Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
DETAILED ACTION
This is a Final Office Action on the merits. Claims 1-20 are currently pending and are addressed below.
Response to Amendment
The amendment filed 05/11/2026 has been entered. Claims 1-20 are currently pending.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 05/11/2026 with respect to the double patenting rejection have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. In response to Applicant's argument that the pending claims are patentably distinct from the patented claims, the Examiner respectfully disagrees. No specific arguments were presented.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments with respect to claims 1-20 have been considered but are moot because the arguments do not apply to the combination of references and/or rationale being used in the current rejection.
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
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Claims 1-2, 19, and 20 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1, 19, and 20 of U.S. Patent No. 11,675,360. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the patented claims comprise substantially similar limitations to each limitation of the pending claims, thereby anticipating the pending claims.
Claims 11-18 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 2, 21, 7, 8, 13, 14, 11, 12, respectively of U.S. Patent No. 11,675,360. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the patented claims comprise substantially similar limitations to each limitation of the pending claims, thereby anticipating the pending claims.
Claims 1-2, and 11-20 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-20 of U.S. Patent No. 12,204,338. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the patented claims comprise substantially similar limitations to each limitation of the pending claims, thereby anticipating the pending claims.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 1-3, 11, 14, and 17-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Francis, Jr. et al. (US 8,452,451) in view of Kobayashi (US 2013/0246318).
Regarding claim 1:
Francis teaches An information processing apparatus comprising:
circuitry configured to
determine an action based on an action history collected by a first autonomous mobile body (see at least Fig. 4, column 9, line 6-column 10, line 28), and
recommend the action to a second autonomous mobile body (see at least column 2, line 5-42),
wherein the action history associates an autonomous physical movement of the first autonomous mobile body with a reaction from one or more users responsive to the autonomous physical movement (see at least column 4, line 11-17, column 7, lines 63-67, column 9, line 25-45, 58-64), and
wherein the reaction is positive feedback or negative feedback (see at least column 7, lines 63-67).
Francis does not explicitly teach storing the reaction as positive or negative feedback.
However, the Examiner notes that Francis’ teaching of at least learning what causes a user’s behavior, and modifying future behavior based on that feedback at least implies some form of storage of the feedback.
Kobayashi teaches a system and method of learning for a robotic device, including storing an action history, including a previous action by a robotic device, and a positive or negative feedback associated with the action (see at least abstract, ¶00238, ¶0266, ¶0373).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the time of filing of the invention to modify the robotic control and learning system and method as taught by Francis with the well-known technique of reward-based learning as taught by Kobayashi in order to provide the well-known benefit of allowing adaptive behavior by the robot, changing behavior to future events based on similar actions in the past and a user’s previous experience and desires.
Regarding claim 2:
Francis further teaches wherein the movement of the first autonomous mobile body is taught as a teaching operation (The Examiner notes that any new action learned, broadly interpreted, is a taught operation. see at least column 10, line 13-25).
Regarding claim 3:
Francis further teaches controlling the robot via interaction with a user interface (see at least column 5, line 65- column 6, line 7).
Francis is silent as to the specifics of the user commands.
The Examiner notes that in the context of the robotic task learning and data sharing system and method as taught by Francis, any number of conventional user commands may meet the claim limitations.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing of the invention to modify the robot task learning system and method as taught by Francis with any conventional robot motion command implemented through the user interface as taught by Francis in order to provide specific motion commands for a particular context that may not have been previously learned by the robots.
Regarding claim 11:
Francis further teaches
wherein the circuitry is further configured to provide the second autonomous mobile body with control sequence data for realizing the movement corresponding to the recommended action (see at least column 17, lines 23-47).
Regarding claim 14:
Francis further teaches wherein the circuitry is further configured to recommend the action based on a request from the second autonomous mobile body(see at least column 8, line 30-67).
Regarding claim 17:
Francis further wherein the circuitry is further configured to collect data registered in an object recognition dictionary included in the first autonomous mobile body (see at least Fig. 5, column 11, lines 45-67, column 16, line 33-55.
