DETAILED ACTION
Claims 1-20 have been examined. Claims 1-7 and 9-20 are rejected. Claim 8 is objected to.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Objections
Claim 20 is objected to because of the following informalities: claim 20 appears to be incomplete and is missing a period at the end of the final limitation in the claim. Appropriate correction is required. For purposes of examination, the first paragraph of the sheet containing the Abstract filed on 12/19/2024 appears to be the rest of the limitations of claim 20. Therefore, the first paragraph of the sheet containing the Abstract filed on 12/19/2024 is examined as part of claim 20.
Claim 8 is objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-2, 5-7, 9-14 and 16-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Pettit (U.S. PGPub 2022/0078028) in view of Simmons et al. (U.S. PGPub 2013/0268755).
Regarding claim 1, Pettit teaches A method of security implementation, comprising: receiving, by a first committee node, first request information, the first request information being used to request an authorization certificate for a first issuing node; and (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0016 receiving, by the first node, a request for a signature share, Si, from a coordinating node…; see paragraph 0098 to obtain the signature shares...transmit a request for signature shares on a message. For instance, the coordinator 101 may transmit a request for signature shares to one, some or all of the group of participants 102...)
generating, by the first committee node jointly with at least one second committee node, a first digital signature; (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraphs 0016-0017 jointly generating a digital signature by distributed nodes in a computing network...the digital signature is generated by joint participation of at least t+1 of the nodes in the set…)
wherein the first digital signature is used to generate the authorization certificate for the first issuing node; and (Pettit, see paragraphs 0216-0217 digital certificates, e.g. digital certificate issued by the X.509 standard. A digital certificate contains a signature that signs over some data... particular use for certificate authorities is to sign certificates used in HTTPS for secure browsing on the internet. Another common use is in issuing identity cards by national governments for use in electronically signing documents...)
However, Pettit does not explicitly teach the authorization certificate is used to prove that the first issuing node has a first permission, which refers to a permission to issue certificates for a plurality of user nodes managed by the first issuing node.
Simmons teaches the authorization certificate is used to prove that the first issuing node has a first permission, which refers to a permission to issue certificates for a plurality of user nodes managed by the first issuing node. (Simmons, see paragraph 0029 a digital certificate issued by the authorization provider 250 as a certificate authority that is used to sign the public key for the authentication certificate of another certificate authority, in this case the media provider (200, 202, 204). This creates a chain of trust from a single trusted certificate authority to multiple other certificate authorities...)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the invention was filed to combine Pettit and Simmons to provide the technique of the authorization certificate is used to prove that the first issuing node has a first permission, which refers to a permission to issue certificates for a plurality of user nodes managed by the first issuing node of Simmons in the system of Pettit in order to allow for a chain of trust among multiple certificate authorities (Simmons, see paragraph 0029).
Regarding claim 2, Pettit-Simmons teaches wherein the first committee node and the at least one second committee node are different nodes in a set of committee nodes; and each committee node in the set of committee nodes is used to manage at least one issuing node. (Pettit, see figs. 1-2; see paragraph 0144 set of nodes, and a response by the participating nodes, where the response includes the respective signature share generated by that participating node...transmission of its signature share to the coordinating node without receiving any communications relating to generation of the digital signature from other nodes; see paragraphs 0016-0017 jointly generating a digital signature by distributed nodes in a computing network...the digital signature is generated by joint participation of at least t+1 of the nodes in the set...)
Regarding claim 5, Pettit-Simmons teaches wherein receiving, by the first committee node, the first request information comprises: receiving, by the first committee node, the first request information from a proxy server, the first request information being sent by the first issuing node to the proxy server; or, receiving, by the first committee node, the first request information sent by the first issuing node. (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0016 receiving, by the first node, a request for a signature share, Si, from a coordinating node…; see paragraph 0098 to obtain the signature shares...transmit a request for signature shares on a message. For instance, the coordinator 101 may transmit a request for signature shares to one, some or all of the group of participants 102...)
Regarding claim 6, Pettit-Simmons teaches wherein the first digital signature comprises a first component r and a second component s, and generating, by the first committee node jointly with the at least one second committee node, the first digital signature comprises: calculating, by the first committee node jointly with the at least one second committee node, the first component r based on message digest e and an elliptic curve parameter; and (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0147 obtain a message to be signed and calculate a message digest. For instance, a coordinator 101 may send a request to (t+1) participants to create a signature share on the message msg. Each participant i may calculate the message digest e=hash(msg)...; see paragraphs 0031-0033 In elliptic curve cryptography, a private key is defined to be a scalar k...Chose a random integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, where n is the order of the elliptic curve...)
calculating, by the first committee node jointly with the at least one second committee node, the second component s based on the first component and a target private key shard of the first committee node. (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0134 calculates a shared private key share and a corresponding public key. For instance, each participant 102 may calculate the shared private key...where P is notation for the public key corresponding to the shared private key. The shared private key has a threshold of (t+1)...)
