DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Double Patenting
The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b).
The filing of a terminal disclaimer by itself is not a complete reply to a nonstatutory double patenting (NSDP) rejection. A complete reply requires that the terminal disclaimer be accompanied by a reply requesting reconsideration of the prior Office action. Even where the NSDP rejection is provisional the reply must be complete. See MPEP § 804, subsection I.B.1. For a reply to a non-final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.111(a). For a reply to final Office action, see 37 CFR 1.113(c). A request for reconsideration while not provided for in 37 CFR 1.113(c) may be filed after final for consideration. See MPEP §§ 706.07(e) and 714.13.
The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The actual filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying-online/eterminal-disclaimer.
Claims 1-6 and 11-16 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18 and 20 of U.S. Patent No. 12,267,542. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because instant claims 1-6 and 11-16 are anticipated by the conflicting patented claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18 and 20 of U.S. Patent No. 12,267,542 as shown in the table below. The difference between the instant examined claim and the conflicting patented claim is that the conflicting patented claims are narrower in scope and falls within the scope of the examined claim. Thus, the species or sub-genus claimed in the conflicting patent anticipates the examined claimed genus. Therefore, a patent to the examined claim genus would improperly extend the right to exclude granted by a patent to the species or sub-genus should the genus issue as a patent after the species or sub-genus. See MPEP § 804 (II)(B)(1).
Instant Application 19/067,470
U.S. Patent No. 12,267,542
Claims 1, 11
Claims 1, 5, 15
Claims 2, 12
Claims 2, 7, 17
Claims 3, 13
Claims 10
Claims 4, 14
Claims 20
Claims 5, 15
Claims 3, 8, 18
Claims 6, 16
Claims 4, 11
Part of Claim 1
Claim 6, 16
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
Applicant’s arguments on pages 7–8 of the Remarks concerning the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. §101 have been considered but are not persuasive for the reasons below.
Applicant contends that claim 1 does not recite a mental process, that the claimed method addresses a problem specifically arising in graphical user interfaces, and that the limitations collectively provide significantly more than an abstract idea.
Applicant particularly relies on USPTO Example 23 and the combination of receiving a rescheduling request, discontinuing the rescheduling reminder, and suppressing the recommended-content identifier until the rescheduled time.
Under Step 2A, Prong One, claim 1 recites managing a user’s content-consumption schedule through scheduling, determining whether scheduled playback occurred, prompting rescheduling after missed playback, and discontinuing or withholding associated prompts following rescheduling. These activities fall within certain methods of organizing human activity, specifically managing personal behavior, under MPEP §2106.04(a)(2), subsection II. The rejection does not require a finding that the physical operations of generating or ceasing to generate display content can themselves be performed mentally. Accordingly, Applicant’s contention that the claim requires computer operations does not resolve whether the claim recites the identified abstract idea.
Under Step 2A, Prong Two, the electronic implementation and the relationship among the claimed operations have been considered. In particular, the amended limitation:
“causing the device associated with the user to stop generating for display a content identifier for the content item as recommended content until the specified rescheduled time”
requires withholding a recommendation for a period tied to the user’s rescheduled playback time. Together with discontinuing the rescheduling reminder, this limitation implements the rule that a user who has rescheduled content need not continue receiving a rescheduling prompt or a recommendation for that content before the selected time. The claimed coordination therefore governs the relevance and timing of information presented to the user.
Applicant’s comparison to Example 23 is not persuasive. The eligible claim in that example detects an overlap between displayed windows, relocates obscured text into an unobscured portion, and restores the text when the overlap condition ends. Those limitations address the interface’s ability to keep displayed information visible despite overlapping windows. In contrast, claim 1 changes the presentation of reminders and recommendations according to the user’s viewing schedule. Applicant has not established that the claimed scheduling-dependent suppression provides a comparable improvement in interface operation. The presence of display-control limitations in both claims does not establish equivalent eligibility outcomes.
