations to remove the structure, materials, or acts that performs the claimed function; or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitations do not recite sufficient structure, materials, or acts to perform the claimed function.
Claim 18 recites the limitations “automatically determining, by a system, an optimal illuminating mode” and “a difference between present luminance and target luminance to ensure that a transition is proceeded according to a preset gradient curve; and when a deviation is detected, allowing a control unit to change a current adjustment strategy to ensure that final luminance is as expected.”
The recitation of “an optimal illuminating mode,” in this limitation, is a label by the system according to the system’s judgement and is not a relative term.
Additionally, the statements that the difference is “to ensure that a transition is proceeded according to a preset gradient curve“ and that the adjustment is allowed “to ensure that final luminance is as expected” is a statement of the intended use of the allowance. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (‘The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.’). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim Objections
Claim 1 is objected to because of the following informalities: in line 12, a colon is present where it appears either a semi-colon or a comma is intended. Appropriate correction is required.
Claims 1-3, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14-16, and 18-20 are objected to because of the following informalities: these claims contain limitations that end with a semi-colon but are not followed by a carriage return as is customary. A carriage return should be added after each semi-colon in order to increase readability. Appropriate correction is required.
Claims 4 and 5 are objected to because they depend from claim 2, while intervening claim 3 depends from claim 1. A series of singular dependent claims is permissible in which a dependent claim refers to a preceding claim which, in turn, refers to another preceding claim.
A claim which depends from a dependent claim should not be separated by any claim which does not also depend from said dependent claim. It should be kept in mind that a dependent claim may refer to any preceding independent claim. In general, Applicants’ sequence will not be changed. See MPEP § 608.01(n).
This objection will be held in abeyance upon Applicant’s request.
Claims 11 and 12 are objected to because they depend from claim 6, while intervening claims 9 and 10 depends from claim 1. A series of singular dependent claims is permissible in which a dependent claim refers to a preceding claim which, in turn, refers to another preceding claim.
A claim which depends from a dependent claim should not be separated by any claim which does not also depend from said dependent claim. It should be kept in mind that a dependent claim may refer to any preceding independent claim. In general, Applicants’ sequence will not be changed. See MPEP § 608.01(n).
This objection will be held in abeyance upon Applicant’s request.
Claims 13 and 14 are objected to because they depend from claim 11, while intervening claim 12 depends from claim 6. A series of singular dependent claims is permissible in which a dependent claim refers to a preceding claim which, in turn, refers to another preceding claim.
A claim which depends from a dependent claim should not be separated by any claim which does not also depend from said dependent claim. It should be kept in mind that a dependent claim may refer to any preceding independent claim. In general, Applicants’ sequence will not be changed. See MPEP § 608.01(n).
This objection will be held in abeyance upon Applicant’s request.
Claims 15 and 16 are objected to because they depend from claim 9, while intervening claim 11 depends from claim 6. A series of singular dependent claims is permissible in which a dependent claim refers to a preceding claim which, in turn, refers to another preceding claim.
A claim which depends from a dependent claim should not be separated by any claim which does not also depend from said dependent claim. It should be kept in mind that a dependent claim may refer to any preceding independent claim. In general, Applicants’ sequence will not be changed. See MPEP § 608.01(n).
This objection will be held in abeyance upon Applicant’s request.
Claims 17 and 18 are objected to because they depend from claim 15, while intervening claim 16 depends from claim 9. A series of singular dependent claims is permissible in which a dependent claim refers to a preceding claim which, in turn, refers to another preceding claim.
A claim which depends from a dependent claim should not be separated by any claim which does not also depend from said dependent claim. It should be kept in mind that a dependent claim may refer to any preceding independent claim. In general, Applicants’ sequence will not be changed. See MPEP § 608.01(n).
This objection will be held in abeyance upon Applicant’s request.
Claims 19 and 20 are objected to because they depend from claim 10, while intervening claim 11 depends from claim 6. A series of singular dependent claims is permissible in which a dependent claim refers to a preceding claim which, in turn, refers to another preceding claim.
A claim which depends from a dependent claim should not be separated by any claim which does not also depend from said dependent claim. It should be kept in mind that a dependent claim may refer to any preceding independent claim. In general, Applicants’ sequence will not be changed. See MPEP § 608.01(n).
