DETAILED ACTION
This non-final action is in response to the application filed 25 December 2024.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Priority
Claims 1-5 are pending, having a filing date of 25 December 2024 and claiming foreign priority to Japanese Patent Application Number JP-2024-028020, filed 28 February 2024.
Acknowledgment is made of applicant’s claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. 119 (a)-(d). The certified copy has been filed in parent Application No. JP-2024-028020, filed on 28 February 2024.
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted 25 December 2024 complies with 35 C.F.R 1.97. Accordingly, the IDS has been considered by the examiner. An initialed copy of the 1449 form is enclosed herewith.
Drawings
The drawings, filed 25 December 2024, are accepted by the examiner.
Specification
The title of the invention (“Device”) is not descriptive. A new title is required that is clearly indicative of the invention to which the claims are directed. A suggested title is “Device for Identifying Defective Components”.
Claim Interpretation
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f). The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f). The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation(s) is/are:
“an identifying unit that identifies” (see specification [0023] disclosing that The processor 201 executes the program PG2 stored in the memory 202 to realize various functions including functions as the first acquisition unit 215, the first identifying unit 220, the instruction unit 230, the second acquisition unit 245, and the second identifying unit 240. Note that the first identifying unit 220 is also simply referred to as an identifying unit; [0006]) in claim 1; and
“an instruction unit for issuing at least one of an evacuation instruction ... and a skip instruction ... “ ([0023]; [0006]) in claim 1.
Because this/these claim limitation(s) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) they are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof. The identifying unit and the instruction unit are being interpreted as the processor executing a program as disclosed in [0023] and [0006].
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1, 2, 4 and 5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
In January, 2019 (updated October 2019), the USPTO released new examination guidelines setting forth a two-step inquiry for determining whether a claim is directed to non-statutory subject matter. According to the guidelines, a claim is directed to non-statutory subject matter if:
• STEP 1: the claim does not fall within one of the four statutory categories of invention (process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter), or
• STEP 2: the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g. an abstract idea, without reciting additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception, as determined using the following analysis:
o STEP 2A (PRONG 1): Does the claim recite an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon?
o STEP 2A (PRONG 2): Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application?
o STEP 2B: Does the claim recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception?
Using the two-step inquiry, it is clear that claim 1 is directed toward non-statutory subject matter as shown below.
STEP 1: Does claim 1 fall within one of the statutory categories? Yes, because claim 1 is directed toward a device which falls within one of the statutory categories.
STEP 2A (PRONG 1): Is the claim directed to a law of nature, a natural phenomenon or an abstract idea? Yes, claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
With regard to STEP 2A (PRONG 1), the guidelines provide three groupings of subject matter that are considered abstract ideas:
1. Mathematical concepts – mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations;
2. Certain methods of organizing human activity – fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and
3. Mental processes – concepts that are practicably performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).
As per claim 1, the device is a mental process that can be performed in the mind and, therefore, an abstract idea. In particular, claim 1 recites the abstract idea:
“an identifying unit that identifies, out of one or more moving bodies that move over a manufacturing line by unmanned driving, a relevant moving body to which a defective component that was evacuated from a component line, over which a plurality of components flows, is to be assembled”.
This recitation merely consist of identifying a moving body with a defective component. This is equivalent to a person identifying a moving body with a defective component (i.e. mental observation). The Examiner notes that under MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(III), the courts consider a mental process (thinking) that "can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper" to be an abstract idea. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372, 99 USPQ2d 1690, 1695 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As the Federal Circuit explained, "methods which can be performed mentally, or which are the equivalent of human mental work, are unpatentable abstract ideas the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’ that are open to all.’" 654 F.3d at 1371, 99 USPQ2d at 1694 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972)). See also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965 ("‘[M]ental processes[] and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work’" (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67, 175 USPQ at 675)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 198 USPQ 193, 197 (1978) (same). As such, a person, identifies a moving body with a defective component. The mere nominal recitations that the identification is implemented by the “identifying unit,” does not take the limitation out of the mental process grouping.
