Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1, 3, 8-9, and 11-13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Banter (US 20140316612 A1).
Regarding Claim 1, Banter teaches: A vehicle assembly (), comprising: an electronic latch (P0020) that transitions between a latched state (P0020, locked state) and an unlatched state (P0020 unlocked state), the electronic latch configured to hold a closure assembly of a vehicle (P0021, the vehicle door) in a closed position (P0003) when the electronic latch is in the latched state (P0020-21), the electronic latch configured to permit movement of the closure assembly from the closed position to an open position (P0021) when the electronic latch is in the unlatched state (P0020-21); a wireless energy transfer access point (30 ‘) configured to wirelessly receive energy (P0037) that powers a transition of the electronic latch from the latched state to the unlatched state (P0022), the energy provided by an energy providing device (20) separate from the vehicle (P0034); and a battery of a vehicle (P0019, the main battery) that powers a transition of the electronic latch from the latched state to the unlatched state (P0019) when a state of charge of the battery is above a threshold value (P0019-22, P0032, when the vehicle’s main battery is sufficiently charged, therefore above a threshold value, the main battery operates the electronic latch as described), the energy received through the wireless energy transfer access point powering the transition of the electronic latch when the state of charge of the battery is below the threshold value (It is the position of the examiner that the wireless energy transfer access point receives energy to transition the electronic latch as described in P0037, when the state of change of the battery is incapable of supplying sufficient power as described in P0034, this therefore being below the threshold value. Examiner also notes that P0050-51 describes an embodiment with a rechargeable battery where the controller operates to monitor the condition of the main vehicle battery, and authorizes the transition of the electronic latch when the state of charge of the main battery is incapable of supplying sufficient power, and it is the position of the Examiner that the controller described in P0034 is able to function similarly).
Regarding Claim 3, Banter teaches: The vehicle assembly of claim 1, wherein the battery is an accessory battery of the vehicle (P0028-29 describe BCM’s, antennas, and receivers within the vehicle that are accessories, therefore the main battery that powers these during normal operations described in P0019, is an accessory battery).
Regarding Claim 8, Banter teaches: The vehicle assembly of claim 1, further comprising a wireless charging coil of the wireless energy transfer access point (P0037-38, the secondary coil described in the wireless charging coil of the wireless energy transfer access point 30’).
Regarding Claim 9, Banter teaches: The vehicle assembly of claim 1, wherein the wireless energy transfer access point is disposed in a front fascia (P0042).
Regarding Claim 11, Banter teaches: The vehicle assembly of claim 1, wherein the energy providing device is a smartphone of a user (P0034), wherein the wireless energy transfer access point is configured to receive energy wirelessly from a smartphone of a user (P0037).
Regarding Claim 12, Banter teaches: The vehicle assembly of claim 1, wherein the wireless energy transfer access point is configured to receive energy wirelessly from a smartphone of an authorized user (P0034, P0037).
Regarding Claim 13, Banter teaches: The vehicle assembly of claim 1, wherein the vehicle is configured such that energy received from the energy providing device through the wireless energy transfer access point is conveyed directly to the electronic latch without the energy being stored in a battery (P0037).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 10, 14-16, and 18-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Banter (US 20140316612 A1).
Regarding Claim 10, Banter teaches: The vehicle assembly of claim 1, but does not explicitly teach wherein the wireless energy transfer access point comprises a logo. However, Banter teaches in Fig 7 and P0042 that the wireless energy transfer access point may be located on several locations of the vehicle body. Additionally, it is well known in the art that motor vehicles include logos in a variety of locations throughout and on the vehicle. Therefore, it would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention for the wireless energy transfer access point to comprise a logo in the form of a vehicle branding logo as P0042 describes the location of the wireless energy transfer access point on places like the hood, grill, fender, trunk, which are all places that vehicle branding logos are placed, as this would be just a simple matter of design choice and involves only routine skill in the art. See MPEP 2144.04.
Regarding Claim 14, Banter does not explicitly teach: A vehicle latch electronic transitioning method, comprising: receiving energy through a wireless energy transfer access point of a vehicle; and with the energy, powering a transition of an electronic latch of the vehicle from a latched state to an unlatched state; and permitting the powering when the vehicle is in a wireless transfer receiving mode, and blocking the powering when the vehicle is not in the wireless transfer receiving mode. However, regarding claim 14, the Examiner notes that the instant method step limitations are considered obvious over the prior art, Banter US 20140316612 A1, in view of rejections of the structural limitations previously set forth (see rejection of claim 1 above). When the method steps essentially set forth the provision and use of an apparatus, as intended by its structure, then such method steps are considered obvious when the structure of the apparatus has been demonstrated as obvious (or anticipated) by the prior art.