The Examiner recognizes that an improvement in computer functionality may be implemented through software and does not require novel hardware. The claim must nevertheless be evaluated for a technological improvement reflected in its particular operations and ordered combination. See MPEP §§2106.04(d)(1) and 2106.05(a), as clarified by the USPTO’s December 5, 2025, Desjardins memorandum. Here, the combination identified by Applicant implements a scheduling-dependent presentation policy. The assertion that this policy is necessarily rooted in computer technology does not explain how it improves the functioning of the computer or graphical interface, beyond implementing the policy electronically.
Under Step 2B, Applicant’s assertion that the limitations provide a nonconventional and nongeneric implementation has also been considered. The claimed device receives scheduling information, evaluates playback status, and controls presentation according to the specified conditions. The particular sequence has not been disregarded: missed playback leads to the rescheduling reminder, receipt of a rescheduling request is followed by cessation of that reminder, and the rescheduled time defines the period for withholding the recommendation.
Accordingly, Applicant’s arguments do not establish that claim 1 integrates the identified abstract idea into a practical application or recites additional elements, individually or in combination, amounting to significantly more than that idea. The rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. §101 is maintained.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claims are directed to a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea) without reciting additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Step 1 – Statutory Category
The claims recites a method and therefore falls within the statutory category of a process.
Step 2A, Prong 1 – The claims are directed to an Abstract Idea.
The claims recite managing a user’s content-consumption schedule by determining whether scheduled playback occurred, prompting rescheduling when playback did not occur, and discontinuing reminders and temporarily withholding recommendations after rescheduling. These activities constitute certain methods of organizing human activity, specifically managing personal behavior, as identified in MPEP §2106.04(a)(2), subsection II.
These limitations collectively organize the user’s planned content consumption and the associated prompts. The identification of the abstract idea does not depend on treating physical operations as acts performable in the human mind.
Step 2A, Prong 2 – The claims do not integrate the Abstract Idea into a Practical Application.
The additional elements include the device associated with the user, electronic receipt of requests from that device, determination of device playback status, generation of a reminder for display, and control of the generation of the reminder and recommended-content identifier for display.
Considered individually, these elements provide electronic mechanisms for obtaining the scheduling information, evaluating whether the scheduled activity occurred, and communicating or withholding information according to the scheduling rules. The device is claimed by its association with the user and the functions it performs, rather than by a particular technological configuration that changes how those functions operate.
The limitation “causing the device associated with the user to stop generating for display a content identifier for the content item as recommended content until the specified rescheduled time” has been expressly considered. It established both the information to be withheld and the duration of withholding. The suppression period is determined by the user’s rescheduled playback time. Thus, the limitation makes recommendation depend on the user’s schedule. Its claimed benefit is avoiding a recommendation for content that the user has already arranged to consume later.
Considered as an ordered combination, the claim links missed playback to a rescheduling reminder, and links receipt of a rescheduling request to cessation of the reminder and temporary suppression of the recommendation. This coordination implements the content-consumption management rule electronically. The temporal relationship narrows the rule being implemented, but does not establish an improvement in the operation of the device or its display.
In particular, claim 1 does not recite resolving obscured display content, changing navigation functionality, or another specific improvement in interface operation. The claimed change concerns which scheduling-related information is presented and when it is presented. The distinction is between an improvement to the information provided through a computer and an improvement to the computer’s functionality. See BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287-88 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Applicant’s reliance on USPTO Example 23 does not establish otherwise. The eligible claim in that example detects overlapping windows and relocates obscured text to maintain visibility. Claim 1 instead conditions reminder and recommendation presentation on scheduling information. The common use of display operations does not make the claimed solutions technologically equivalent.
This determination does not rest on the absence of novel hardware. Software operations can supply a technological improvement, and the ordered combination must be considered. Here, however, the identified combination implements the scheduling and recommendation policy without establishing a corresponding improvement in computer functionality. See the USPTO’s December 5, 2025, Desjardins memorandum.
Accordingly, the additional elements, individually and in combination, do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Claim 1 is directed to the identified abstract idea.
Step 2B – The claims do not recite an Inventive Concept
The additional elements have been reconsidered, individually and as an ordered combination, to determine whether they provide an inventive concept
The remaining computer operations determine whether the playback condition is satisfied and implement the resulting presentation decisions. The claim specifies the conditions governing those decisions but does not recite a particular technical implementation for determining playback status or controlling display generation. As claimed, the computer operations amount to instructions to execute the identified scheduling and notification rules using a device. See MPEP §2106.05(f).