This objection will be held in abeyance upon Applicant’s request.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101
35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 9 and 15-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Regarding claim 9, it recites a “computer-readable storage medium” storing instructions that perform various functions. The plain and ordinary meaning of “computer readable medium” includes both statutory and non-statutory subject matter. See Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 1862 (P.T.A.B. 2013) (precedential). In the Specification of the present application, the “computer readable medium” is never expressly defined to exclude transmission media. Thus, the recited “computer readable medium” is not a “process,” a “machine,” a “manufacture” or a “composition of matter,” as defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Examiner recommends amending “computer-readable storage medium” to “non-transitory computer-readable medium” to overcome this rejection.
Accordingly, Claim 9 fails to recite statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claims 15-18, being dependent on claim 9, merely recites either additional functions performed by the instructions or additional descriptions of electronic data. Accordingly, claims 15-19 fail to recite statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
Claims 3, 5, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
Regarding claim 3, this claim includes the limitations “establishing a correlation between the vehicle lamp temperature and the rotational speed of the cooling fan to form a vehicle lamp temperature-rotational speed correlation table; calculating a theoretical rotational speed of the cooling fan according to a real-time monitored vehicle lamp temperature based on the vehicle lamp temperature-rotational speed correlation table; adjusting a rotational speed of the cooling fan within first preset time through a first segmented adjustment strategy according to the theoretical rotational speed, and continuously tracking a change of the vehicle lamp temperature; and once the vehicle lamp temperature is adjusted to meet the preset first temperature threshold, fixing the rotational speed of the cooling fan, thereby achieving a dynamic balanced state among heat dissipation efficiency, the vehicle lamp temperature, and an illumination intensity;” and “establishing a correlation between the vehicle lamp temperature and a flow velocity of a liquid cooling system to form a temperature-flow velocity comparison table; calculating a theoretical flow velocity of the liquid cooling system according to a present monitored vehicle lamp temperature based on the temperature-flow velocity comparison table; adjusting the flow velocity of the cooling liquid within second preset time through a second segmented adjustment strategy according to the theoretical flow velocity, and continuously monitoring a change of the vehicle lamp temperature; and when the vehicle lamp temperature is adjusted to reach a preset standard, allowing a system to stop increasing the flow velocity of the cooling liquid, thereby establishing a dynamic balanced state between water cooling efficiency, the vehicle lamp temperature, and the illumination intensity.” (Emphasis added),
In the present instance, the use of the “thereby” clauses render these limitations subject to two, mutually exclusive interpretations. First, the “thereby” clauses may be interpreted as mere statements of intended use and, therefore would not be subject to any patentable weight.
Second, the “thereby” clauses may be interpreted as affirmative requirements that the appropriate dynamic, balanced state is achieved and that the dynamic balance state is established.
“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See also Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-006416 (PTAB 2017) (precedential) (affirming the holding in Ex parte Miyazaki).
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
For purposes of examination, the “thereby” clauses shall be interpreted as statements of intended use.
Regarding claim 5, this claim includes the limitation “intelligently selecting an LB, an HB, a DRL, a turn signal lamp or a fog lamp based on a vehicle speed, an external light condition, a weather condition, and a vehicle state, so as to provide an optimal field of view (FOV) and optimal safety.” (Emphasis added).
In the present instance, the use of the “so as to” clause is subject to two, mutually exclusive interpretations. First, this may be interpreted as a mere statement of intended use and, therefore, would not be subject to any patentable weight.
Second, this may be interpreted to replace an affirmative requirement that the field of view and safety are “optimal.”
“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See also Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-006416 (PTAB 2017) (precedential) (affirming the holding in Ex parte Miyazaki).
Additionally, the term “optimal” is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite. The term “optimal” is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
For purposes of examination, the “so as to” clause shall be interpreted as statements of intended use.
Regarding claim 12, this claim recites the limitations “fixing the rotational speed of the cooling fan, thereby achieving a dynamic balanced state among heat dissipation efficiency, the vehicle lamp temperature, and an illumination intensity;” and “allowing a system to stop increasing the flow velocity of the cooling liquid, thereby establishing a dynamic balanced state between water cooling efficiency, the vehicle lamp temperature, and the illumination intensity.” (Emphasis added).
In the present instance, the use of the “thereby” clauses render these limitations subject to two, mutually exclusive interpretations. First, the “thereby” clauses may be interpreted as mere statements of intended use and, therefore would not be subject to any patentable weight.
Second, the “thereby” clauses may be interpreted as affirmative requirements that the related clauses occur.
