DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Specification
The lengthy specification has not been checked to the extent necessary to determine the presence of all possible minor errors. Applicant’s cooperation is requested in correcting any errors of which applicant may become aware in the specification.
Claim Objections
Claims 5-8 and 11-14 are objected to because of the following informalities:
Claim 5 recites “where controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises:” in lines 1-2, which should be amended to instead recite --where controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode for the first condition comprises:-- for consistency and proper antecedent basis with “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition” in lines 4-5 of claim 1 and in view of claims 2, 4, and 5 being directed to the “first condition.”
Claim 6 recites “where controlling the driving of the vehicle comprises:” in line 1, which should be amended to instead recite --where controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode for the first condition comprises:-- for consistency and proper antecedent basis with “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition” in lines 4-5 of claim 1 and in view of claims 2 and 4-6 being directed to the “first condition.”
Claim 7 recites “where controlling the driving of the vehicle comprises:” in line 1, which should be amended to instead recite --where controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode for the first condition comprises:-- for consistency and proper antecedent basis with “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition” in lines 4-5 of claim 1 and in view of claims 2 and 4-7 being directed to the “first condition.”
Claim 8 recites “where controlling driving of the vehicle comprises:” in line 1, which should be amended to instead recite --where controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode for the first condition further comprises:-- for consistency and proper antecedent basis with “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition” in lines 4-5 of claim 1 and in view of claims 2, 4-6, and 8 being directed to the “first condition.”
Claim 11 recites “where controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises:” in lines 1-2, which should be amended to instead recite --where controlling driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode for the second condition comprises:-- for consistency and proper antecedent basis with “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for […] the second condition” in lines 4-5 of claim 1 and in view of claims 9 and 10 being directed to the “second condition.”
Claim 12 recites “where controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises:” in lines 1-2, which should be amended to instead recite --where controlling driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode for the second condition comprises:-- for consistency and proper antecedent basis with “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for […] the second condition” in lines 4-5 of claim 1 and in view of claims 9-11 being directed to the “second condition.”
Claim 13 recites “where controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises:” in lines 1-2, which should be amended to instead recite --where controlling driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode for the second condition comprises:-- for consistency and proper antecedent basis with “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for […] the second condition” in lines 4-5 of claim 1 and in view of claims 9-12 being directed to the “second condition.”
Claim 14 recites “where controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises:” in lines 1-2, which should be amended to instead recite --where controlling driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode for the second condition comprises:-- for consistency and proper antecedent basis with “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for […] the second condition” in lines 4-5 of claim 1 and in view of claims 9-13 being directed to the “second condition.”
Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Interpretation
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation(s) is/are: “advanced driver assistance system” in claims 15-20.
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 2-8, 10-14, and 17-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 2 recites “wherein the first condition includes a condition that another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” in lines 1-3. Claim 2 is dependent from claim 1, and it is unclear what exactly is meant by “another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control is operated” (emphasis added) in claim 2, as neither claim appears to specify operation of a first ADAS control, and it is unclear whether the control of the “smart cruise control (SCC)” introduced in line 3 of claim 1 is intended to correspond to operation of an ADAS control different from “another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control is operated” refers, or whether “another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control is operated” is intended to differ from operation of an ADAS control different from the control of the “smart cruise control (SCC)” introduced in claim 1.
Claims 3-8 depend from claim 2, such that claims 3-8 also include the indefinite subject matter recited by claim 2 and are rejected for at least the same reasons that claim 2 is rejected.
Claim 3 refers to “the other ADAS control” in line 1; however, claim 3 is dependent from claim 1 via claim 2, and none of claims 1-3 previously introduces “an other ADAS control,” such that it is unclear what exactly is meant by “the other ADAS control” in line 1 of claim 3. Claim 2 does, however, previously introduce “another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control” in lines 1-2, and it is unclear whether “the other ADAS control” referred to in line 1 of claim 3 is intended to be the same as or different from the “another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control” previously introduced in lines 1-2 of claim 2. Thus, there is improper antecedent basis for the limitation in the claim.
