DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 20 July 2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
First, the replacement drawing sheet overcomes the objection to the drawings, which is withdrawn.
Second, regarding the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112(a), description requirement, and regarding applicant’s arguments and the Inventor Declaration pursuant to Rule 132, upon reconsideration by the examiner, these are convincing as to the independent claims, but are not convincing as to claims 6, 15, and 18 which were not apparently argued against nor particularly declared in support of. Accordingly, the rejection in this respect is withdrawn in part.
Third, while applicant’s amendments overcome some of the bases for the rejections under 35 U.S.C. 112(b), other bases remain, with new issues also being dealt with below.
Fourth, the examiner maintains the rejection of claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. 112(d), since the learned acceleration tables are already generated based on the conjunctive list (Superguide; Ex parte Jung[1]) of “the delta velocity, the requested torque, and the longitudinal acceleration” in claim 1, and so claim 9 (again) reciting that the learned acceleration tables are generated based on the delta velocity does not further limit the claim.
Fifth, regarding the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101, applicant’s arguments are not convincing.
In this respect, applicant argues:
The Memo further clarifies that claim limitations that encompass artificial intelligence or machine learning in a way that cannot be practically performed in the human mind do not fall within this grouping.
The claims recite enforcing, via the learn driver acceleration application, a maximum acceleration for the vehicle. This limitation, particularly when considered in combination with generating the learned acceleration tables based on the estimated requested torque and longitudinal acceleration, describes specific, concrete actions performed upon a machine that go far beyond mere mental observation. As described in the Specification, the learn driver acceleration application utilizes the acceleration limit to enforce a maximum acceleration for the vehicle such that the acceleration preferences cannot exceed the maximum acceleration and/or the acceleration limit of the vehicle. This limit may be informed by the physical limits of an engine of the vehicle, whether the vehicle is configured as an electric vehicle, a hybrid vehicle, or an internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle. See the Instant Application at Paragraph [0046].
A human mind, whether observing from a passenger seat or otherwise, cannot practically enforce a maximum acceleration on a vehicle's cruise control system based on powertrain or engine parameters. Enforcing a physical acceleration limit requires electronic integration with the vehicle's control systems to restrict engine output or torque application. Because the human mind is not equipped to perform these physical, integrated control limitations, the claims cannot be classified as a mental process.
However, applicant does not claim a cruise control system that enforces any maximum acceleration or any powertrain or engine parameters, or any physical integration with the vehicle’s control systems to restrict engine output or torque application, so these arguments are not commensurate with the abstract claim scope. In this respect, the examiner believes a vehicle designer or engineer could evaluate and/or intelligently observe and/or learn (tabular) relationships between vehicle velocity (e.g., delta velocity), requested torque, and longitudinal acceleration as recited in the claim, e.g., by applying Newton’s Second Law of Motion, as would have been well within the knowledge of those skilled in this art. Moreover, the examiner believes (e.g., from experience) a parent can enforce how fast their teenager accelerates through positive and/or negative behavioral reinforcement procedures (as e.g., Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity and/or Mental Processes), for example by saying, “David, accelerate gently this time in the RX-4 or you’ll be grounded, again!!” Accordingly, applicant’s arguments are not persuasive.
Further, as to the enforcing of the maximum acceleration to influence the ability of the vehicle to accelerate, i) this limitation is indefinite, ii) this limitation (from the teachings of the specification) is apparently unrelated to any generated acceleration table and is therefore extra-solution activity, and iii) this limitation recites using acceleration limits to influence the acceleration of the vehicle, which is apparently well-understood, routine, conventional, as demonstrated e.g., by the literature cited with this Office action. Accordingly, applicant’s arguments are not persuasive in this respect.
Next, applicant argues:
The Office Action further asserts that "generating a delta velocity, generating a table or tables, and replacing tables (in a computational system) are apparently mathematical concepts." See the Office Action at Page 16. However, as clarified in the Memo, examiners must distinguish between claims that recite a judicial exception and claims that merely involve a judicial exception. The Memo points to USPTO Example 39 ("training a neural network"), noting that even though such training involves a broad array of techniques that rely upon mathematical concepts, the limitation does not set forth or describe any mathematical relationships, calculations, formulas, or equations.
