DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Objections
Claim 3 is objected to because of the following informalities: Recommend replacing "cannot be" with "is not". "cannot be" is not a definitive term. . Appropriate correction is required.
Claim 7 is objected to because of the following informalities: "a computing device" has already been recited before in claim 1. Recommend correcting to "the computing device". Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 1-7 and 9-20 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable by Lopatin (EP 3808143B1) in view of Dover (US 20230129728 A1).
Regarding Claim 1, Lopatin discloses a method comprising:
obtaining, by a first device, a private key associated with the first device, wherein the private key is known to the first device and unknown to other devices ([0024] “The mobile device 102 can use an associated private key to decrypt the encrypted location data. The decrypted location data can then be processed by the mobile device 102 to determine a most probable location for the wireless accessory 201”; [0041] “The mobile device can then generate a public/private key pair and one or more additional shared secrets (block 402)”), private key is unknown in other devices;
generating, by the first device, a public key based on the obtained private key (([0025] “In one embodiment, during the public key exchange (310) the mobile device 102 and the wireless accessory 201 exchange public keys of public key pairs generated by the device and the accessory. In one embodiment the public key exchange (310) is a one-way transfer, in which the mobile device 102 transmits a public key of a public/private key pair to the wireless accessory 201”; “[0041] The mobile device can then generate a public/private key pair and one or more additional shared secrets (block 402)”), public/private keys are based on public/private pair which corresponds to each other;
providing, by the first device, the public key and a [symmetric] key to a second device ([0025] “”In one embodiment, during the public key exchange (310) the mobile device 102 and the wireless accessory 201 exchange public keys of public key pairs generated by the device and the accessory. In one embodiment the public key exchange (310) is a one-way transfer, in which the mobile device 102 transmits a public key of a public/private key pair to the wireless accessory 201”; [0035] “The mobile device 102 can generate the set of public keys based on the secret information held by the mobile device 102 and the wireless accessory 201 and the timestamps over which the mobile device 102 wishes to receive location data”, [0041] “The mobile device can then generate a public/private key pair and one or more additional shared secrets (block 402). The device can then send the public key and one or more additional shared secrets to the wireless accessory (block 403).” the first device, mobile device 102, transmits the key to the second device, wireless accessory 201;
generating, by the first device, a respective ephemeral key for each time period of a future time window, wherein each respective ephemeral key is generated based on the [private key and the symmetric] key ([[0035] “The mobile device 102 can generate the set of public keys based on the secret information held by the mobile device 102 and the wireless accessory 201 and the timestamps over which the mobile device 102 wishes to receive location data”), note that the first device, mobile device 102, generates the ephemeral key, which is interpreted as a cryptographic key used for encrypting and decrypting information wherein the key is short-lived and used for a specific time period of a future time window; the ephemeral key is generated based the first device, mobile device 102, based on the shared cryptographic session key, or shared secreted established during public key exchange (310);
obtaining, by the first device, a set of hash values based on each respective ephemeral key ([0035] “The mobile device 102, upon loading the device locator UI 204, can send a request (330) for location data to the device locator server 203. The request 330 can include a set of public keys or public key hashes, which can serve as beacon identifiers for the beacon data. The mobile device 102 can generate the set of public keys based on the secret information held by the mobile device 102 and the wireless accessory 201 and the timestamps over which the mobile device 102 wishes to receive location data. In one embodiment the set of public keys is the sequence of public keys Pi that are generated based on the anti-tracking secret. The sequence of public keys Pi corresponds to a matching sequence of private keys di. The mobile device 102 can generate the sequence of public keys, as well as the corresponding sequence of public keys di, where i is a counter or timestamp. In one embodiment, the mobile device 102 can generate and send the previous 24 hours of public keys (or hashes of the 24 hours of public keys) within the request 330. If no data is found for 24 hours of public keys, the mobile device 102 can send generate keys for an earlier period, back to a pre-determined location data retention limit”), note that ephemeral key is interpreted as keys generated based on the timestamps over which the mobile device 102 receives the location data, same function as the ephemeral key in the instant application – See Applicant’s paragraph [0058];
providing, by the first device, the obtained set of hash values to a computing device of a platform (([0035] “The mobile device 102, upon loading the device locator UI 204, can send a request (330) for location data to the device locator server 203. The request 330 can include a set of public keys or public key hashes, which can serve as beacon identifiers for the beacon data. The mobile device 102 can generate the set of public keys based on the secret information held by the mobile device 102 and the wireless accessory 201 and the timestamps over which the mobile device 102 wishes to receive location data. In one embodiment the set of public keys is the sequence of public keys Pi that are generated based on the anti-tracking secret. The sequence of public keys Pi corresponds to a matching sequence of private keys di. The mobile device 102 can generate the sequence of public keys, as well as the corresponding sequence of public keys di, where i is a counter or timestamp. In one embodiment, the mobile device 102 can generate and send the previous 24 hours of public keys (or hashes of the 24 hours of public keys) within the request 330. If no data is found for 24 hours of public keys, the mobile device 102 can send generate keys for an earlier period, back to a pre-determined location data retention limit”);
