Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Objections
Claims 77 is objected to because of the following informalities:
In claim 77, line 1, it appears Applicant intended “is the first motor-vehicle;” to read --is the first motor-vehicle.--
Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 80 and 90 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. Said claims each recite “wherein the predicting that the second motor-vehicle will detect the object comprises predicting that an onboard device of the second motor-vehicle will automatically detect the object.” Applicant’s specification, however, merely mentions that “In some embodiments, ‘predicting an outcome’ includes predicting one or more future vehicle control actions - e.g. predicting that the driver of a car X will notice that s/he is about to hit a tree so s/he will swerve to the left” (Specification p. 25, lines 13-16; Examiner notes similar support is found throughout each parent application, without further discussion of “predicting that an onboard device of the second motor-vehicle will automatically detect the object”). Accordingly, the claimed subject matter lacks support in the instant and parent specifications, and it is unclear how such a prediction regarding future object detection in an onboard device of a second motor-vehicle would be made.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 74-93 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
101 Analysis – Step 1
Independent claim 74 is directed to a method (i.e., a process) and independent claim 84 is directed to an apparatus (i.e., a machine). Therefore, claims 74 and 84 are each within at least one of the four statutory categories.
101 Analysis – Step 2A, Prong I
Regarding Prong I of the Step 2A analysis in the 2019 PEG, the claims are to be analyzed to determine whether they recite subject matter that falls within one of the follow groups of abstract ideas: a) mathematical concepts, b) certain methods of organizing human activity, and/or c) mental processes.
Independent claim 74 includes limitations that recite an abstract idea (emphasized below) and will be used as a representative claim for the remainder of the 101 rejection. The apparatus of claim 84 mirrors claim 74, and is analyzed similarly. Claim 74 recites:
A motor-vehicle anti-accident method comprising:
a. predicting, by an onboard computer of a first motor-vehicle, one or more future vehicle control actions of a second motor-vehicle which are predicted to be performed by the second motor-vehicle in order to avoid an impending collision with an object, the second motor-vehicle being different from the first motor-vehicle;
b. based on the predicting of the one or more future vehicle control actions of the second motor-vehicle, computationally predicting, by the on-board computer of the first motor-vehicle, that a motor-vehicle accident involving the first motor-vehicle and the second motor-vehicle will occur; and
c. in response to the predicting of the motor-vehicle accident, performing, by the onboard computer of the first motor-vehicle, at least one vehicle control action so as to attempt at least one of the following: (i) avoiding collision of the first motor-vehicle with the second motor-vehicle and (ii) minimizing damage to the first motor-vehicle caused by the collision of the first motor-vehicle with the second motor-vehicle.
The examiner submits that the foregoing bolded limitation(s) constitute a “mental process” because under its broadest reasonable interpretation, the claim covers performance of the limitation in the human mind. For example, “predicting … one or more future vehicle control actions of a second motor-vehicle which are predicted to be performed by the second motor-vehicle in order to avoid an impending collision with an object …” and “based on the predicting of the one or more future vehicle control actions of the second motor-vehicle, … predicting … that a motor-vehicle accident involving the first motor-vehicle and the second motor-vehicle will occur” in the context of this claim encompasses a human driver observing their surroundings and predicting future actions of another vehicle in its attempt at avoiding a collision, and forming a simple judgement based on said prediction that the other vehicle will collide with the human driver’s vehicle. Accordingly, the claim recites at least one abstract idea.
101 Analysis – Step 2A, Prong II
Regarding Prong II of the Step 2A analysis in the 2019 PEG, the claims are to be analyzed to determine whether the claim, as a whole, integrates the abstract into a practical application. As noted in the 2019 PEG, it must be determined whether any additional elements in the claim beyond the abstract idea integrate the exception into a practical application in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception. The courts have indicated that additional elements merely using a computer to implement an abstract idea, adding insignificant extra solution activity, or generally linking use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use do not integrate a judicial exception into a “practical application.”