Regarding Claim 16, Banter does not explicitly teach: The vehicle latch electronic transitioning method of claim 14, further comprising transitioning to the wireless transfer receiving mode in response to a state of charge of an accessory battery falling below a threshold value. However, regarding claim 16, The Examiner notes that the instant method step limitations are considered obvious over the prior art, Banter US 20140316612 A1, in view of rejections of the structural limitations previously set forth (see rejection of claims 1 and 3 above). When the method steps essentially set forth the provision and use of an apparatus, as intended by its structure, then such method steps are considered obvious when the structure of the apparatus has been demonstrated as obvious (or anticipated) by the prior art.
Regarding Claim 18, Banter does not explicitly teach: The vehicle latch electronic transitioning method of claim 16, further powering the electronic latch with an accessory battery of the vehicle when the state of charge is at or above the threshold value. However, regarding claim 18, The Examiner notes that the instant method step limitations are considered obvious over the prior art, Banter US 20140316612 A1, in view of rejections of the structural limitations previously set forth (see rejection of claims 1 and 3 above). When the method steps essentially set forth the provision and use of an apparatus, as intended by its structure, then such method steps are considered obvious when the structure of the apparatus has been demonstrated as obvious (or anticipated) by the prior art.
Regarding Claim 19, Banter does not explicitly teach: The vehicle latch electronic transitioning method of claim 14, wherein the energy directly powers the electronic latch without storing the energy in a battery. However, regarding claim 19, The Examiner notes that the instant method step limitations are considered obvious over the prior art, Banter US 20140316612 A1, in view of rejections of the structural limitations previously set forth (see rejection of claim 13 above). When the method steps essentially set forth the provision and use of an apparatus, as intended by its structure, then such method steps are considered obvious when the structure of the apparatus has been demonstrated as obvious (or anticipated) by the prior art.
Regarding Claim 20, Banter does not explicitly teach: The vehicle latch electronic transitioning method of claim 14, wherein the energy is received from a smartphone. However, regarding claim 20, The Examiner notes that the instant method step limitations are considered obvious over the prior art, Banter US 20140316612 A1, in view of rejections of the structural limitations previously set forth (see rejections of claims 11 and 12 above). When the method steps essentially set forth the provision and use of an apparatus, as intended by its structure, then such method steps are considered obvious when the structure of the apparatus has been demonstrated as obvious (or anticipated) by the prior art.
Claims 6 and 21-23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Banter (US 20140316612 A1), in view of Kowalewski (US 20170089104 A1).
Regarding Claim 6, Banter teaches: The vehicle assembly of claim 1, wherein the battery is an accessory battery (P0028-29 describe BCM’s, antennas, and receivers within the vehicle that are accessories, therefore the main battery that powers these during normal operations described in P0019, is an accessory battery), the accessory battery operatively coupled to the electronic latch (Banter: P0019). Banter does not teach: wherein the battery is inaccessible when the closure assembly is in the closed position, and accessible when the closure assembly is in the open position, or wherein the accessory battery is held within a frunk that is covered by the closure assembly when the closure assembly is in a closed position, the accessory battery operatively coupled to the electronic latch. Kowalewski teaches that it is known in the art to include an accessory battery (Kowalewski: 104) that is held within a frunk (Kowalewski: Fig 1 shows accessory battery 104 located within the frunk of the vehicle) that is covered by a closure assembly (Kowalewski: P0014, the hood is the closure assembly) when the closure assembly is in the closed position (Kowalewski: P0014 describes the battery being located within the hood of the vehicle, it is the position of the Examiner that this means the hood is in the closed position), the battery operatively coupled to the electronic latch (Krishnan: P0015). It would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the teachings of Banter to have the accessory battery located within a frunk as taught by Kowalewski, resulting in an easily accessible battery, thereby increasing ease of maintenance. It follows then that the battery would be inaccessible when the closure assembly is in the closed position, and accessible when the closure assembly is in the open position.
Claim 21 is rejected by Banter (in view of Kowalewski) as applied to claims 1 and 6 above.
Regarding claim 22, Banter (in view of Kowalewski) teaches: The vehicle assembly of claim 21, further comprising a controller configured to activate the wireless energy transfer access point in response to a state of charge of the accessory battery falling below a threshold value, the controller configured to block the wireless energy transfer access point from receiving energy when the state of charge is at or above the threshold value (Banter: P0050).
Claim 23 is rejected by Banter (in view of Kowalewski) as applied to claim 10 above.
Claims 5 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Banter (US 20140316612 A1), in view of Krishnan (US 20160340940 A1).
Regarding Claim 5, Banter teaches: The vehicle assembly of claim 2. Banter does not teach: wherein the battery is inaccessible when the closure assembly is in the closed position, and accessible when the closure assembly is in the open position. Krishnan teaches that it is known in the art to have a battery (Krishnan: 48) wherein the battery is inaccessible when a closure assembly (Krishnan: 2) is in the closed position (Krishnan: Fig 1 shows closure assembly in the closed position. P0025 explains that the battery 48 is located in opening 84 in map pocket 78 which is accessible only when the closure assembly 2 is in the unlatched state as shown in Fig 5). It would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the teachings of Banter, so that the battery is located in the closure assembly 2 such that it is inaccessible when the closure assembly is in the closed position and accessible when the closure assembly is in the open position, thereby allowing for servicing/replacement (Krishnan: P0025), increasing the reliability of the battery.