Claim 4 recites “the predetermined reference number includes a first reference number and a second reference number” in lines 2-3. First, it is unclear how a “predetermined reference number,” which is singular, could include more than one “reference number” (e.g., a “first reference number” and a “second reference number”) via “the predetermined reference number includes a first reference number and a second reference number” in claim 4. Next, claim 4 is dependent from claim 1 via claim 2, claim 2 recites “wherein the first condition includes a condition that another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” in lines 1-3, and it is unclear what exactly is meant by “is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” in the required case where “the predetermined reference number includes a first reference number and a second reference number” given that the comparison of “is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” is with respect to a singular “reference number.”
Claims 5-8 depend from claim 4, such that claims 5-8 also include the indefinite subject matter recited by claim 4 and are rejected for at least the same reasons that claim 4 is rejected.
Claim 6 recites “changing the determined acceleration based on the set second limiting mode or switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC” in lines 4-5; however, it is unclear whether “switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC” is also intended to be performed “based on the set second limiting mode,” or whether “switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC” is differently intended to be performed irrespective of whether the “second limiting mode” is the “set limiting mode.”
Claims 7 and 8 depend from claim 6, such that claims 7 and 8 also include the indefinite subject matter recited by claim 6 and are rejected for at least the same reasons that claim 6 is rejected.
Claim 7 recites “changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode or switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC” in lines 4-5; however, it is unclear whether “switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC” is also intended to be performed “based on the set third limiting mode,” or whether “switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC” is differently intended to be performed irrespective of whether the “third limiting mode” is the “set limiting mode.”
Claim 10 recites “the predetermined reference safety distance includes a first reference safety distance and a second reference safety distance” in lines 2-3. First, it is unclear how a “predetermined safety distance,” which is singular, could include more than one “reference safety distance” (e.g., a “first reference safety distance” and a “second reference safety distance”) via “the predetermined reference safety distance includes a first reference safety distance and a second reference safety distance” in claim 410. Next, claim 10 is dependent from claim 1 via claim 9, claim 9 recites “wherein the second condition includes a condition that, when the vehicle stops in the SCC, a distance between the vehicle and another vehicle ahead of the vehicle is equal to or smaller than a predetermined reference safety distance” in lines 1-3, and it is unclear what exactly is meant by “is equal to or smaller than a predetermined reference safety distance” in the required case where “the predetermined reference safety distance includes a first reference safety distance and a second reference safety distance” given that the comparison of “is equal to or smaller than a predetermined reference safety distance” is with respect to a singular “safety distance.”
Claims 11-14 depend from claim 10, such that claims 11-14 also include the indefinite subject matter recited by claim 10 and are rejected for at least the same reasons that claim 10 is rejected.
Claim 12 recites “changing the determined acceleration based on the set second limiting mode or switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC” in lines 5-6; however, it is unclear whether “switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC” is also intended to be performed “based on the set second limiting mode,” or whether “switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC” is differently intended to be performed irrespective of whether the “second limiting mode” is the “set limiting mode.”
Claims 13 and 14 depend from claim 12, such that claims 13 and 14 also include the indefinite subject matter recited by claim 12 and are rejected for at least the same reasons that claim 12 is rejected.
Claim 13 recites “changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode or switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC” in lines 5-6; however, it is unclear whether “switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC” is also intended to be performed “based on the set third limiting mode,” or whether “switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC” is differently intended to be performed irrespective of whether the “third limiting mode” is the “set limiting mode.”
Claim 14 depends from claim 13, such that claim 14 also includes the indefinite subject matter recited by claim 13 and is rejected for at least the same reasons that claim 13 is rejected.