In the present case, the additional limitations beyond the above-noted abstract idea are as follows (where the underlined portions are the “additional limitations” while the bolded portions continue to represent the “abstract idea”):
A motor-vehicle anti-accident method comprising:
a. predicting, by an onboard computer of a first motor-vehicle, one or more future vehicle control actions of a second motor-vehicle which are predicted to be performed by the second motor-vehicle in order to avoid an impending collision with an object, the second motor-vehicle being different from the first motor-vehicle;
b. based on the predicting of the one or more future vehicle control actions of the second motor-vehicle, computationally predicting, by the on-board computer of the first motor-vehicle, that a motor-vehicle accident involving the first motor-vehicle and the second motor-vehicle will occur; and
c. in response to the predicting of the motor-vehicle accident, performing, by the onboard computer of the first motor-vehicle, at least one vehicle control action so as to attempt at least one of the following: (i) avoiding collision of the first motor-vehicle with the second motor-vehicle and (ii) minimizing damage to the first motor-vehicle caused by the collision of the first motor-vehicle with the second motor-vehicle.
For the following reason(s), the examiner submits that the above identified additional limitations do not integrate the above-noted abstract idea into a practical application.
Regarding the additional limitation of “in response to the predicting of the motor-vehicle accident, performing, by the onboard computer of the first motor-vehicle, at least one vehicle control action so as to attempt at least one of the following: (i) avoiding collision of the first motor-vehicle with the second motor-vehicle and (ii) minimizing damage to the first motor-vehicle caused by the collision of the first motor-vehicle with the second motor-vehicle” the examiner submits that these limitations are insignificant extra-solution activities that merely use a computer (circuitry) to perform the process. In particular, the performing at least one vehicle control step is recited at a high level of generality (i.e. as a general means of implementing safety actions based on the predicted accident), and amounts to mere post solution activity, which is a form of insignificant extra-solution activity. Lastly, the “circuitry” merely describes how to generally “apply” the otherwise mental judgements in a generic or general-purpose computerized vehicle environment.
Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Further, looking at the additional limitation(s) as an ordered combination or as a whole, the limitation(s) add nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually. For instance, there is no indication that the additional elements, when considered as a whole, reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to another technology or technical field, apply or use the above-noted judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, implement/use the above-noted judicial exception with a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim, effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing, or apply or use the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is not more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception (MPEP § 2106.05). Accordingly, the additional limitation(s) do/does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.
101 Analysis – Step 2B
Regarding Step 2B of the 2019 PEG, representative independent claim 74 does not include additional elements (considered both individually and as an ordered combination) that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception for the same reasons to those discussed above with respect to determining that the claim does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional element of using circuitry to execute the performing at least one vehicle control step amounts to nothing more than applying the exception using a generic computer component. Generally applying an exception using a generic computer component cannot provide an inventive concept. And as discussed above, regarding the additional limitation of “in response to the predicting of the motor-vehicle accident, performing, by the onboard computer of the first motor-vehicle, at least one vehicle control action so as to attempt at least one of the following: (i) avoiding collision of the first motor-vehicle with the second motor-vehicle and (ii) minimizing damage to the first motor-vehicle caused by the collision of the first motor-vehicle with the second motor-vehicle”, the examiner submits that this limitation is insignificant extra-solution activity.
Further, a conclusion that an additional element is insignificant extra-solution activity in Step 2A should be re-evaluated in Step 2B to determine if they are more than what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field. The additional limitations of “in response to the predicting of the motor-vehicle accident, performing, by the onboard computer of the first motor-vehicle, at least one vehicle control action so as to attempt at least one of the following: (i) avoiding collision of the first motor-vehicle with the second motor-vehicle and (ii) minimizing damage to the first motor-vehicle caused by the collision of the first motor-vehicle with the second motor-vehicle” is well-understood, routine, and conventional activity as outlined in the prior art rejections below. MPEP 2106.05(d)(II), and the cases cited therein, including Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016), TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015), indicate that mere collection or receipt of data over a network is a well‐understood, routine, and conventional function when it is claimed in a merely generic manner. Hence, the claim is not patent eligible.
