Prosecution Insights
Last updated: November 04, 2026
Application No. 19/040,454

ISOLATED TEST ENVIRONMENT FOR RANSOMWARE ANALYSIS

Final Rejection §103§112
Filed
Jan 29, 2025
Priority
Jan 29, 2024 — provisional 63/626,467
Examiner
CHAO, MICHAEL W
Art Unit
2492
Tech Center
2400 — Computer Networks
Assignee
Mimic Networks Inc.
OA Round
2 (Final)
70%
Grant Probability
Favorable
3-4
OA Rounds
1y 5m
Est. Remaining
99%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 70% — above average
70%
Career Allowance Rate
392 granted / 559 resolved
+12.1% vs TC avg
Strong +40% interview lift
Without
With
+39.5%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
3y 3m
Avg Prosecution
16 currently pending
Career history
597
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
14.6%
-25.4% vs TC avg
§103
45.0%
+5.0% vs TC avg
§102
15.1%
-24.9% vs TC avg
§112
20.3%
-19.7% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 559 resolved cases

Office Action

§103 §112
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . This action is in response to the claims filed 8/20/2026. Claims 1-20 are pending. Claim 1 (a method) and 13 (a machine) are independent. Response to Arguments Applicant’s arguments, see page 13, filed 8/20/2026, with respect to the rejection(s) of claim(s) 1 under Ettema et al. US 2017/0019425 (published 2017), in view of Vejmelka US 2017/0169214 (published 2017) have been fully considered and are persuasive. Ettema in view of Vejmelka does not disclose: “Isolated from network communication external to the isolated test environment One or more processes that executed under control of the selected ransomware variant and one or more effects of the selected ransomware variant on the one or more enterprise applications as deployed” Therefore, the rejection has been withdrawn. However, upon further consideration, a new ground(s) of rejection is made in view of Ettema et al. US 2017/0019425 (published 2017), in view of Vejmelka US 2017/0169214 (published 2017), and Fellows et al. US 2023/0011004 (filed 2022). Applicant's arguments filed 8/20/2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. On pages 9-10 of the remarks Applicant highlights the disclosure of Applicant’s figure 5 to assert that the terminology of claims 11 and 20 is not ambiguous under 112(b): “wherein determining the one or more resource dependencies is based on the test kernel telemetry data.” These remarks are not persuasive. See for example Applicant’s claim 9 requiring: “determining one or more resource dependencies of the one or more enterprise applications; obtaining a set of resources to deploy in the isolated test environment based on the one or more resource dependencies”. The resource dependencies are obtained from the production environment for the purpose of instantiating the test environment. The claim limitation of claims 11 and 20 that obtains dependencies from the test environment is backwards. Per Applicant’s specification ¶ 26: “The kernel telemetry data may be used to determine resource dependencies in order to generate the enterprise replica. In some embodiments, the enterprise replica may include an enterprise application and application dependencies identified by analyzing the kernel telemetry data collected in the live production environment or the application evaluation environment.” On page 11 Applicant asserts that “Ettema does not disclose "deploying the one or more enterprise applications on the one or more server systems." Even if virtual clones are provisioned for computers in the enterprise network, Ettema merely describes emulating "various attributes, IP address, OS type and version, and/or services on certain ports."” This argument is not persuasive: Ettema discloses: (“the virtual clone can be configured to synchronize the installed software (including versions thereof) and various configuration settings of the target device.” Ettema ¶ 86) (“device profile data (e.g., Host Information Profile (HIP) data) received from the agent (e.g., Global Protect (GP) agent or another agent) can be used to automatically select a host VM configuration from a VM library (e.g., selecting a VM image that most closely matches the installed OS/version, installed application software/version, and/or other HIP data of the target device) to provision a new VM instance to clone the target device based on the HIP data (e.g., further customization may also be performed to configure the VM instance to match relevant HIP data and/or other configuration or network related values/settings). As such, the decoy host can be configured to execute the same version of OS and same versions of application software as the target host. In addition, the decoy host can be configured with the correct configuration settings to match such configuration settings/state of the target device (e.g., how long the device has been live/up and running, IP address, proxy settings, default printer, LDAP server, default DNS server, and/or configuration settings/state of the target device).” Ettema ¶ 87) Thus, the replica includes the software. On page 12 of the remarks Applicant states: “While Ettema's virtual clones 626-632 are isolated from the enterprise network 610, they are not isolated from external network communication”. This argument is persuasive Examiner notes that the sole support for network isolation appears to be Applicant’s ¶ 72 which discusses isolating the malware as a remedial action post detection. See the updated rejection as detailed below. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. Claims 11 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention. Claims 11 and 20 require: “wherein determining the one or more resource dependencies is based on the test kernel telemetry data.” Dependencies determine what to deploy to the test system, per claim 9: “wherein determining the one or more resource dependencies comprises… obtaining a set of resources to deploy in the isolated test environment based on the one or more resource dependencies;” Dependencies cannot be determined based on the test environment, which as built based on the dependencies. Per Applicant’s specification ¶ 26: “The kernel telemetry data may be used to determine resource dependencies in order to generate the enterprise replica. In some embodiments, the enterprise replica may include an enterprise application and application dependencies identified by analyzing the kernel telemetry data collected in the live production environment or the application evaluation environment.” Claims 11 and 20 should read “based on the As presently worded the test kernel is generated based on itself. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. Claim(s) 1-4, 9, 11-14, 18, and 20 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Ettema et al. US 2017/0019425 (published 2017), in view of Vejmelka US 2017/0169214 (published 2017), and Fellows et al. US 2023/0011004 (filed 2022). As to claims 1 and 13 Ettema discloses a method/machine comprising: {as to the processors and memory of claim 13, see Ettema Fig. 2 and associated disclosure} {as to claim 13: select one or more enterprise applications to run in an isolated test environment} (“Assume that a malware (e.g., potentially malicious content, such as a download during a web session or an attachment to an email, or a link in a web page, email, and/or file, etc.) is directed to Alice's device.” Ettema ¶ 44) assigning one or more enterprise applications to one or more server systems to be provisioned in an isolated test environment; (“the device profile of the target device(s) of the enterprise network can be determined using network data and/or an endpoint presence (e.g., an agent executed locally on the device) to detect the environment of the target hosts in order to synchronize or “clone” relevant aspects of the device and network to provide for a honey network” Ettema ¶ 86) generating an enterprise replica in the isolated test environment by provisioning the one (“device profile data (e.g., Host Information Profile (HIP) data) received from the agent (e.g., Global Protect (GP) agent or another agent) can be used to automatically select a host VM configuration from a VM library (e.g., selecting a VM image that most closely matches the installed OS/version, installed application software/version, and/or other HIP data of the target device) to provision a new VM instance to clone the target device based on the HIP data (e.g., further customization may also be performed to configure the VM instance to match relevant HIP data and/or other configuration or network related values/settings). As such, the decoy host can be configured to execute the same version of OS and same versions of application software as the target host. In addition, the decoy host can be configured with the correct configuration settings to match such configuration settings/state of the target device (e.g., how long the device has been live/up and running, IP address, proxy settings, default printer, LDAP server, default DNS server, and/or configuration settings/state of the target device).” Ettema ¶ 87) or more server systems (“if the user is associated with multiple target devices that can be used to access the malware email, then one or more (e.g., a subset or all) of such multiple target devices can be selected for cloning and each can be used for intelligent detonation for further security analysis” Ettema ¶ 121) and deploying the one or more enterprise applications on the one or more server systems in the isolated test environment; (“the virtual clone can be configured to synchronize the installed software (including versions thereof) and various configuration settings of the target device.” Ettema ¶ 86. “can be performed on an appliance or a computing device that is locally connected to or in local network communication with the target enterprise network (e.g., performed using a device that is also a member of the target enterprise network). In another example implementation, generation of a honey network configuration to emulate a target network environment can be performed using a cloud security service, such as shown in FIG. 4” Ettema ¶ 61.) deploying a kernel monitoring component on the one or more server systems in the isolated test environment, the kernel monitoring component configured to generate kernel telemetry data describing aspects of a plurality of system calls initiated by processes executing on the one or more server systems; (“a virtual environment (e.g., an instrumented virtual environment, which is sometimes also referred to as using a sandbox analysis of malware samples that can be instrumented with various user level and/or kernel level hooks for monitoring behaviors of programs executing and/or monitoring various network activities, which can be unknown threats) and observing their behavior,” Ettema ¶ 30) deploying a selected while the enterprise replica executes the one or more enterprise applications (“As such, the decoy host can be configured to execute the same version of OS and same versions of application software as the target host.” Ettema ¶ 87) determining an effect of the selected ransomware variant on the enterprise replica based on analyzing the kernel telemetry data; (“behavior, including network and/or other activities, can be monitored and logged using a honey network log 746. For example, the intelligent detonation of the email malware sample in the virtual client of the target Client A can be monitored to detect, for example, C&C network traffic, which