Claim 17 refers to “the other ADAS control” in line 1; however, claim 17 is dependent from claim 15 via claim 16, and none of claims 15-17 previously introduces “an other ADAS control,” such that it is unclear what exactly is meant by “the other ADAS control” in line 1 of claim 17. Claim 16 does, however, previously introduce “another ADAS control” in lines 1-2, and it is unclear whether “the other ADAS control” referred to in line 1 of claim 17 is intended to be the same as or different from the “another ADAS control” previously introduced in lines 1-2 of claim 16. Thus, there is improper antecedent basis for the limitation in the claim.
Claim 18 depends from claim 17, such that claim 18 also includes the indefinite subject matter recited by claim 17 and is rejected for at least the same reasons that claim 17 is rejected.
Claim 18 refers to “the first limiting mode” in line 2 and later refers to “the set first limiting mode” in line 4; however, claim 18 is dependent from claim 15 via claims 16 and 17, and none of claims 15-18 previously introduces either of “a first limiting mode” and “a set first limiting mode,” such that it is unclear what exactly is meant by each of “the first limiting mode” and “the set first limiting mode” in claim 18. Thus, there is improper antecedent basis for the limitations in the claim.
Claim 19 recites “the predetermined reference number includes a first reference number and a second reference number” in lines 2-3. First, it is unclear how a “predetermined reference number,” which is singular, could include more than one “reference number” (e.g., a “first reference number” and a “second reference number”) via “the predetermined reference number includes a first reference number and a second reference number” in claim 19. Next, claim 19 is dependent from claim 15 via claim 16, claim 16 recites “wherein the first condition includes a condition that another ADAS control is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” in lines 1-3, and it is unclear what exactly is meant by “is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” in the required case where “the predetermined reference number includes a first reference number and a second reference number” given that the comparison of “is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” is with respect to a singular “reference number.”
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-7, 9-13, and 15-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 6,304,808 to Milot (hereinafter: “Milot”).
With respect to claim 1, Milot teaches a method of controlling a vehicle, the method comprising: determining, by a controller, that a first condition or a second condition is satisfied while the vehicle is controlled in a smart cruise control (SCC) [for example, as depicted by at least Fig. 1 and as discussed by at least Col. 1, lines 7-17, Col. 1, lines 25-43, Col. 1, lines 48-67, Col. 2, lines 21-44, Col. 2, line 62 – Col. 3, line 5 & Col. 3, lines 9-17, a vehicular control system (e.g., “controller”) determines that a vehicle stability control (VSC) function activates (e.g., “that a first condition … is satisfied”) at times including when the vehicle is controlled in an adaptive cruise control (ACC) (e.g., “SCC”), such as when the VSC function includes a traction control (TC) function of a traction control system (TCS); because determining that a second condition is satisfied and determining that a first condition is satisfied are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives]; and controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition or the second condition [for example, as depicted by at least Fig. 1 and as discussed by at least Col. 1, lines 25-67, Col. 2, lines 21-27 & Col. 3, lines 6-20, the vehicular control system controls driving of the vehicle, including by reducing a current acceleration request (e.g., “controlling …driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode”) when the VCS is activated at times including when the vehicle is controlled in the ACC; because for the first condition and for the second condition are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 2, Milot teaches the method of claim 1, wherein the first condition includes a condition that another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number [the broadest reasonable interpretation of a method (or process) claim having contingent limitations requires only those steps that must be performed and does not include steps that are not required to be performed because the condition(s) precedent are not met (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_II), and claim scope is not limited by claim language that suggests or makes optional but does not require steps to be performed, or by claim language that does not limit a claim to a particular structure (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I), and, as discussed in detail above with respect to claim 1, because determinations, and uses thereof, of the first condition and the second condition are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives, such that “wherein the first condition includes a condition that another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” does not necessarily further limit the method of claim 2 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “second condition” is determined (and used) during performing of the claimed method; even so, for example, the VSC function activates at least once (e.g., “a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number”) at times including when the vehicle is controlled in the ACC; because is operated in a number of times equal to a predetermined reference number and is operated in a number of times over a predetermined reference number are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 3, Milot teaches the method of claim 2, wherein the other ADAS control includes an electronic stability control (ESC) or a traction control system (TCS) [“wherein the other ADAS control includes an electronic stability control (ESC) or a traction control system (TCS)” only necessarily further limits “wherein the first condition includes a condition that another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” in claim 2 and therefore does not necessarily further limit the method of claim 3 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “second condition” is determined (and used) during performing of the claimed method (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); even so, for example, as discussed in detail above with respect to claim 1; because an ESC and a TCS are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 4, Milot teaches the method of claim 2, wherein: the predetermined reference number includes a first reference number (e.g., zero) and a second reference number (e.g., one); and the set limiting mode comprises a first limiting mode, a second limiting mode, or a third