Regarding claim 7, Pettit-Simmons teaches wherein the first digital signature comprises a first component r and a second component s, and generating, by the first committee node jointly with the at least one second committee node, the first digital signature comprises: generating, by the first committee node jointly with the at least one second committee node, the first component r based on an elliptic curve parameter, a first random number for the first committee node, and a second random number for the first committee node; and (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0147 obtain a message to be signed and calculate a message digest. For instance, a coordinator 101 may send a request to (t+1) participants to create a signature share on the message msg. Each participant i may calculate the message digest e=hash(msg)...; see paragraphs 0031-0033 In elliptic curve cryptography, a private key is defined to be a scalar k...Chose a random integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, where n is the order of the elliptic curve...)
generating, by the first committee node jointly with the at least one second committee node, the second component s based on message digest, the first component, the first random number for the first committee node, and a target private key shard of the first committee node. (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0147 obtain a message to be signed and calculate a message digest. For instance, a coordinator 101 may send a request to (t+1) participants to create a signature share on the message msg. Each participant i may calculate the message digest e=hash(msg)...; see paragraphs 0031-0033 In elliptic curve cryptography, a private key is defined to be a scalar k...Chose a random integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, where n is the order of the elliptic curve...)
Regarding claim 9, Pettit-Simmons teaches wherein the first request information comprises at least one of the following information: identification information of the first issuing node; a public key of the first issuing node; service identification information for indicating a service type supported by the first issuing node; data identification information for indicating a data type supported by the first issuing node; or a second digital signature, which is obtained by signature for other information in the first request information according to a private key of the first issuing node. (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0231-0232 c. verifying, for each respective participant, that the respective participant has generated their respective private key share correctly by: i. determining a first candidate value based on the respective data item, obtained from that participant, obfuscated with the generator value; ii. determining a second candidate value based on the respective set of obfuscated coefficients obtained from that respective participant; and iii. verifying that the first candidate value corresponds to the second candidate value.; see paragraph 0134 each participant 102 calculates a shared private key share and a corresponding public key. For instance, each participant 102 may calculate the shared private key, and corresponding public key using JVRSS and the calculation of the public key given in the preliminaries...)
Regarding claim 10, Pettit-Simmons teaches further comprising: generating, by the first committee node, the authorization certificate for the first issuing node, the authorization certificate comprising the first digital signature; and (Pettit, see paragraphs 0216-017 digital certificates, e.g. digital certificate issued by the X.509 standard. A digital certificate contains a signature that signs over some data... particular use for certificate authorities is to sign certificates used in HTTPS for secure browsing on the internet. Another common use is in issuing identity cards by national governments for use in electronically signing documents...)
sending, by the first committee node, the authorization certificate to the first issuing node. (Simmons, see paragraph 0029 a digital certificate issued by the authorization provider 250 as a certificate authority that is used to sign the public key for the authentication certificate of another certificate authority, in this case the media provider (200, 202, 204). This creates a chain of trust from a single trusted certificate authority to multiple other certificate authorities...; see paragraph 0040 issues an authentication certificate (i.e. certificate 238) to the client as part of the provisioning of the protected resource provider's security module on the client. ) The motivation regarding to the obviousness to claim 1 is also applied to claim 10.
Regarding claim 11, Pettit-Simmons teaches wherein the authorization certificate further comprises at least one of the following information: identification information of the first issuing node; a public key of the first issuing node; service identification information for indicating a service type supported by the first issuing node; data identification information for indicating a data type supported by the first issuing node; identification information of the first committee node; identification information of the at least one second committee node; identification information of a proxy server; or a joint public key, which is jointly generated by each committee node in a set of committee nodes based on the initial private key shard of the each committee node. (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0231-0232 c. verifying, for each respective participant, that the respective participant has generated their respective private key share correctly by: i. determining a first candidate value based on the respective data item, obtained from that participant, obfuscated with the generator value; ii. determining a second candidate value based on the respective set of obfuscated coefficients obtained from that respective participant; and iii. verifying that the first candidate value corresponds to the second candidate value.; see paragraph 0134 each participant 102 calculates a shared private key share and a corresponding public key. For instance, each participant 102 may calculate the shared private key, and corresponding public key using JVRSS and the calculation of the public key given in the preliminaries...)