Similarly, the elements of the claims, such as generating a delta velocity based on an estimated set speed and a target speed and generating learned acceleration tables, undoubtedly involve math. However, the claims do not recite a mathematical equation, formula, or specific mathematical calculation. Instead, the claims utilize these generated data points to perform the physical step of enforcing a maximum acceleration for the vehicle. Because the claim relies on variables to execute vehicle control functions rather than claiming a mathematical formula itself, it does not recite a mathematical concept under Step 2A, Prong One.
Applicant’s arguments are persuasive in this respect. Upon further consideration, the examiner agrees that generating the delta velocity and generating and replacing tables are not mathematical concepts.
Accordingly, applicant’s arguments are persuasive in part in this respect.
Next, applicant argues:
Furthermore, the character of the claims is not directed to a method of organizing human activity. The MPEP defines this grouping as fundamental economic practices, commercial or legal interactions, or managing personal behavior. Managing a vehicle's cruise control acceleration tables, monitoring requested torque, and enforcing a physical maximum acceleration limit on a vehicle is a technological process rooted in automotive engineering and control systems. It has no correlation to social activities, economic principles, or commercial interactions.
The examiner disagrees, with the new claim limitation “enforcing . . . a maximum acceleration for the vehicle. . .” (e.g., when one person is driving the vehicle and a second person is enforcing the maximum acceleration) being an example of managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions). In this respect, the examiner believes (e.g., from experience) a parent can enforce how fast their teenager accelerates through positive and/or negative behavioral reinforcement procedures (as e.g., Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity and/or Mental Processes), for example by saying, “David, accelerate gently this time in the RX-4 or you’ll be grounded, again!!” Accordingly, applicant’s arguments are not persuasive.
Next, regarding an improvement, applicant argues:
The Memo expressly instructs examiners to consider whether the claim reflects an improvement to another technology or technical field or whether the additional elements amount to more than mere instructions to "apply" an abstract idea on a generic computer. The Memo stresses evaluating "the particularity or generality of the application of the judicial exception," noting that claims covering a "particular solution to a problem or a particular way to achieve a desired outcome" strongly support eligibility.
The claims are directed toward a specific, technical method for actively controlling the physical acceleration of a vehicle by replacing calibration tables with dynamically learned acceleration tables and explicitly enforcing a physical maximum acceleration limit on the vehicle. The claims recite a specific series of steps that go far beyond a generic, data-gathering or mathematical exercise. Rather, the claims introduce concrete actions tied directly to the physical operation, engine limits, and cruise control actuation of a vehicle. . . .
The claims address specific technical challenges in the realm of vehicular cruise control systems. Conventional cruise control systems often rely on static calibration tables that fail to adequately account for varying environmental conditions, specific vehicle capabilities, or nuanced driver preferences over a range of speeds.
The claims overcome these technological hurdles by reciting a particular solution: gathering speed parameters that explicitly include a speed range; utilizing that speed range to estimate a target speed; generating learned acceleration tables based on the delta velocity, requested torque, and longitudinal acceleration; replacing static calibration tables with these learned tables; and, crucially, enforcing a maximum acceleration for the vehicle.
This sequence represents a specific, technological improvement to the functioning of the vehicle itself. As detailed in the Specification at Paragraph [0046], the vehicle's acceleration limit may be informed by the physical limits of the vehicle's engine components, whether the vehicle is an electric vehicle, a hybrid vehicle, or configured with an ICE. By actively replacing control tables and enforcing this physical maximum acceleration, the claims provide a technological solution (an integrated, dynamically updated cruise control application that respects physical engine limits) to a technical problem (inflexible or inefficient conventional cruise control algorithms). This directly aligns with the Memo's guidance that claims improving an existing technology integrate the exception into a practical application.
Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive for two reasons. First, the arguments are not commensurate with the claim scope, and therefore any argued improvement is not reflected in the claims. That is, nowhere in the claim set is actively controlling the acceleration of the vehicle required, and this argued characterization of the claim set may not even be disclosed. For example, in the specification at published paragraph [0046], the enforcing of the maximum acceleration 24a for the vehicle 100 only is disclosed as restricting “the acceleration preferences 54”2 so that the preferences “cannot exceed the maximum acceleration 24a and/or the acceleration limit 24 of the vehicle 100”. Moreover, nowhere in the claim set are concrete actions tied directly to the physical operation, engine limits, and cruise control actuation of a vehicle required or claimed, and while some claims require replacing calibration tables of a cruise control system or receiving the calibration tables from calibration parameters of a cruise control system or capturing a maximum requested torque via a cruise control system as an insignificant data gathering step, that cruise control system is apparently not positively recited as a claim element in any claim. Moreover, nowhere in the claim set is the vehicle's acceleration limit may be informed by the physical limits of the vehicle's engine components, whatever that might mean Second, it appears that the argued “improvement” (e.g., “utilizing that speed range to estimate a target speed; generating learned acceleration tables based on the delta velocity, requested torque, and longitudinal acceleration; replacing static calibration tables with these learned tables; and, crucially, enforcing a maximum acceleration for the vehicle”) is itself an abstract idea, and thus is not an additional element that could integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Accordingly, applicant’s arguments are not persuasive.
Next, applicant argues:
Enforcing a maximum acceleration is not merely a calculation. It is a specific control decision and physical actuation step that directly dictates the vehicle's operational output. Creating and utilizing these learned tables to enforce a physical limit necessitates interfacing with the complex physical systems that manage the vehicle's powertrain and engine load. This is a direct application of the preceding data analysis to control a physical machine in a specific, protective way to achieve a practical outcome of operating the vehicle smoothly while preventing engine over-exertion or unsafe acceleration.
However, according to the specification, the learned tables are not described as being “utiliz[ed]” to enforce a physical limit (e.g., no tables are even referred to in published paragraph [0046] of the specification). Rather, “the acceleration limit 24 [which may be “preset” at published paragraph [0037], is utilized] to enforce a maximum acceleration 24a for the vehicle 100”.
Lastly in this respect, applicant argues that the claims do not “preempt the field of vehicle speed tracking or acceleration prediction”. However, as indicated in MPEP 2106.04, I., “the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate that a claim is eligible. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 n.14, 209 USPQ 1, 10-11 n.14 (1981)”. Accordingly, applicant’s arguments are not fully persuasive in this respect.
Sixth, in view of the claim amendments, the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 is overcome, and is therefore withdrawn.
Accordingly, applicant’s arguments are only persuasive in part.
Drawings
The drawings were received on 20 July 2026. These drawings are accepted by the examiner.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(d):
(d) REFERENCE IN DEPENDENT FORMS.—Subject to subsection (e), a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, fourth paragraph:
Subject to the following paragraph [i.e., the fifth paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112], a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
Claims 6, 15, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Regarding claims 6, 15, and 18, applicant has apparently not described, in sufficient detail, by what algorithm(s)3, or by what steps or procedure, the learn driver acceleration application determined whether to use the learned (average) or scaled acceleration tables. Accordingly, the examiner believes that applicant has not evidenced, to those skilled in the art, possession of the full scope of the claimed invention, but has rather only described a desired result.
In this respect, filed paragraphs [0045] and [0050] of the specification indicate:
"For example, the learn driver acceleration application 16 may determine whether to use the learned average acceleration table 40a or the scaled table 70 before replacing the acceleration request table 62a. In some instances, the learn driver acceleration application 16 may utilize the scaled acceleration tables 70."
"At 708, the learn driver acceleration application 16 determines the average ratio 72 for the scaled acceleration table 70. The learn driver acceleration application 16 determines, at 710, whether to use the scaled acceleration table 70. If the learn driver acceleration application 16 determines not to use the scaled acceleration table 70, then the learn driver acceleration application 16 replaces, at 712, the calibrated average acceleration table 62a with the learned average acceleration table 40a. If the learn driver acceleration application 16 determines to use the scaled acceleration table 70, then the learn driver acceleration application 16 replaces, at 714, the calibrated average acceleration table 62a with the scaled acceleration table 70."