“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See also Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-006416 (PTAB 2017) (precedential) (affirming the holding in Ex parte Miyazaki).
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
For purposes of examination, the “thereby” clauses shall be interpreted as statements of intended use.
Regarding claim 14, this claim recites the limitations “intelligently selecting an LB, an HB, a DRL, a turn signal lamp or a fog lamp based on a vehicle speed, an external light condition, a weather condition, and a vehicle state, so as to provide an optimal field of view (FOV) and optimal safety;” and “when a deviation is detected, allowing a control unit to change a current adjustment strategy to ensure that final luminance is as expected.” (Emphasis added).
In the present instance, the use of the “so as to” and “thereby” clauses are each subject to two, mutually exclusive interpretations. First, these clauses may be interpreted as mere statements of intended use and, therefore, would not be subject to any patentable weight.
Second, these clauses may be interpreted as placing an affirmative requirement that the associated events occur.
Additionally, the term “optimal” is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite. The term “optimal” is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
For purposes of examination, the “so as to” and “thereby” clauses shall be interpreted as statements of intended use.
Regarding claim 16, this claim includes the limitations “once the vehicle lamp temperature is adjusted to meet the preset first temperature threshold, fixing the rotational speed of the cooling fan, thereby achieving a dynamic balanced state among heat dissipation efficiency, the vehicle lamp temperature, and an illumination intensity;” and “allowing a system to stop increasing the flow velocity of the cooling liquid, thereby establishing a dynamic balanced state between water cooling efficiency, the vehicle lamp temperature, and the illumination intensity.” (Emphasis added).
In the present instance, the use of the “thereby” clauses render these limitations subject to two, mutually exclusive interpretations. First, the “thereby” clauses may be interpreted as mere statements of intended use and, therefore would not be subject to any patentable weight.
Second, the “thereby” clauses may be interpreted as affirmative requirements that the related clauses occur.
“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See also Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-006416 (PTAB 2017) (precedential) (affirming the holding in Ex parte Miyazaki).
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
For purposes of examination, the “thereby” clauses shall be interpreted as statements of intended use.
Regarding claim 18, this claim recites the limitation “automatically determining, by a system, an optimal illuminating mode; and intelligently selecting an LB, an HB, a DRL, a turn signal lamp or a fog lamp based on a vehicle speed, an external light condition, a weather condition, and a vehicle state, so as to provide an optimal field of view (FOV) and optimal safety.” (Emphasis added).
In the present instance, the use of the “so as to” clause render this limitation subject to two, mutually exclusive interpretations. First, the “so as to” clause may be interpreted as a mere statement of intended use and, therefore would not be subject to any patentable weight.
Second, the “thereby” clauses may be interpreted as affirmative requirements that the related clauses occur.
“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See also Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-006416 (PTAB 2017) (precedential) (affirming the holding in Ex parte Miyazaki).
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
For purposes of examination, the “so as to” clause shall be interpreted as statements of intended use.
Regarding claim 20, this claim recites the limitation “once the vehicle lamp temperature is adjusted to meet the preset first temperature threshold, fixing the rotational speed of the cooling fan, thereby achieving a dynamic balanced state among heat dissipation efficiency, the vehicle lamp temperature, and an illumination intensity;” and “when the vehicle lamp temperature is adjusted to reach a preset standard, allowing a system to stop increasing the flow velocity of the cooling liquid, thereby establishing a dynamic balanced state between water cooling efficiency, the vehicle lamp temperature, and the illumination intensity.” (Emphasis added).
In the present instance, the use of the “thereby” clauses render these limitations subject to two, mutually exclusive interpretations. First, the “thereby” clauses may be interpreted as mere statements of intended use and, therefore would not be subject to any patentable weight.
Second, the “thereby” clauses may be interpreted as affirmative requirements that the related clauses occur.
“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See also Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-006416 (PTAB 2017) (precedential) (affirming the holding in Ex parte Miyazaki).
Therefore, this claim is indefinite.
For purposes of examination, the “thereby” clauses shall be interpreted as statements of intended use.
Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. § 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims, the Examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicants are advised of the obligation under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 1, 9, and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Yatsuda et al., US Publication 2010/0134017 (hereinafter Yatsuda) in view of Navarro Alvarez et al., US Publication 2022/0214730 (hereinafter Navarro).
