DETAILED ACTION
This action is responsive to communications filed on 12/9/2024.
Currently, claims 1-11 are pending.
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-6 and 8-10 are concurrently rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Elgersma et al. (US 2022/0221588: hereinafter “Elgersma”).
With regards to claim 1, Elgersma teaches a system (figs. 1a/b, and 2-9: see the system shown by figure 1a and/or figure 1b), comprising:
an atomic clock (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: this limitation is mapped to the CSAC unit 104 which is “chip-scale atomic clock” [0068]) configured to provide a local reference clock signal and further configured to be disciplined to an external clock signal (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: output of the CSAC timing signal in figs. 1a/b. Additionally, see the steps/functions/operations of at least figure 2, where in 202 the CSAC is synchronized/training/disciplined to the an external GNSS clock signal (output by GNSS receiver 102));
an external clock interface (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: where the GNSS receiver 102 of figs. 1a/b is mapped to the limitation, which receives the GNSS clock signal from Antenna 101 and further outputs the GNSS clock signal into the system shown by figs. 1a/b. Which corresponds to the merits of instant figure 1 where the GNSS receiver is ‘an external clock interface’) configured to receive the external clock signal (previously addressed and/ readily apparent);
a comparator configured to compare the local reference clock signal and the external clock signal (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: see the subtraction operation of summer 108 in figure 1a between the GNSS clock signal and the CSAC time signal. Additionally but not exclusively, as stated in [0026], in figure 1b the same subtraction operation occurs inside processing system 106 (between the GNSS clock signal and the CSAC time signal)) and, in response, to (addressed below):
generate a comparison output signal (previously addressed and/or readily apparent); and
an interference detection system (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: where the processing system 106 is mapped to this limitation, also see figure 2 and [0005-0006]) configured to:
receive the comparison output signal (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: regardless of whether figure 1a and figure 1b is used, the subtracted difference between the GNSS clock signal and the CSAC time signal is received and processed by other circuits (e.g. when comparing the subtracted clock difference to the threshold value in 206 of figure 2);
based on the comparison output signal (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: see figures 1a/b and figure 2 and [0005-0007] and [0098]; where the subtracted clock difference between the two clock signals is compared with the threshold value and when/if the clock difference is greater than the threshold value then the GNSS clock signal is determined to include interference (specifically spoofing). See [0005] [Wingdings font/0xE0] “The at least one processor is further configured to, when the difference between the GNSS time signal and the chip-scale atomic clock time signal exceeds the threshold, estimate a system time signal without using the GNSS time signal and output an alarm indicating that GNSS spoofing has been detected”. Where instant paragraph [0012] of the instant specification defines ‘interference’ to include ‘spoofing’.
The remaining limitations were previously addressed and/or are readily apparent), determine whether the external clock signal has an interference signal component (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: see figures 1a/b and figure 2 and [0005-0007] and [0098]; where the subtracted clock difference between the two clock signals is compared with the threshold value and when/if the difference is greater than the threshold value the GNSS clock signal is determined to include interference (specifically spoofing be spoofed). See [0005] [Wingdings font/0xE0] “The at least one processor is further configured to, when the difference between the GNSS time signal and the chip-scale atomic clock time signal exceeds the threshold, estimate a system time signal without using the GNSS time signal and output an alarm indicating that GNSS spoofing has been detected”. Where instant paragraph [0012] of the instant specification defines ‘interference’ to include ‘spoofing’.
Additionally, when the clock difference is less than the threshold then no interference/spoofing in the GNSS clock/timing signal is detected (see figures 2+7: 206/706 [Wingdings font/0xE0] NO result). Also see previously cited paragraphs [0005-0007] and [0098].
The remaining limitations were previously addressed and/or are readily apparent);
output an alert signal indicating whether the external clock signal has the interference signal component (previously addressed and/or readily apparent); and
inhibit disciplining of the local reference clock signal to the external clock signal (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: see figures 1a/b and figure 2: step/function 208 as well as [0005-0007] and [0098]; where [0005] states “The at least one processor is further configured to, when the difference between the GNSS time signal and the chip-scale atomic clock time signal exceeds the threshold, estimate a system time signal without using the GNSS time signal and output an alarm indicating that GNSS spoofing has been detected”. Additionally but not exclusively, see [0078+0079] and step/function 708 of figure 7 ([Wingdings font/0xE0] Switch CSAC to coasting mode). Where the cited sections of Elgersma reference each individually (as well as in-combination) meet the instant limitation).