However, these indications do not apparently describe, in sufficient detail, any algorithm(s) by which the learn driver acceleration application determined whether to use the learned (average) or scaled acceleration tables. Accordingly, the examiner believes that applicant has not evidenced, to those skilled in the art, possession of the full scope of the claimed invention, but has rather only described a desired result.
In this respect, see e.g., MPEP 2161.01, I., which indicates, “[O]riginal claims may lack written description when the claims define the invention in functional language specifying a desired result but the specification does not sufficiently describe how the function is performed or the result is achieved. For software, this can occur when the algorithm or steps/procedure for performing the computer function are not explained at all or are not explained in sufficient detail (simply restating the function recited in the claim is not necessarily sufficient). In other words, the algorithm or steps/procedure taken to perform the function must be described with sufficient detail so that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand how the inventor intended the function to be performed. See MPEP §§ 2163.02 and 2181, subsection IV.”
See also e.g., MPEP 2163, I., A. which indicates, “However, as discussed in subsection I, supra, issues of adequate written description may arise even for original claims, for example, when an aspect of the claimed invention has not been described with sufficient particularity such that one skilled in the art would recognize that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention at the time of filing. . . . An invention described solely in terms of a method of making and/or its function may lack written descriptive support where there is no described or art-recognized correlation between the disclosed function and the structure(s) responsible for the function.”
See also MPEP 2163.03, V. which indicates, “An original claim may lack written description support when (1) the claim defines the invention in functional language specifying a desired result but the disclosure fails to sufficiently identify how the function is performed or the result is achieved or (2) a broad genus claim is presented but the disclosure only describes a narrow species with no evidence that the genus is contemplated. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The written description requirement is not necessarily met when the claim language appears in ipsis verbis in the specification. "Even if a claim is supported by the specification, the language of the specification, to the extent possible, must describe the claimed invention so that one skilled in the art can recognize what is claimed. The appearance of mere indistinct words in a specification or a claim, even an original claim, does not necessarily satisfy that requirement." Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968, 63 USPQ2d 1609, 1616 (Fed. Cir. 2002).”
Claims 1 to 3, 6, 8 to 12, 15 to 19, and 21 to 26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
In claim 1, line 6, in claim 10, line 9, and in claim 17, line 10, “estimating, based on the speed range, a target speed of the vehicle” in indefinite and unclear from the teachings of the specification4 that does not define what a “target speed” would be with reasonable certainty5 (e.g., a target for whom or what, and used as a target in what particular way?) and/or how (e.g., in the cruise control context) the claimed target speed might be different from (if it is) and/or relate to the well-known claimed “set speed”, which set speed also appears (to the examiner) to be a target speed. It is also unclear from the teachings of the specification what it means that the target speed is estimated “based on the speed range”, when no such “based on” estimation is apparently described in the specification. It is also unclear what the metes and bounds of the claimed target speed is, and whether the “target speed” is/might be an unclear double inclusion/recitation of the (also claimed) “set speed” by another name. See MPEP 2173.05(o). In this respect, for (non-limiting) manners in which a variety of “target speed[s]” might possibly relate a “set speed” in cruise control systems, see the “Prior Art” section near the end of this Office action.
In claim 1, lines 18ff, and in claim 10, lines 21ff, “replacing . . . calibration tables” is indefinite in the claim context (e.g., replacing particularly how? For example, does this require i) that calibration tables be overwritten/replaced in some memory/storage, when the calibration tables are apparently not claimed as being stored in the method or system, or perhaps ii) that they are not used/replaced in favor of the generated learned acceleration tables for performing some/any unclaimed function in the method or system, or perhaps iii) something else entirely?) and from the teachings of the specification. Additionally, “calibration tables” is indefinite with indeterminate metes and bounds (e.g., calibration tables defined particularly how, for calibrating what in what particular way?)