limiting mode based on the first reference number and the second reference number [“wherein: the predetermined reference number includes a first reference number and a second reference number; and the set limiting mode comprises a first limiting mode, a second limiting mode, or a third limiting mode based on the first reference number and the second reference number” only necessarily further limits “wherein the first condition includes a condition that another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” in claim 2 and therefore does not necessarily further limit the method of claim 4 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “second condition” is determined (and used) during performing of the claimed method (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); even so, for example, as discussed in detail above with respect to claim 1; because a first limiting mode, a second limiting mode, and a third limiting mode are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 5, Milot teaches the method of claim 4, wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: controlling the vehicle in the first limiting mode when the number of times is less than or equal to the first reference number; and maintaining a determined acceleration or a time to collision (TTC) based on the set first limiting mode [“wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: controlling the vehicle in the first limiting mode when the number of times is less than or equal to the first reference number; and maintaining a determined acceleration or a time to collision (TTC) based on the set first limiting mode” would not necessarily further limit “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition or the second condition” in claim 1 and therefore would not necessarily further limit the method of claim 5 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “second condition” is determined (and used) during performing of the claimed method (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); also, each of “controlling the vehicle in the first limiting mode” and “maintaining a determined acceleration or a time to collision (TTC) based on the set first limiting mode” is contingent upon meeting of a condition “when the number of times is less than or equal to the first reference number” which is not necessarily met during performing of the claimed method (e.g., when the number is greater than the first reference number—note that the first reference number is definable as any number under a broadest reasonable interpretation), such that no part of “wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: controlling the vehicle in the first limiting mode when the number of times is less than or equal to the first reference number; and maintaining a determined acceleration or a time to collision (TTC) based on the set first limiting mode” necessarily further limits the claimed method under a broadest reasonable interpretation (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); even so, for example, as depicted by at least Fig. 1 and as discussed by at least Col. 3, lines 6-20, the vehicular control system controls driving of the vehicle, including by not reducing the current acceleration request (e.g., “maintaining a determined acceleration”), when the VCS is not activated (e.g., “when the number of times is less than or equal to the first reference number”) at times including when the vehicle is controlled in the ACC; because when the number of times is less than the first reference number and when the number of times is equal to the first reference number are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives; because a determined acceleration and a TTC are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 6, Milot teaches the method of claim 5, wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle comprises: controlling the vehicle in the second limiting mode when the number of times is greater than the first reference number and is less than or equal to the second reference number; and changing the determined acceleration based on the set second limiting mode or switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC [“wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle comprises: controlling the vehicle in the second limiting mode when the number of times is greater than the first reference number and is less than or equal to the second reference number; and changing the determined acceleration based on the set second limiting mode or switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC” would not necessarily further limit “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition or the second condition” in claim 1 and therefore would not necessarily further limit the method of claim 6 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “second condition” is determined (and used) during performing of the claimed method (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); also, each of “controlling the vehicle in the second limiting mode” and “changing the determined acceleration based on the set second limiting mode or switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC” is contingent upon meeting of a condition “when the number of times is greater than the first reference number and is less than or equal to the second reference number” which is not necessarily met during performing of the claimed method (e.g., when the number is less than or equal to the first reference number OR greater than the second reference number—note that each of the first reference number and the second reference number is definable as any number under a broadest reasonable interpretation), such that no part of “wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle comprises: controlling the vehicle in the second limiting mode when the number of times is greater than the first reference number and is less than or equal to the second reference number; and changing the determined acceleration based on the set second limiting mode or switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC” necessarily further limits the claimed method under a broadest reasonable interpretation (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); even so, for example, as depicted by at least Fig. 1 and as discussed by at least Col. 3, lines 6-20, the vehicular control system controls driving of the vehicle, including by reducing the current acceleration request (e.g., “changing the determined acceleration”), when the VCS is activated once (e.g., “when the number of times is greater than the first reference number and is less than or equal to the second reference number”) at times including when the vehicle is controlled in the ACC; because when the number of times is less than the second reference number and when the number of times is equal to the second reference number are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives; because