Regarding claim 1, Yatsuda discloses a heat dissipation method of a vehicle light-emitting diode (LED) lamp, (Yatsuda ¶ 3) comprising “in response to an illuminating state of a vehicle lamp, acquiring a vehicle lamp instruction [Yatsuda ¶ 107, and ON or OFF signal from the on-off switch], a vehicle lamp temperature [Yatsuda ¶ 114, measuring the temperature], vehicle lamp luminance [Yatsuda ¶ 152, illumination intensity], a cooling fan state [Yatsuda ¶ 177 detecting that the fan “cannot work properly due to some accident], a liquid cooling state [Yatsuda ¶ 112, detecting that “the liquid cooling system 3 has been stopped”], and an external environmental temperature of the vehicle lamp [Yatsuda ¶ 114, outside air temperature]” (Yatsuda ¶¶ 107, 112, 114, 152, 177, Fig. 19) which are each “in response to an illuminating state of a vehicle lamp” because these steps occur in order to cool a lamp that is in an on state as shown in Fig. 19. Additionally, Yatsuda discloses “based on the vehicle lamp instruction [Yatsuda ¶ 110], the vehicle lamp temperature [Yatsuda ¶ 125], the vehicle lamp luminance [Yatsuda ¶ 180, the illumination intensity is lowered as part of the cooling process], the cooling fan state [Yatsuda ¶ 180, the cooling system, which includes the fan is broken, which is a state], the liquid cooling state [Yatsuda ¶ 152, the temperature of the cooling liquid a state], the external environmental temperature of the vehicle lamp [Yatsuda Table 2 showing the outside air temperature being a factor of the cooling system] and a preset first temperature threshold [Yatsuda ¶ 121, the temperature detected being equal to or lower than a threshold value], adjusting heat dissipation data of the vehicle lamp” (Yatsuda ¶¶ 110, 121, 125, 152, 180, and Table 2) where each factor is shown to be used in the control of the heat dissipation system. Further, Yatsuda discloses “adjusting the cooling fan state according to the vehicle lamp temperature in the vehicle lamp instruction” (Yatsuda Fig. 13) where control of the fan is shown to be dependent on the temperature. Moreover, Yatsuda discloses “in response to passive heat dissipation and the vehicle lamp temperature being greater than the preset first temperature threshold, starting a cooling fan to lower the vehicle lamp temperature to the preset first temperature threshold or below” (Yatsuda ¶ 118) where the liquid cooling system, which includes a cooling fan, is only turned on when the temperature sensor 34 determines that the temperature is above a threshold. This means that when the temperature is below that threshold, the cooling system is in an off state and the heat dissipation is passive. Likewise, Yatsuda discloses “adjusting the liquid cooling state according to the vehicle lamp temperature in the vehicle lamp instruction” (Yatsuda ¶ 120) where the cooling state is adjusted based on the off signal (i.e., the vehicle lamp instruction) being sent to the temperature control circuit 33. Yatsuda also discloses “regardless of a value of the vehicle lamp temperature, when the external environmental temperature reaches an environmental temperature threshold, starting the cooling fan and the liquid cooling simultaneously” (Yatsuda ¶ 114) where the cooling system is turned on or off based on the outside air temperature of 25°C. Because the liquid cooling system includes the cool fan (Yatsuda ¶ 7), they are always started simultaneously. In addition, Yatsuda discloses “wherein the cooling fan state comprises start/stop of the cooling fan …” (Yatsuda ¶ 177) where the cooling state includes that the fan is broken and, therefore, in a stop state. Finaly, Yatsuda discloses “the liquid cooling state comprises start/stop of the liquid cooling …” (Yatsuda ¶ 112) by detecting that “the liquid cooling system 3 has been stopped,”
Yatsuda does not appear to explicitly disclose “in response to a maximum rotational speed of the cooling fan and the vehicle lamp temperature still being greater than a second temperature threshold, starting liquid cooling to further lower the vehicle lamp temperature to the second temperature threshold or below;” “wherein the cooling fan state comprises start/stop of the cooling fan and a rotational speed of the cooling fan;” and “the liquid cooling state comprises start/stop of the liquid cooling, and a flow velocity of a cooling liquid.”