The ordered combination has also been considered. Specifically:
1) Failure to play the scheduled content supplies the condition for generating the rescheduling reminder. 2) Receipt of the rescheduling request supplies the context for discontinuing the reminder. 3) The specified rescheduled time supplies the endpoint for withholding the recommendation.
These relationships give the scheduling policy its particular scope. They do not provide a further inventive concept in the electronic implementation of that policy. Any asserted inventiveness in deciding to withhold the recommendation until the rescheduled time resides in the identified abstract scheduling and recommendation rule itself. An abstract idea cannot supply the inventive concept necessary to transform its implementation into patent-eligible subject matter. See BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290-91.
The rejection therefore does not assume that the exact sequence was previously known merely because its individual computer functions were known. Rather, the claimed sequence specifies the abstract policy, while the additional electronic operations implement that policy without a further meaningful limitation.
Accordingly, the additional elements, considered individually and as an ordered combination, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Claim 1 is therefore ineligible under 35 U.S.C. §101.
Accordingly, claims 1 and 11 are directed to an abstract idea and does not recite an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claim into patent-eligible subject matter.
Claims 2-10, 12-20 fail to remedy these deficiencies, thus claims 1-20 are considered to be directed to a non-statutory process.
Claim Objections
Two claims cannot have the same number. Claim 20 is canceled. Newly added claim is also numbered claim 20. Newly added claim should be renumbered as claim 21.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, see pages 7+ of the Remarks, filed 08/26/2026, with respect to the rejections of claims 1-19 under Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102 have been fully considered and are persuasive. Therefore, the rejection has been withdrawn. However, upon further consideration, a new ground(s) of rejection is made in view of Cordray et al. (U.S. Pub. No. 2007/0157249) and further in view of Kveton et al. (U.S. Pub. No. 2019/0007740).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1, 2, 6-12, 16-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Ellis (U.S. Pub. No. 2016/0100202) in view of Cordray et al. (U.S. Pub. No. 2007/0157249) and further in view of Kveton et al. (U.S. Pub. No. 2019/0007740).
Regarding claim 1, Ellis discloses a method comprising:
receiving, from a device associated with a user, a request to schedule playing of a content item, wherein the request specifies a scheduled time for playing the content item (see paragraphs 0064, 0094, 0167-0169, 0177, 0194-0196, figs. 22 and 24; receiving user requests to schedule viewing/recording of a program at a specific time);
determining whether the device associated with the user was used to play the content item at the scheduled time (see paragraphs 0174, 0201-0202; monitoring whether the user actually watched the program at the scheduled time);
receiving, from the device associated with the user, a request to reschedule playing of the content item, wherein the request specifies a rescheduled time for playing the content item (see paragraphs 0184-0187, 0199, fig. 29 (338); receiving a user request to reschedule viewing to a new time. User selects a new time such as “in 5 minutes”, “in 30 minutes”, “in 1 hour”); and
causing the device associated with the user to stop generating for display the reminder to reschedule playing of the content item (see paragraphs 0171-0172; cancelling a reminder and hiding its display. Paragraphs 0186, 0199-0200; deferring the reminder and displaying a new reminder when the revised time arrives).
However, Ellis et al. is silent as to based at least in part on determining the device associated with the user was not used to play the content item at the scheduled time, generating, for display at the device associated with the user, a reminder to reschedule playing of the content item.
In an analogous art, Cordray discloses based at least in part on determining the device associated with the user was not used to play the content item at the scheduled time, generating, for display at the device associated with the user, a reminder to reschedule playing of the content item (see paragraphs 0135, 0141-0144, fig. 14; schedule button 1406 allows a missed episode to be scheduled for automatic presentation at a later date and time).
It would have been obvious to a skilled artisan before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Ellis et al. with the teachings of Cordray, the motivation being complete the previously requested viewing.
However, Ellis et al and Cordray are silent as to causing the device associated with the user to stop generating for display a content identifier for the content item as recommended content until the specified rescheduled time.