changing the determined acceleration based on the set second limiting mode and switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 7, Milot teaches the method of claim 6, wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle comprises: controlling the vehicle in the third limiting mode when the number of times is greater than the second reference number; and changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode or switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC [“wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle comprises: controlling the vehicle in the third limiting mode when the number of times is greater than the second reference number; and changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode or switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC” would not necessarily further limit “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition or the second condition” in claim 1 and therefore would not necessarily further limit the method of claim 7 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “second condition” is determined (and used) during performing of the claimed method (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); also, each of “controlling the vehicle in the third limiting mode” and “changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode or switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC” is contingent upon meeting of a condition “when the number of times is greater than the second reference number” which is not necessarily met during performing of the claimed method (e.g., when the number is less than or equal to the second reference number—note that the second reference number is definable as any number under a broadest reasonable interpretation), such that no part of “wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle comprises: controlling the vehicle in the third limiting mode when the number of times is greater than the second reference number; and changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode or switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC” necessarily further limits the claimed method under a broadest reasonable interpretation (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); because changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode and switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 9, Milot teaches the method of claim 1, wherein the second condition includes a condition that, when the vehicle stops in the SCC, a distance between the vehicle and another vehicle ahead of the vehicle is equal to or smaller than a predetermined reference safety distance [as discussed in detail above with respect to claim 1, because determinations, and uses thereof, of the first condition and the second condition are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives, such that “wherein the second condition includes a condition that, when the vehicle stops in the SCC, a distance between the vehicle and another vehicle ahead of the vehicle is equal to or smaller than a predetermined reference safety distance” does not necessarily further limit the method of claim 9 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “first condition” is determined (and used) during performing of the claimed method (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2), and the alternatively-recited “first condition” has been addressed by the prior art rejections of the instant Office Action, as discussed in detail with respect to claims 1-8; because is equal to a predetermined reference safety distance and is smaller than a predetermined reference safety distance are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 10, Milot teaches the method of claim 9, wherein: the predetermined reference safety distance includes a first safety distance and a second safety distance; and the set limiting mode comprises a first limiting mode, a second limiting mode, or a third limiting mode based on the first safety distance and the second safety distance [“wherein: the predetermined reference safety distance includes a first safety distance and a second safety distance; and the set limiting mode comprises a first limiting mode, a second limiting mode, or a third limiting mode based on the first safety distance and the second safety distance” only necessarily further limits “wherein the second condition includes a condition that, when the vehicle stops in the SCC, a distance between the vehicle and another vehicle ahead of the vehicle is equal to or smaller than a predetermined reference safety distance” in claim 9 and therefore does not necessarily further limit the method of claim 10 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “first condition” is determined (and used) during performing of the claimed method (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2), and the alternatively-recited “first condition” has been addressed by the prior art rejections of the instant Office Action, as discussed in detail with respect to claims 1-9; because a first limiting mode, a second limiting mode, and a third limiting mode are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 11, Milot teaches the method of claim 10, wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: controlling the vehicle in the first limiting mode when the distance is less than or equal to the first safety distance; and maintaining a determined acceleration or a time to collision (TTC) based on the set first limiting mode [“wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: controlling the vehicle in the first limiting mode when the distance is less than or equal to the first safety distance; and maintaining a determined acceleration or a time to collision (TTC) based on the set first limiting mode” would not necessarily further limit “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition or the second condition” in claim 1 and therefore would not necessarily further limit the method of claim 11 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “first condition” is determined (and used) during performing of the claimed method (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2), and the alternatively-recited “first condition” has been addressed by the prior art rejections of the instant Office Action, as discussed in detail with respect to claims 1-10; also, each of “controlling the vehicle in the first limiting mode” and “maintaining a determined acceleration or a time to collision (TTC) based on the set first limiting mode” is contingent upon meeting of a condition “when the distance is less than or equal to the first safety distance” which is not necessarily met during performing of the claimed method (e.g., when the distance is greater than the first safety distance—note that the first safety distance is definable as any distance under a broadest reasonable interpretation), such that no part of “wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: controlling the vehicle in the first limiting mode when the distance is less than or equal to the first safety distance; and maintaining a determined acceleration or a time to collision (TTC) based on the set first limiting mode” necessarily further limits the claimed method under a broadest reasonable interpretation (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); because when the distance is less than the first safety distance and when the distance is equal to the first safety distance are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives; because a determined acceleration and a TTC are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 12, Milot teaches the method of claim 11, wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: controlling the vehicle in the second limiting mode when the distance is greater than the first safety distance and is less than or equal to the second safety distance; and changing the determined acceleration based on the set second limiting mode or switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC [“wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: controlling the vehicle in the second limiting mode when the distance is greater than the first safety distance and is less than or equal to the second safety distance; and changing the determined acceleration based on the set second limiting mode or switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC” would not necessarily further limit “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition or the second condition” in claim 1 and therefore would not necessarily further limit the method of claim 12 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “first condition” is determined (and used) during performing of the claimed method (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2), and the alternatively-recited “first condition” has been addressed by the prior art rejections of the instant Office Action, as discussed in detail with respect to claims 1-11; also, each of “controlling the vehicle in the second limiting mode” and “changing the determined acceleration based on the set second limiting mode or switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC” is contingent upon meeting of a condition “when the distance is greater than the first safety distance and is less than or equal to the second safety distance” which is not necessarily met during performing of the claimed method (e.g., when the distance is less than or equal to the first safety distance OR greater than the second safety distance—note that each of the first safety distance and the second safety distance is definable as any distance under a broadest reasonable interpretation), such that no part of “wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: controlling the vehicle in the second limiting mode when the distance is greater than the first safety distance and is less than or equal to the second safety distance; and changing the determined acceleration based on the set second limiting mode or switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC” necessarily further limits the claimed method under a broadest reasonable interpretation (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); because when the distance is less than the second safety distance and when the distance is equal to the second safety distance are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives; because changing the determined acceleration based on the set second limiting mode and switching to a first TTC so that a braking control time is ahead of the TTC are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 13, Milot teaches the method of claim 12, wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: controlling the vehicle in the third limiting mode when the distance is greater than the second safety distance; and changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode or switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC [“wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: controlling the vehicle in the third limiting mode when the distance is greater than the second safety distance; and changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode or switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC” would not necessarily further limit “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition or the second condition” in claim 1 and therefore would not necessarily further limit the method of claim 13 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “first condition” is determined (and used) during performing of the claimed method (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2), and the alternatively-recited “first condition” has been addressed by the prior art rejections of the instant Office Action, as discussed in detail with respect to claims 1-12; also, each of “controlling the vehicle in the third limiting mode” and “changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode or switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC” is contingent upon meeting of a condition “when the distance is greater than the second safety distance” which is not necessarily met during performing of the claimed method (e.g., when the distance is less than or equal to the second safety distance—note that the second safety distance is definable as any distance under a broadest reasonable interpretation), such that no part of “wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: controlling the vehicle in the third limiting mode when the distance is greater than the second safety distance; and changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode or switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC” necessarily further limits the claimed method under a broadest reasonable interpretation (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); because changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode and switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 15, Milot teaches a vehicle (apparent from at least Fig. 1 in view of at least the Abstract) comprising: a sensor module configured to sense environment around the vehicle (apparent from at least Fig. 1 in view of at least Col. 1, lines 11-15, Col. 1, lines 34-39, Col. 2, lines 38-46); an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) configured to implement ADAS controls including a smart cruise control (SCC) (apparent from at least Fig. 1 in view of at least Col. 2, lines 21-37); and a controller configured to control the sensor module and the ADAS, wherein the controller is further configured to determine that a first condition or a second condition is satisfied while the vehicle is controlled in the SCC and to control driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition or the second condition (as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 1).