receiving, by the first device, a notification of a secure message of the second device for the first device ([0025] “Fig. 3 illustrates a system 300 for pairing and locating a wireless accessory, according to embodiments described herein. In one embodiment a mobile device 102 of a user of the wireless accessory 201 can present an accessory pairing UI 302 by which the user can pair the mobile device 102 with the wireless accessory 201. During an initial pairing (305) between the mobile device 102 and the wireless accessory, a public key exchange (310) can be performed between the mobile device and the wireless accessory. In one embodiment, during the public key exchange (310) the mobile device 102 and the wireless accessory 201 exchange public keys of public key pairs generated by the device and the accessory”; [0026] “After the wireless accessory 201 has been paired with the mobile device 102, the wireless accessory 201 can periodically broadcast a beacon signal 301 that includes device status information and a beacon identifier. In one embodiment the beacon identifier is a public key derived from a shared secret that is established during the public key exchange (310)”), note that the first device, electronic device or mobile device (102), receives secure messages, interpreted as a beacon identifier for the signal or a visual indicator of a secure message, from the second device, the wireless accessory 201;
wherein the secure message is encoded based on a hash value of the set of hash values corresponding to a current time period of the future time window ([0034] “Hashes of the beacon identifier/public key of an accessory can be sent along with encrypted location data”; [0035] “ In one embodiment, the mobile device 102 can generate and send the previous 24 hours of public keys (or hashes of the 24 hours of public keys) within the request 330. If no data is found for 24 hours of public keys, the mobile device 102 can send generate keys for an earlier period, back to a pre-determined location data retention limit”; ([0043] “In one embodiment, location data sent by the server in response to the request will be encrypted using the public key transmitted as the beacon identifier of the wireless accessory. The electronic device can decrypt the encrypted location data received by the server using the private key generated during the initial pairing with the wireless accessory (block 414); [Claim 1] “A method implemented on an electronic device (102) and comprising: sending hashes of the set of public keys to a server (203) with a request to return location data that corresponds with the set of public keys”, the secure message is received by the mobile device 102 wherein the secure message, beacon identifier, is decrypted; and
accessing, by the first device, content of the secure message based on the [symmetric key and the private] key ([0045] “If the data is returned by the server (block 423, "yes"), the electronic device can decrypt the location data received from the server using the private key that corresponds with the set of public keys”), first device is interpreted as the electronic device, 102, see reference’s paragraph [0041].
While Lopatin teaches an ephemeral key based on the shared cryptographic session key; Lopatin does not explicitly disclose an ephemeral key is generated based on the private key and the symmetric key. Dover further teaches generating an ephemeral key based on a private key and a symmetric key ([0066] “Although, in some examples, symmetric keys (e.g., “first” symmetric keys) generated from maintained private keys and received public keys may be directly implemented in the techniques disclosed herein, in some other examples, such symmetric keys may applied as inputs to further key generation, such as the generation of ephemeral keys (e.g., “second” symmetric keys, ephemeral symmetric keys). For example, at each of 325 and 330, or some other successive operations, each of the host system 105-b and the memory system 110-b may generate respective ephemeral keys, which may be relatively temporary in nature. In some examples, the generation of such ephemeral keys may be duration-initiated, such as a generation that is initiated upon a timer value (e.g., at the host system 105-b, at the memory system 110-b, or both) satisfying a threshold”)”).
Lopatin and Dover are analogous in systems that implement cryptographic keys to secure access to a device. Therefore, it would be obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Lopatin to incorporate the teachings of Dover to implement generating another key using a symmetric key and a private key Doing so would strengthen cryptographic access and determine appropriate course of action (Dover [0011] “However, some techniques for maintaining authenticity of system identities, including some cryptographic protection techniques, may be vulnerable to identification information or authentication information being stolen, cloned, or otherwise insecurely implemented, or may not have been implemented in the context of signaling between host systems and memory systems themselves for establishing authenticity of specific devices (e.g., in accordance with unique hardware or device identities)”).
Regarding the non-transitory computer readable storage medium claim 15, the
claim recite similar limitations as the computer method claim 1, therefore, rejected based
on the same rationale as claim 1.
Regarding claim 2, Lopatin further discloses the method of claim 1, wherein accessing the content of the secure message based on the [symmetric key and the private] key
([0045] “If the data is returned by the server (block 423, "yes"), the electronic device can decrypt the location data received from the server using the private key that corresponds with the set of public keys”) comprises:
determining a time period when the notification of the secure message is received ([0047] “The public key can be derived based on a shared secret and a timestamp determined based on a clock or time keeping device of the wireless accessory. The wireless accessory can then transmit a beacon signal at a first frequency, where the beacon signal includes the public key (block 503). The first frequency can vary, and in one embodiment is one beacon every two seconds”); and
initiating a decryption operation to decrypt the content of the secure message using the [private ephemeral] key ([0037] “In some embodiments, if a location query is to be performed via the web-based interface from an electronic device, such as a laptop or desktop device, keys to enable the decryption of the location data may be required to be sent to the electronic device. In one embodiment, decryption keys for the location data may be sent to the server that provides the web-based interface to enable the server to decrypt location data, at least while the location data is being viewed through the web-based interface”).
