DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments
Applicant's 1-16-26 arguments vis-a-vis 35 U.S.C. 112(b)/2nd par. rejections, simply stating that the rejections were addressed by the 1-16-26 amendments, have been fully considered and are persuasive in view of said amendments. These rejections are withdrawn.
Applicant's 1-16-26 arguments vis-a-vis the 35 U.S.C. 112(d)/4th par. rejection, simply stating that the rejection was addressed by the 1-16-26 amendments, have been fully considered but are not persuasive. This rejection, adjusted as necessitated by the 1-16-26 amendments, is re-asserted as proper.
Applicant's 1-16-26 arguments vis-a-vis prior art rejections over WO2016/022522 (2016) (listed in and attached to applicant’s 12-3-24 IDS) (“’522”), simply stating that the rejections were addressed by the 1-16-26 amendments (i.e. asserting that ‘522 does not input its measurements into a regression model to determine the carbonation extent), have been fully considered but are not persuasive. As applicant admits, ‘522 discloses real-time measuring of relative humidity, CO2 concentration, and gas flow rate, determining a state/extent of curing and total CO2 consumed, and sending signals to control/adjust measured parameters to manage the state/extent of curing (Remarks at p. 9). With that in mind, the choice of statistical model type (regression as claimed, estimation models such as weighted, least squares, linear, etc., or otherwise) does not actually/materially affect the claimed method or the effects of said method, akin to whether an identical or at least substantially similar computer program is written in C++, Basic, FORTRAN, Java, COBOL, or otherwise; so long as the input and output data are the same or at least substantially similar (as they are here), it matters not the equation or program that converts said input data to said output data, nor the/any reason as to why one model was chosen over another. As such, the selection of one statistical model over another is considered a mere mental/algorithmic step, which is not i) accorded/entitled to patentable weight and/or ii) does not further limit the claim's positive step(s). For i), see, e.g., Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hosp. Prods. IP Ltd., 890 F.3d 1024, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (rejecting the arguments that a) limitations reciting mental/algorithmic steps are entitled to patentable weight, and b) whether claims are directed to mental steps "may only be considered in determining patent eligibility [vis-a-vis 35 U.S.C. 101], not obviousness[, i.e. prior art applicability]"). For ii), see, e.g., Ex parte Varanasi, Appeal No. 2012-001521 (PTAB 2013) (available at https://developer.uspto.gov/ptab-web/#/search/documents?proceedingNumber=2012001521) at p. 4, citing Ex parte Nehls, 88 USPQ2d 1883, 1889 (BPAI 2008) (precedential), and Ex parte Cormier, Appeal No. 2017-011263 (PTAB 2018) (available at https://developer.uspto.gov/ptab-web/#/search/documents?proceedingNumber=2017011263) at p. 8. Additionally, note the CCPA’s statements that “a purely mental step [ ] can nowise lend patentability to the claims[,]” see In re Lundberg, 197 F.2d 336, 339 (CCPA 1971) (internal citations omitted), and “Patentability cannot be predicated upon a mental step.” See In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95 (CCPA 1958) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the BPAI in Ex parte Jansen, Appeal No. 2009-001067 (BPAI 2009) (available online at https://developer.uspto.gov/ptab-web/#/search/documents?proceedingNumber=2009001067) stated that “the reason recited for performing a certain step does not create a patentable distinction.” See Jansen at p. 9.
Said rejections, adjusted as necessitated by the 1-16-26 amendments, are re-asserted as proper; applicant’s request for rejoinder of withdrawn claims 30-32, 34, and 42 is thus denied as moot.
Claim Interpretation
The claimed phrase “green body” is interpreted per par. 47 of the specification-as-filed to mean a concrete precursor, concrete product, and/or materials that react with CO2 in a carbonation chamber.
The claimed phrase “waste heat” is interpreted per par. 128 of the specification-as-filed to mean heat recovered by passing a CO2-comprising gas stream through a heat exchanger.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(d):
(d) REFERENCE IN DEPENDENT FORMS.—Subject to subsection (e), a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, fourth paragraph:
Subject to the following paragraph [i.e., the fifth paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112], a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(d)/4th par. as being of improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of the claim upon which it depends. To the extent that claim 20 embraces 0 h, the claim does not further limit claim 1.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102/103
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the Examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the Examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
In considering the obviousness rejections below, the applicant should note that the person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the effective filing date of the claimed invention has the capability of understanding the scientific and engineering principles applicable to the claimed invention. The references of record in the application reasonably reflect this level of skill.