Kveton et al. discloses causing the device associated with the user to stop generating for display a content id3entifier for the content item as recommended content until the specified rescheduled time (see paragraph 0025, 0028; a viewer selects a future time context; the recommendation is withheld before that content and displayed when it exists. Paragraph 0031, fig. 4E; the selected recommendation is removed from the display. Paragraphs 0034-0039, fig. 5; the system checks the time condition, withholds the recommendation, and subsequently provides it).
It would have been obvious to a skilled artisan before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the system of Ellis et al., Cordray with the teachings of Kveton et al., the motivation being to control when content recommendation appears and a user remains interested in content but is not viewing it now.
Regarding claim 11, claim 11 is rejected for the same reason set forth in the rejection of claim 1.
Regarding claims 2 and 12, Ellis et al., Cordray and Kveton et al. discloses everything claimed as applied above (see claims 1 and 11). Ellis et al. discloses wherein: the reminder to reschedule playing of the content item is a first reminder (see paragraphs 0171-0172, 0184-0187; first reminder that appears when the user misses the scheduled time. A first reminder such as “REMINDER – SEINFELD 8:00 PM” displayed when the scheduled time arrives and the user has not watched the program); and the method further comprises:
generating, for display at the device associated with the user, prior to or at the rescheduled time, a second reminder to consume the content item (see paragraphs 0185-0187, 0199, 0201, fig. 28; after the user reschedule the reminder, the system generates a second reminder at the new time. User selects a new time (“in 5 minutes,” “in 30 minutes,” “in 1 hour,” etc.).
Regarding claims 6 and 16, Ellis et al., Cordray and Kveton et al. discloses everything claimed as applied above (see claims 1 and 11). Ellis et al. discloses wherein determining whether the device associated with the user was used to play the content item at the scheduled time (see paragraphs 0171-0172 and fig. 27) comprises determining whether the device associated with the user was used to access a content platform for the content item at the scheduled time (see paragraphs 0201-0203, 0144-0150, figs. 14-18).
Regarding claims 7 and 17, Ellis et al., Cordray and Kveton et al. discloses everything claimed as applied above (see claims 1 and 11). Ellis et al. discloses based at least in part on receiving the request to reschedule playing of the content item (see paragraphs 0199, 0201-0203), causing the device associated with the user to download the content item prior to or at the rescheduled time (see paragraphs 0007-0009, 0011, 0152, 0187-0190, 0203-0205, figs. 27-28).
Regarding claims 8 and 18, Ellis et al., Cordray and Kveton et al. discloses everything claimed as applied above (see claims 1 and 11). Ellis et al. discloses wherein the content item is a broadcast program (see paragraphs 0001, 0007), further comprising based at least in part on receiving the request to reschedule playing of the content item (see paragraphs 0199, 0201-0203):
scheduling recording of the content item (see paragraphs 0007, 0154, 0190-0195,0203-0205, fig. 19a-19b); and
causing the device associated with the user to download the content item prior to or at the rescheduled time (see paragraph 0007-0009, 0011, 0152, 0187-0190, 0203-0205).
Regarding claims 9 and 19, Ellis et al., Cordray and Kveton et al. discloses everything claimed as applied above (see claims 1 and 11). Ellis et al. discloses wherein the reminder to reschedule playing of the content item comprises a proposed time (see paragraphs 0184-0187, fig. 28; the user may select option 324 to defer the reminder for five minutes or may select option 326 to defer the reminder for thirty minutes).
Regarding claim 10, Ellis et al., Cordray and Kveton et al. discloses everything claimed as applied above (see claim 9). Ellis et al. discloses wherein the rescheduled time is different than the proposed time (see paragraphs 0185-0187, 0178-0180, fig. 26(300), fig. 28).