Regarding claims 12 and 20, Pettit teaches A method of security implementation, comprising: receiving, by a proxy server, first request information, the first request information being used to request an authorization certificate for a first issuing node; and (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0016 receiving, by the first node, a request for a signature share, Si, from a coordinating node…; see paragraph 0098 to obtain the signature shares...transmit a request for signature shares on a message. For instance, the coordinator 101 may transmit a request for signature shares to one, some or all of the group of participants 102...; see paragraphs 0216-0217 digital certificates, e.g. digital certificate issued by the X.509 standard. A digital certificate contains a signature that signs over some data... particular use for certificate authorities is to sign certificates used in HTTPS for secure browsing on the internet. Another common use is in issuing identity cards by national governments for use in electronically signing documents...)
obtaining, by the proxy server, a first digital signature; (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0016 receiving, by the first node, a request for a signature share, Si, from a coordinating node…; see paragraph 0098 to obtain the signature shares...transmit a request for signature shares on a message. For instance, the coordinator 101 may transmit a request for signature shares to one, some or all of the group of participants 102...; see paragraphs 0216-0217 digital certificates, e.g. digital certificate issued by the X.509 standard. A digital certificate contains a signature that signs over some data... particular use for certificate authorities is to sign certificates used in HTTPS for secure browsing on the internet. Another common use is in issuing identity cards by national governments for use in electronically signing documents...)
the first digital signature being obtained by joint signature of a plurality of target committee nodes, or by joint signature of the proxy server and the plurality of target committee nodes; (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraphs 0016-0017 jointly generating a digital signature by distributed nodes in a computing network...the digital signature is generated by joint participation of at least t+1 of the nodes in the set…)
wherein the first digital signature is used to generate the authorization certificate for the first issuing node; and (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0016 receiving, by the first node, a request for a signature share, Si, from a coordinating node…; see paragraph 0098 to obtain the signature shares...transmit a request for signature shares on a message. For instance, the coordinator 101 may transmit a request for signature shares to one, some or all of the group of participants 102...; see paragraphs 0216-0217 digital certificates, e.g. digital certificate issued by the X.509 standard. A digital certificate contains a signature that signs over some data... particular use for certificate authorities is to sign certificates used in HTTPS for secure browsing on the internet. Another common use is in issuing identity cards by national governments for use in electronically signing documents...)
However, Pettit does not explicitly teach the authorization certificate is used to prove that the first issuing node has a first permission, which refers to a permission to issue certificates for a plurality of user nodes managed by the first issuing node.
Simmons teaches the authorization certificate is used to prove that the first issuing node has a first permission, which refers to a permission to issue certificates for a plurality of user nodes managed by the first issuing node. (Simmons, see paragraph 0029 a digital certificate issued by the authorization provider 250 as a certificate authority that is used to sign the public key for the authentication certificate of another certificate authority, in this case the media provider (200, 202, 204). This creates a chain of trust from a single trusted certificate authority to multiple other certificate authorities...)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the invention was filed to combine Pettit and Simmons to provide the technique of the authorization certificate is used to prove that the first issuing node has a first permission, which refers to a permission to issue certificates for a plurality of user nodes managed by the first issuing node of Simmons in the system of Pettit in order to allow for a chain of trust among multiple certificate authorities (Simmons, see paragraph 0029).
Regarding claim 13, Pettit-Simmons teaches wherein the plurality of target committee nodes are different nodes in a set of committee nodes; each committee node in the set of committee nodes is used to manage at least one issuing node; and (Pettit, see figs. 1-2; see paragraph 0144 set of nodes, and a response by the participating nodes, where the response includes the respective signature share generated by that participating node...transmission of its signature share to the coordinating node without receiving any communications relating to generation of the digital signature from other nodes; see paragraphs 0016-0017 jointly generating a digital signature by distributed nodes in a computing network...the digital signature is generated by joint participation of at least t+1 of the nodes in the set...)
the plurality of target committee nodes are nodes, whose verification of the first request information passes, among the set of committee nodes. (Pettit, see figs. 1-2; see paragraph 0144 features a request for signature shares from the coordinating node to a set of nodes, and a response by the participating nodes, where the response includes the respective signature share generated by that participating node...begin with the transmission or broadcast of a request for signature shares from the coordinating node to nodes in the set, and may end with generation of the digital signature by the coordinating node (request information passes...))