can be correlated to the malware sample.” Ettema ¶ 124. See also ¶ 152. “Once a file is deemed malicious (e.g., a malware sample is deemed to be malware), protections can be automatically generated using, for example, a cloud security service (e.g., implementing a dynamic security analysis of malware samples in a scalable cloud-based, virtual environment to directly observe the behavior of potentially malicious malware and exploits) to be delivered to subscribers of the cloud security service” Ettema ¶ 31) wherein the method is performed by one or more processors. (see Ettema Fig. 2 and associated disclosure) Ettema does not disclose specifically targeting ransomware. Isolated from network communication external to the isolated test environment One or more processes that executed under control of the selected ransomware variant and one or more effects of the selected ransomware variant on the one or more enterprise applications as deployed Vejmelka discloses that ransomware is a species of malware (“Examples of such malware include software viruses, trojan horses, rootkits, ransomware etc. A common mechanism used by malware developers is to embed the malware into a file that is made to appear desirable to user, or is downloaded and executed when the user visits a web site.” Vejmelka ¶ 3) Vejmelka further discloses logging sandboxed malware using a kernel driver and utilizing the saved logs to detect malicious behaviors, Vejmelka ¶¶ 20-21. A person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention would have combined Ettema with Vejmelka by checking for the species of malware, including ransomware, using information logged by the kernel as disclosed in Vejmelka. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention would have combined Ettema with Vejmelka in order to detect the various forms of malicious files that threated users of information technology systems, Vejmelka ¶ 3, Ettema ¶ 30. Ettema in view of Vejmelka does not disclose: Isolated from network communication external to the isolated test environment One or more processes that executed under control of the selected ransomware variant and one or more effects of the selected ransomware variant on the one or more enterprise applications as deployed Fellows discloses: sandboxes (“the method for automated cloning may include configuring the clone creator to set up one or more sandbox environments. Each sandbox environment may be populated with one or more virtual machines to implement the clone network” Fellows ¶ 17. “enable independent testing of the machine learning algorithms and their effectiveness, and further determine the effect of each possible cyber threat on the clone network without disrupting the reference network” Fellows ¶ 37. “once the normal pattern of life has been learned by the models, the network module, the endpoint agent coordinator module, and/or the researcher module may readily identify the anomalies in the normal pattern of life and thus any unusual behaviors from the devices, users, or other aspects of the network and its associated host/endpoint computing devices.” Fellows ¶ 94) Ransomware (“The cyber threat can be a simple single-stage attack or a complicated multistage attack, such as a ransomware. ” Fellows ¶ 49) Isolated from network communication external to the isolated test environment (“(c) simple and default actions such as actions to prompt user, quarantine a suspicious process (from network access and process as well as internal computing device's process and filesystem), shutdown the offending processes, and so on).” Fellows ¶ 80. “the cyber security sandbox environment disclosed herein clones the entire network of virtual machines, including a copy of the cyber security appliance, the machine learning algorithms, the user devices and the IP packet traffic, and then isolates the clone network, and unleashes the cyber threats in the clone network.” Fellows ¶ 38. Note Applicant’s ¶ 72) One or more processes that executed under control of the selected ransomware variant (“(b) relationships between processes (parent/child, shared files, IPC, etc.),” Fellows ¶ 80) and one or more effects of the selected ransomware variant on the one or more enterprise applications as deployed (“including monitoring at least one or more of: (a) process behavior (use of network, filesystem, etc.),” Fellows ¶ 80. “at least one of more of: (a) audit system details, for example installed operating systems, installed software, software versioning, security update status, etc.; (b) gather system usage activity such as shutdown periods, login failures, file modifications, network connections, etc.; and/or (c) record use of external devices or transfer protocols (e.g., USB usage, Bluetooth usage, email usage, etc.); ” Fellows ¶ 80) A person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention would have combined Ettema in view of Vejmelka with Fellows by including the AI baseline/anomaly learner/detector in the honey network of Ettema for detecting relationships between the enterprise processes of Ettema (Ettema ¶ 87) and effects of the malware on said processes. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Ettema in view of Vejmelka with Fellows in order to create a fully automated malicious detection system for cloned networks and provide proactive awareness of vulnerabilities of specific organizations, Fellows ¶ 5. As to claims 2 and 14 Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows discloses the method/machine of claims 1 and 13 and further discloses: wherein the kernel telemetry data associates, for each system call of the plurality of system calls, a process invoking the system call, (“sandbox 110 can intercept system calls and store information about the system calls in log 112. The log 112 may include data indicating the operating system calls and call parameters invoked by the executable file when running in sandbox 110.” Vejmelka ¶ 20) an operation type of the system call, (“the log file may contain text strings identifying the name of the system call and the type or class of the arguments to the system call.” Vejmelka ¶ 20) and a target of the system call. (“the log file may contain text strings identifying the name of the system call and the type or class of the arguments to the system call.” Vejmelka ¶ 20.) As to claim 3 Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows discloses the method/machine of claims 1 and 13 and further discloses: Wherein the one or more effects of the selected ransomware variant includes at least one of Processes that were started or stopped; System configuration data that was modified; (“at least one of more of: (a) audit system details, for example installed operating systems, installed software, software versioning, security update status, etc.; (b) gather system usage activity such as shutdown periods, login failures, file modifications, network connections, etc.; and/or (c) record use of external devices or transfer protocols (e.g., USB usage, Bluetooth usage, email usage, etc.); ” Fellows ¶ 80) Networking requests associated with ransomware activity; and (“including monitoring at least one or more of: (a) process behavior (use of network, filesystem, etc.),” Fellows ¶ 80.) Files or directories that were accessed, encrypted, or exfiltrated. (“including monitoring at least one or more of: (a) process behavior (use of network, filesystem, etc.),” Fellows ¶ 80.) As to claim 4 Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows discloses the method/machine of claims 1 and 13 and further discloses: selecting one or more server parameters for the one or more server systems; (“The device profile data of a target device (e.g., in which malware was determined to be directed to the target device) can be used to synchronize with the honey network implementation such that the device profile data can be used, for example, to deploy a decoy host (e.g., a virtual clone) that can be used for detonating malware” Ettema ¶ 87) wherein the one or more server systems are provisioned based on the one or more server parameters. (“an agent is deployed to devices (e.g., endpoints) on the enterprise network. … The agent can be configured to automatically collect data from the device, which is referred to herein as device profile data. For example, device profile data can include installed software and versions, and various configuration data (e.g., Operating System (OS) configuration settings, such as logged in user, browser proxy settings, network settings, and/or various other OS, device, and/or network related settings).” Ettema ¶ 87). As to claims 9 and 18 Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows discloses the method/machine of claims 1 and 13 and further discloses: determining one or more resource dependencies of the one or more enterprise applications; (“an agent is deployed to devices (e.g., endpoints) on the enterprise network…. For example, device profile data can include installed software and versions, and various configuration data (e.g., Operating System (OS) configuration settings, such as logged in user, browser proxy settings, network settings, and/or various other OS, device, and/or network related settings). ” Ettema ¶ 87) obtaining a set of resources to deploy in the isolated test environment based on the one or more resource dependencies; and deploying the set of resources in the isolated test environment. (“device profile data (e.g., Host Information Profile (HIP) data) received from the agent (e.g., Global Protect (GP) agent or another agent) can be used to automatically select a host VM configuration from a VM library (e.g., selecting a VM image that most closely matches the installed OS/version, installed application software/version, and/or other HIP data of the target device) to provision a new VM instance to clone the target device based on the HIP data (e.g., further customization may also be performed to configure the VM instance to match relevant HIP data and/or other configuration or network related values/settings). As such, the decoy host can be configured to execute the same version of OS and same versions of application software as the target host.” Ettema ¶ 87) As to claims 11 and 20 Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows discloses the method/machine of claims 9 and 18 and further discloses: deploying one or more test server systems running the one or more applications in an application evaluation environment; and (“a virtual environment (e.g., an instrumented virtual environment” Ettema ¶ 30) deploying the kernel monitoring component on the one or more test server systems, (“a virtual environment (e.g., an instrumented virtual environment, which is sometimes also referred to as using a sandbox analysis of malware samples that can be instrumented with various user level and/or kernel level hooks for monitoring behaviors of programs executing and/or monitoring various network activities, which can be unknown threats) and observing their behavior,” Ettema ¶ 30) wherein the kernel monitoring component generates test kernel telemetry data for a fourth (note that there is no second or third plurality of system calls; claims 11 and 20 are not dependent on those claims.) plurality of system calls initiated by processes executing on the one or more test server systems; (“device profile data (e.g., Host Information Profile (HIP) data) received from the agent (e.g., Global Protect (GP) agent or another agent) can be used to automatically select a host