STEP 2A (PRONG 2): Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application? No, the claim does not recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
With regard to STEP 2A (prong 2), whether the claim recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, the guidelines provide the following exemplary considerations that are indicative that an additional element (or combination of elements) may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical application:
• an additional element reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field;
• an additional element that applies or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition;
• an additional element implements a judicial exception with, or uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim;
• an additional element effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing; and
• an additional element applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.
While the guidelines further state that the exemplary considerations are not an exhaustive list and that there may be other examples of integrating the exception into a practical application, the guidelines also list examples in which a judicial exception has not been integrated into a practical application:
• an additional element merely recites the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely includes instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea;
• an additional element adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception; and
• an additional element does no more than generally link the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use.
Claim 1 does not recite any of the exemplary considerations that are indicative of an abstract idea having been integrated into practical application. Claim 1 further recites the additional element of
“an instruction unit for issuing at least one of an evacuation instruction for evacuating the relevant moving body from the manufacturing line by the unmanned driving, and a skip instruction for skipping the assembling to the relevant moving body … .”
This additional element further limits the abstract idea without integrating the abstract idea into practical application or significantly more. In particular, the “issuing ... an evacuation instruction … “ is interpreted as a signal per se, that does not possess concrete structure that would qualify as a device or part of a device under the definition of a machine under the definition of a manufacture, per MPEP 2106.03.
Claim 1 still further includes the additional elements “an instruction unit”. This elements are not sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because it fails to integrate the exception into practical application. The mere inclusion of instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea is indicative that the judicial exception has not been integrated into a practical application. In the instant case, issuing of the evacuation instruction is implemented by “an instruction unit” i.e. via computers. Thus, it is clear that the abstract idea is merely implemented on a computer, which is indicative of the abstract idea having not been integrated in the practical application. The “instruction unit,” merely describes how to generally “apply” the otherwise metal judgements in a generic or general purpose computing environment. The instruction unit is recited at a high level of generality and merely automate the issuing step.
STEP 2B: Does the claim recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception? No, claim 1 does not recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
With regard to STEP 2B, whether the claims recite additional elements that provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception, the guidelines specify that the pre-guideline procedure is still in effect. Specifically, that examiners should continue to consider whether an additional element or combination of elements:
• adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an inventive concept may be present; or
• simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.
Claim 1 does not recite any specific limitation or combination of limitations that are well-understood, routine, conventional (WURC) activity in the field. Issuing data is a fundamental, i.e. WURC, activities performed by computers, such as servers, cloud servers, computers, and processors operating on data such as the units recited in claim 1. Further, applicant’s specification does not provide any indication that the issuing activities of the device are performed using anything other than a conventional computer. MPEP 2106.05(d)(II), and the cases cited therein, including Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016), TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015), indicate that mere performance of an action is a well‐understood, routine, and conventional function when it is claimed in a merely generic manner.
Thus, since claim 1 is: (a) directed toward an abstract idea; (b) does not recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into practical application; and (c) does not recites additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception, it is clear that claim 1 is directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Dependent claims 2, 4 and 5 further limit the abstract idea without integrating the abstract idea into practical application or significantly more. For example, the additional elements in claims 2, 4 and 5 are further limitations that under their broadest reasonable interpretation are limitations that further limit the abstract idea without integrating the abstract idea into practical application or significantly more.
As such, claims 1,2, 4 and 5 are rejected as being drawn to an abstract idea without more, and thus are ineligible.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or non-obviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent Publication Number 2020/0156722 to Watkins et al. (hereafter Watkins) in view of U.S. Patent Publication Number 2006/0161319 to Tooyama.
As per claim 1, Watkins discloses [a] device (see at least Watkins, Abstract) comprising: ...