While Lopatin teaches an ephemeral key based on the shared cryptographic session key; Lopatin does not explicitly disclose generating a private ephemeral key based on the private and symmetric key. Dover further teaches a private key and a symmetric key [0066] “Although, in some examples, symmetric keys (e.g., “first” symmetric keys) generated from maintained private keys and received public keys may be directly implemented in the techniques disclosed herein, in some other examples, such symmetric keys may applied as inputs to further key generation, such as the generation of ephemeral keys (e.g., “second” symmetric keys, ephemeral symmetric keys). For example, at each of 325 and 330, or some other successive operations, each of the host system 105-b and the memory system 110-b may generate respective ephemeral keys, which may be relatively temporary in nature. In some examples, the generation of such ephemeral keys may be duration-initiated, such as a generation that is initiated upon a timer value (e.g., at the host system 105-b, at the memory system 110-b, or both) satisfying a threshold”)”).
Lopatin and Dover are analogous in systems that implement cryptographic keys to secure access to a device. Therefore, it would be obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Lopatin to incorporate the teachings of Dover to implement generating another key using a symmetric key and a private key Doing so would strengthen cryptographic access and determine appropriate course of action (Dover [0011] “However, some techniques for maintaining authenticity of system identities, including some cryptographic protection techniques, may be vulnerable to identification information or authentication information being stolen, cloned, or otherwise insecurely implemented, or may not have been implemented in the context of signaling between host systems and memory systems themselves for establishing authenticity of specific devices (e.g., in accordance with unique hardware or device identities)”).
Regarding the non-transitory computer readable storage medium claim 16, the
claim recite similar limitations as the computer method claim 2, therefore, rejected based
on the same rationale as claim 2.
Regarding claim 3, Lopatin and Doherty disclose all the limitations listed in claim 1 above; in responsive to determining that the decryption operation cannot be completed using the key, generating an additional key when the notification of the secure message is received.
Lopatin further discloses in responsive to determining that the decryption operation cannot be completed using the [private] ephemeral key, generating an additional [private] ephemeral key for a prior time period to the time period when the notification of the secure message is received; ([0046] “If data is not returned by the server (block 423, "no") the electronic device can generate a second set of public keys that were included within a beacon signal broadcast by the wireless accessory during a second period (block 424). The second period can be the 24, 48, or another number of hours before the first period. The electronic device can then request for the device locator server to send data that corresponds with the second set of public keys (block 425). If, in response to the request, data is returned by the server (block 426, "yes"), method 420 can proceed to block 429, in which the electronic device decrypts the received data. If data is not returned by the server (block 426, "no"), or the server sends a reply that indicates data is not available, method 420 includes for the electronic device can widen the search time by requesting successively older time periods until the max period is reached (block 427)”; [0065] “The electronic device associated with the device locator UI 204 can generate a set of public keys that the wireless accessory will broadcast with the beacon signal during a future time period (e.g., next 24 hours, next 48 hours, etc.)”;
initiating the decryption operation to decrypt the content of the secure message using the [additional private] ephemeral key (([0037] “In some embodiments, if a location query is to be performed via the web-based interface from an electronic device, such as a laptop or desktop device, keys to enable the decryption of the location data may be required to be sent to the electronic device. In one embodiment, decryption keys for the location data may be sent to the server that provides the web-based interface to enable the server to decrypt location data, at least while the location data is being viewed through the web-based interface”).).
While Lopatin teaches an ephemeral key based on the shared cryptographic session key; Lopatin does not explicitly disclose generating an additional private ephemeral key. Dover further discloses an additional private ephemeral key ([0066] “Although, in some examples, symmetric keys (e.g., “first” symmetric keys) generated from maintained private keys and received public keys may be directly implemented in the techniques disclosed herein, in some other examples, such symmetric keys may applied as inputs to further key generation, such as the generation of ephemeral keys (e.g., “second” symmetric keys, ephemeral symmetric keys). For example, at each of 325 and 330, or some other successive operations, each of the host system 105-b and the memory system 110-b may generate respective ephemeral keys, which may be relatively temporary in nature. In some examples, the generation of such ephemeral keys may be duration-initiated, such as a generation that is initiated upon a timer value (e.g., at the host system 105-b, at the memory system 110-b, or both) satisfying a threshold”);
Lopatin and Dover are analogous in systems that implement cryptographic keys to secure access to a device. Therefore, it would be obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Lopatin to incorporate the teachings of Dover to implement generating a key using an additional private ephemeral key. Doing so would strengthen cryptographic access and determine appropriate course of action (Dover [0011] “However, some techniques for maintaining authenticity of system identities, including some cryptographic protection techniques, may be vulnerable to identification information or authentication information being stolen, cloned, or otherwise insecurely implemented, or may not have been implemented in the context of signaling between host systems and memory systems themselves for establishing authenticity of specific devices (e.g., in accordance with unique hardware or device identities)”).
