DETAILED ACTION
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This Office Action is in response to Application No. 18/998,532 filed on 01/27/2025.
As per the preliminary Amendment filed on 01/27/2025, Claim 13 has been canceled, Claims 8-15 have been amended, claims 16-21 are newly added, and claims 1-12 and 14-21 have been examined and are currently pending.
Priority
Applicant’s claim for the benefit of a prior-filed application, parent Application No.: PCT/CN2022/108287 filed on 07/27/2022, under 35 U.S.C. 119(e) or under 35 U.S.C. 120, 121, 365(c), or 386(c) is acknowledged.
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS), submitted on 11/03/2025 and 02/28/2025, are in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statements are being considered by the examiner.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Claim(s) 1-7, 9-11, and 14-21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by 3GPP, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security aspects of Proximity based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS) (Release 17) (3GPP STANDARD; TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION; 3GPP TS 33.503, 3RD GENERATION PARTNERSHIP PROJECT (3GPP), MOBILE COMPETENCE CENTRE; 650, ROUTE DES LUCIOLES ; F-06921 SOPHIA-ANTIPOLIS CEDEX; FRANCE no. V1 .0.0 31 May 2022 (2022-05-31), pages 1-50, XP052182647; Hereinafter “3GPP”).
Regarding claim 1, 3GPP teaches a key generation method, performed by a first user equipment (UE) (3GPP: page 32, figure 6.3.3.3.2-1: "5G Prose UE-to-Network Relay security procedure with setup of network Prose security context during PC5 link establishment" showing a remote UE generating several keys at step Bb: "Generate 5GPRUK and 5GPRUK ID" and at step 15: "Generate KNR_ProSe" and page 35, paragraph 6.3.3.3, figure showing key generation at remote UE side, see also: "5GPRUK: The root credential derived from KAUSF P that is the root of security of the PC5 unicast link used for 5G Prose VE-to-Network Relay service. KNR_ProSe: This is a 256-bit root key that is established between the two entities that communicating using NR PC5 unicast link'7, performed by a first user equipment (UE) [cf. page 32, figure 6.3.3.3.2-1: showing the generating of several keys at step Bb: "Generate 5GPRUK and 5GPRVK ID" and at step 15: "Generate KNR_ProSe" by "remote VE'1), wherein the method comprises:
generating a first root key based on a long term credential (3GPP: Page 32, figure 6.3.3.3.2-1: "5G Prose VE-to-Network Relay security procedure with setup of network Prose security context during PC5 link establishment" showing a remote VE generating several keys at step Bb: "Generate 5GPRUK and 5GPRVK ID" and page 35, paragraph 6.3.3.3, figure showing key generation at remote VE side, see also: "- 5GPRUK: The root credential derived from KAVSF P that is the root of security of the PC5 unicast link used for 5G Prose VE-to-Network Relay service ... " and page 47 Annex A.2: ''A.2 5GPRUK derivation function When deriving a SGPRUK from KAUSF P,, '7; Page 35, paragraph 6.3.3.3, figure showing key generation at remote VE side, see also:"- 5GPRVK: The root credential derived from KAUSF P that is the root of security of the PC5 unicast link used for 5G Prose VE-to-Network Relay service ... ", note that KAVSF is a root key and not session key and as such is a long and not a temporary (i.e. session) credential]);
generating, based on the first root key, a second root key of a target function (3GPP: 3GPP: Page 32, figure 6.3.3.3.2-1: showing the generating at step 15: "Generate KNR ProSe" by "remote VE" and page 34, step 15: "15. The 5G Prose Remote UE shall generate the KNR Prose key to be used for remote access via the 5G Prose VE-to-Network Relay in the same way as defined in step 11. '1 and step 11: "1. The AVSF of the 5G Prose Remote VE shall generate Nonce_2 and derive the KNR Prose key using 5GPRUK, Nonce_ 1 and Nonce 2 as defined in Annex A.4. and page 35, paragraph 6.3.3.3, figure showing key generation at remote VE side, see also: "KNR_ProSe: This is a 256-bit root key that is established between the two entities that communicating using NR PC5 unicast link" and page 48, annex A.4: ''A.4 KNR_ProSe derivation function When deriving the KNR_ProSe from SGPRUK key,"]) ; and
generating a session key based on the second root key (3GPP: page 34, step 15: "Remote UE shall derive PC5 session key Krelay-sess and confidentiality and integrity keys from KNR Prose ... '7),
wherein the session key is used for control signaling transmission of the target function (3GPP: Page 34, step 16: "16. The 5G Prose Remote UE shall send the Direct Security Mode Complete message containing its PC5 user plane security policies to the 5G Prose VE-to-Network relay, which is protected by Krelay-int or/and Krelay-enc derived from Krelay-sess according to the negotiated PC5 signalling policies between the 5G Prose Remote VE and the 5G Prose VE-to-Network Relay.", where the direct security mode is a control signaling protected used said session key see also page 35: "6.3.3.3.3 PC5 Key Hierarchy over Control Plane: ... KAVSF_P ... 5GPRVK. .. KNR_ProSe ... V2NW Relay ME. .. Krelay-sess ... Krelay-enc Krelay-int. .. '7).