in which the component line merges with the manufacturing line in an assembly area for executing assembly of the component to the moving body (see at least Watkins, [0059] disclosing that FIG. 4 is a schematic of an illustrative production layout 400. Area 402 is an assembly shop through which vehicles progress to various manufacturing stations along assembly line 404. Vehicle 406 advances through assembly line 404 and enters wheel installation station 410. Lift 408 elevates vehicle 406 to enable assembly line personnel or robotics to perform additional manufacturing steps. Vehicle 406 advances through additional portions of assembly line 404 and can then proceed further in an autonomous mode until all or most of the manufacture of the vehicle is complete, provided additional components have been installed to enable vehicle 406 to be self-driven); and
an instruction unit for issuing at least one of an evacuation instruction for evacuating the relevant moving body from the manufacturing line by the unmanned driving, and a skip instruction for skipping the assembling to the relevant moving body (see at least Watkins, [0056] disclosing that production facilities may be configured such that a vehicle can be taken out of line and the remaining vehicles can continue cycling through production. This can be accomplished manually or control system 100 can be configured to recognize events that warrant removal of a vehicle from the assembly line and also to autonomously guide the vehicle away from the line. The control system may be configured so vehicles removed from the assembly line may be guided to a single location or to a location specific to the event that triggered the vehicle's removal. This will prevent production line down time ). But, Watkins does not teach the following limitation taught in Tooyama:
an identifying unit that identifies, out of one or more moving bodies that move over a manufacturing line by unmanned driving, a relevant moving body to which a defective component that was evacuated from a component line, over which a plurality of components flows, is to be assembled (see at least Tooyama, [0048] disclosing that the judgment at the step ST15 is negative, the procedure is blanched to a step ST17 where the vehicle with defective AFS is removed from the vehicle production and assembly line for off-line repairing of the defective AFS. Then, at a step ST18, information concerning a fault or failure obtained during inspection with respect to the defective AFS is fed back to a relevant processing part or station of the vehicle production and assembly line for taking appropriate measures to remove the fault on a real-time basis) ... .
Watkins and Tooyama are analogous art to claim 1 because they are in the same field of vehicle assembly. Watkins relates to the sequence of fabrication steps and incorporation of autonomous vehicle functions in the manufacturing and delivery process and configuration of assembly lines and facilities (see Watkins, [0001]). Tooyama relates to method of checking operation of an adaptive front lighting system (see at least Tooyama, [0001]).
Therefore, it would have been prima facie obvious to someone of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified the device, as disclosed in Watkins, to provide the benefit of identifying, out of one or more moving bodies that move over a manufacturing line by unmanned driving, a relevant moving body to which a defective component that was evacuated from a component line, over which a plurality of components flows, as disclosed in Tooyama, with a reasonable expectation of success. Doing so would provide the benefit of saving time a expense by detecting and removing defective components before assembly is complete.
Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Watkins and Tooyama as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of U.S. Patent Publication Number 2023/0321693 to Shinagawa et al. (hereafter Shinagawa).
As per claim 2, the combination of Watkins and Tooyama discloses all of the limitations of claim 1, as shown above. Tooyama further discloses the following limitation:
... a second entry instruction for instructing a trailing moving body that is the moving body trailing the relevant moving body, to enter a second vacant region generated by the relevant moving body being removed from the manufacturing line (see at least Tooyama, [0048]). But, neither Watkins nor Tooyama explicitly teach the following limitation taught in Shinagawa:
wherein when the evacuation instruction is issued, the instruction unit issues a first entry instruction for instructing equipment that is configured to change a position of each of the components flowing over the component line, to cause to enter, into a first vacant region generated by the defective component being removed from the component line, the component trailing the defective component (see at least Shinagawa, [0002] disclosing that a conventional assembly operation of an automobile, a connector component, such as a bolt, is welded to a workpiece that is constituted by a press-molded steel sheet or the like. This bolt or the like is transferred by a component transfer device; [0005] disclosing that power source is provided to discharge a defective component makes a device complicated. In addition, when a jam occurs in a transport path, the power source is actuated to remove a defective component. Consequently, transportation of components is stopped during a time of the jam, which may lead to a decrease in productivity) ... .
Watkins, Tooyama and Shinagawa are analogous art to claim 2 because they are in the same field of vehicle assembly. Watkins relates to the sequence of fabrication steps and incorporation of autonomous vehicle functions in the manufacturing and delivery process and configuration of assembly lines and facilities (see Watkins, [0001]). Tooyama relates to method of checking operation of an adaptive front lighting system (see at least Tooyama, [0001]). Shinagawa relates to a component transfer device (see at least Shinagawa, [0001]).