VM configuration from a VM library (e.g., selecting a VM image that most closely matches the installed OS/version, installed application software/version, and/or other HIP data of the target device) to provision a new VM instance to clone the target device based on the HIP data (e.g., further customization may also be performed to configure the VM instance to match relevant HIP data and/or other configuration or network related values/settings). As such, the decoy host can be configured to execute the same version of OS and same versions of application software as the target host.” Ettema ¶ 87. See also Vejmelka ¶¶ 20-21) wherein determining the one or more resource dependencies is based on the test kernel telemetry data. (“behavior, including network and/or other activities, can be monitored and logged using a honey network log 746. For example, the intelligent detonation of the email malware sample in the virtual client of the target Client A can be monitored to detect, for example, C&C network traffic, which can be correlated to the malware sample.” Ettema ¶ 124. See also ¶ 152.) As to claim 12 Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows discloses the method/machine of claims 1 and 13 and further discloses: deploying environment monitoring instrumentation in the isolated test environment, the environment monitoring instrumentation configured to collect resource consumption telemetry data corresponding to resource usage by the kernel monitoring component; and (“device profile data (e.g., Host Information Profile (HIP) data) received from the agent (e.g., Global Protect (GP) agent or another agent) can be used to automatically select a host VM configuration from a VM library (e.g., selecting a VM image that most closely matches the installed OS/version, installed application software/version, and/or other HIP data of the target device) to provision a new VM instance to clone the target device based on the HIP data (e.g., further customization may also be performed to configure the VM instance to match relevant HIP data and/or other configuration or network related values/settings). As such, the decoy host can be configured to execute the same version of OS and same versions of application software as the target host.” Ettema ¶ 87. See also Vejmelka ¶¶ 20-21) determining an effect of the kernel monitoring component on the enterprise replica based on the resource consumption telemetry data. “Once a file is deemed malicious (e.g., a malware sample is deemed to be malware), protections can be automatically generated using, for example, a cloud security service (e.g., implementing a dynamic security analysis of malware samples in a scalable cloud-based, virtual environment to directly observe the behavior of potentially malicious malware and exploits) to be delivered to subscribers of the cloud security service” Ettema ¶ 31) Claim(s) 5-7, 15, and 16 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Ettema et al. US 2017/0019425 (published 2017), in view of Vejmelka US 2017/0169214 (published 2017), Fellows et al. US 2023/0011004 (filed 2022), and Graves, US 9,003,231 (published 2015). As to claims 5 and 15 Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows discloses the method/machine of claims 1 and 13 and further discloses: generating a second enterprise replica in a second isolated test environment by provisioning the one or more server systems and deploying the one or more enterprise applications with at least one configuration difference from the enterprise replica; (“if the user is associated with multiple target devices that can be used to access the malware email, then one or more (e.g., a subset or all) of such multiple target devices can be selected for cloning and each can be used for intelligent detonation for further security analysis” Ettema ¶ 121) deploying the kernel monitoring component and the selected ransomware variant (“each can be used for intelligent detonation for further security analysis” Ettema ¶ 121) in the second isolated test environment, the kernel monitoring component configured to generate second kernel telemetry data for a second plurality of system calls initiated by processes executing on the one or more server systems in the second isolated test environment; (“a virtual environment (e.g., an instrumented virtual environment, which is sometimes also referred to as using a sandbox analysis of malware samples that can be instrumented with various user level and/or kernel level hooks for monitoring behaviors of programs executing and/or monitoring various network activities, which can be unknown threats) and observing their behavior,” Ettema ¶ 30) determining a second effect of the selected ransomware variant on the enterprise replica in the second isolated test environment based on analyzing the second kernel telemetry data; and (“behavior, including network and/or other activities, can be monitored and logged using a honey network log 746. For example, the intelligent detonation of the email malware sample in the virtual client of the target Client A can be monitored to detect, for example, C&C network traffic, which can be correlated to the malware sample.” Ettema ¶ 124. See also ¶ 152. “Once a file is deemed malicious (e.g., a malware sample is deemed to be malware), protections can be automatically generated using, for example, a cloud security service (e.g., implementing a dynamic security analysis of malware samples in a scalable cloud-based, virtual environment to directly observe the behavior of potentially malicious malware and exploits) to be delivered to subscribers of the cloud security service” Ettema ¶ 31) Etterma in view of Vejmelka and Fellows does not explicitly disclose: identifying a set of differences