In claim 1, lines 20ff, in claim 10, lines 23ff, and in claim 17, lines 23ff, “an average ratio” is indefinite in the claim context (e.g., an average ratio of what particularly, defined particularly how?) and from the teachings of the specification, with “average” and “ratio” seeming to be contradictory (e.g., how can “average” describe a ratio [A/B], and how can a ratio [A/B] be average?) and with the specification with providing no significant help as the glossary for the claim term. For example, what particular quantities or entities is the ratio a ratio of, particularly? Here, the examiner notes that a ratio of “[plural] learned acceleration tables 40 with the [plural] calibration tables” is disclosed in the specification. However, the examiner cannot determine what such a ratio of the plural tables might possibly be, what it might represent (a ratio of one cell to another, a ratio of all cells to all cells in different tables, a ratio of a number of tables to another number of tables, etc., or how an “average ratio” in that context might be particularly defined.6
In claim 1, lines 24ff, in claim 10, lines 27ff, and in claim 17, lines 27ff, “enforcing, via the learn driver acceleration application, a maximum acceleration for the vehicle using an acceleration limit of the vehicle to influence an ability of the vehicle to accelerate” is indefinite and facially subjective from the teachings of the specification (e.g., enforcing in what definite way within the scope of the claim since no components that would even give the vehicle an ability to accelerate, e.g., by generating torque, are apparently recited in the claim, “enforcing” defined particularly how and with what reasonably certain metes and bounds, and “influence” of the “ability” defined particularly how, e.g., from the teachings of the specification so as to not be facially subjective[7], e.g., since no engine components are even claimed?)
In claim 6, lines 2ff, in claim 15, lines 2ff, and in claim 18, lines 1ff, “determining . . . whether to use . . . [the table]” is indefinite in the claim context (which does not indicate what the table might be used for or include any active, positive steps delimiting how this use is actually practiced; see MPEP 2173.05(q)).
In claim 17, lines 23ff, “replacing . . . a calibrated maximum table of calibration tables” is indefinite in the claim context (e.g., replacing particularly how? For example, does this require i) that calibration table be overwritten in some memory/storage, when the calibration tables are apparently not claimed as being stored in the system, or ii) that it is not used in favor of the generated learned acceleration table for some/any unclaimed function in the system, or iii) something else entirely?) and from the teachings of the specification. Additionally, “a calibrated maximum table” and “calibration tables” are indefinite with indeterminate metes and bounds (e.g., a calibrated maximum table and calibration tables defined particularly how, maximum of what particularly, tables for calibrating what in what particular way?)
In claim 21, lines 1ff, and in claim 25, lines 1ff, “receiving, from calibration parameters of a cruise control system, the calibration tables” is indefinite and unclear (e.g., how can tables be received from parameters?)
Claim(s) depending from claims expressly noted above are also rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112 by/for reason of their dependency from a noted claim that is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, for the reasons given.
Claim 9 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(d) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, 4th paragraph, as being of improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of the claim upon which it depends, or for failing to include all the limitations of the claim upon which it depends. The independent claim 1 from which claim 9 depends, because of the conjunctive (“based on at least one of . . . and . . .”, cf. Superguide, see previous Office action) phrases requiring that the learned acceleration tables are generated based on all three criteria including the delta velocity, already claim the details recited in claim 9. Therefore, the claim 9 apparently do not further limit the subject matter of claim 1. Applicant may cancel the claim(s), amend the claim(s) to place the claim(s) in proper dependent form, rewrite the claim(s) in independent form, or present a sufficient showing that the dependent claim(s) complies with the statutory requirements.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1 to 3, 6, 8 to 12, 15 to 19, and 21 to 26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.