However, Navarro discloses a method for cooling LED lights including the limitation “in response to a maximum rotational speed of the cooling fan and the vehicle lamp temperature still being greater than a second temperature threshold, starting liquid cooling to further lower the vehicle lamp temperature to the second temperature threshold or below” (Navarro ¶¶ 59-61, Fig. 6, see also ¶ 22) where the thermoelectric cooler (i.e., the liquid cooling system) is off and the system is unable to maintain the temperature threshold (i.e., the fan is operating at maximum capability), the thermoelectric system is started. Additionally, Navarro discloses “wherein the cooling fan state comprises start/stop of the cooling fan and a rotational speed of the cooling fan” (Navarro ¶ 40) because Navarro must know the speed (i.e., rotational speed) and activation state of the fan in order to change the speed and activation state of the fan. Finally, Navarro discloses “the liquid cooling state comprises start/stop of the liquid cooling, and a flow velocity of a cooling liquid” (Navarro ¶ 40) because Navarro must know the speed (i.e., flow velocity) and activation state of the cooling liquid in order to change the speed and activation state of the cooling liquid.
Yatsuda and Navarro are analogous art because they are from the “same field of endeavor,” namely that of cooling LED lights.
Prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, having the teachings of Yatsuda and Navarro before him or her to modify the cooling system of Yatsuda to include the separate cooling using only the fan of Navarro.
The motivation for doing so would have been to allow the system to conserve energy when only minimal cooling is needed. (Navarro ¶ 21).
Regarding claim 9, it merely recites a computer-readable storage medium for performing the method of claim 1. The medium comprises computer software modules for performing the various functions. The combination of Yatsuda and Navarro comprises computer software modules for performing the same functions. Thus, claim 9 is rejected using the same rationale set forth in the above rejection for claim 1.
Regarding claim 10, it merely recites a computer device for performing the method of claim 1. The computer device comprises computer hardware and software modules for performing the various functions. The combination of Yatsuda and Navarro comprises computer hardware and software modules for performing the same functions. Thus, claim 10 is rejected using the same rationale set forth in the above rejection for claim 1.
Claims 2, 4, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Yatsuda in view of Navarro, as applied to claims 1, 6, 9, and 10 above, and in further view of Kover, Jr. et al., US Publication 2005/0057162 (hereinafter Kover)
Regarding claims 2, 11, 15, and 19, the combination of Yatsuda and Navarro discloses the limitations contained in parent claims 1, 6, 9, and 10 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, the combination of Yatsuda and Navarro does not appear to explicitly disclose “wherein the vehicle lamp instruction comprises at least a low beam (LB) sub-instruction, a high beam (HB) sub-instruction, a daytime running lamp (DRL) sub-instruction, a turn signal lamp sub-instruction, and a fog lamp sub-instruction; and the preset first temperature threshold, the second temperature threshold, and the environmental temperature threshold are different in the LB sub-instruction, the HB sub-instruction, the DRL sub-instruction, the turn signal lamp sub-instruction, and the fog lamp sub-instruction.”
However, Kover discloses a vehicle lighting system including a series of sub-instructions “wherein the vehicle lamp instruction comprises at least a low beam (LB) sub-instruction [Kover ¶ 9], a high beam (HB) sub-instruction [Kover ¶ 9], a daytime running lamp (DRL) sub-instruction [Kover ¶ 16], a turn signal lamp sub-instruction [Kover ¶ 5], and a fog lamp sub-instruction [Kover ¶ 9].” (Kover ¶¶ 5, 9, 16). Additionally, Kover “the preset first temperature threshold, the second temperature threshold, and the environmental temperature threshold are different in the LB sub-instruction, the HB sub-instruction, the DRL sub-instruction, the turn signal lamp sub-instruction, and the fog lamp sub-instruction” (Kover ¶ 8) where each device has a normal operating system used for determining heat dissipation.
Yatsuda, Navarro, and Kover are analogous art because they are from the “same field of endeavor,” namely that of heat dissipation systems for LED lights.
Prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, having the teachings of Yatsuda, Navarro, and Kover before him or her to modify the heat lights Yatsuda and Navarro to include the various types of lighting of Kover.
The motivation for doing so would have been that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that it is advantageous to incorporate the various types of lighting systems into the heat dissipation system of Yatsuda and Navarro in order to provide the advantages of Yatsuda and Navarro on other commonly used vehicle lights.
Regarding claims 4, 13, and 17, the combination of Yatsuda, Navarro, and Kover discloses the limitations contained in parent claims 2, 11, and 15 for the reasons discussed above. In addition, the combination of Yatsuda, Navarro, and Kover discloses “wherein the vehicle lamp instruction comprises at least intelligent control and gradual transition control when the LB sub-instruction, the HB sub-instruction, the DRL sub-instruction, the turn signal lamp sub-instruction, and the fog lamp sub-instruction are switched” (Kover ¶¶ 31, 37) where the control may be automatic (i.e., intelligent, Kover ¶ 37) or at a rate of change (i.e., gradual, Kover ¶ 31).
Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Yatsuda in view of Navarro, as applied to claim 1 above, and in further view of Akachi, US Patent 4,921,041 (hereinafter Akachi).
Regarding claim 6, the combination of Yatsuda and Navarro discloses a vehicle LED lamp heat dissipation apparatus is configured to realize the heat dissipation method of the vehicle LED lamp according to claim 1 as discussed above. In addition, the combination of Yatsuda and Navarro discloses “vehicle LED lamp, comprising a housing [Yatsuda ¶ 94] and a thermal … tube provided in the housing, wherein an accommodating cavity and a heat dissipation cavity are formed in the housing [Yatsuda Fig. 5].” (Yatsuda ¶ 94, Fig. 5). Further, the combination of Yatsuda and Navarro discloses “an LED module and a vehicle LED lamp heat dissipation apparatus are provided in the accommodating cavity.” (Yatsuda ¶ 99, Fig. 5). Moreover, the combination of Yatsuda and Navarro discloses “the heat conducting section contacts the LED module.” (Yatsuda ¶ 99, Fig. 5). Likewise, the combination of Yatsuda and Navarro discloses “a heat dissipation apparatus is provided in the heat dissipation cavity.” (Yatsuda Fig. 5). The combination of Yatsuda and Navarro also discloses “the heat dissipation apparatus is opposite to the cooling section.” (Yatsuda ¶ 94, Fig. 5). Finally, the combination of Yatsuda and Navarro discloses “the vehicle LED lamp heat dissipation apparatus is electrically connected to the LED module.” (Yatsuda ¶ 100).
The combination of Yatsuda and Navarro does not appear to explicitly disclose “a thermal superconductive tube provided in the housing;” “the thermal superconductive tube comprises a heat conducting section and a cooling section;” “the cooling section is wound in the heat dissipation cavity and contacts an inner wall of the heat dissipation cavity;” and “the thermal superconductive tube is configured to conduct heat generated by illumination of the LED module to the housing and the heat dissipation cavity.”
However, Akachi disclose a heat dissipation system including “a thermal superconductive tube provided in the housing” where “the thermal superconductive tube comprises a heat conducting section and a cooling section” (Akachi col. 6, ll. 32-45) where the system includes both a heating and cooling means. Additionally, Akachi discloses “the cooling section is wound in the heat dissipation cavity and contacts an inner wall of the heat dissipation cavity.” (Akachi col. 14, ll. 43-51, Figs. 11(B)-11(C)). Finally, Akachi discloses “the thermal superconductive tube is configured to conduct heat generated … to the housing and the heat dissipation cavity” (Akachi col. 8, ll. 13-34).
A person of ordinary skill in the art prior to the effective filing date of the present invention would have recognized that when Akachi was combined with Yatsuda and Navarro the dissipated heat of Akachi would be from the heat generated by illumination of the LED module, according to Yatsuda and Navarro. Therefore, the combination of Yatsuda, Navarro, and Akachi at least teaches and/or suggests “the thermal superconductive tube is configured to conduct heat generated by illumination of the LED module to the housing and the heat dissipation cavity,” rendering it obvious.
Yatsuda, Navarro, and Akachi are analogous art because they are from the “same field of endeavor,” namely that of heat dissipation systems.
Prior to the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, having the teachings of Yatsuda, Navarro, and Akachi before him or her to modify the heat tube of Yatsuda and Navarro to be made of superconductive material, according to Akachi.
The motivation for doing so would have been to reduce the amount of cooling liquid required. (Akachi col. 22, l. 67-col. 23, l. 14).
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 7 and 8 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to Applicant's disclosure:
Liu, US Publication 2019/0191592, A system for controlling the rotational speed of a fan in a heat dissipation system.
Chen et al., US Publication 2020/0224866, A system and method for cooling vehicle lamps.
McAlpin, US Publication 2013/0235584, A system and method for cooling vehicle lamps.
McIntyre et al., US Publication 2023/0395295, A system for using superconductive tubes in heat dissipation.
Wang et al., CN 110789441, A system and method for cooling vehicle lamps.
DE 2020144103329 U1, , A system and method for cooling vehicle lamps.
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/ANDREW R DYER/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3662
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