between the effect and the second effect that are attributable to the at least one configuration difference. Graves discloses: identifying a set of differences between the effect and the second effect that are attributable to the at least one configuration difference. (“FIG. 8 is a diagram illustrating a side-by-side comparison for two example testing sandbox environment instances. …. This approach allows user 194 to easily compare the results of separate tests of first testing sandbox environment instance 806A and second testing sandbox environment instance 806B, each carrying out a test in its own sandbox.” Graves cols. 9-10, bridging paragraph.) A person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention would have combined Etterma in view of Vejmelka and Fellows with Graves by comparing the multiple tests of Ettema with the test comparison of Graves. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date would have combined Etterma in view of Vejmelka and Fellows with Graves in order to provide user’s with information on the differences between the respective test environments, Graves cols. 9-10, that are instantiated for the user, Ettema ¶ 121. As to claims 6 and 16 Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows discloses the method/machine of claims 5 and 15 and further discloses: wherein the at least one configuration difference comprises deploying a ransomware defense component (this is just a monitoring element as described in Applicant’s specification ¶ 55) on at least one of the one or more server systems in the second isolated test environment. (“These instrumented virtual machine (VM) environments, which can include one or more VM instances (126 and 128), can include, for example, various network activity logging, user level hooks, and/or kernel level hooks in the emulated execution environment to facilitate the monitoring of various network and/or program related activities and/or behaviors during emulation using the virtual environment (e.g., instrumented VM environments, such as described above)” Ettema ¶ 55). As to claim 7 Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows discloses the method/machine of claims 5 and 15 and further discloses: wherein the at least one configuration difference includes (“if the user is associated with multiple target devices that can be used to access the malware email, then one or more (e.g., a subset or all) of such multiple target devices can be selected for cloning and each can be used for intelligent detonation for further security analysis” Ettema ¶ 121) at least one of: one or more different application parameters for the one or more enterprise applications; and one or more different system parameters for the one or more server systems. (“device profile data (e.g., Host Information Profile (HIP) data) received from the agent (e.g., Global Protect (GP) agent or another agent) can be used to automatically select a host VM configuration from a VM library (e.g., selecting a VM image that most closely matches the installed OS/version, installed application software/version, and/or other HIP data of the target device) to provision a new VM instance to clone the target device based on the HIP data (e.g., further customization may also be performed to configure the VM instance to match relevant HIP data and/or other configuration or network related values/settings). As such, the decoy host can be configured to execute the same version of OS and same versions of application software as the target host. In addition, the decoy host can be configured with the correct configuration settings to match such configuration settings/state of the target device (e.g., how long the device has been live/up and running, IP address, proxy settings, default printer, LDAP server, default DNS server, and/or configuration settings/state of the target device).” Ettema ¶ 87) Claim(s) 8 and 17 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Ettema et al. US 2017/0019425 (published 2017), in view of Vejmelka US 2017/0169214 (published 2017), Fellows et al. US 2023/0011004 (filed 2022), and Dubin, US 2023/0394146 (published 2023). As to claims 8 and 17 Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows discloses the method/machine of claims 1 and 13 and further discloses: deploying a ransomware defense component on at least one of the one or more server systems in the isolated test environment, the ransomware defense component configured to: (“These instrumented virtual machine (VM) environments, which can include one or more VM instances (126 and 128), can include, for example, various network activity logging, user level hooks, and/or kernel level hooks in the emulated execution environment to facilitate the monitoring of various network and/or program related activities and/or behaviors during emulation using the virtual environment (e.g., instrumented VM environments, such as described above)” Ettema ¶ 55). analyze the kernel telemetry data; (“a virtual machine environment for performing a dynamic analysis for advanced threats as further described herein.” Ettema ¶ 53. See also Ettema ¶¶ 116-130) based on analyzing the kernel telemetry data, determine in response to determining that the particular process executed under control of the ransomware agent, initiate one or more response measures. (“during/after the completion of analysis of a malicious event or malware sample by the virtual honey network (honeynet) environment, all instrumented data collected from the VM hosts and VM manager are processed to deliver any/all of the following: ….and (3) host-based and network-based protections (e.g., host-based or network-based signatures) or indicators of compromise that can be used by the operator to detect the same or similar attack/attacker on the real production network.” Ettema ¶ 129). Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows does not explicitly disclose: a particular process executed under control of a ransomware agent Dubin discloses: a particular process executed under control of a ransomware agent (“For example, a file from the network traffic may be a Word document which is executed in the virtual machine of the malware sandbox. The kernel mode may detect that the Word document opens a powershell. This is not necessarily a malicious activity but there is no reason for a Word document to open a powershell. In this case, the file would not be permitted to enter the enterprise system.” Dubin ¶ 15. See also Dubin ¶¶ 35 and 36) A person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention would have combined Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows with Dubin by determining what unusual application accesses. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows with Dubin in order to detect unnecessary application instantiations that indicate malicious software, theerby detecting malicious activity, Dubin ¶ 15. See also Dubin ¶¶ 35 and 36. Claim(s) 10 and 19 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Ettema et al. US 2017/0019425 (published 2017), in view of Vejmelka US 2017/0169214 (published 2017), Fellows et al. US 2023/0011004 (filed 2022), and Herman Saffar et al., US 10,936,717 (published 2021). As to claims 10 and 19 Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows discloses the method/machine of claims 9 and 18 and further discloses: wherein determining the one or more resource dependencies comprises: deploying the kernel monitoring component on one or more production server systems running the one or more applications, wherein the kernel monitoring component generates production kernel telemetry data for a third plurality of wherein determining the one or more resource dependencies is based on the production kernel telemetry data. (“device profile data (e.g., Host Information Profile (HIP) data) received from the agent (e.g., Global Protect (GP) agent or another agent) can be used to automatically select a host VM configuration from a VM library (e.g., selecting a VM image that most closely matches the installed OS/version, installed application software/version, and/or other HIP data of the target device) to provision a new VM instance to clone the target device based on the HIP data (e.g., further customization may also be performed to configure the VM instance to match relevant HIP data and/or other configuration or network related values/settings). As such, the decoy host can be configured to execute the same version of OS and same versions of application software as the target host.” Ettema ¶ 87) Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows does not disclose that the ‘agent’ of executed in the production system of Ettema observes system calls, as claimed: system calls initiated by processes executing on the one or more production server systems Herman Saffar discloses: system calls initiated by processes executing on the one or more production server systems (“A model is generated in step 204, where the model characterizes normal operation of the at least one application running in the given container using a second set of behavior metrics obtained during a learning period.” Herman Saffar col. 6, ln. 48. “the first set of behavior metrics and the second set of behavior metrics comprise one or more system calls metrics. System calls metrics characterize sequences of assembly commands executed by the given container. Generating the model in step 204 may include grouping together sequences of N assembly commands in the second set of behavior metrics, wherein N is an integer greater than one,” Herman Saffar col. 6, ln. 59) A person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention would have combined Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows with Herman Saffar by establishing a system call behavioral baseline using the agents of Ettema for later detection of anomalous activity via machine learning. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Ettema in view of Vejmelka and Fellows with Herman Saffar in order to detect anomalous behaviors in close to real-time, Herman Saffar col. 11, ln. 18. Conclusion The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. See PTO-892, particularly: Shukula, US 2008/0016339, disclosing an application sandbox to prevent malware. Ezrielev et al., US 2024/0346143, disclosing tracking of files for running malware processes. Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MICHAEL W CHAO whose telephone number is (571)272-5165. The examiner can normally be reached M, W-F 8-5. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Rupal Dharia can be reached at (571) 272-3880. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /MICHAEL W CHAO/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2492
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Prosecution Timeline

Jan 29, 2025
Application Filed
Apr 21, 2026
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §103, §112
Aug 20, 2026
Response Filed
Oct 16, 2026
Final Rejection mailed — §103, §112 (current)

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Study what changed to get past this examiner. Based on 5 most recent grants.

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Prosecution Projections

3-4
Expected OA Rounds
70%
Grant Probability
99%
With Interview (+39.5%)
3y 3m (~1y 5m remaining)
Median Time to Grant
Moderate
PTA Risk
Based on 559 resolved cases by this examiner. Grant probability derived from career allowance rate.

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