Step 1 and Step 2A, Prong I:
Claim(s) 1 to 3, 6, 8 to 12, 15 to 19, and 21 to 26, while (each) reciting a statutory category of invention defined in 35 U.S.C. 101 (a useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter), is/are directed to an abstract idea, which is a judicial exception, the recited abstract idea being that of estimating, based on the speed range, a target speed of the vehicle, estimating, based on at least one of the vehicle parameters and the environmental parameters, a set speed of a vehicle; generating, based on the estimated set speed of the vehicle and the estimated target speed, a delta velocity; estimating, based on at least one of the vehicle parameters and the environmental parameters, a requested torque; determining, based on the estimated requested torque, a longitudinal acceleration of the vehicle; generating, via the learn driver acceleration application, learned acceleration tables based on at least one of the delta velocity, the requested torque, and the longitudinal acceleration of the vehicle; replacing, via the learn driver acceleration application, at least one calibration table with the generated learned acceleration tables, determining, based on the learned acceleration tables and the calibration tables, an average ratio, and generating, based on the determined average ratio, a scaled acceleration table, and (potentially, since this limitation is indefinite) enforcing, via the learn driver acceleration application, a maximum acceleration for the vehicle using an acceleration limit of the vehicle to influence an ability of the vehicle to accelerate e.g., by receiving, at a learn driver acceleration application, one or more of vehicle parameters and environmental parameters, the vehicle parameters including speed parameters that include a speed range; estimating, based on the speed range, a target speed of a vehicle; estimating, based on at least one of the vehicle parameters and the environmental parameters, a set speed of the vehicle; generating, based on the estimated set speed of the vehicle and the estimated target speed, a delta velocity; estimating, based on at least one of the vehicle parameters and the environmental parameters, a requested torque; determining, based on the estimated requested torque, a longitudinal acceleration of the vehicle; generating, via the learn driver acceleration application, learned acceleration tables based on at least one of the delta velocity, the requested torque, and the longitudinal acceleration of the vehicle; replacing, via the learn driver acceleration application, calibration tables with the generated learned acceleration tables; determining, based on the learned acceleration tables and the calibration tables, an average ratio of the learned acceleration tables and the calibration tables; generating, based on the average ratio of the learned acceleration tables and the calibration tables, a scaled acceleration table; and enforcing, via the learn driver acceleration application, a maximum acceleration for the vehicle using an acceleration limit of the vehicle to influence an ability of the vehicle to accelerate, wherein the learned acceleration tables include a learned average acceleration table and a learned maximum acceleration table and the calibration tables include an acceleration request table and a calibrated maximum acceleration table; wherein replacing the calibration tables with the learned acceleration tables includes replacing the calibrated maximum acceleration table with the learned maximum acceleration table; wherein replacing the calibration tables with the learned acceleration tables includes determining, via the learn driver acceleration application, whether to use the learned average acceleration table or the scaled acceleration table; wherein generating the delta velocity includes generating the delta velocity based on the speed parameters; further including generating, via the learn driver acceleration application, the learned acceleration tables based on the delta velocity; further including receiving, from calibration parameters of a cruise control system, the calibration tables; wherein estimating the set speed includes determining acceleration preferences of a driver acceleration profile; further including monitoring, via the learn driver acceleration application, the acceleration preferences of a respective driver identification (ID) of the driver acceleration profile based on speed data received from a speed sensor of the vehicle; and further including capturing, via a cruise control system of the vehicle, a maximum requested torque at each respective speed range during manual operation of the vehicle.
This abstract idea falls within the grouping(s) of mathematical concepts, mental processes, and/or certain methods of organizing human activity, distilled from case law, because it could be practically performed in the human mind by a vehicle passenger or designer/engineer who was evaluating/observing and/or rendering an opinion/judgment on the operation of the vehicle while the cruise control function was active or while a new driver was driving and writing down (with a pen or pencil and paper as a physical aid) qualitatively the performance of vehicle’s acceleration in accordance with vehicle parameters and environmental parameters, in table format, and replacing an old table of observations with new ones after more observations were made. Moreover, the enforcing of a maximum acceleration for the vehicle as driven by a driver would constitute not only a mental process but also certain methods of organizing human activity (e.g., managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions)).
Step 2A, Prong II and Step 2B:
Additionally, applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, the abstract idea is not integrated (e.g., at Step 2A, Prong II) by the recitation of additional elements/limitations into a practical application (using the considerations set forth in MPEP §§ 2106.04(a)-(h)) because merely using a computer (or processing hardware and memory hardware) as a tool to perform an abstract idea or adding the words "apply it" is not integrating the idea into a practical application of the idea, and e.g., looking at the claim as a whole and considering any additional elements/limitations individually and in combination, no (additional) particular machine, transformation (with “influence” being indefinite and apparently not constituting a transformation into a different state), improvement to the functioning of a computer or an existing technological process or technical field, or meaningful application of the idea, beyond generally linking the idea to a technological environment (e.g., "implementation via computers", Alice) or adding insignificant extra-solution8 activity (e.g., receiving parameters and replacing a table or tables, enforcing, via the learn driver acceleration application, a maximum acceleration for the vehicle using an acceleration limit of the vehicle to influence an ability of the vehicle to accelerate, capturing a maximum requested torque via a cruise control system, etc.), is recited in or encompassed by the claims. Therefore, the claim is not integrated into a practical application and is thus "directed to" the exception.