With regards to claim 2, Elgersma teaches the limitations of claim 1 above.
Elgersma further teaches wherein the atomic clock is co-located with the comparator (at least figure 1a and/or figure 1b show the previously addressed CSAC and previously addressed comparator are co-located within the same device/system).
With regards to claim 3, Elgersma teaches the limitations of claim 1 above.
Elgersma further teaches the system of claim 1 (previously addressed), further comprising a global navigation satellite system receiver (GNSS and GNSS receiver were both previously addressed and/or readily apparent), wherein the global navigation satellite system receiver is configured to provide the external clock signal (these limitations were previously addressed and/or are readily apparent).
With regards to claims 4 and 8, Elgersma teaches a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: see [0095-0097] which disclose at least one memory unit including software/program instruction that when executed by at least one processor/computer controls the hardware to implement the steps/functions to implement the invention of Elgersma), the computer-readable storage medium including instructions that when executed by a computer (previously addressed), cause the computer (previously addressed) to perform a/the method/functions (where the method steps are implemented as functions of the cited hardware, the rest of the limitations are addressed below):
receive/receiving, during a first time period, multiple clock signals comprising a local reference clock signal and an external clock signal (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: the local reference clock signal is mapped to the CSAC timing/clock signal and the external clock signal is mapped to the GNSS timing/clock signal (see figures 1a/b); which are both received by summation unit 108 (in the case of figure 1a) and/or processing system 106 (in the case of figure 1a/b) during the first time period, which corresponds to at least 202-208 of figure 2 and/or 702-706 of figure 7), wherein the local reference clock signal is derived from an atomic system (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: CSAC unit 104 which is “chip-scale atomic clock” [0068], and thus the CSAC clock/timing signal (and the generation/derivation thereof) is mapped to these limitations);
output/outputting the local reference clock signal (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: the previously addressed CSAC unit outputs the CSAC clock/timing signal (as shown by figs. 1a/b));
compare/comparing the local reference clock signal and an external clock signal received during the first time period (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: the first time period was previously addressed. Moreover, see the subtraction operation of summer 108 in figure 1a between the GNSS clock signal and the CSAC time signal. Additionally but not exclusively, as stated in [0026], in figure 1b the same subtraction operation occurs inside processing system 106 (between the GNSS clock signal and the CSAC time signal); also see [0005-0007] and [0098]);
determine/determining whether the external clock signal received during the first time period contains an interference signal component based on the comparison (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: where the first time period was previously addressed. Additionally, see figures 1a/b and figure 2 and [0005-0007] and [0098]; where the subtracted clock difference between the two clock signals is compared with the threshold value and when/if the difference is greater than the threshold value the GNSS clock signal is determined to include interference (specifically spoofing be spoofed). See [0005] [Wingdings font/0xE0] “The at least one processor is further configured to, when the difference between the GNSS time signal and the chip-scale atomic clock time signal exceeds the threshold, estimate a system time signal without using the GNSS time signal and output an alarm indicating that GNSS spoofing has been detected”. Where instant paragraph [0012] of the instant specification defines ‘interference’ to include ‘spoofing’.
The remaining limitations were previously addressed and/or are readily apparent); and
provide/providing an output alert indicating whether the external clock signal during the first time period contains the interference signal component (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: see figures 1a/b and figure 2 and [0005-0007] and [0098]; where the subtracted clock difference between the two clock signals is compared with the threshold value and when/if the difference is greater than the threshold value the GNSS clock signal is determined to include interference (specifically spoofing be spoofed). See [0005] [Wingdings font/0xE0] “The at least one processor is further configured to, when the difference between the GNSS time signal and the chip-scale atomic clock time signal exceeds the threshold, estimate a system time signal without using the GNSS time signal and output an alarm indicating that GNSS spoofing has been detected”. Where instant paragraph [0012] of the instant specification defines ‘interference’ to include ‘spoofing’.
Additionally, when the clock difference is less than the threshold then no interference/spoofing in the GNSS clock/timing signal is detected (see figures 2+7: 206/706 [Wingdings font/0xE0] NO result. Also see previously cited paragraphs [0005-0007] and [0098].
The remaining limitations were previously addressed and/or are readily apparent).
With regards to claims 5 and 9, Elgersma teaches the limitations of claims 4 and 8 above.
