DETAILED ACTION
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claims because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claims.
Claims 1, 9 and 17 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 1-20 of copending Application No. 18/991,440 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claimed invention simply claims a similar and broader scope from the ‘440 application.
Claims 1, 9 and 17 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 1-20 of copending Application No. 18/991,457 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claimed invention simply claims a similar and broader scope from the ‘457 application.
Claims 1, 9 and 17 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 1-20 of copending Application No. 18/991,470 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claimed invention simply claims a similar and broader scope from the ‘470 application.
Claims 1, 9 and 17 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 1-20 of copending Application No. 19/065,315 (reference application). Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claimed invention simply claims a similar and broader scope from the ‘315 application.
This is a provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the patentably indistinct claims have not in fact been patented.
Claim Interpretation
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f). The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f). The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), because the claim limitation uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier.
Such claim limitation is:
“artificial intelligence agent participant configured to analyze …” in claims 8 and 16. An example of corresponding structure can be found from fig. 1 element 108.
Because these claim limitations are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), they are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If applicant does not intend to have these limitations interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitations recite sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f).
In claims 17-20, the “computer readable storage medium” is understood and interpreted as excluding any transitory signal based on applicant’s definition in specification paras. 100-101.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-3, 9-11 and 17-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1)/(a)(2) as being anticipated by Kairali (US 2024/0,297,960).
Referring to claims 1, 9 and 17, Kairali discloses a method that generates a graphical representation (fig. 3, streamed virtual meeting 304) of an artificial intelligence agent participant (fig. 1, participant 128) in a context of a collaboration session (fig. 3, virtual meeting 300), the method comprising:
executing the collaboration session for a plurality of participants (fig. 1, participants 128, 132, 134) to collaborate on a mission (para.0004, virtual/augmented/mixed reality) being completed within a geographical environment (fig. 1, location 106),
wherein the plurality of participants includes the artificial intelligence agent participant (fig. 1, participants 128, 134), a human participant (fig. 1, participant at device 104), and a robotic device participant (fig. 1, virtual controller 132);
determining a type (fig. 1, extended reality environment 126; para.0020) of the artificial intelligence agent participant;
generating an interaction environment (fig. 1, streamed virtual meeting 136) for the collaboration session;
generating, within the interaction environment for the collaboration session, a graphical representation (fig. 3, extended reality 304) for the artificial intelligence agent participant based on the type of the artificial intelligence agent participant; and
providing the interaction environment, including the graphical representation for the artificial intelligence agent participant, to a computing device (fig. 1, device 104/138) associated with the human participant.
As to claims 2, 10 and 18, Kairali discloses the method of claim 1, wherein:
the type of the artificial intelligence agent participant comprises a general-purpose (fig. 1, participant 128); and
the graphical representation for the artificial intelligence agent comprises a human-like graphical representation (fig. 1, through extended reality display 138).
As to claims 3, 11 and 19, Kairali discloses the method of claim 1, wherein:
the type of the artificial intelligence agent participant comprises a specific-purpose type (fig. 1, robot/participant 132) based on a type of the robotic device participant; and
the graphical representation for the artificial intelligence agent comprises a robot-like graphical representation (fig. 1, through extended reality display 138) associated with the type of the robotic device participant.
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 4-8, 12-16 and 20 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter:
The further limiting of “the artificial intelligence agent participant” in above mentioned dependent claims. The closest prior art on record does not disclose the same display and operation of the participant as claimed.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Conclusion
The following prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. See M.P.E.P 707.05(c).
US 2026/0,220,394 discloses machine learning model-based meeting as in fig. 4.
US 12,413,436 discloses collaboration and cognitive analysis in a meeting environment.
Contact Information
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to examiner Cheng-Yuan Tseng whose telephone number is (571)272-9772, and fax number is (571)273-9772. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday through Friday from 09:00 to 17:30 Eastern Time. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Alicia Harrington can be reached on (571)272-2330. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is (571)273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at (866)217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call (800)786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or (571)272-1000.
/CHENG YUAN TSENG/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2615
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