Moreover, applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, the claim(s) does/do not include additional elements/limitations/steps (e.g., at Step 2B) that are, individually or in ordered combination, sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the elements/limitations/steps are recited at a high level of generality (e.g., generating or replacing tables, etc.) so as to not favor eligibility (MPEP § 2106.05(d)) and/or are used e.g., for data/information gathering only or for other activities that were well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in the industry, for example as indicated in applicant's specification at filed paragraph [0003], [0041], etc. and (e.g., for enforcing a maximum acceleration, see e.g., the Adams, Fleming, Gonzales, Jarzebowska, and Moharrami literature) in the literature cited with the examiner’s Office action(s), and moreover, the generically recited computer elements (e.g., data processing hardware, memory hardware, generic tables9 of e.g., a cruise control system, etc.; see e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 110 USPQ2d 1984 (2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d. 1350, 112 USPQ2d 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2014); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 115 USPQ2d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Intellectual Ventures I v. Symantec, 838 F.3d 1307, 1321, 120 USPQ2d 1353, 1362; Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354-1355, 119 USPQ2d 1739, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.”); Mobile Acuity, Ltd. v. Blippar Ltd., Case No. 22-2216 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 6, 2024); see also the 2019 PEG Advanced Module at pages 89, 145, etc.) do not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because their use would be routine (and conventional) in any computer implementation of the idea.
Moreover, limiting or linking the use of the idea to a particular technological environment (e.g., a learn driver acceleration system for a vehicle including tables of a cruise control system) is not enough to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention (Flook[10]) e.g., because the preemptive effect of the claims on the idea within the field of use would be broad.
Prior Art
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
For example only, the following references show different ways that a “target speed” in a cruise control system may (perhaps) relate to the “set speed”:
In FIG. 5D of Choi et al. (2025/0100554), two target speeds (VTAR1 and VTAR2) are below the set speed (VSET).
In Kumazaki (2023/0242113), the set speed represents the target speed (abstract).
In Ide (2022/0194226), the target speed V0 is the fastest set speed (paragraph [0090]).
In Petrie, JR. (2004/0084237), the target speed (target set speed) is a speed between the lower set speed and the upper set speed (FIGS. 4 to 6).
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to David A Testardi whose telephone number is (571)270-3528. The examiner can normally be reached Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, 8:30am - 5:30pm E.T., and Friday, 8:30 am - 12:30 pm E.T.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Rachid Bendidi can be reached at (571) 272-4896. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/DAVID A TESTARDI/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3664
1 See Ex parte Jung, 2016-008290 (PTAB Mar. 22, 2017; informative), “For claims written in the format of “at least one of A and B,” the Federal Circuit made clear in SuperGuide that the plain and ordinary meaning is the conjunctive phrase “at least one of A and at least one of B.” 358 F.3d at 887. An Examiner may adopt a different meaning if called for based upon the usual claim construction considerations, including analyzing the specification for any definition or disavowal. See id. (examining the specification to determine whether it supports the plain and ordinary meaning); id. at 888 (“Lastly, we decline to enlarge the claim scope from its plain and ordinary meaning based on the prosecution history in this case because the ’211 patentee did not clearly and explicitly define the term ‘and’ in the covered criteria list as ‘or.’”); see generally Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313—19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding claim terms should be read in the context of the claims, the rest of the specification, the prosecution history, and in some cases extrinsic evidence). However, like any claim construction straying from the ordinary meaning, the Examiner should set forth the reasoning for such an interpretation, including citations and explanations of relevant portions of the claims, specification, or prosecution history. See, e.g., Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2111.01(V) (“an Office action should acknowledge and identify the special definition in this situation”).” (Emphasis added)
2 These acceleration preferences 54 are a part of the driver acceleration profiles 50 that include i) a driver identification (ID) 52 and ii) acceleration preferences 54 (paragraph [0041]).