Dependent claim(s) 75-83 and 85-93 do not recite any further limitations that cause the claim(s) to be patent eligible. Rather, the limitations of dependent claims are directed toward additional aspects of the judicial exception and/or well-understood, routine and conventional additional elements that do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Said claims as a whole recite a mental process because the claims recite, under their broadest reasonable interpretation as drafted, specifying the object is a tree, a third motor-vehicle, or the first motor-vehicle; specifying the prediction includes that the second motor-vehicle will detect the object and the second motor-vehicle will change its velocity vector in response to the detected object; specifying the prediction includes that a human driver of second motor-vehicle will detect the object; specifying the prediction includes that an onboard device of second motor-vehicle will automatically detect the object; specifying the prediction includes that an onboard device of second motor-vehicle will automatically change the velocity vector in response to detecting the object; specifying the prediction includes that a human driver of the second motor-vehicle will cause the velocity vector to change in response to detecting the object; and specifying various vehicle control actions of the onboard device of the first motor-vehicle to include accelerating, decelerating, employing a steering system, or employing a braking system.
Therefore, dependent claims 75-83 and 85-93 are not patent eligible under the same rationale as provided for in the rejection of claim 74.
Therefore, claim(s) 74-93 is/are ineligible under 35 USC §101.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claim(s) 74-77, 83-87, and 93 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Rebhan et al. (US PGPub. No. 2016/0059855).
Regarding claim 74, Rebhan discloses a motor-vehicle anti-accident method comprising:
a. predicting, by an onboard computer [23] of a first motor-vehicle [7], one or more future vehicle control actions of a second motor-vehicle [3, 5] which are predicted to be performed by the second motor-vehicle in order to avoid an impending collision with an object [2, 3, 5], the second motor-vehicle being different from the first motor-vehicle (Figure 1; ¶0021, ¶0027, ¶0034, ¶0038, ¶0075, ¶0077, ¶0098);
b. based on the predicting of the one or more future vehicle control actions of the second motor-vehicle, computationally predicting, by the on-board computer of the first motor-vehicle, that a motor-vehicle accident involving the first motor-vehicle and the second motor-vehicle will occur (¶0078-0080, ¶0099-0100; Rebhan’s description of minimizing damage to the host vehicle from an impending/unavoidable collision with target objects reads on “computationally predicting, by the on-board computer of the first motor-vehicle, that a motor-vehicle accident involving the first motor-vehicle and the second motor-vehicle will occur”); and
c. in response to the predicting of the motor-vehicle accident, performing, by the onboard computer of the first motor-vehicle, at least one vehicle control action so as to attempt at least one of the following: (i) avoiding collision of the first motor-vehicle with the second motor-vehicle and (ii) minimizing damage to the first motor-vehicle caused by the collision of the first motor-vehicle with the second motor-vehicle (¶0069, ¶0099-0100).
Regarding claim 75, Rebhan discloses the method of claim 74, wherein the object is a tree [2] (¶0075).
Regarding claim 76, Rebhan discloses the method of claim 74, wherein the object is a third motor-vehicle [3, 5] which is different from the first motor-vehicle (Figure 1; ¶0075).
Regarding claim 77, Rebhan discloses the method of claim 74, wherein the object is the first motor-vehicle (¶0069, ¶0078-0080, ¶0099-0100);
Regarding claim 83, Rebhan discloses the method of claim 74, wherein the at least one vehicle control action performed by the onboard computer of the first motor-vehicle includes at least one of the following:
a. accelerating the first motor-vehicle;
b. decelerating the first motor-vehicle (¶0100);
c. employing a steering system of the first motor-vehicle (¶0100); and
d. employing a braking system of the first motor-vehicle (¶0100).