Claims 1-3, 5, 7, 9, 16-17, 19-21, 23-25, and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by WO2016/022522 (2016) (listed in and attached to applicant’s 12-3-24 IDS) (“’522”), or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over ‘522. Regarding claims 1, 9, 16, and 20, ‘522 discloses a method comprising flowing a CO2-comprising mixed gas 130 (thus implying 0 h of pre-treatment air curing) from a gas conditioning apparatus 102 into a carbonation chamber 120 (said chamber comprising ≥1 green body, labeled by ‘522 as a CO2 composite material, i.e. “CCM”1) (see ‘522 at, e.g., par. 117; Fig. 1), measuring, in real time, the chamber’s T, relative humidity (“rh”), mixed gas flow rate, and/or CO2 concentration (see id. at, e.g., par. 107), inputting the measurement(s) into a controller to determine the CCM’s state/extent of curing (i.e. carbonation extent) in the chamber (see id. at, e.g., par. 120), and sending a signal to the apparatus while flowing the mixed gas to actively condition the mixed gas based on the curing/carbonation state/extent and thus effect a multi-step carbonation (see id.). Since the controller determines said CCM’s state/extent of curing (i.e. carbonation extent) and conditions the mixed gas based on the curing/carbonation state/extent to thus effect a multi-step carbonation, ‘522’s controller is reasonably considered to implicitly and/or inherently employ a statistical model, in which the input data (i.e. chamber T, rh, mixed gas flow rate, and/or CO2 concentration) is processed to give actionable output data (i.e. curing/carbonation state/extent) utilized to condition the mixed gas. MPEP 2112 & 2144.01.
Additionally and/or alternatively, given ‘522’s collection, processing, output, and use of such data as detailed above, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to employ any known statistical model as ‘522’s model, such as a regression model as claimed. MPEP 2143 I.(E). Additionally and/or alternatively still, the selection of one statistical model over another is considered a mere mental/algorithmic step, which is not i) accorded/entitled to patentable weight and/or ii) does not further limit the claim's positive step(s). For i), see, e.g., Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hosp. Prods. IP Ltd., 890 F.3d 1024, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (rejecting the arguments that a) limitations reciting mental/algorithmic steps are entitled to patentable weight, and b) whether claims are directed to mental steps "may only be considered in determining patent eligibility [vis-a-vis 35 U.S.C. 101], not obviousness[, i.e. prior art applicability]"). For ii), see, e.g., Ex parte Varanasi, Appeal No. 2012-001521 (PTAB 2013) (available at https://developer.uspto.gov/ptab-web/#/search/documents?proceedingNumber=2012001521) at p. 4, citing Ex parte Nehls, 88 USPQ2d 1883, 1889 (BPAI 2008) (precedential), and Ex parte Cormier, Appeal No. 2017-011263 (PTAB 2018) (available at https://developer.uspto.gov/ptab-web/#/search/documents?proceedingNumber=2017011263) at p. 8. Additionally, note the CCPA’s statements that “a purely mental step [ ] can nowise lend patentability to the claims[,]” see In re Lundberg, 197 F.2d 336, 339 (CCPA 1971) (internal citations omitted), and “Patentability cannot be predicated upon a mental step.” See In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95 (CCPA 1958) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the BPAI in Ex parte Jansen, Appeal No. 2009-001067 (BPAI 2009) (available online at https://developer.uspto.gov/ptab-web/#/search/documents?proceedingNumber=2009001067) stated that “the reason recited for performing a certain step does not create a patentable distinction.” See Jansen at p. 9.
Regarding claims 2 and 17, as the CCM is within the chamber, ‘522’s aforementioned measuring is considered to measure such values within the CCM/green body as well. MPEP 2112 (use of implicit disclosure and/or reasonable inferences drawn from prior art disclosures in 35 U.S.C. 102 rejections is proper).
Regarding claim 3, as ‘522 discloses that its method is less E-intensive than prior art curing methods, ‘522’s method is reasonably considered to reduce the overall process E consumed. See ‘522 at, e.g., par. 143; MPEP 2112.
Regarding claim 5, ‘522 employs a CO2-comprising mixed gas flow rate of 1.7 kg/h, i.e. ~0.000472 kg/s. See ‘522 at, e.g., par. 123. As the density of gaseous CO2 is 1.815 kg/m3 @ STP, this converts to 0.001815 kg/L (or ~550.96 L/kg CO2) @ STP. As such, ~0.000472 kg/s x ~550.96 L/kg = ~0.26 LCO2/s, within the claimed range.
Regarding claim 7, ‘522 so discloses the use of multiple controllers, implying performing multiple conditioning aspects in multiple steps. See ‘522 at, e.g., par. 115-16; MPEP 2112.
Regarding claim 19, ‘522 performs such steps as needed. See ‘522 at, e.g., par. 139.
Regarding claims 21 and 23-25, ‘522 employs the claimed T and rh values. See ‘522 at, e.g., Fig. 10.
Regarding claim 27, ‘522 uses waste heat to heat its mixed gas 130 (in heat exchanger 112 and heaters 114) to 55oC before entering its carbonation chamber 120. See id. at, e.g., par. 120; Figs. 1 and 10.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the/any new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from Examiner should be directed to DANIEL BERNS whose telephone number is (469)295-9161. Examiner can normally be reached M-F 8:30-5:00 (Central). Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach Examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, Examiner’s supervisor, Anthony Zimmer can be reached at (571) 270-3591. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/DANIEL BERNS/ February 24, 2026
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 1736
1 ‘522’s CCM reacts with CO2 (see ‘522 at, e.g., par. 133) and is thus considered to be a green body as claimed.