Regarding claim 14, Pettit-Simmons teaches further comprising: sending, by the proxy server, the first request information to each committee node in the set of committee nodes; the each committee node being further used to verify the first request information. (Pettit, see figs. 1-2; see paragraph 0144 begin with the transmission or broadcast of a request for signature shares from the coordinating node to nodes in the set, and may end with generation of the digital signature by the coordinating node...; see paragraph 0147 the threshold number of participants 102 obtain a message to be signed and calculate a message digest. For instance, a coordinator 101 may send a request to (t+1) participants to create a signature share on the message msg...)
Regarding claim 16, Pettit-Simmons teaches wherein verification of the first request information comprises at least one of the following: verifying whether a service indicated by service identification information in the first request information is provided; verifying whether a data type indicated by data identification information in the first request information is supported; or verifying whether a contract is signed with a sender of the first request information. (Pettit, see paragraphs 0231-0232 a joint verifiable secret sharing scheme that... verifying, for each respective participant, that the respective participant has generated their respective private key share correctly... verifying that the first candidate value corresponds to the second candidate value...)
Regarding claim 17, Pettit-Simmons teaches wherein the first digital signature is obtained by joint signature of the proxy server and the plurality of target committee nodes, the first digital signature comprises a first component r and a second component s, and obtaining, by the proxy server, the first digital signature comprises: calculating, by the proxy server jointly with the plurality of target committee nodes, the first component r based on message digest and an elliptic curve parameter; and (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0147 obtain a message to be signed and calculate a message digest. For instance, a coordinator 101 may send a request to (t+1) participants to create a signature share on the message msg. Each participant i may calculate the message digest e=hash(msg)...; see paragraphs 0031-0033 In elliptic curve cryptography, a private key is defined to be a scalar k...Chose a random integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, where n is the order of the elliptic curve...)
calculating, by the proxy server jointly with the plurality of target committee nodes, the second component s based on the first component. (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraphs 0016-0017 jointly generating a digital signature by distributed nodes in a computing network...the digital signature is generated by joint participation of at least t+1 of the nodes in the set…)
Regarding claim 18, Pettit-Simmons teaches wherein the first digital signature is obtained by joint signature of the proxy server and the plurality of target committee nodes, the first digital signature comprises a first component r and a second component s, and obtaining, by the proxy server, the first digital signature comprises: generating, by the proxy server jointly with the plurality of target committee nodes, the first component based on an elliptic curve parameter; and (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0147 obtain a message to be signed and calculate a message digest. For instance, a coordinator 101 may send a request to (t+1) participants to create a signature share on the message msg. Each participant i may calculate the message digest e=hash(msg)...; see paragraphs 0031-0033 In elliptic curve cryptography, a private key is defined to be a scalar k...Chose a random integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, where n is the order of the elliptic curve...)
generating, by the proxy server jointly with the plurality of target committee nodes, the second component based on message digest and the first component. (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraph 0147 obtain a message to be signed and calculate a message digest. For instance, a coordinator 101 may send a request to (t+1) participants to create a signature share on the message msg. Each participant i may calculate the message digest e=hash(msg)...; see paragraphs 0031-0033 In elliptic curve cryptography, a private key is defined to be a scalar k...Chose a random integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, where n is the order of the elliptic curve...)
Regarding claim 19, Pettit-Simmons teaches further comprising: generating, by the proxy server, the authorization certificate for the first issuing node, the authorization certificate comprising the first digital signature; and (Pettit, see paragraphs 0216-0217 digital certificates, e.g. digital certificate issued by the X.509 standard. A digital certificate contains a signature that signs over some data... particular use for certificate authorities is to sign certificates used in HTTPS for secure browsing on the internet. Another common use is in issuing identity cards by national governments for use in electronically signing documents...)
sending, by the proxy server, the authorization certificate to the first issuing node. (Simmons, see paragraph 0029 a digital certificate issued by the authorization provider 250 as a certificate authority that is used to sign the public key for the authentication certificate of another certificate authority, in this case the media provider (200, 202, 204). This creates a chain of trust from a single trusted certificate authority to multiple other certificate authorities...; see paragraph 0040 issues an authentication certificate (i.e. certificate 238) to the client as part of the provisioning of the protected resource provider's security module on the client. ) The motivation regarding to the obviousness to claims 12 and 20 is also applied to claim 19.
Claims 3-4 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Pettit-Simmons in view of Wentz et al. (U.S. PGPub 2020/0153627).