Regarding the non-transitory computer readable storage medium claim 17, the
claim recite similar limitations as the computer method claim 3, therefore, rejected based
on the same rationale as claim 3.
Regarding claim 4, Lopatin further discloses that the method of claim 1, wherein the first device is a client device and the second device is a beacon device ([0015] “Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a network operating environment 100 for mobile devices, according to an embodiment. The network operating environment 100 includes multiple mobile devices, such as mobile device 102A and mobile device 102B. The mobile devices 102A-102B can each be any electronic device capable of communicating with a wireless network and a wireless accessory device”; first device is interpreted as electronic/mobile device 102 which receives information from a client, [0032] “The beacon signal 301 transmitted by the wireless accessory 201 can be detected by a set of finder devices 303, which are other electronic devices that can receive the beacon signal transmitted by the wireless accessory and are transmit location and other data associated with the beacon signal 301 to the device locator server 203 via the wide area network 114”), second device, wireless accessory 201, is a beacon device.
Regarding the non-transitory computer readable storage medium claim 18, the
claim recite similar limitations as the computer method claim 4, therefore, rejected based
on the same rationale as claim 4.
Regarding claim 5, Lopatin further discloses the method of claim 1, wherein the content of the secure message indicates a geographic region of the second device ([0024] “The mobile device 102 can use an associated private key to decrypt the encrypted location data. The decrypted location data can then be processed by the mobile device 102 to determine a most probable location for the wireless accessory 201. In various embodiments, the most probable location for the wireless accessory 201 can be determined by triangulation from multiple received locations and using other data, such as a beacon signal RSSI associated with each location and timestamp or UWB ranging data included within the location data”), note that the content of the secure message received from the first device, i.e. mobile device 102, indicating the location of the second device, i.e. wireless accessory 201.
Regarding the non-transitory computer readable storage medium claim 19, the
claim recite similar limitations as the computer method claim 5, therefore, rejected based
on the same rationale as claim 5.
Regarding claim 6, Lopatin further discloses the method of claim 5, wherein the content of the secure message indicates a set of geographic coordinates of a third device located within the indicated geographic region during a time period when the third device detected a signal emitted by the second device ([0032] “The beacon signal 301 transmitted by the wireless accessory 201 can be detected by a set of finder devices 303, which are other electronic devices that can receive the beacon signal transmitted by the wireless accessory and are transmit location and other data associated with the beacon signal 301 to the device locator server 203 via the wide area network 114. In one embodiment the set of finder devices 303 include variants of the mobile device 102 or can be other types of electronic devices. The set of finder devices 303 can include a variant of the finder device 202 of Fig. 2 and can determine similar location determination techniques. For example, the set of finder devices can perform operations (320) to correlate the beacon signal 301 received from the wireless accessory 201 with a device location associated with the finder device”, [0021] “The beacon signal can be detected by a finder device 202, which is locally proximate to the wireless accessory 201… The timestamp for a determined location for the finder device 202 can be correlated with a timestamp for which a beacon signal was received to associate a geographic location with a received beacon signal.”, Note that the third device, finder devices 303, detects a signal emitted by the second device, wireless accessory 201 with a device location, or geographic coordinates, associated with the finder device.
Regarding the non-transitory computer readable storage medium claim 20, the
claim recite similar limitations as the computer method claim 6, therefore, rejected based
on the same rationale as claim 6.
Regarding claim 7, Lopatin further discloses the method of claim 6, wherein the notification of the secure message is received from a computing device of a platform, the computing device comprising at least one of a server machine of the platform or the third device ([0032] “The beacon signal 301 transmitted by the wireless accessory 201 can be detected by a set of finder devices 303, which are other electronic devices that can receive the beacon signal transmitted by the wireless accessory and are transmit location and other data associated with the beacon signal 301 to the device locator server 203 via the wide area network 114”, interpreted as the device receiving a notification of the secure message, indicating a wireless beacon has been detected – see claim 8 of reference; [0035] “The mobile device 102, upon loading the device locator UI 204, can send a request (330) for location data to the device locator server 203. The request 330 can include a set of public keys or public key hashes, which can serve as beacon identifiers for the beacon data. The mobile device 102 can generate the set of public keys based on the secret information held by the mobile device 102 and the wireless accessory 201 and the timestamps over which the mobile device 102 wishes to receive location data”; [0038] “The device locator server 203 can then notify the mobile device 102 if any location data is received that correspond with a key in the set of future public keys” Note that the computing device, mobile device 102, comprises a server machine of the platform, or the device locator server 203.
