DETAILED ACTION
This action is responsive to papers filed on 6/18/2026.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1, 3-8, 10-15, and 17-23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because, while the claims herein are directed to a method and/or system, which could be classified under one of the listed statutory classifications (i.e., 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (hereinafter “PEG”) “PEG” Step 1=Yes), the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.
Regarding claims 1, 8, 15, the claims recite, in part, receiving an advertisement request comprising an application identifier and a device identifier; obtaining, based on the device identifier, an audience tag from a user information big data platform; obtaining, based on the audience tag, a target advertisement creative from a preset advertisement creative library that corresponds to the application identifier and that is accessible, wherein the preset advertisement library comprises a plurality of creatives each uploaded by an advertiser and each associated with a different audience parameter, wherein the target advertisement creative is a display style of a target advertisement on an advertisement slot of an application to which the application identifier belongs; obtaining, based on the target advertisement creative and the device identifier, a target advertisement material from a preset material library, wherein the target advertisement material comprises one or more of a picture, a video, a text, and a link; splicing, the target advertisement material based on the target advertisement creative to obtain the target advertisement; and delivering the target advertisement to the advertisement slot.
The limitations, as drafted and detailed above, recites delivering advertising based on an advertising request, which falls within the “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity” grouping of abstract ideas, and more specifically advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors. Accordingly, the claim recites an abstract idea (i.e. “PEG” Revised Step 2A Prong One=Yes).
This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. In particular, the claims only recite the additional elements of first terminal device (claims 1, 8, 15), cloud server (claims 1, 8, 15), device (claim 8), memory (claim 8), one or more processors (claims 8, 15), and non-transitory computer-readable medium (claim 15). The additional technical elements above are recited at a high-level of generality (i.e. as a generic processor performing a generic computer function of receiving, obtaining, splicing, and delivering) such that it amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. There are no additional functional limitations to be considered under prong two.
Accordingly, the additional technical elements above do not integrate the abstract idea/judicial exception into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. More specifically, the additional elements fail to include (1) improvements to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field (see MPEP 2106.05(a)), (2) applying or using a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition (see Vanda memo), (3) applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine (see MPEP 2106.05(b)), (4) effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (see MPEP 2106.05(c)), or (5) applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception (see MPEP 2106.05(e) and Vanda memo).
Rather, the limitations merely add the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea (see MPEP 2106.05(f)), or generally link the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use (see MPEP 2106.05(h)). Thus, the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea (i.e. “PEG” Revised Step 2A Prong Two=Yes).
When considering Step 2B of the Alice/Mayo test, the claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the claims do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea.
More specifically, as discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional elements of using first terminal device (claims 1, 8, 15), cloud server (claims 1, 8, 15), device (claim 8), memory (claim 8), one or more processors (claims 8, 15), and non-transitory computer-readable medium (claim 15) to perform the claimed functions amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component.
“Generic computer implementation” is insufficient to transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention (See Affinity Labs, _F.3d_, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016), citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352, 2357) and more generally, “simply appending conventional steps specified at a high level of generality” to an abstract idea does not make that idea patentable (See Affinity Labs, _F.3d_, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016), citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300). Moreover, “the use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter (See FairWarning, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1293, citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). As such, the additional elements of the claim do not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because they would be generic computer functions in any computer implementation. Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the above-identified judicial exception (the abstract idea). Looking at the limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually. There is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of the computer or improves any other technology. Their collective functions merely provide generic computer implementation.
The Examiner notes simply implementing an abstract concept on a computer, without meaningful limitations to that concept, does not transform a patent-ineligible claim into a patent- eligible one (See Accenture, 728 F.3d 1336, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013), citing Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1280), limiting the application of an abstract idea to one field of use does not necessarily guard against preempting all uses of the abstract idea (See Accenture, 728 F.3d 1336, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013), citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231), and further the prohibition against patenting an abstract principle “cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the [principle] to a particular technological environment” (See Accenture, 728 F.3d 1336, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013), citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 584), and finally merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract (See Affinity Labs, _F.3d_, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016), citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat' l Ass' n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Applicant herein only requires a general purpose computer (see Applicant specification paragraph 0169); therefore, there does not appear to be any alteration or modification to the generic activities indicated, and they are also therefore recognized as insignificant activity with respect to eligibility.
The dependent claims 3-7, 10-14, and 17-23 appear to merely limit determining an advertisement creative with a highest effective cost per mille, adjusting the audience tag based on delivery information, updating a creative library based on an advertisement creative on a second device, and specifics of the audience tag, and therefore only limit the application of the idea, and not add significantly more than the idea (i.e. “PEG” Step 2B=No).