With respect to claim 16, Milot teaches the vehicle of claim 15, wherein the first condition includes a condition that another ADAS control is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number [claim scope is not limited by claim language that suggests or makes optional but does not require steps to be performed, or by claim language that does not limit a claim to a particular structure (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I), and, as discussed in detail above with respect to claim 15, because determinations, and uses thereof, of the first condition and the second condition are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives, such that “wherein the first condition includes a condition that another ADAS control is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” does not necessarily further limit the vehicle of claim 16 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “second condition” is determined (and used) by the recited controller-implemented functions of the claimed vehicle; even so, for example, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claims 2 and 15; because is operated in a number of times equal to a predetermined reference number and is operated in a number of times over a predetermined reference number are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 17, Milot teaches the vehicle of claim 16, wherein the other ADAS control includes an electronic stability control (ESC) or a traction control system (TCS) [“wherein the other ADAS control includes an electronic stability control (ESC) or a traction control system (TCS)” only necessarily further limits “wherein the first condition includes a condition that another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” in claim 16 and therefore does not necessarily further limit the vehicle of claim 17 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “second condition” is determined (and used) by the recited controller-implemented functions of the claimed vehicle (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 16); even so, for example, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claims 3, 15, and 16; because an ESC and a TCS are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 18, Milot teaches the vehicle of claim 17, wherein the controller is further configured to control the vehicle in the first limiting mode when the number of times is less than or equal to the first reference number and to maintain a determined acceleration or a time to collision (TTC) based on the set first limiting mode [“wherein the controller is further configured to control the vehicle in the first limiting mode when the number of times is less than or equal to the first reference number and to maintain a determined acceleration or a time to collision (TTC) based on the set first limiting mode” would not necessarily further limit “to control driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition or the second condition” in claim 15 and therefore would not necessarily further limit the vehicle of claim 18 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “second condition” is determined (and used) by the recited controller-implemented functions of the claimed vehicle (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 16); even so, for example, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claims 5 and 15-17; because when the number of times is less than the first reference number and when the number of times is equal to the first reference number are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives; because a determined acceleration and a TTC are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 19, Milot teaches the vehicle of claim 16, wherein: the predetermined reference number includes a first reference number and a second reference number; and the set limiting mode comprises a first limiting mode, a second limiting mode, or a third limiting mode based on the first reference number and the second reference number [“wherein: the predetermined reference number includes a first reference number and a second reference number; and the set limiting mode comprises a first limiting mode, a second limiting mode, or a third limiting mode based on the first reference number and the second reference number” only necessarily further limits “wherein the first condition includes a condition that another advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) control is operated in a number of times equal to or over a predetermined reference number” in claim 16 and therefore does not necessarily further limit the vehicle of claim 19 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “second condition” is determined (and used) by the recited controller-implemented functions of the claimed vehicle (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 16); even so, for example, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claims 4, 15, and 16; because a first limiting mode, a second limiting mode, and a third limiting mode are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
With respect to claim 20, Milot teaches the vehicle of claim 15, wherein the second condition includes a condition that, when the vehicle stops in the SCC, a distance between the vehicle and another vehicle ahead of the vehicle is equal to or smaller than a predetermined reference safety distance [as discussed in detail above with respect to claim 15, because determinations, and uses thereof, of the first condition and the second condition are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives, such that “wherein the second condition includes a condition that, when the vehicle stops in the SCC, a distance between the vehicle and another vehicle ahead of the vehicle is equal to or smaller than a predetermined reference safety distance” does not necessarily further limit the vehicle of claim 20 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “first condition” is determined (and used) by the recited controller-implemented functions of the claimed vehicle (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 16), and the alternatively-recited “first condition” has been addressed by the prior art rejections of the instant Office Action, as discussed in detail with respect to claims 15-19; because is equal to a predetermined reference safety distance and is smaller than a predetermined reference safety distance are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 8 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Milot in view of JP 2019-190959 A to Watabe et al. (hereinafter: “Watabe”).