Regarding claim 9, Lopatin further discloses a system comprising: a memory (See paragraphs [0079-0082], figs 2,3, and 12); and
a set of one or more processing devices coupled to the memory (See paragraphs [0079-0082, figures 2,3, and 12), wherein the set of one or more processing devices is to perform operations comprising (See paragraphs [0079-0082, figures 2,3, and 12):
receiving a public key [and a symmetric key] from a device, wherein the public key is generated based on a private key that is known to the device and unknown to other devices ([0041] “[0041] “The mobile device can then generate a public/private key pair and one or more additional shared secrets (block 402). The device can then send the public key and one or more additional shared secrets to the wireless accessory (block 403)” ); [0042] “After generating the public/private keypair and one or more additional shared secrets, the mobile device can store public/private key pair to keystore (block 404)”; and
broadcasting a signal comprising the generated public ephemeral key for the first time period (([0026] After the wireless accessory 201 has been paired with the mobile device 102, the wireless accessory 201 can periodically broadcast a beacon signal 301 that includes device status information and a beacon identifier. In one embodiment the beacon identifier is a public key derived from a shared secret that is established during the public key exchange (310). Additionally, the wireless accessory 201 can periodically perform a public key derivation (315) to generate a new public key and begin broadcasting the new public key as the beacon identifier. The public key is a K-byte key, with a new K-byte key generated every M minutes. The value K and M can vary between embodiments. In one embodiment, a K value of 28 bytes is used. In one embodiment, a K value of 27 bytes is used”); [0047] “If the wireless accessory does not receive a response from the owner device (block 504, "no"), the wireless accessory can continue beaconing at the first frequency (block 506)”), see reference’s block 506 for first frequency signal based on the public ephemeral key generated from a first time period; note that ephemeral key to mobile device 102 which is interpreted as a cryptographic key used for encrypting and decrypting information wherein the key is short-lived and used for a specific time period of a future time window; and
generating a public ephemeral key for a first time period based on the [public key and the symmetric] key ([0043] “The electronic device is aware of the frequency in which the wireless accessory is to generate new public keys and, using a shared secret generated with the wireless accessory, can generate a set of public keys that correspond with the keys that were generated by the wireless accessory over the first period… The first period can be, for example, a previous 24 hours. The electronic device is aware of the frequency in which the wireless accessory is to generate new public keys and, using a shared secret generated with the wireless accessory, can generate a set of public keys that correspond with the keys that were generated by the wireless accessory over the first period. ”; [0045] “As shown in Fig. 4C, method 420 includes operations that can be performed if the device locator server does not have location data to provide to the electronic device in response to a request. The electronic device can generate a first set of public keys that were included within a beacon signal broadcast by wireless accessory during a first period (block 421). The first period can be, for example, 24 hours, although other initial search periods can be used. The electronic device can perform a subsequent operation to request the device locator server to send location data that corresponds with first set of public keys (block 422)”), see reference’s block 421 for first public ephemeral key is generated for a first time period;
While Lopatin teaches a public ephemeral key based on the shared cryptographic session key; Lopatin does not explicitly disclose generating a public ephemeral key based on the public and the symmetric key. Dover further teaches generating a public ephemeral key based on a public key and a symmetric key ([0058] “In some implementations, the exchange of public keys may support the generation of symmetric keys at each of the host system 105-a and the memory system 110-a using such techniques as a Diffie-Hellman key exchange or elliptic-curve techniques, so that a symmetric secret can be shared between device and host without exposing the private keys of the respective systems. In some implementations, an asymmetric Diffie-Hellman key exchange can be performed between the host system 105-a and the memory system 110-a to generate symmetric keys that are then used to enable better performance at the host system 105-a or the memory system 110-a for authentication, encryption, or both. Further, ephemeral symmetric keys can be derived using a same algorithm shared by the host system 105-a and the memory system 110-a to make it more difficult for an adverse actor to extract or replicate such keys, based on various techniques for duration-initiated or event-initiated generation of ephemeral keys”; [0066] “Although, in some examples, symmetric keys (e.g., “first” symmetric keys) generated from maintained private keys and received public keys may be directly implemented in the techniques disclosed herein, in some other examples, such symmetric keys may applied as inputs to further key generation, such as the generation of ephemeral keys (e.g., “second” symmetric keys, ephemeral symmetric keys). For example, at each of 325 and 330, or some other successive operations, each of the host system 105-b and the memory system 110-b may generate respective ephemeral keys, which may be relatively temporary in nature. In some examples, the generation of such ephemeral keys may be duration-initiated, such as a generation that is initiated upon a timer value (e.g., at the host system 105-b, at the memory system 110-b, or both) satisfying a threshold”)”).
Lopatin and Dover are analogous in systems that implement cryptographic keys to secure access to a device. Therefore, it would be obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Lopatin to incorporate the teachings of Dover to implement generating another key using a symmetric key and a public key Doing so would strengthen cryptographic access and determine appropriate course of action (Dover [0011] “However, some techniques for maintaining authenticity of system identities, including some cryptographic protection techniques, may be vulnerable to identification information or authentication information being stolen, cloned, or otherwise insecurely implemented, or may not have been implemented in the context of signaling between host systems and memory systems themselves for establishing authenticity of specific devices (e.g., in accordance with unique hardware or device identities)”).