Regarding claim 18:
Francis further teaches wherein the circuitry is further configured to
collect data registered in an object recognition dictionary included in the second autonomous mobile body, and
register the data registered in the object recognition dictionary included in the first autonomous mobile body into the object recognition dictionary included in the second autonomous mobile body (see at least column 5, line 65- column 9, line 65, column 16, line 33-55).
Regarding claims 19 and 20, the combination of Francis and Kobayashi teaches a method and computer readable medium as in claim 1 above.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Francis and Kobayashi as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Lin (US 2018/0304460).
Regarding claim 4:
Francis teaches the limitations as in claim 1 above.
Francis is silent as to teaching via physical manipulation of robot joints.
Lin teaches a system and method of teaching a robot including wherein the teaching operation includes physical bending and stretching operations of a joint of the first autonomous mobile body by the user (see at least abstract, ¶0040).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to modify the robot control system and method as taught by Francis and Kobayashi with the well-known technique of manual teaching as taught by Lin in order to quickly and efficiently teach new motions to a robot without requiring external teaching devices or data entry.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
Claims 5-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Francis and Kobayashi as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Ito (US 2004/0036437).
Regarding claims 5-6:
Francis teaches the limitations as in claim 2 above.
Francis is silent as to demonstration learning through motion capture.
Ito teaches a system and method of teaching motions to a mobile body including wherein the teaching operation is obtained from movement of an imaged motion of a mobile body wherein the circuitry is further configured to
estimate a position of a joint of the imaged mobile body, and
control a joint part of the first autonomous mobile body corresponding to the joint of the imaged mobile body (see at least ¶0008, 0034, 0068).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to modify the robot teaching system and method as taught by Francis and Kobayashi with the well-known technique of teaching robot motions via motion capture as taught by Ito in order to quickly teach a desired, complex motion without requiring a programming of individual joint angles manually.
Regarding claim 7-10:
Ito further teaches wherein the circuitry is further configured to store an incentive situation associated with the action wherein the incentive situation includes situation recognition based on a sensor information wherein the incentive situation includes music wherein the incentive situation is specified by a user (see at least ¶0016, ¶0112).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
Claims 12-13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Francis and Kobayashi as applied to claim 1 above, in view Thapliya et al. (US 2017/0266812).
Regarding claims 12-13:
Francis teaches the limitations as in claim 1 above. Francis further teaches wherein the robot interacts with a user via natural language and identifies a user based on speech or facial recognition (see column 3, line 53- column 4, line 18). Francis is silent as to user enthusiasm or user feedback via utterance or facial expression.
Thapliya teaches a system and method of human-robot interaction through natural language including determining a next robotic action based at least in part on a level of enthusiasm of a user and facial expressions (see at least ¶0055-0057).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to modify the cloud-based robot-human interaction learning system and method as taught by Francis and Kobayashi with the technique of utilizing user enthusiasm as a feedback mechanism as taught by Thapliya in order to allow for natural, intuitive interactions between the user and robot.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
Claims 15-16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Francis and Kobayashi as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Jenkins et al. (US 2019/0122157).
Regarding claim 15:
Francis teaches the limitations as in claim 1 above. Francis is silent as to recommending maintenance.
Jenkins teaches a system and method of robotic fleet operation, including wherein the circuitry is further configured to transmit a notification for recommending maintenance based on an analysis result of an operation state related to the second autonomous mobile body (see at least ¶0066-0067).
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to modify the cloud-based robot-human interaction learning system and method as taught by Francis and Kobayashi with the technique of recommending maintenance upon detecting a failure or other need for maintenance as taught by Jenkins in order to timely determine maintenance requirements to ensure all agents are operating correctly and the system maintains operation.
Regarding claim 16:
Jenkins further teaches wherein the circuitry transmits the notification for recommending maintenance to a user, on a basis of the operation state estimated from an action failure log (broadly interpreted, any detecting, storing, and processing of an action failure constitutes a “failure log”, see at least ¶0066-0067).
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to Applicant's disclosure.
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to RYAN J RINK whose telephone number is (571)272-4863. The examiner can normally be reached on M-F 8-5.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Anna Momper can be reached on (571) 270-5788. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/Ryan Rink/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3619
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