Regarding claim 2, 3GPP teaches the method according to claim 1, wherein the generating, based on the first root key, the second root key of the target function comprises: generating the second root key based on the first root key and a control service code of the target function (3GPP: page 47: ''.A.2 5GPRUK derivation function When deriving a 5GPRUK from KAUSF P, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF: - FC = OxXX; - PO= SUP/; - LO = length of SUP/. - P1 = relay service code: - L 1 = length of relay service code. The input key KEY is KAUSF_P'' When deriving the KNR Prose from 5GPRUK key. the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF: - FC = OxZZ; - PO= Nonce_2; - LO= length of Nonce 2; -P1=Nonce_1; - L 1 = length of Nonce 1. The input key KEY shall be 5GPRUK key ... "l [the first root key is itself derived based on control service =relay service code of target function i.e. relay UE, so the second root key is also derived based on first root key derived from said control service code]).
Regarding claim 3, 3GPP teaches the method according to claim 2, wherein the generating the second root key based on the first root key and the control service code of the target function comprises: generating the second root key based on the control service code of the target function, an identification of the first UE, an identification of a second UE, and the first root key ; (3GPP: page 47: ''.A.2 5GPRUK derivation function When deriving a 5GPRUK from KAUSF P, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF: - FC = OxXX; - PO= SUP/; - LO = length of SUP/. - P1 = relay service code: - L 1 = length of relay service code. The input key KEY is KAUSF_P'' When deriving the KNR Prose from 5GPRUK key. the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF: - FC = OxZZ; - PO= Nonce_2; - LO= length of Nonce 2; -P1=Nonce_1; - L 1 = length of Nonce 1. The input key KEY shall be 5GPRUK key ... "l [identification= SUPI of the first UE and relay service code is related to the identification of the second UE (=relay UE)]).
Regarding claim 4, 3GPP teaches the method according to claim 3, wherein the second UE is an opposite end UE of the first UE (3GPP: Page 32, Figure 3.3.2.3-1, Network Relay Side is opposite Remote UE side).
Regarding claim 5, 3GPP teaches the method according to claim 3, wherein the generating the second root key based on the control service code of the target function, the identification of the first UE, the identification of the second UE, and the first root key comprises: generating the second root key based on the control service code of the target function, a layer-2 identification of the first UE, a layer-2 identification of the second UE, and the first root key (3GPP: page 40, step 3b: " .. Re-authentication request contains the GPSI, and the IP/MAC address of the UE allocated.).
Regarding claim 6, 3GPP teaches the method according to claim 5, wherein the generating the second root key based on the control service code of the target function, the layer-2 identification of the first UE, the layer-2 identification of the second UE, and the first root key comprises: obtaining a preset parameter by performing bitwise exclusive or (XOR) on the layer-2 identification of the first UE, and the layer-2 identification of the second UE; and generating the second root key based on the first root key, the control service code, a length of the control service code, the preset parameter, and a length of the preset parameter (3GPP: page 47: ''.A.2 5GPRUK derivation function When deriving a 5GPRUK from KAUSF P, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF: - FC = OxXX; - PO= SUP/; - LO = length of SUP/. - P1 = relay service code: - L 1 = length of relay service code. The input key KEY is KAUSF_P'' When deriving the KNR Prose from 5GPRUK key. the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF: - FC = OxZZ; - PO= Nonce_2; - LO= length of Nonce 2; -P1=Nonce_1; - L 1 = length of Nonce 1. The input kev KEY shall be 5GPRUK kev ... "l [the length of parameter includes L0 and L1 length of SUPI], D1 page 42, paragraph 6.3.5, step 3: ''XOR the first L bits).
Regarding claim 7, 3GPP teaches the method according to claim 2, wherein the generating the second root key based on the first root key and the control service code of the target function comprises: generating the second root key based on the first root key, a key identification of the first root key, a length of the key identification of the first root key, the control service code, and a length of the control service code (3GPP: page 47: ''.A.2 5GPRUK derivation function When deriving a 5GPRUK from KAUSF P, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF: - FC = OxXX; - PO= SUP/; - LO = length of SUP/. - P1 = relay service code: - L 1 = length of relay service code. The input key KEY is KAUSF_P'' When deriving the KNR Prose from 5GPRUK key. the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF: - FC = OxZZ; - PO= Nonce_2; - LO= length of Nonce 2; -P1=Nonce_1; - L 1 = length of Nonce 1. The input kev KEY shall be 5GPRUK kev ... "l [L0, L1, P0, P1]).
Regarding claim 9, 3GPP teaches the method according to claim 1, wherein the generating the session key based on the second root key comprises; generating an intermediate key based on the second root key; and generating the session key based on the intermediate key (3GPP: Page 34, step 15: Remote UE shall derive PC5 session key Krelay-sess and confidentiality and integrity keys from KNR ProSe; Page 36, figure 6.3.3.3.3-1, showing "Krelay_enc" "Krelay_int" J which are the further session keys derived from session key Krelay sess which is itself an intermediate session key [session key may be utilized as an intermediate key for deriving further session keys]).