The first terminal device (claims 1, 8, 15), cloud server (claims 1, 8, 15), device (claim 8), memory (claim 8), one or more processors (claims 8, 15), and non-transitory computer-readable medium (claim 15) are each functional generic computer components that perform the generic functions of receiving, obtaining, splicing, and delivering, all common to electronics and computer systems.
Applicant's specification does not provide any indication that the first terminal device (claims 1, 8, 15), cloud server (claims 1, 8, 15), device (claim 8), memory (claim 8), one or more processors (claims 8, 15), and non-transitory computer-readable medium (claim 15) are anything other than generic, off-the-shelf computer components. Therefore, the claims do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea (i.e. “PEG” Step 2B=No).
Thus, based on the detailed analysis above, claims 1, 3-8, 10-15, and 17-23 are not patent eligible.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1, 7, 8, 14, 15, and 21-23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Levkovitz (U.S. Pub No. 2007/0088851) in view of Dunn (U.S. Pub No. 2011/0022464).
Regarding claims 1, 8, 15, Levkovitz teaches receiving an advertisement request comprising an application identifier and a device identifier of a first terminal device (Paragraph 0147, content client creates request comprising a plurality of identifiers, including application and device identifiers); obtaining, based on the device identifier, an audience tag from a user information big data platform (Paragraphs 0027, 0147, user information equates to “audience tags”, data item representing property of a user of said wireless communication device); obtaining, based on the audience tag, a target advertisement creative from a preset advertisement creative library that corresponds to the application identifier, wherein the target advertisement creative is a display style of a target advertisement on an advertisement slot of an application to which the application identifier belongs (Paragraph 0027, select content item based on data item, the data item could represent an age or gender, Paragraphs 0080-0081, content items repository is an advertisement creative library, advertisement is obtained based on data of the device and data related to the application, advertisements meant to go into a specific applications are considered to be of a “display style” for an advertisement slot of that application), wherein the preset advertisement creative library comprises a plurality of advertisement creatives each uploaded by an advertiser and each associated with a different audience parameter (Paragraphs 0080-0081, content items repository is an advertisement creative library, 0006, content items can be targeted based on demographics about the user and therefore the content items are associated with a different audience parameter, 0087, received from advertisers); obtaining, based on the target advertisement creative and the device identifier, a target advertisement material (Paragraphs 0165-0166, criteria to reformat an ad better accommodate capabilities equates to target advertisement material); splicing, the target advertisement material based on the target advertisement creative to obtain the target advertisement (Paragraphs 0165-0166, re-formatting/repackaging using criteria equates to “splicing”); and delivering the target advertisement to the advertisement slot (Paragraphs 0085, 0167, 0169, content presented within application).
Levkovitz does not appear to specify obtaining, based on the target advertisement creative and the device identifier, a target advertisement material from a preset material library, wherein the target advertisement material comprises one or more of a picture, a video, a text, and a link. Dunn, however, teaches obtaining, based on the target advertisement creative and the device identifier, a target advertisement material from a preset material library, wherein the target advertisement material comprises one or more of a picture, a video, a text, and a link (Paragraphs 0032-0036, obtaining elements based on advertisement creative and device specifics, 0025, images, videos, text); and splicing, the target advertisement material based on the target advertisement creative to obtain the target advertisement (Paragraph 0036, combining elements to form the advertisement). It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to splice elements of an advertisement based on device capabilities in order to be able to supply appropriate advertising to any possible device regardless of device limitations.
Levkovitz and Dunn do not appear to specify information that is accessible on a cloud server. However, cloud servers have been old and well known long before the filing of Applicant’s invention. For example, Amazon Web Services introduced a cloud storage service, Amazon S3, in 2006. Another example is Alibaba Cloud, which is a cloud storage service that was launched in 2009. It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to access information through a cloud service since the claimed invention is merely a combination of old elements and the combination of each element merely would have performed the same function as it did separately and a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the results of the combination were predictable.
Regarding claims 7, 14, Levkovitz teaches obtaining at least one advertisement creative that is on a second terminal device; and updating the preset advertisement creative library based on the at least one advertisement creative (Paragraph 0087, second terminal device is an advertiser computer that initially supplies advertisements to be distributed, as new ads are supplied the ad repository is updated).
Regarding claims 21-23, Levkovitz teaches the audience tag comprises one or more of a gender, an age, a geographic location, an interest, and a consumption capability of a user of the first terminal device (Paragraph 0027, age, gender).