With respect to claim 8, Milot teaches the method of claim 6, wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle further comprises turning off the SCC (implicit from at least Col. 3, lines 21-24); however, Milot appears to lack a clear teaching as to whether controlling the driving of the vehicle further comprises outputting an alarm regarding inspection and replacement of tires based on the third limiting mode [“wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle further comprises […] outputting an alarm regarding inspection and replacement of tires based on the third limiting mode” would not necessarily further limit “controlling, by the controller, driving of the vehicle in a set limiting mode for the first condition or the second condition” in claim 1 and therefore would not necessarily further limit the method of claim 8 under a broadest reasonable interpretation in a case where the alternatively-recited “second condition” is determined (and used) during performing of the claimed method (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); also, “outputting an alarm regarding inspection and replacement of tires based on the third limiting mode” is contingent upon meeting of a condition where the “set limiting mode” is the “third limiting mode” which is not necessarily met during performing of the claimed method, such that no part of “wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle further comprises […] outputting an alarm regarding inspection and replacement of tires based on the third limiting mode” necessarily further limits the claimed method under a broadest reasonable interpretation (e.g., see: MPEP 2111.04_I & 2111.04_II, as discussed in detail above with respect to at least claim 2); because changing the determined acceleration based on the set third limiting mode and switching to a second TTC so that the braking control time is ahead of the first TTC are recited in the alternative, it is sufficient to address one of the claimed alternatives].
Even so, Watabe teaches controlling driving of a vehicle including outputting an alarm regarding inspection and replacement of tires based on a number of times of vehicle stability control exceeding one (for example: “When the operation count of the vehicle stability control is unnecessarily large, the tire replacement determination device 22 determines that the tire 10 being mounted does not conform to the road surface condition, and determines that the tire 10 needs to be replaced” and “As described above, in a snowy area in winter, when the number of operations FW is larger than the number of operations FS in summer exceeding the first threshold Th1, and it is determined that the tire 10 being mounted is a summer tire, The replacement determination unit 140 determines that replacement from the summer tire to the studless tire is necessary. In other cases, the tire replacement determination unit 140 does not determine that the tire 10 needs to be replaced immediately. Therefore, it is possible to reliably call attention only to a driver that needs to replace the tire 10, and unnecessary alerting is suppressed. As a result, the driver's uncomfortable feeling is reduced.”).
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to have modified the method of Milot with the teachings of Watabe, if even necessary, such that controlling the driving of the vehicle further comprises outputting an alarm regarding inspection and replacement of tires based on the third limiting mode to beneficially alert a driver of the vehicle that a tire needs to be replaced when an activation count of the vehicle stability control is unnecessarily large.
With respect to claim 14, Milot modified supra teaches the method of claim 13, wherein controlling the driving of the vehicle in the set limiting mode comprises: turning off the SCC; and outputting an alarm regarding inspection and replacement of tires (as discussed in detail above with respect to claim 8).
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure and is provided on the attached PTO-892 Notice of References Cited form.
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/JOHN M ZALESKAS/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3747
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