Regarding claim 3, Pettit-Simmons teaches further comprising: calculating, by the first committee node jointly with the at least one second committee node, the first digital signature after a first condition is met; (Pettit, see fig. 2; see paragraphs 0131-0132 performed by each of a threshold number of participants 102 in this example (including the first participant 102a)... the creation of a shared secret of threshold (t+1) in a group of N≥2t+1 participants, where the signing threshold is also (t+1)...; see paragraph 0149 calculates the signature. For instance, the coordinator 101 may calculate s=interpolate(s.sub.1, . . . , s.sub.t+1)=k.sup.−1(e+ar), and finally the signature (r, s).)
the target committee node referring to a node whose verification of the first request information passes; and (Pettit, see figs. 1-2; see paragraph 0144 features a request for signature shares from the coordinating node to a set of nodes, and a response by the participating nodes, where the response includes the respective signature share generated by that participating node...begin with the transmission or broadcast of a request for signature shares from the coordinating node to nodes in the set, and may end with generation of the digital signature by the coordinating node (request information passes...))
the plurality of target committee nodes comprise the first committee node and the at least one second committee node. (Pettit, see figs. 2-3; see paragraphs 0016-0017 jointly generating a digital signature by distributed nodes in a computing network...the digital signature is generated by joint participation of at least t+1 of the nodes in the set…)
However, Pettit-Simmons does not explicitly teach wherein the first condition refers to that a sum of numbers of initial private key shards respectively held by a plurality of target committee nodes is greater than a first threshold,
Wentz teaches wherein the first condition refers to that a sum of numbers of initial private key shards respectively held by a plurality of target committee nodes is greater than a first threshold, (Wentz, see paragraph 0117 fewer than a threshold number of shards may be insufficient to reconstruct the confidential datum...require one, a threshold number, or all of the shards to reconstruct the private key.; see paragraph 0122 all or a threshold number of shards would be necessary to reconstruct the private key...)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the invention was filed to combine Pettit-Simmons and Wentz to provide the technique of the first condition refers to that a sum of numbers of initial private key shards respectively held by a plurality of target committee nodes is greater than a first threshold of Wentz in the system of Pettit-Simmons in order to sufficiently reconstruct the private key (Wentz, see paragraphs 0117 and 0122).
Regarding claim 4, Pettit-Simmons-Wentz teaches wherein verification of the first request information comprises at least one of the following: verifying whether a service indicated by service identification information in the first request information is provided; verifying whether a data type indicated by data identification information in the first request information is supported; or verifying whether a contract is signed with a sender of the first request information. (Pettit, see paragraphs 0231-0232 a joint verifiable secret sharing scheme that... verifying, for each respective participant, that the respective participant has generated their respective private key share correctly... verifying that the first candidate value corresponds to the second candidate value...)
Regarding claim 15, Pettit-Simmons teaches further comprising: obtaining, by the proxy server, the first digital signature after a first condition is met, (Pettit, see fig. 2; see paragraphs 0131-0132 performed by each of a threshold number of participants 102 in this example (including the first participant 102a)... the creation of a shared secret of threshold (t+1) in a group of N≥2t+1 participants, where the signing threshold is also (t+1)...; see paragraph 0149 calculates the signature. For instance, the coordinator 101 may calculate s=interpolate(s.sub.1, . . . , s.sub.t+1)=k.sup.−1(e+ar), and finally the signature (r, s).)
However, Pettit-Simmons does not explicitly teach wherein the first condition refers to that a sum of numbers of initial private key shards respectively held by a plurality of target committee nodes is greater than a first threshold.
Wentz teaches wherein the first condition refers to that a sum of numbers of initial private key shards respectively held by a plurality of target committee nodes is greater than a first threshold. (Wentz, see paragraph 0117 fewer than a threshold number of shards may be insufficient to reconstruct the confidential datum...require one, a threshold number, or all of the shards to reconstruct the private key.; see paragraph 0122 all or a threshold number of shards would be necessary to reconstruct the private key...)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the invention was filed to combine Pettit-Simmons and Wentz to provide the technique of the first condition refers to that a sum of numbers of initial private key shards respectively held by a plurality of target committee nodes is greater than a first threshold of Wentz in the system of Pettit-Simmons in order to sufficiently reconstruct the private key (Wentz, see paragraphs 0117 and 0122).
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. This includes:
U.S. PGPub 2021/0083882, which describes an approach for a certificate authority (CA) that is distributed among nodes of a network, such that only a portion of the network nodes are required to sign and issue a digital certificate;
U.S. PGPub 2021/0105265, which describes techniques relating to authenticating a user with a mobile device; and
U.S. PGPub 2019/0356491, which describes a system for securing personal information via biometric public key.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MENG VANG whose telephone number is (571)270-7023. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 8AM-2PM, 3PM-5PM.
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/MENG VANG/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2443
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