Regarding Claim 17, Banter, in view of Krishnan, does not explicitly teach: The vehicle latch electronic transitioning method of claim 16, wherein the accessory battery is accessible when a closure assembly of the vehicle is in an open position, wherein the closure assembly is moveable to the open position when the latch is in the unlatched state. However, regarding claim 17, The Examiner notes that the instant method step limitations are considered obvious over the prior art, Banter US 20140316612 A1 and Krishnan US 20160340940 A1, in view of rejections of the structural limitations previously set forth (see rejection of claim 5 above). When the method steps essentially set forth the provision and use of an apparatus, as intended by its structure, then such method steps are considered obvious when the structure of the apparatus has been demonstrated as obvious (or anticipated) by the prior art.
Claim 7 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Banter (US 20140316612 A1), in view of Distefano (US 20190368237 A1).
Regarding Claim 7, Banter teaches: The vehicle assembly of claim 1 wherein the closure assembly is a vehicle door (P0021). Banter is silent on wherein the closure assembly is a frunk lid. Distefano teaches that it is known in the art that a vehicle closure assembly comprises front door panels, rear liftgates, frunks, and sliding door panels (Distefano: P0057). It would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the teachings of Banter to substitute the frunk lid for a door, as taught by Distefano, as they are both vehicle closure panels moveable between opened and closed positions, that perform the same function.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 20 May 2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Regarding Applicant’s argument that “[Banter’s system] does not coordinate two power sources based on a threshold value. Banter never discloses a threshold state of charge. Banter never discloses that the vehicle's battery powers the latch above a threshold while wirelessly received energy powers the latch below that threshold. Banter never describes the vehicle entering a defined mode in response to a battery state of charge condition. Banter's external power supply is not a second-tier power source that takes over at a defined threshold,” the examiner respectfully disagrees and points Applicant to paragraph 0050 of Banter in which it is expressly taught that the controller of Banter is “programmed to identify when the vehicle’s main battery is incapable of supplying power sufficient to actuate the power locks, in order that the controller not operate concurrently with operation of the vehicle’s primary power lock actuating system” and that the controller of Banter is “programmed to effect locking/unlocking of the vehicle’s power locks only in the event that the vehicle’s main battery were established to be incapable of actuating the power locks. Establishing that condition could, in one exemplary embodiment, be effected by a signal from the controller in the event that the main battery reaches a charge level predetermined to be incapable of providing sufficient power to actuate the vehicle’s power locks.” Paragraph 0051 of Banter further teaches that the controller is programmed “to alternate to operation of the authenticating means and power locks via power from the rechargeable power supply.” Contrary to Applicant’s assertion, it is clear that Banter’s system coordinates two power sources based on a threshold value (i.e., “a charge level predetermined to be incapable of providing sufficient power”).
Regarding Applicant’s argument that “the Examiner's position that Banter discloses the threshold-based switching of original claim 2 was based on an inference: because Banter's system activates when the battery is incapable of supplying power, it must implicitly involve a threshold,” the examiner respectfully disagrees and points Applicant to the response above. A threshold is expressly taught by Banter.
Regarding Applicant’s arguments directed to the obviousness rejections of claim 5 and 17, the examiner respectfully notes that one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Krishnan was relied upon as a teaching for a potential location for the battery of Banter. The battery of Banter is, in fact, the primary power source for the door latch. As such, the combination of Banter and Krishnan makes obvious an arrangement in which a battery for a door latch is not accessible (e.g., to a person standing outside the vehicle and attempting to unlock and unlatch the door for entry into the vehicle) when the door is in the closed position and is accessible when the door is in an open position.
Regarding Applicant’s arguments directed to the obviousness rejections of claims 10, 14-16, and 18-20, the examiner respectfully disagrees.
Firstly, it is noted that portions of the arguments directed to the rejection of claim 10 are moot. The remainder of Applicant’s arguments directed to the rejection of claim 10 appear to argue claim limitations not currently present (e.g., “the examiner has identified no reference that teaches incorporating a logo into a wireless energy transfer access point for user guidance purposes”). Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
In response to Applicant’s arguments directed to the rejection of claims 14 and 16, the examiner points Applicant to similar arguments addressed above regarding claim 1.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. The examiner notes that the prior art cited on PTO-892 but not relied upon for this rejection discloses vehicle latch systems relevant in scope and structure to the claimed invention.
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Christine M Mills whose telephone number is (571) 272-8322. The examiner can normally be reached from Monday - Thursday, 7:30 - 5:30 EST.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Namrata Boveja, can be reached on (571) 272-8105. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is (571) 273-8300.
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/CHRISTINE M MILLS/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3675