Regarding claim 10, Lopatin further discloses wherein the operations further comprise: upon detecting that the first time period has expired, generating an updated public ephemeral key for a second time period based on the [public key and the symmetric] key ([0049] Method 500 additionally includes for the wireless device, while beaconing, to rotate the public key every M minutes, where the value of M can vary across embodiments and/or based on the device state. Based on a timer expiration, counter, or another mechanism, the wireless accessory can determine whether the accessory has entered a new key period (block 508). While the wireless accessory has not entered a new key period (block 508, "no"), the accessory can continue beaconing using the current public key (block 510). When the wireless accessory detects that it has entered a new key period (block 508, "yes") the accessory can derive a new public key using the current timestamp (block 509). In one embodiment the new public key can be derived using an existing public key, a timestamp, and an anti-tracking secret), Note that the public key is a K-byte key, with a new K-byte key generated every M minutes, or whenever it is expired, updates the public ephemeral key for the second timestamp; and
broadcasting an additional signal comprising the updated public ephemeral key ([0026] “After the wireless accessory 201 has been paired with the mobile device 102, the wireless accessory 201 can periodically broadcast a beacon signal 301 that includes device status information and a beacon identifier. In one embodiment the beacon identifier is a public key derived from a shared secret that is established during the public key exchange (310). Additionally, the wireless accessory 201 can periodically perform a public key derivation (315) to generate a new public key and begin broadcasting the new public key as the beacon identifier”; [0035] “In one embodiment the set of public keys is the sequence of public keys Pi that are generated based on the anti-tracking secret. The sequence of public keys Pi corresponds to a matching sequence of private keys di. The mobile device 102 can generate the sequence of public keys, as well as the corresponding sequence of public keys di, where i is a counter or timestamp”, note that the updated public ephemeral key, interpreted as the beacon identifier or a public key derived from a shared secret, is periodically broadcasted after the first period expires based on a counter or timestamp; [0048] “After transmitting a beacon signal, the wireless accessory can listen for a response from the owner device. If the wireless signal receives a response from the owner device (block 504, "yes"), the wireless accessory can enter a near-owner state (block 505) and begin to transmit the beacon signal at a second, lower frequency (block 507)”, note that updated variant of K value of 27 or 28 bytes derived from the public ephemeral key and time period determines the beacon length used to transmit the beacon signal at a second, lower frequency; [0048] “After transmitting a beacon signal, the wireless accessory can listen for a response from the owner device. If the wireless signal receives a response from the owner device (block 504, "yes"), the wireless accessory can enter a near-owner state (block 505) and begin to transmit the beacon signal at a second, lower frequency (block 507). If the wireless accessory does not receive a response from the owner device (block 504, "no"), the wireless accessory can continue beaconing at the first frequency (block 506)”), note that the updated ephemeral key broadcast after the first period expired; lower frequency (block 507) is an additional second signal.
While Lopatin teaches an updated public ephemeral key based on the shared cryptographic session key; Lopatin does not explicitly disclose generating an updated public ephemeral key based on the public and symmetric key. Dover further teaches generating an updated ephemeral key based on a public key and a symmetric key ([0058] “In some implementations, the exchange of public keys may support the generation of symmetric keys at each of the host system 105-a and the memory system 110-a using such techniques as a Diffie-Hellman key exchange or elliptic-curve techniques, so that a symmetric secret can be shared between device and host without exposing the private keys of the respective systems. In some implementations, an asymmetric Diffie-Hellman key exchange can be performed between the host system 105-a and the memory system 110-a to generate symmetric keys that are then used to enable better performance at the host system 105-a or the memory system 110-a for authentication, encryption, or both. Further, ephemeral symmetric keys can be derived using a same algorithm shared by the host system 105-a and the memory system 110-a to make it more difficult for an adverse actor to extract or replicate such keys, based on various techniques for duration-initiated or event-initiated generation of ephemeral keys”; [0066] “Although, in some examples, symmetric keys (e.g., “first” symmetric keys) generated from maintained private keys and received public keys may be directly implemented in the techniques disclosed herein, in some other examples, such symmetric keys may applied as inputs to further key generation, such as the generation of ephemeral keys (e.g., “second” symmetric keys, ephemeral symmetric keys). For example, at each of 325 and 330, or some other successive operations, each of the host system 105-b and the memory system 110-b may generate respective ephemeral keys, which may be relatively temporary in nature. In some examples, the generation of such ephemeral keys may be duration-initiated, such as a generation that is initiated upon a timer value (e.g., at the host system 105-b, at the memory system 110-b, or both) satisfying a threshold”)”).