Regarding claim 84, Rebhan discloses an anti-accident device [23] for operation onboard a host motor-vehicle [7], the anti-accident device comprising:
a. a prediction-engine [15] operative to (i) predict that one or more future vehicle control actions will be performed by a second motor-vehicle [3, 5] in order to avoid an impending collision with an object [2, 3, 5], the second motor-vehicle being different from the host motor-vehicle (Figure 1; ¶0021, ¶0027, ¶0034, ¶0038, ¶0075, ¶0077, ¶0098), and (ii) based on the predicting of the one or more future vehicle control actions of the second motor-vehicle, computationally predict that a motor-vehicle accident involving the host motor-vehicle and the second motor-vehicle will occur (¶0078-0080, ¶0099-0100); and
b. a device controller [23] for sending control signals [“actuation signals”] to onboard vehicle controls of the host motor-vehicle, the device controller being operative, in response to the predicting that the motor-vehicle accident will occur, to send one or more control signals to one or more of the onboard vehicle controls of the host motor-vehicle to perform at least one vehicle control action so as to attempt at least one of: (i) avoiding the predicted motor-vehicle accident, and (ii) minimizing damage to the host motor-vehicle caused by the predicted motor-vehicle accident (¶0069, ¶0099-0100).
Regarding claim 85, Rebhan discloses the anti-accident device of claim 84, wherein the object is a tree [2] (¶0075).
Regarding claim 86, Rebhan discloses the anti-accident device of claim 84, wherein the object is a third motor-vehicle [3, 5] which is different from the host motor-vehicle (Figure 1; ¶0075).
Regarding claim 87, Rebhan discloses the anti-accident device of claim 84, wherein the object is the first motor-vehicle (¶0069, ¶0078-0080, ¶0099-0100).
Regarding claim 93, Rebhan discloses the anti-accident device of claim 84, wherein the at least one vehicle control action effected by the sending of the one or more control signals by the device controller includes performing at least one operation selected from the group consisting of (i) accelerating the host motor-vehicle, (ii) decelerating the host motor-vehicle (¶0100), (iii) employing a steering system of the host motor-vehicle (¶0100), and (iv) employing a braking system of the host motor-vehicle (¶0100).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 78-82 and 88-92 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Rebhan as applied to claims 74 and 84 above, and further in view of Park (US Patent No. 11,046,247).
Regarding claim 78, Rebhan discloses the method of claim 74 (Rebhan ¶0021, ¶0027, ¶0034, ¶0038, ¶0075, ¶0077-0080, ¶0098-0100), wherein the predicting of the one or more future vehicle control actions comprises:
b. predicting that the second motor-vehicle will change its velocity vector in response to the detecting of the object (Rebhan ¶0046, ¶0078-0080, ¶0084, ¶0087); but appears to be silent on the method explicitly including wherein the predicting of the one or more future vehicle control actions comprises: a. predicting that the second motor-vehicle will detect the object.
Park, however, teaches a method for predicting effects of forward glance durations on latent hazard detection including estimating a probability that a driver will detect a hazard (Park Col. 5, lines 23-56), and taking action when that probability is below a threshold (Park Col. 5, lines 57-67). It would have been obvious, however, to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date to have modified Rebhan in view of Park. One having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date would have been motivated to have modified Rebhan, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success therein, to include wherein the predicting of the one or more future vehicle control actions comprises: a. predicting that the second motor-vehicle will detect the object, as doing so was a known approach to increasing vehicle safety around potentially unrecognized collision scenarios, as recognized by Park (Park Col. 5, lines 23-56).
Regarding claim 79, Rebhan in view of Park teaches the method of claim 78, wherein the predicting that the second motor-vehicle will detect the object comprises predicting that a human driver of the second motor-vehicle will detect the object (Park Col. 5, lines 23-56).