Therefore, it would have been prima facie obvious to someone of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified the device, as disclosed in Watkins, as modified by Tooyama, to provide the benefit of issuing a first entry instruction for equipment to change a position of each of the components flowing over the component line, to enter into a first vacant region generated by the defective component being removed from the component line, the component trailing the defective component, as disclosed in Shinagawa, with a reasonable expectation of success. Doing so would provide the benefit of saving time a expense by removing defective components before assembly is complete.
Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Watkins, Tooyama and Shinagawa as applied to claim 2 above, and further in view of U.S. Patent Publication Number 2024/0270337 to Wang et al. (hereafter Wang).
As per claim 3, the combination of Watkins, Tooyama and Shinagawa discloses all of the limitations of claim 2, as shown above.
wherein the instruction unit causes the trailing moving body to enter the second vacant region by making a degree of deceleration of the trailing moving body to be smaller than a degree of deceleration of the moving body preceding the trailing moving body, in the second entry instruction (see at least Wang, [0069] disclosing that the navigation device 11 of the embodiment of the present application may also not be separated from the assembled vehicle 2. Specifically, at the end-of-line station 103, the assembled vehicle 2 carries the navigation device 11 while leaving the line, so that the navigation device 11 does not enter an assembly process of the next vehicle 2. In this way, it is possible to increase the speed of the vehicle final assembly line 1 without repeatedly detaching the navigation device 11, thereby improving the production efficiency of the vehicle 2).
Watkins, Tooyama, Shinagawa and Wang are analogous art to claim 3 because they are in the same field of vehicle assembly. Watkins relates to the sequence of fabrication steps and incorporation of autonomous vehicle functions in the manufacturing and delivery process and configuration of assembly lines and facilities (see Watkins, [0001]). Tooyama relates to method of checking operation of an adaptive front lighting system (see at least Tooyama, [0001]). Shinagawa relates to a component transfer device (see at least Shinagawa, [0001]). Wang relates to a vehicle final assembly line (see at least Wang, [0002]).
Therefore, it would have been prima facie obvious to someone of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified the device, as disclosed in Watkins, as modified by Tooyama and Shinagawa, to provide the benefit of having the trailing moving body enter the second vacant region by making a degree of deceleration of the trailing moving body to be smaller than a degree of deceleration of the moving body preceding the trailing moving body, as disclosed in Wang, with a reasonable expectation of success. Doing so would provide the benefit of improving production efficiency (see at least Wang, [0069]).
Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Watkins and Tooyama as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of U.S. Patent Publication Number 2006/0231371 To Moliere et al. (hereafter Moliere).
As per claim 4, the combination of Watkins and Tooyama discloses all of the limitations of claim 1, as shown above. Tooyama further discloses the following limitation:
wherein the instruction unit issues an instruction to repair a defect of the defective component that was evacuated (see at least Tooyama, [0048] disclosing that if the judgment at the step ST15 is negative, the procedure is blanched to a step ST17 where the vehicle with defective AFS is removed from the vehicle production and assembly line for off-line repairing of the defective AFS. Then, at a step ST18, information concerning a fault or failure obtained during inspection with respect to the defective AFS is fed back to a relevant processing part or station of the vehicle production and assembly line for taking appropriate measures to remove the fault on a real-time basis. The step ST18 is particularly advantageous because if a fault detected by the step ST14 with respect to one AFS is due to faulty wiring, it will probably occur that all of the succeeding AFSs also have the same fault as they are produced in the same lot as the detected faulty AF) ... . But, neither Watkins nor Tooyama explicitly teach the following limitation taught in Moliere:
when repair of the defect is complete, issues an instruction for causing equipment that is configured to enter a repaired component that is the component regarding which the repair is completed to the component line, to enter the repaired component to the component line, and an instruction for causing the relevant moving body evacuated by the evacuation instruction to enter the manufacturing line by the unmanned driving (see at least Moliere, [0027] disclosing that the advantage of having the mobile control unit attached removably to the transport device or to the vehicle or partially assembled vehicle is that the mobile control unit can remain with the vehicle if the vehicle has to be removed from the assembly line because a fault has been detected. The mobile control unit can then be deposited expediently in the vehicle, and because the equipment package intended for the vehicle in question is stored in the mobile control unit, the vehicle can easily be re-integrated in the production process--for instance, when the fault has been rectified. As a result, no special preparations need be made before returning a vehicle that was removed from the assembly line, providing the fault has been rectified).