Lopatin and Dover are analogous in systems that implement cryptographic keys to secure access to a device. Therefore, it would be obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Lopatin to incorporate the teachings of Dover to implement generating another key using a symmetric key and a public key Doing so would strengthen cryptographic access and determine appropriate course of action (Dover [0011] “However, some techniques for maintaining authenticity of system identities, including some cryptographic protection techniques, may be vulnerable to identification information or authentication information being stolen, cloned, or otherwise insecurely implemented, or may not have been implemented in the context of signaling between host systems and memory systems themselves for establishing authenticity of specific devices (e.g., in accordance with unique hardware or device identities)”).
11. Regarding claim 11, Lopatin further discloses the system of claim 10, wherein generating the public ephemeral key for the first time period comprises (([0045] “As shown in Fig. 4C, method 420 includes operations that can be performed if the device locator server does not have location data to provide to the electronic device in response to a request. The electronic device can generate a first set of public keys that were included within a beacon signal broadcast by wireless accessory during a first period (block 421). The first period can be, for example, 24 hours, although other initial search periods can be used. The electronic device can perform a subsequent operation to request the device locator server to send location data that corresponds with first set of public keys (block 422)”), see reference’s block 421 for first public ephemeral key is generated for a first time period;
providing the [public key, the symmetric] key, and an indication of the first time period as an input to a cryptographic function ([0045] “As shown in Fig. 4C, method 420 includes operations that can be performed if the device locator server does not have location data to provide to the electronic device in response to a request. The electronic device can generate a first set of public keys that were included within a beacon signal broadcast by wireless accessory during a first period (block 421). The first period can be, for example, 24 hours, although other initial search periods can be used. The electronic device can perform a subsequent operation to request the device locator server to send location data that corresponds with first set of public keys (block 422)”; [0047] “The public key can be derived based on a shared secret and a timestamp determined based on a clock or time keeping device of the wireless accessory. The wireless accessory can then transmit a beacon signal at a first frequency, where the beacon signal includes the public key (block 503). The first frequency can vary, and in one embodiment is one beacon every two seconds”, the set of keys can be derived or provided as an input to the cryptographic function to determine the device location data;
obtaining one or more outputs of the cryptographic function ([0048] “After transmitting a beacon signal, the wireless accessory can listen for a response from the owner device. If the wireless signal receives a response from the owner device (block 504, "yes"), the wireless accessory can enter a near-owner state (block 505) and begin to transmit the beacon signal at a second, lower frequency (block 507). If the wireless accessory does not receive a response from the owner device (block 504, "no"), the wireless accessory can continue beaconing at the first frequency (block 506)”), the function that determines the new K-byte key; and outputs “yes” or “no” from the function; and
extracting the public ephemeral key from the obtained one or more outputs of the cryptographic function ([0049] “While the wireless accessory has not entered a new key period (block 508, "no"), the accessory can continue beaconing using the current public key (block 510). When the wireless accessory detects that it has entered a new key period (block 508, "yes") the accessory can derive a new public key using the current timestamp (block 509). In one embodiment the new public key can be derived using an existing public key, a timestamp, and an anti-tracking secret”, extract the existing or new public ephemeral key based on the outputs “yes” or “no”).
Lopatin teaches generating a public ephemeral key derived from the secret information, a shared key; however, Lopatin does not explicitly teach generating a public ephemeral key based on the public key and symmetric key. Dover further teaches generating a public ephemeral key based on a public key and a symmetric key ([0058] “In some implementations, the exchange of public keys may support the generation of symmetric keys at each of the host system 105-a and the memory system 110-a using such techniques as a Diffie-Hellman key exchange or elliptic-curve techniques, so that a symmetric secret can be shared between device and host without exposing the private keys of the respective systems. In some implementations, an asymmetric Diffie-Hellman key exchange can be performed between the host system 105-a and the memory system 110-a to generate symmetric keys that are then used to enable better performance at the host system 105-a or the memory system 110-a for authentication, encryption, or both. Further, ephemeral symmetric keys can be derived using a same algorithm shared by the host system 105-a and the memory system 110-a to make it more difficult for an adverse actor to extract or replicate such keys, based on various techniques for duration-initiated or event-initiated generation of ephemeral keys”; [0066] “Although, in some examples, symmetric keys (e.g., “first” symmetric keys) generated from maintained private keys and received public keys may be directly implemented in the techniques disclosed herein, in some other examples, such symmetric keys may applied as inputs to further key generation, such as the generation of ephemeral keys (e.g., “second” symmetric keys, ephemeral symmetric keys). For example, at each of 325 and 330, or some other successive operations, each of the host system 105-b and the memory system 110-b may generate respective ephemeral keys, which may be relatively temporary in nature. In some examples, the generation of such ephemeral keys may be duration-initiated, such as a generation that is initiated upon a timer value (e.g., at the host system 105-b, at the memory system 110-b, or both) satisfying a threshold”)”).
