Prosecution Insights
Last updated: November 20, 2026
Application No. 19/013,746

VEHICLE SECURITY SYSTEM AND SECURITY METHOD

Final Rejection §103
Filed
Jan 08, 2025
Priority
Jan 19, 2024 — JP 2024-006620 +1 more
Examiner
DOAN, TRANG T
Art Unit
2431
Tech Center
2400 — Computer Networks
Assignee
Panasonic Holdings Corporation
OA Round
2 (Final)
83%
Grant Probability
Favorable
3-4
OA Rounds
1y 5m
Est. Remaining
99%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 83% — above average
83%
Career Allowance Rate
530 granted / 639 resolved
+24.9% vs TC avg
Strong +17% interview lift
Without
With
+16.6%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
3y 4m
Avg Prosecution
12 currently pending
Career history
664
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
15.3%
-24.7% vs TC avg
§103
35.4%
-4.6% vs TC avg
§102
19.6%
-20.4% vs TC avg
§112
19.9%
-20.1% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 639 resolved cases

Office Action

§103
DETAILED ACTION In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. This Office Action is in response to the communication filed on 8/19/2026. Claim 2 has been canceled. Claims 1 and 3-9 are pending for consideration. Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Response to Arguments Regarding the 101 rejection of claims 1-8, claims 1-8 have been amended to incorporate the ECU into the system of claim 1. Therefore, the rejection has been withdrawn Applicant's arguments filed 8/19/2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant asserts that the combination of previously cited prior arts fails to disclose “a plurality of communication monitors configured to execute a monitoring process for monitoring whether a received message is normal, wherein each of the first group and the second group includes a communication monitor among the plurality of communication monitors, wherein at least one of the first communication controller and the second communication controller executes a decision process to decide whether to send the received message directly to a destination, when direct communication to the destination is rejected, sends the message to at least one of the plurality of the communication monitors, and when the at least one of the plurality of communication monitors determines that the received message is normal, communication of the message to the destination is permitted”. Examiner respectfully disagrees with the Applicant’s assertions. The combination of Tschache in view of Omar discloses a plurality of communication monitors configured to execute a monitoring process for monitoring whether a received message is normal (Tschache: figures 5a and 5b and paragraphs 0098-0103, “The domain security layer may intercept (all) service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications”… “The domain security layer 552, 560 (communication layer) performs an access-control check…The domain security layer 572, 560 (communication layer) performs an access control-check”), wherein each of the first group and the second group includes a communication monitor among the plurality of communication monitors (Tschache: paragraphs 0097-0103, “domain security layers” … “The domain security layer may maintain strict isolation between the different execution environments (e.g., processes)”), wherein at least one of the first communication controller and the second communication controller executes a decision process to decide whether to send the received message directly to a destination, when direct communication to the destination is rejected, sends the message to at least one of the plurality of the communication monitors, and when the at least one of the plurality of communication monitors determines that the received message is normal, communication of the message to the destination is permitted (Tschache: paragraphs 0097-0103, “FIG. 5b illustrates the primary access-control check for two applications. Application A 550 invokes the “Light” service with the method “Set” (1). The domain security layer 552, 560 (communication layer) performs an access-control check against the service- security manifest of A and determines that the operation may be authorized (2). Therefore, the domain security layer 552 transforms the function call into a request for the network (3) 554 and returns no error for the operation (4). Application B 570 invokes the “Odometer” service with the method “Get” (5). The domain security layer 572, 560 (communication layer) performs an access control-check against the service-security manifest of B and determines that the operation may be denied (6). Therefore, the domain security layer 572, 570, 560, 562 generates an IDS event (7) and returns an error for the operation (8). Network layer 564 is not invoked.”). Therefore, the combination of Tschache in view of Omar does disclose the disputed limitations. Applicant’s arguments (i.e., “a plurality of communication monitors configured to execute a monitoring process for monitoring whether a received message is normal, wherein each of the first group and the second group includes a communication monitor among the plurality of communication monitors, wherein at least one of the first communication controller and the second communication controller executes a decision process to decide whether to send the received message directly to a destination, when direct communication to the destination is rejected, sends the message to at least one of the plurality of the communication monitors, and when the at least one of the plurality of communication monitors determines that the received message is normal, communication of the message to the destination is permitted”) with respect to claim(s) 1 and 3-9 have been considered but are moot. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. Claim(s) 1 and 3-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Tschache et al. (US 20210398364) (hereinafter Tschache) in view of Omar (US 12519864) (hereinafter). Regarding claim 1, Tschache discloses a vehicle security system in a vehicle, the vehicle security system comprising: a plurality of groups into which a plurality of software areas are separated for each virtual machine or each container (Tschache: Figure 5a PNG media_image1.png 632 454 media_image1.png Greyscale and paragraphs 0016-0020,0071-0077 and 0098, “ECU A 520 includes two SOA domains Al 522 and A2 524, which are executed on hardware 528 via a hypervisor 526. SOA domain Al 522 includes two vehicle applications, which are mutually separated, and an Operating System (OS) Kernel, which is separated from the vehicle applications, and which serves as domain security layer… SOA domain A2 524 also includes two vehicle applications, which are mutually separated, and a RunTime Environment (RTE), which is separated from the vehicle applications. In this case, the RTE serves as domain security layer, obtains the application manifests (e.g., the permission information manifests)”); a first communication controller that manages first communication related to a software area belonging to a first group of the plurality of groups (Tschache: paragraphs 0016-0020,0071-0077;0097, The “domain security layer” may be a domain-specific software layer that can observe and control all service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications that are in that SOA domain.; and 0098, fig. 5a, “Operating System (OS) Kernel, which is separated from the vehicle applications, and which serves as domain security layer. The OS Kernel obtains the application manifests (e.g., the permission information manifests), and includes an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) sensor… a RunTime Environment (RTE), which is separated from the vehicle applications. In this case, the RTE serves as domain security layer”;0099, “In each SOA domain, the domain security layer may be implemented outside the SOA applications, in a separate, protected execution environment, where none of the SOA applications can interfere with it. As an example, the domain security layer may be implemented in a more privileged processor mode (e.g., an OS kernel running in supervisor mode), in a controlling runtime environment (RTE), or in a separate process; 0102 The domain security layer may intercept (all) service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications that are in its domain and perform a primary access-control check on each such operation”; 0103, “The domain security layer 552, 560 (communication layer) performs an access-control check … the domain security layer 552 transforms the function call into a request for the network”; see also 0104-0112); a second communication controller that manages second communication related to a software area belonging to a second group of the plurality of groups (Tschache: paragraphs 0016-0020,0071-0077 and 0097, “The “domain security layer” may be a domain-specific software layer that can observe and control all service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications that are in that SOA domain”; and 0098, fig. 5a, “Operating System (OS) Kernel, which is separated from the vehicle applications, and which serves as domain security layer. The OS Kernel obtains the application manifests (e.g., the permission information manifests), and includes an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) sensor… a RunTime Environment (RTE), which is separated from the vehicle applications. In this case, the RTE serves as domain security layer”; 0099, “In each SOA domain, the domain security layer may be implemented outside the SOA applications, in a separate, protected execution environment, where none of the SOA applications can interfere with it. As an example, the domain security layer may be implemented in a more privileged processor mode (e.g., an OS kernel running in supervisor mode), in a controlling runtime environment (RTE), or in a separate process”; 0102, “The domain security layer may intercept (all) service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications that are in its domain and perform a primary access-control check on each such operation”; 0103, “The domain security layer 552, 560 (communication layer) performs an access-control check … the domain security layer 552 transforms the function call into a request for the network”; see also 0104-0112); and a plurality of communication monitors configured to execute a monitoring process for monitoring whether a received message is normal (Tschache: figures 5a and 5b and paragraphs 0098-0103, “The domain security layer may intercept (all) service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications”… “The domain security layer 552, 560 (communication layer) performs an access-control check…The domain security layer 572, 560 (communication layer) performs an access control-check”), wherein each of the first group and the second group includes a communication monitor among the plurality of communication monitors (Tschache: paragraphs 0097-0103, “domain security layers” … “The domain security layer may maintain strict isolation between the different execution environments (e.g., processes)”), wherein at least one of the first communication controller and the second communication controller executes a decision process to decide whether to send the received message directly to a destination, when direct communication to the destination is rejected, sends the message to at least one of the plurality of the communication monitors, and when the at least one of the plurality of communication monitors determines that the received message is normal, communication of the message to the destination is permitted (Tschache: paragraphs 0097-0103, “FIG. 5b illustrates