Regarding claim 20, Ellis et al., Cordray and Kveton et al. discloses everything claimed as applied above (see claims 1 and 11). Kveton et al. discloses wherein the content identifier is a first content identifier and the content item is a first content item (see paragraph 0025), and wherein the causing the device associated with the user to stop generating for display the content identifier for the content item as recommended content until the specified rescheduled time comprises (see paragraph 0028, 0031): replacing the first content identifier with a second content identifier for a second content item on the display of the device (see paragraph 0031; removing Content A 404 from display 402, leaving empty space 424, and subsequently displaying additional recommended Content E in that space, paragraph 0025), wherein the second content identifier is distinct from the first content identifier and the second content item is distinct from the first content item (see paragraphs 0025, 0031; fig. 4E shows the vacated space; Content E’s subsequent insertion is described in paragraph 0031 but not shown).
Claims 3-5 and 13-15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Ellis (U.S. Pub. No. 2016/0100202) in view of Cordray et al. (U.S. Pub. No. 2007/0157249) and further in view of Kveton et al. (U.S. Pub. No. 2019/0007740).
Regarding claims 3 and 13, Ellis et al., Cordray and Kveton et al. discloses everything claimed as applied above (see claims 1 and 11). Ellis et al. discloses wherein: the reminder to reschedule playing of the content item is a first reminder (see paragraphs 0171-0172, 0184-0187; first reminder that appears when the user misses the scheduled time. A first reminder such as “REMINDER – SEINFELD 8:00 PM” displayed when the scheduled time arrives and the user has not watched the program); and the method further comprises:
based at least in part on determining the device associated with the user was not used to play the content item at the rescheduled time (see paragraphs 0200-0203; the system monitors whether the user responds to or watches the program at the new reminder time), generating, for output at a second device associated with the user, a second reminder to reschedule playing of the content item (see paragraphs 0200-0203 (when the new reminder time arrives, the reminder may again be displayed for the user), 0018-0020, 0003-0006; reminders and guide interactions may occur across different user devices. Paragraph 0020 discloses that user equipment includes televisions, set-top boxes, and computers. So Ellis teaches a second reminder and the capability to output the second reminder on different devices associated with the same user and it would have been obvious to output the second reminder on a second device because Ellis already teaches the same user accessing the guide from multiple devices, and reminders being generated at multiple times).
A person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that sending the second reminder to another device (e.g., a mobile device or computer) is a predictable use of Ellis’s multi-device architecture to ensure the user receives the reminder.
Regarding claims 4 and 14, Ellis et al., Cordray and Kveton et al. discloses everything claimed as applied above (see claims 1 and 11). Ellis et al. discloses wherein: the device associated with the user is a first device (see paragraphs 0003-0005, 0051 and figs. 2-3; user equipment 18; user television equipment 20; user computer equipment 22);
the reminder to reschedule playing of the content item is a first reminder (see paragraphs 0171-0172, 0184-0187); and the method further comprises:
based at least in part on determining the first device was not used to play the content item at the rescheduled time (see paragraphs 0201-0203, 0220-0222), generating, for output at a second device associated with the user, a second reminder to reschedule playing of the content item (see paragraphs 0201-0203, 0220-0222 discloses second reminder at the rescheduled time. Paragraphs 0003-0005, 0051 and figs. 2-3 discloses multiple devices associated with the same user. Therefore, Ellis teaches a second reminder and multiple devices capable of receiving reminders).
A person of ordinary skill in the art would find it obvious to output the second reminder to a second device because the user interacts with the guide across multiple devices, that reminders are being generated at multiple times and sending the second reminder to another device is a predictable use of Ellis’s multi-device architecture to ensure the user receives the reminder.
Regarding claims 5 and 15, Ellis et al., Cordray and Kveton et al. discloses everything claimed as applied above (see claims 1 and 11). Ellis et al. discloses
determining whether the device associated with the user was used to play the content item within a predetermined time from the scheduled time (see paragraphs 0171-0172, 0184-0187, 0201-0203 and fig. 27), wherein:
generating, for output at the device associated with the user, a reminder to reschedule playing of the content item is further based on determining the device associated with the user was not used to play the content item within the predetermined time from the scheduled time (see paragraphs 0184-0187, 0201-0203, fig. 27).
A person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that implementing this determining step using an explicit “predetermined time” is a routine design choice.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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NNENNA EKPO
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 2425
/NNENNA N EKPO/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2425 September 23, 2026.