Elgersma further teaches the computer-readable storage medium of claim 8 (previously addressed), wherein the instructions of further configure the computer to (and the method of claim 4 (previously addressed) further comprising:),
based on determining whether the external clock signal received during the first time period contains an interference signal component (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: see figures 1a/b and figure 2: step/function 208 as well as [0005-0007] and [0098]; where [0005] states “The at least one processor is further configured to, when the difference between the GNSS time signal and the chip-scale atomic clock time signal exceeds the threshold, estimate a system time signal without using the GNSS time signal and output an alarm indicating that GNSS spoofing has been detected”. Additionally but not exclusively, see [0078+0079] and step/function 708 of figure 7 ([Wingdings font/0xE0] Switch CSAC to coasting mode). Where the cited sections of Elgersma reference each individually (as well as in-combination) meet the instant limitation.
The remaining limitations were previously addressed and/or are readily apparent):
inhibiting/inhibit disciplining of the local reference clock signal to the external clock signal (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: see figures 1a/b and figure 2: step/function 208 as well as [0005-0007] and [0098]; where [0005] states “The at least one processor is further configured to, when the difference between the GNSS time signal and the chip-scale atomic clock time signal exceeds the threshold, estimate a system time signal without using the GNSS time signal and output an alarm indicating that GNSS spoofing has been detected”. Additionally but not exclusively, see [0078+0079] and step/function 708 of figure 7 ([Wingdings font/0xE0] Switch CSAC to coasting mode). Where the cited sections of Elgersma reference each individually (as well as in-combination) meet the instant limitation).
With regards to claims 6 and 10, Elgersma teaches the limitations of claim 5 and 9 above.
Elgersma further teaches the computer-readable storage medium of claim 9 (previously addressed), wherein the instructions of further configure the computer to (and the method of claim 5 (previously addressed) further comprising:),
receiving/receive, during a second time period, multiple clock signals comprising the local reference clock signal and the external clock signal (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: at the GNSS clock/timing signal and CSAC clock/timing signal are received (as previously addressed) but at second later time period (after the previously addressed first time period and corresponding steps/functions, also previously addressed). The claimed second time period corresponds to at least step/function 210 of figure 2 and/or step/function 710 of figure 7; also see [0054-005]);
comparing/compare the local reference clock signal and the external clock signal received during the second time period (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: the GNSS clock/timing signal and CSAC clock/timing signal are again compared/subtracted (as previously addressed) but at the later second time period. The claimed second time period corresponds to at least step/function 210 of figure 2 and/or step/function 710 of figure 7; also see [0054-005]);
determining/determine whether the interference signal component determined in the external clock signal received during the first time period is no longer present in the external clock signal received during the second time period based on the comparison (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: the previously addressed compared/subtracted result compared to the threshold again step/function 210 of figure 2 and/or step/function 710 of figure 7; also see [0054-005]. As addressed by the reference, when the subtracted clock difference is less than the threshold then spoofing/interference (previously addressed) is no longer detected/present in the GNSS signal (see YES result of 210/710). Although if the subtracted clock difference is not less than the threshold then spoofing/interference (previously addressed) is still detected/present (see NO result of 210/710).
The other limitations were previously addressed and/or are readily apparent); and
resuming/resume disciplining of the local reference clock signal to the external clock signal based on determining whether the interference signal component is no longer present in the external clock signal received during the second time period (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: the previously addressed compared/subtracted result compared to the threshold again step/function 210 of figure 2 and/or step/function 710 of figure 7; also see [0054-005]. As addressed by the reference, when the subtracted clock difference is less than the threshold then spoofing/interference (previously addressed) is no longer detected/present in the GNSS signal (see YES result of 210/710). Afterward the YES result of 210/710 then the CSAC clock signal yet again synchronized/disciplined to the GNSS clock signal, see at least 204/704 (in the given context).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 7 and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Elgersma et al. (US 2022/0221588: hereinafter “Elgersma”) as applied to claims 4 and 8 above, further in view of Ashjaee (US 2019/0154839).
With regards to claim 7, Elgersma teaches the limitations of claim 4.
Elgersma further teaches the method of claim 4 (previously addressed), further comprising including a time stamp for the GNSS timing/clock signal and a time stamp for the CSAC timing/clock signal (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: see [0024-0025]) .
Limitation 1 (below)
Where Elgersma is silent to disclosing “including a time stamp in the output alert, wherein the time stamp indicates when the interference signal component was detected”.