the primary access-control check for two applications. Application A 550 invokes the “Light” service with the method “Set” (1). The domain security layer 552, 560 (communication layer) performs an access-control check against the service- security manifest of A and determines that the operation may be authorized (2). Therefore, the domain security layer 552 transforms the function call into a request for the network (3) 554 and returns no error for the operation (4). Application B 570 invokes the “Odometer” service with the method “Get” (5). The domain security layer 572, 560 (communication layer) performs an access control-check against the service-security manifest of B and determines that the operation may be denied (6). Therefore, the domain security layer 572, 570, 560, 562 generates an IDS event (7) and returns an error for the operation (8). Network layer 564 is not invoked.”). Tschache does not explicitly disclose the following limitation which is disclosed by Omar, a third communication controller that manages communication between the software area belonging to the first group and the software area belonging to the second group, separately from the first communication and the second communication (Omar: figure 1 and paragraphs 21, 79 and 32, “Alternatively, the device 10 may be comprised in an external entity”… “network gateways 100 as introduced in connection with FIG. 1, may comprise home gateways and automotive gateways (e.g. an access point inside a car).”; paragraph 32, “the processing module 14 may be configured to provide a software interface between the first software module and the second software module. … the software interface may comprise at least one element of the group of an API abstraction interface (e.g. an interface configured to provide an abstraction layer between an API call made by the second software module and an API of the first software module), a message passing abstraction interface, an inter-process communication abstraction interface, a socket communication abstraction interface and shared memory. For example, the software interface may provide an abstraction layer between (any) communication between the second software module and the first software module (e.g. the operating system of the device 10 and/or of the network gateway 100).”). Tschache and Omar are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor, access protection. Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, having the teachings of Tschache and Omar before him or her, to modify the system of Tschache to include a third communication controller that manages communication between a software area belonging to a first group and a software area belonging to a second group, separately from the first communication and the second communication of Omar. The suggestion/motivation for doing so would have been to limit an access between the second software module and the first software module (Omar: paragraph 32). Regarding claim 9, claim 9 discloses a method claim that is substantially equivalent to the system of claim 1. Therefore, the arguments set forth above with respect to claim 1 are equally applicable to claim 9 and rejected for the same reasons. Regarding claim 3, Tschache as modified discloses wherein when the message is received, each of the first communication controller and the second communication controller executes a determination process to determine whether the destination of the message received belongs to a group to which each of the first communication controller and the second communication controller belongs (Tschache: paragraphs 0016-0020,0071-0077;0097, The “domain security layer” may be a domain-specific software layer that can observe and control all service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications that are in that SOA domain.; and 0098, fig. 5a, “Operating System (OS) Kernel, which is separated from the vehicle applications, and which serves as domain security layer. The OS Kernel obtains the application manifests (e.g., the permission information manifests), and includes an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) sensor… a RunTime Environment (RTE), which is separated from the vehicle applications. In this case, the RTE serves as domain security layer”;0099, “In each SOA domain, the domain security layer may be implemented outside the SOA applications, in a separate, protected execution environment, where none of the SOA applications can interfere with it. As an example, the domain security layer may be implemented in a more privileged processor mode (e.g., an OS kernel running in supervisor mode), in a controlling runtime environment (RTE), or in a separate process; 0102 The domain security layer may intercept (all) service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications that are in its domain and perform a primary access-control check on each such operation”; 0103, “The domain security layer 552, 560 (communication layer) performs an access-control check … the domain security layer 552 transforms the function call into a request for the network”; see also 0104-0112). Tschache does not explicitly disclose the following limitation which is disclosed by Omar, when the destination does not belong to the group, each of the first communication controller and the second communication controller transfers the message to the third communication controller (Omar: paragraphs 34 and 51, “the processing module 14 may be configured to adjust an access limit and/or a monitoring of the access from the second software module to the first software module through the software interface based on an input of an operator. This may enable the operator (e.g. a user of the network gateway) to adjust the access rights or monitoring assigned to the second software module based on a compromise between functionality, privacy and security and/or based on a trust towards a provider of the second software module.”). Tschache and Omar are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor, access protection. Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, having the teachings of Tschache and Omar before him or her, to modify the system of Tschache to include when a destination does not belong to a group, each of a first communication controller and a second communication controller transfers a message to the third communication controller of Omar. The suggestion/motivation for doing so would have been to limit an access between the second software module and the first software module (Omar: paragraph 32). Regarding claim 4, Tschache as modified discloses wherein when a result of the determination process indicates that the destination of the message belongs to the group to which each of the first communication controller and the second communication controller belongs, each of the first communication controller and the second communication controller executes the decision process to decide whether to send the message directly to the destination (Tschache: paragraphs 0016-0020,0071-0077;0097, The “domain security layer” may be a domain-specific software layer that can observe and control all service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications that are in that SOA domain.; and 0098, fig. 5a, “Operating System (OS) Kernel, which is separated from the vehicle applications, and which serves as domain security layer. The OS Kernel obtains the application manifests (e.g., the permission information manifests), and includes an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) sensor… a RunTime Environment (RTE), which is separated from the vehicle applications. In this case, the RTE serves as domain security layer”;0099, “In each SOA domain, the domain security layer may be implemented outside the SOA applications, in a separate, protected execution environment, where none of the SOA applications can interfere with it. As an example, the domain security layer may be implemented in a more privileged processor mode (e.g., an OS kernel running in supervisor mode), in a controlling runtime environment (RTE), or in a separate process; 0102 The domain security layer may intercept (all) service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications that are in its domain and perform a primary access-control check on each such operation”; 0103, “The domain security layer 552, 560 (communication layer) performs an access-control check … the domain security layer 552 transforms the function call into a request for the network”; see also 0104-0112). Regarding claim 5, Tschache as modified discloses wherein the plurality of software areas are logically divided into a plurality of partitions different from divisions by the plurality of groups, and in the decision process, when a partition to which a sender of the message belongs and a partition to which the destination of the message belongs are different from each other, direct communication to the destination is rejected (Tschache: paragraphs 0016-0020,0071-0077;0097, The “domain security layer” may be a domain-specific software layer that can observe and control all service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications that are in that SOA domain.; and 0098, fig. 5a, “Operating System (OS) Kernel, which is separated from the vehicle applications, and which serves as domain security layer. The OS Kernel obtains the application manifests (e.g., the permission information manifests), and includes an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) sensor… a RunTime Environment (RTE), which is separated from the vehicle applications. In this case, the RTE serves as domain security layer”;0099, “In each SOA domain, the domain security layer may be implemented outside the SOA applications, in a separate, protected execution environment, where none of the SOA applications can interfere with it. As an example, the domain security layer may be implemented in a more privileged processor mode (e.g., an OS kernel running in supervisor mode), in a controlling runtime environment (RTE), or in a separate process; 0102 The domain security layer may intercept (all) service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications that are in its domain and perform a primary access-control check on each such operation”; 0103, “The domain security layer 552, 560 (communication layer) performs an access-control check … the domain security layer 552 transforms the function call into a request for the network”; see also 0104-0112). Regarding claim 6, Tschache as modified discloses wherein each of the first group and the second group includes, as the plurality of software areas, a first area, a second area, and a third area according to a degree of trustworthiness indicating a degree of possibility of being tampered with by an attacker, the degree of trustworthiness of the first area is lower than the degree of trustworthiness of the second area and the degree of trustworthiness of the third area, the degree of trustworthiness of the third area is higher than the degree of trustworthiness of the first area and the degree of trustworthiness of the second area, and the second area includes the communication monitor that monitors communication to the third area (Tschache: Figure 5a and paragraphs 0016-0020,0069, 0071-0077; and 0097, “Some approaches may be unsuitable for these requirements. For example, a central authorization ECU which holds and distributes access right lists to other ECUs may provide a Single point of failure, primary attack target”; and 0098, fig. 5a, “Operating System (OS) Kernel, which is separated from the vehicle applications, and which serves as domain security layer. The OS Kernel