3 See the 2019 35 U.S.C. 112 Compliance Federal Register Notice (Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 4, Monday, January 7, 2019, pages 57 to 63). See also https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2019_112_guidance_initiative.pptx . Quoting the FR Notice at pages 61 and 62, "The Federal Circuit emphasized that ‘‘[t]he written description requirement is not met if the specification merely describes a ‘desired result.’ ’’ Vasudevan, 782 F.3d at 682 (quoting Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349). . . . When examining computer-implemented, software-related claims, examiners should determine whether the specification discloses the computer and the algorithm(s) that achieve the claimed function in sufficient detail that one of ordinary skill in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor possessed the claimed subject matter at the time of filing. An algorithm is defined, for example, as 'a finite sequence of steps for solving a logical or mathematical problem or performing a task.' Microsoft Computer Dictionary (5th ed., 2002). Applicant may 'express that algorithm in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.' Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1340 (internal citation omitted). It is not enough that one skilled in the art could theoretically write a program to achieve the claimed function, rather the specification itself must explain how the claimed function is achieved to demonstrate that the applicant had possession of it. See, e.g., Vasudevan, 782 F.3d at 682–83. If the specification does not provide a disclosure of the computer and algorithm(s) in sufficient detail to demonstrate to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention that achieves the claimed result, a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) for lack of written description must be made. See MPEP § 2161.01, subsection I."
4 For example, the specification teaches this about the “target speed” at published paragraphs [0038], [0041], and [0043]:
[0038] . . . The learn driver acceleration application 16 may be utilized by the data processing hardware 18 to estimate the estimated target speed 30c based on other vehicle parameters 22 and environmental parameters 36. The environmental parameters 36 are configured based on the image data 208 and/or the navigation data 302.
[0041] . . . The driver acceleration profiles 50 may be utilized by the learn driver acceleration application 16 to estimate the target speed 30c and the set speed 30d based on the acceleration preferences 54 associated with the driver ID 52. . . .
[0043] The learn driver acceleration application 16 automatically monitors the vehicle parameters 22 and the environmental data 36 to continuously estimate the set speed 30d and the target speed 30c. . . .
5 See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. (U.S. Supreme Court, 2014) which held, "A patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the patent’s specification and prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention." See also In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307 (Fed.Cir.2014)(“[A] claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear,” i.e., “ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention.”) and Ex Parte McAward, Appeal No. 2015-006416 (PTAB, Aug. 25, 2017, Precedential) (“Applying the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim, then, the Office establishes a prima facie case of indefiniteness with a rejection explaining how the metes and bounds of a pending claim are not clear because the claim contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear.”)
6 The specification indicates at published paragraph [0045] that, “As mentioned above, the learn driver acceleration application 16 may generate an average ratio 72 by creating a ratio of the learned acceleration tables 40 with the calibration tables 62. For example, the learn driver acceleration application 16 may determine whether to use the learned average acceleration table 40a or the scaled table 70 before replacing the acceleration request table 62a. In some instances, the learn driver acceleration application 16 may utilize the scaled acceleration tables 70. The scaled acceleration tables 70 are the calibration tables 62 scaled, via the average ratio 72, relative to the learned acceleration tables 40.” However, it is unclear what a ratio of the tables might possibly be, or how that ratio might be used/useful in e.g., scaling an acceleration table in order to possibly become something other than the learned acceleration table from which the ratio was created in the first place.
7 See MPEP 2173.05(b), IV.
8 Apparently unrelated to any tables in the claim. See published paragraph [0046] of the specification.
9 Here, the examiner merely notes that the claimed “tables” are, from the teachings of the specification when interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art, apparently generic tables (such as “tables of batting averages”, e.g., storing nonfunctional descriptive material related to acceleration; MPEP 2111.05) and are not “a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory” as was the case in Enfish, 822 F.3d 1327 (2016).
10 See e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 ("Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use . . . did not make the concept patentable.")
Prosecution Insights