Regarding claim 10, 3GPP teaches the method according to claim 9, wherein the generating the intermediate key based on the second root key comprises: generating a first random number; receiving a second random number generated by a second UE; and generating the intermediate key based on the first random number, the second random number, and the second root key (3GPP: page 47: ''.A.2 5GPRUK derivation function When deriving a 5GPRUK from KAUSF P, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF: - FC = OxXX; - PO= SUP/; - LO = length of SUP/. - P1 = relay service code: - L 1 = length of relay service code. The input key KEY is KAUSF_P'' When deriving the KNR Prose from 5GPRUK key. the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF: - FC = OxZZ; - PO= Nonce_2; - LO= length of Nonce 2; -P1=Nonce_1; - L 1 = length of Nonce 1. The input kev KEY shall be 5GPRUK kev ... " Page 33, Fig. 6.3.3.3.2-1, [Message 2 includes Nonce 1, Message 14 includes Nonce 2]).
Regarding claim 11, 3GPP teaches the method according to claim 9, wherein the generating the session key based on the intermediate key comprises: determining an algorithm identification of a security algorithm for the first UE and a second UE to perform control signaling transmission protection; and generating the session key based on the algorithm identification and the intermediate key (3GPP: page 36, paragraph 6.3.3.3.3: "Krelav-int. Krelav-enc: The Krelav-int and Krelav-enc are used in the chosen confidentiality and integrity algorithms respectively for protecting PC5-S signalling).
Regarding claim 14, Claim 14 is rejected under the same rational as claim 1.
Regarding claim 15, Claim 15 is rejected under the same rational as claim 1.
Regarding claims 16-21, Claims 16-21 are rejected under the same rational as claims 2-7, respectively.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Claim(s) 8 and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over 3GPP, 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security aspects of Proximity based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS) (Release 17) (3GPP STANDARD; TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION; 3GPP TS 33.503, 3RD GENERATION PARTNERSHIP PROJECT (3GPP), MOBILE COMPETENCE CENTRE; 650, ROUTE DES LUCIOLES ; F-06921 SOPHIA-ANTIPOLIS CEDEX; FRANCE no. V1 .0.0 31 May 2022 (2022-05-31), pages 1-50, XP052182647; Hereinafter “3GPP”) in view of XIAOMI: "33.893: New Key Issue on Direct Communication Security", 3GPP DRAFT; S3-221543, 3RD GENERATION PARTNERSHIP PROJECT (3GPP), MOBILE COMPETENCE CENTRE; 650, ROUTE DES LUCIOLES ; F-06921 SOPHIA-ANTIPOLIS CEDEX ; FRANCE vol. SA WG3; 20220627 - 20220701 20 June 2022 (2022-06-20), XP052195885; “Hereinafter Xiaomi”).
Regarding claim 8, 3GPP teaches the method according to claim 1, wherein the generating the first root key based on the long term credential comprises. 3GPP does not explicitly teach generating, based on the long term credential, the first root key of a ranging/sidelink positioning service.
In an analogous art, Xiaomi teaches generating, based on the long term credential, the first root key of a ranging/sidelink positioning service (Xiaomi: Page 2, Paragraph 5.x.2: "the root key of an existing PC5 direct link established for ProSe/V2X service is reused for Ranging/Side/ink Positioning services ...).
It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to combine the teachings of Xiaomi with the system and method of 3GPP to include generating, based on the long term credential, the first root key of a ranging/sidelink positioning service because this functionality provides for generation and reuse of the root key for positioning services (Xiaomi: Page 2, Para. 5.x.2).
Regarding claim 12, 3GPP teaches the method according to claim 1. 3GPP does not explicitly teach wherein the target function comprises at least one of: a device and service discovery function (DSDF); a group support service function (GSSF); or a sidelink positioning and ranging function (SPRF).
In an analogous art, Xiaomi teaches wherein the target function comprises at least one of: a device and service discovery function (DSDF); a group support service function (GSSF); or a sidelink positioning and ranging function (SPRF) (Xiaomi: Page 2, paragraph 5.x.1: " .... an existing root key of PC5 direct link established for ProSe/V2X service is sufficient to protect the control signalling over SR5/RSPP for Ranging/Side/ink Positioning services still need to be investigated)
It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to combine the teachings of Xiaomi with the system and method of 3GPP to include wherein the target function comprises at least one of: a device and service discovery function (DSDF); a group support service function (GSSF); or a sidelink positioning and ranging function (SPRF) because this functionality provides enhanced protection of control signaling (Xiaomi: Page 2, Para. 5.x.1).
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2026/0052384 by Lu.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Nelson Giddins whose telephone number is (571)272-7993. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday - Friday, 9:00 AM - 5:00 PM.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Linglan Edwards can be reached at (571) 270-5440. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/NELSON S. GIDDINS/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2437
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