Watkins, Tooyama and Moliere are analogous art to claim 4 because they are in the same field of vehicle assembly. Watkins relates to the sequence of fabrication steps and incorporation of autonomous vehicle functions in the manufacturing and delivery process and configuration of assembly lines and facilities (see Watkins, [0001]). Tooyama relates to method of checking operation of an adaptive front lighting system (see at least Tooyama, [0001]). Moliere relates to a transport device for a motor vehicle or a partially assembled motor vehicle during the production process (see at least Moliere, [0001]).
Therefore, it would have been prima facie obvious to someone of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified the device, as disclosed in Watkins, as modified by Tooyama, to provide the benefit issues an instruction to repair a defect of the defective component that was evacuated and when repair of the defect is complete, causing equipment that is configured to enter a repaired component that is the component regarding which the repair is completed to the component line, to enter the repaired component to the component line, as further disclosed in Tooyama, and an instruction for causing the relevant moving body evacuated by the evacuation instruction to enter the manufacturing line by the unmanned driving, as disclosed in Moliere, with a reasonable expectation of success. Doing so would provide the benefit of obviating the necessity of removing the vehicle from the assembly line for the purposes of corrective action (see Moliere, [0009]).
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Watkins and Tooyama as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Moliere and U.S. Patent Publication Number 2022/0024041 to Freire et al. (hereafter Freire).
As per claim 5, the combination of Watkins and Tooyama discloses all of the limitations of claim 1, as shown above. Tooyama further discloses the following limitation:
wherein the instruction unit issues an instruction to repair a defect of the defective component that was evacuated (see at least Tooyama, [0048]) ... . But, neither Watkins nor Tooyama explicitly teach the following limitation taught in Moliere:
when repair of the defect is complete, issues an instruction for moving a repaired component that is the component regarding which the repair is completed, ... , and an instruction for assembling the repaired component to the relevant moving body (see at least Moliere, [0027]). But, neither Watkins, Tooyama nor Moliere explicitly teach the following limitation taught in Freire:
... moving the repaired component ... toward the relevant moving body using a device different from the component line (see at least Freire, Fig 1, showing robot 160; [0053] disclosing that at a second downstream station, after several other assembly operations have been performed on the vehicle body, an industrial robot <interpreted as a device different from the component> picks and removes the door from the door holding fixture and, again using a method as disclosed above, the same robot re-assembles it on the vehicle body, e.g. on the vehicle body hinges).
Watkins, Tooyama, Moliere and Freire are analogous art to claim 5 because they are in the same field of vehicle assembly. Watkins relates to the sequence of fabrication steps and incorporation of autonomous vehicle functions in the manufacturing and delivery process and configuration of assembly lines and facilities (see Watkins, [0001]). Tooyama relates to method of checking operation of an adaptive front lighting system (see at least Tooyama, [0001]). Moliere relates to a transport device for a motor vehicle or a partially assembled motor vehicle during the production process (see at least Moliere, [0001]). Freire relates to an assembly unit or system for performing an assembling operation on a part having a target for the assembling operation (see at least Freire, [0001]).
Therefore, it would have been prima facie obvious to someone of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified the device, as disclosed in Watkins, as modified by Tooyama, to provide when repair of the defect is complete, an instruction for moving a repaired component that is the component regarding which the repair is completed, toward the relevant moving body using a device different from the component line, and an instruction for assembling the repaired component to the relevant moving body, as disclosed in Moliere and Freire, with a reasonable expectation of success. Doing so would provide the benefit of obviating the necessity of removing the vehicle from the assembly line for the purposes of corrective action (see Moliere, [0009]).
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to PATRICK M. BRADY III whose telephone number is (571)272-7458. The examiner can normally be reached Monday - Friday 7:00 am - 4;30 pm.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Erin Bishop can be reached at 571-270-3713. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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PATRICK M. BRADY III
Examiner
Art Unit 3665
/PATRICK M BRADY/Examiner, Art Unit 3665
/Erin D Bishop/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3665