obtains the application manifests (e.g., the permission information manifests), and includes an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) sensor… a RunTime Environment (RTE), which is separated from the vehicle applications. In this case, the RTE serves as domain security layer”;0099, “In each SOA domain, the domain security layer may be implemented outside the SOA applications, in a separate, protected execution environment, where none of the SOA applications can interfere with it. As an example, the domain security layer may be implemented in a more privileged processor mode (e.g., an OS kernel running in supervisor mode), in a controlling runtime environment (RTE), or in a separate process; 0102 The domain security layer may intercept (all) service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications that are in its domain and perform a primary access-control check on each such operation”; 0103, “The domain security layer 552, 560 (communication layer) performs an access-control check … the domain security layer 552 transforms the function call into a request for the network”; see also 0104-0112). Regarding claim 7, Tschache as modified discloses wherein a device including the first group and a device including the second group are different from each other (Tschache: paragraphs 0016-0020,0058, and 0071-0077;0097, “The interface 12 may correspond to one or more inputs and/or outputs for receiving and/or transmitting information, which may be in digital (bit) values according to a specified code, within a module, between modules or between modules of different entities. In embodiments, the computation module 14 may be implemented using one or more computation units, one or more processing units, one or more computation devices, one or more processing devices”; and 0098, fig. 5a, “Operating System (OS) Kernel, which is separated from the vehicle applications, and which serves as domain security layer. The OS Kernel obtains the application manifests (e.g., the permission information manifests), and includes an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) sensor… a RunTime Environment (RTE), which is separated from the vehicle applications. In this case, the RTE serves as domain security layer”;0099, “In each SOA domain, the domain security layer may be implemented outside the SOA applications, in a separate, protected execution environment, where none of the SOA applications can interfere with it. As an example, the domain security layer may be implemented in a more privileged processor mode (e.g., an OS kernel running in supervisor mode), in a controlling runtime environment (RTE), or in a separate process; 0102 The domain security layer may intercept (all) service registrations and all service invocations of the SOA applications that are in its domain and perform a primary access-control check on each such operation”; 0103, “The domain security layer 552, 560 (communication layer) performs an access-control check … the domain security layer 552 transforms the function call into a request for the network”; see also 0104-0112). Regarding claim 8, Tschache does not explicitly disclose the following limitation which is disclosed by Omar, wherein the third communication controller in the device including the first group and the third communication controller in the device including the second group manage communication between the software area belonging to the first group and the software area belonging to the second group by cooperating with each other (Omar: paragraphs 34 and 51, “the processing module 14 may be configured to adjust an access limit and/or a monitoring of the access from the second software module to the first software module through the software interface based on an input of an operator. This may enable the operator (e.g. a user of the network gateway) to adjust the access rights or monitoring assigned to the second software module based on a compromise between functionality, privacy and security and/or based on a trust towards a provider of the second software module.”). Tschache and Omar are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor, access protection. Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, having the teachings of Tschache and Omar before him or her, to modify the system of Tschache to include wherein a third communication controller in a device including a first group and a third communication controller in the device including a second group manage communication between a software area belonging to the first group and a software area belonging to the second group by cooperating with each other of Omar. The suggestion/motivation for doing so would have been to limit an access between the second software module and the first software module (Omar: paragraph 32). Conclusion Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to TRANG T DOAN whose telephone number is (571)272-0740. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday 7-4 ET. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Lynn D Feild can be reached on (571)272-2092. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /TRANG T DOAN/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2431
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Prosecution Timeline

Jan 08, 2025
Application Filed
Jun 02, 2026
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §103
Jul 28, 2026
Interview Requested
Aug 06, 2026
Applicant Interview (Telephonic)
Aug 18, 2026
Examiner Interview Summary
Aug 19, 2026
Response Filed
Oct 27, 2026
Final Rejection mailed — §103 (current)

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Prosecution Projections

3-4
Expected OA Rounds
83%
Grant Probability
99%
With Interview (+16.6%)
3y 4m (~1y 5m remaining)
Median Time to Grant
Moderate
PTA Risk
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