Lopatin and Dover are analogous in systems that implement cryptographic keys to secure access to a device. Therefore, it would be obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified Lopatin to incorporate the teachings of Dover to implement generating another key using a symmetric key and a public key Doing so would strengthen cryptographic access and determine appropriate course of action (Dover [0011] “However, some techniques for maintaining authenticity of system identities, including some cryptographic protection techniques, may be vulnerable to identification information or authentication information being stolen, cloned, or otherwise insecurely implemented, or may not have been implemented in the context of signaling between host systems and memory systems themselves for establishing authenticity of specific devices (e.g., in accordance with unique hardware or device identities)”).
12. Regarding claim 12, Lopatin further discloses the system of claim 11, wherein the cryptographic function is an asymmetric key generation function ([0041] “The mobile device can then generate a public/private key pair and one or more additional shared secrets (block 402). The device can then send the public key and one or more additional shared secrets to the wireless accessory (block 403). A variety of key generation techniques can be used. In one embodiment, a variant of ECDH is used to generate a public key pair for encryption. In one embodiment, the one or more additional shared secrets can include an anti-tracking secret that enables the wireless accessory to derive a new public key based on an existing public key”, Note that a public/private key pair is the same as asymmetric key cryptography - See applicant’s paragraph [0060]).
13. Regarding claim 13, Lopatin further discloses the system of claim 9, wherein the system is comprised in a beacon device, and wherein the device is a client device associated with a user of a platform ([0032] “The beacon signal 301 transmitted by the wireless accessory 201 can be detected by a set of finder devices 303, which are other electronic devices that can receive the beacon signal transmitted by the wireless accessory and are transmit location and other data associated with the beacon signal 301 to the device locator server 203 via the wide area network 114”), finder device 303 or beacon device transmits the data to the client or locator server 203.
14. Regarding claim 14, Lopatin further discloses the system of claim 9, further comprising:
one or more sensors configured to collect data pertaining to an environment of the system ([0086] “In one embodiment, a sensor controller 1244 is included to monitor, control, and/or processes data received from one or more of the motion sensor 1210, light sensor 1212, proximity sensor 1214, or other sensors 1216. The sensor controller 1244 can include logic to interpret sensor data to determine the occurrence of one of more motion events or activities by analysis of the sensor data from the sensors”), and
wherein the broadcast signal further comprises the data collected by the one or more sensors during the first time period ([0020] “The beacon signal can also convey information about the wireless accessory 201, such as a beacon type, device classification, battery level. In one embodiment the beacon signal can also convey device status, such as a lost status, alarm status, or a near-owner status. The beacon signal can also include information that specifies battery life, charging status, and/or other status information. The lost status can indicate that the wireless accessory 201 has determined itself to be lost or has been placed into a lost state by the owner of the device. The alarm status can indicate that the wireless accessory 201 was placed in a state that the device should trigger an alarm if moved from a current location. The near-owner status can indicate that the wireless accessory 201 has detected the nearby presence of the mobile device 102 associated with the owner of the accessory”; [0043] “ In response to launching the device locator UI, the electronic device, which can be a mobile device as described herein, or another electronic device associated with the same cloud services account as the mobile electronic device, can perform an operation to generate a set of public keys that were included within a beacon signal broadcast by a wireless accessory during a first period (block 412)”), sensors is interpreted as certain statuses; e.g., alarm status.
Claim(s) 8 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Lopatin (EP 3808143 B1) in view of Dover (US 20230129728 A1) and AHN (US 20220069984 A1).
Regarding claim 8, Lopatin disclose all of the limitations of claim 1 listed above, including obtaining the private key. However, Lopatin does not explicitly disclose a random value generator; AHN further discloses, wherein obtaining the private key comprises: extracting a random value from one or more outputs of a random value generator ([0023] “According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the group action may be performed according to H.sub.BQ.sub.ABQ.sub.AB(C)=M, Q.sub.AB is a symmetric key of the encryption execution object and the decryption execution object, H.sub.B may be a private key of the decryption execution object, M may be a message space, and C is a ciphertext space”; [0024] “According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the encryption key generator may include a random number generator PRNG configured to generate a one-time pseudorandom number through a key derivation function KDF using a plurality of parameters, and a permutation generator configured to generate a one-time pseudorandom permutation PRP through the key derivation function KDF and to provide the one-time pseudorandom permutation PRP to a key generation module”).
Lopatin and AHN are analogous in systems that implement cryptographic keys to secure access to a device. Therefore, it would be obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have modified to incorporate the teachings of AHN to implement a random value generator. Doing so would strengthen cryptographic access and determine appropriate course of action regarding a specific communication time (AHN [0001] “Accordingly, a security problem in terms of exposure of secret information as conventional cryptographic technology uses the same message space and the same specific value each time may be overcome”).
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to VIVIAN D. HO whose telephone number is (571)272-9957. The examiner can normally be reached M- TH 9:00 - 6:00; F 9:00-1:00.
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/VIVIAN D HO/Examiner, Art Unit 2497
/BASSAM A NOAMAN/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2497
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