Regarding claim 80, Rebhan in view of Park teaches the method of claim 78, but appears to be silent on wherein the predicting that the second motor-vehicle will detect the object comprises predicting that an onboard device of the second motor-vehicle will automatically detect the object.
Rebhan, however, teaches that the system for assisting a driver [Rebhan 23] may incorporate V2V communications from proximate vehicles including the planned actions of ADAS systems in those vehicles (Rebhan ¶0077). Further, Park teaches prediction of whether a human driver will detect a roadway hazard (Park Col. 5, lines 23-56). It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date to have modified Rebhan in view of Park. One having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date would have been motivated to have modified Rebhan in view of Park, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success therein, to include wherein the predicting that the second motor-vehicle will detect the object comprises predicting that an onboard device of the second motor-vehicle will automatically detect the object, as doing so represents an equivalent approach to Park’s prediction of whether a human driver will detect obstacles, but for use in a vehicle equipped with an ADAS and V2V communications.
Regarding claim 81, Rebhan in view of Park teaches the method of claim 78, wherein the predicting that the second motor-vehicle will change its velocity vector comprises predicting that an onboard device of the second motor-vehicle will automatically change the velocity vector in response to the detecting of the object (Rebhan ¶0046, ¶0078-0080, ¶0084, ¶0087).
Regarding claim 82, Rebhan in view of Park teaches the method of claim 78, wherein the predicting that the second motor-vehicle will change its velocity vector comprises predicting that a human driver of the second motor-vehicle will cause the velocity vector to change in response to the detecting of the object (Rebhan ¶0046, ¶0078-0080, ¶0084, ¶0087; Park Col. 5, lines 23-56), as previously modified, and with the same motivation as applied in regard to claim(s) 80, above.
Regarding claim 88, Rebhan discloses the anti-accident device of claim 84 (Rebhan ¶0021, ¶0027, ¶0034, ¶0038, ¶0075, ¶0077-0080, ¶0098-0100), wherein the predicting that one or more future vehicle control actions will be performed by the second motor-vehicle comprises:
a. predicting that the second motor-vehicle will detect the object (Park Col. 5, lines 23-67); and
b. predicting that the second motor-vehicle will change its velocity vector in response to the detecting of the object (Rebhan ¶0046, ¶0078-0080, ¶0084, ¶0087), as previously modified, and with the same motivation as applied in regard to claim(s) 78, above.
Regarding claim 89, Rebhan discloses the anti-accident device of claim 88, wherein the predicting that the second motor-vehicle will detect the object comprises predicting that a human driver of the second motor-vehicle will detect the object (Park Col. 5, lines 23-56).
Regarding claim 90, Rebhan discloses the anti-accident device of claim 88, wherein the predicting that the second motor-vehicle will detect the object comprises predicting that an onboard device of the second motor-vehicle will automatically detect the object (Rebhan ¶0077; Park Col. 5, lines 23-56), as previously modified, and with the same motivation as applied in regard to claim(s) 80, above.
Regarding claim 91, Rebhan discloses the anti-accident device of claim 88, wherein the predicting that the second motor-vehicle will change its velocity vector comprises predicting that an onboard device of the second motor-vehicle will automatically change the velocity vector in response to the detecting of the object (Rebhan ¶0046, ¶0078-0080, ¶0084, ¶0087).
Regarding claim 92, Rebhan discloses the anti-accident device of claim 88, wherein the predicting that the second motor-vehicle will change its velocity vector comprises predicting that a human driver of the second motor-vehicle will cause the velocity vector to change in response to the detecting of the object (Rebhan ¶0046, ¶0078-0080, ¶0084, ¶0087; Park Col. 5, lines 23-56), as previously modified, and with the same motivation as applied in regard to claim(s) 80, above.
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MICHAEL V KERRIGAN whose telephone number is (571)272-8552. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday 9:30am-8:00pm.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Kito Robinson can be reached at (571) 270-3921. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/MICHAEL V KERRIGAN/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3664