However secondary reference Ashjaee discloses a related invention that performs spoofing detection and rejection for GNSS receivers and GNSS clock/timing signals, see [0004] and [0026-0027]. Where [0080] states (with emphasis added),
[0080] Upon determining that the spoofing or otherwise questionable signal has been received, the GNSS device can output an indication that the false signal exists. For example, the GNSS device outputs a visual indication on its display screen, such as a user interface indicating that the spoofing or questionable signal has been received. In some cases, the user interface includes details on the received signal, such as a timestamp when it was detected, type or characteristic(s) of the spoofing or questionable signal, and/or options for the user to select whether to change an operational mode of the device (e.g., other navigation or sensor mode, activate a mode for determining a direction of the spoofer). In some cases, the GNSS device outputs an audible indication and/or a haptic indication when the spoofing or questionable signal has been identified. For example, the GNSS device generates a warning sound for output at a speaker at the device, or generates a vibration pattern for output through a haptic output generator at the device. Still, in some examples, the GNSS device generates an alert or message (e.g., text message) that is transmitted to an external user device, such as to user's smart phone, which may display or otherwise output an indication that a spoofing or questionable signal has been detected at the GNSS device. In some cases, upon determining that the set of signals does not include any spoofing or questionable signals, the GNSS device forgoes generating such indications and/or proceeds with normal operation (e.g., calculates a position and/or time based on the set of signals). It is noted that in any of the foregoing examples, the GNSS device may store information related to spoofing or questionable signals received at the device in a database or log.
Therefore, in view of the cited teachings of Ashjaee, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify “the output alert” for the invention of Elgersma (as previously addressed) to ‘include a time stamp in the output alert, wherein the time stamp indicates when the interference signal component was detected’ as disclosed by at least paragraph [0080] of Ashjaee (as previously addressed) in order to yield the predictable results and benefits improving the tracking/logging of detected spoofed GNSS satellites/signals within a database and/or log, as well as improving the reliability of clock/timing signals within the system and/or device
With regards to claim 11, Elgersma teaches the limitations of claim 8.
Elgersma further teaches the computer-readable storage medium of claim 8 (previously addressed), wherein the instructions further configure the computer to include a time stamp for the GNSS timing/clock signal and a time stamp for the CSAC timing/clock signal (figs. 1a/b and 2-9: see [0024-0025]) .
Limitation 1 (below)
Where Elgersma is silent to disclosing “include a time stamp in the output alert, wherein the time stamp indicates when the interference signal component was detected”.
However secondary reference Ashjaee discloses a related invention that performs spoofing detection and rejection for GNSS receivers and GNSS clock/timing signals, see [0004] and [0026-0027]. Where [0080] states (with emphasis added),
[0080] Upon determining that the spoofing or otherwise questionable signal has been received, the GNSS device can output an indication that the false signal exists. For example, the GNSS device outputs a visual indication on its display screen, such as a user interface indicating that the spoofing or questionable signal has been received. In some cases, the user interface includes details on the received signal, such as a timestamp when it was detected, type or characteristic(s) of the spoofing or questionable signal, and/or options for the user to select whether to change an operational mode of the device (e.g., other navigation or sensor mode, activate a mode for determining a direction of the spoofer). In some cases, the GNSS device outputs an audible indication and/or a haptic indication when the spoofing or questionable signal has been identified. For example, the GNSS device generates a warning sound for output at a speaker at the device, or generates a vibration pattern for output through a haptic output generator at the device. Still, in some examples, the GNSS device generates an alert or message (e.g., text message) that is transmitted to an external user device, such as to user's smart phone, which may display or otherwise output an indication that a spoofing or questionable signal has been detected at the GNSS device. In some cases, upon determining that the set of signals does not include any spoofing or questionable signals, the GNSS device forgoes generating such indications and/or proceeds with normal operation (e.g., calculates a position and/or time based on the set of signals). It is noted that in any of the foregoing examples, the GNSS device may store information related to spoofing or questionable signals received at the device in a database or log.
Therefore, in view of the cited teachings of Ashjaee, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify “the output alert” for the invention of Elgersma (as previously addressed) to ‘include a time stamp in the output alert, wherein the time stamp indicates when the interference signal component was detected’ as disclosed by at least paragraph [0080] of Ashjaee (as previously addressed) in order to yield the predictable results and benefits improving the tracking/logging of detected spoofed GNSS satellites/signals within a database and/or log, as well as improving the reliability of clock/timing signals within the system and/or device
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure and are cited in the attached PTO-892 form.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to James M. Perez, telephone number (571)270-3231. The examiner can normally be reached Monday through Friday: 10am to 6pm EST.
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/JAMES M PEREZ/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2635 4/3/2026