Claims 3-5, 10-12, and 17-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Levkovitz (U.S. Pub No. 2007/0088851) in view of Dunn (U.S. Pub No. 2011/0022464), and further in view of Little (U.S. Pub No. 2008/0294523).
Regarding claims 3, 10, 17, Levkovitz and Dunn do not appear to specify when a plurality of advertisement creatives in the preset advertisement creative library matches the audience tag, determining, as the target advertisement creative, an advertisement creative with a highest effective cost per mille in the plurality of advertisement creatives. However, Little teaches regardless of whether a plurality of advertisement creatives in the preset advertisement creative library matches the audience tag, determining, as the target advertisement creative, an advertisement creative with a highest effective cost per mille from a plurality of advertisements (Paragraph 0056). It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to select an advertisement that has the highest eCPM in order to make the more possible revenue from presenting the selected advertisement.
Regarding claims 4, 11, 18, Levkovitz and Dunn do not appear to specify when no advertisement creative that matches the audience tag exists in the preset advertisement creative library, determining, as the target advertisement creative, an advertisement creative with a highest effective cost per mille in the preset advertisement creative library. However, Little teaches regardless of whether a plurality of advertisement creatives in the preset advertisement creative library matches the audience tag, determining, as the target advertisement creative, an advertisement creative with a highest effective cost per mille from a plurality of advertisements (Paragraph 0056). It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to select an advertisement that has the highest eCPM in order to make the more possible revenue from presenting the selected advertisement.
Regarding claims 5, 12, 19, Levkovitz and Dunn do not appear to specify determining, as the target advertisement creative, an advertisement creative with a highest effective cost per mille in the preset advertisement creative library. However, Little teaches determining, as the target advertisement creative, an advertisement creative with a highest effective cost per mille from a plurality of advertisements (Paragraph 0056). It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to select an advertisement that has the highest eCPM in order to make the more possible revenue from presenting the selected advertisement.
Claims 6, 13, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Levkovitz (U.S. Pub No. 2007/0088851) in view of Dunn (U.S. Pub No. 2011/0022464), and further in view of Dmitriev (U.S. Pub No. 2008/0092159).
Regarding claims 6, 13, 20, Levkovitz teaches obtaining delivery information of the target advertisement on the first terminal device, wherein the delivery information comprises a browsing duration and/or a click-through rate of the target advertisement (Paragraph 0143).
Levkovitz and Dunn do not appear to specify adjusting, based on the delivery information, the audience tag corresponding to the device identifier. However, Dmitriev teaches adjusting, based on the delivery information, the audience tag corresponding to the device identifier (Paragraph 0135, user profile is adjusted based on delivery information). It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to adjust targeting information associated with a user based on delivery information in order to better target future advertisements to a user.
Response to Arguments
Applicant argues “This architecture enables per-user variation in both the structural presentation format and the content of an advertisement, which was not achievable by prior systems. See paragraph 8 of the application”. However, paragraph 8 of the specification does not describe what was or wasn’t achievable in prior systems. Rather, paragraph 8 does state that the invention “improves the delivery effect of an online advertisement”. Improving the act of advertising or the effect of advertising is merely an improvement to the abstract idea. In the SAP decision (See SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163, 127 USPQ2d 1597, 1599 (Fed. Cir. 2018)), the courts found that an improvement made to the abstract idea is not patent eligible. SAP v. Investpic: Page 2, line 22 through Page 3, line 13 - Even assuming that the algorithms claimed are groundbreaking, innovative or even brilliant, the claims are ineligible because their innovation is an innovation in ineligible subject matter because there are nothing but a series of mathematical algorithms based on selected information and the presentation of the results of those algorithms. Thus, the advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausible alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm. An advance of this nature is ineligible for patenting; and Page 10, lines 18-24 - Even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is limited to particular content, or a particular source, that limitations does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.
Applicant argues “This is a specific technical improvement to the functioning of an online advertising delivery system, not a generalized commercial practice implemented on a computer” and “the claimed system does not merely apply a longstanding commercial practice to generic computer components”. However, as explained in the rejection above, the specification clearly states that the computer used to implement the abstract idea is general purpose. Further, the entire claimed invention is about implementing targeted advertising, which is irrefutably listed as an abstract idea under Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity. Therefore, the invention is absolutely a general purpose computer used to apply the abstract idea.
Applicant argues “These steps are not merely instructions to apply an abstract idea using a generic computer” and “This is a practical application of any alleged abstract idea that improves the technical functioning of the advertisement delivery system”. However, as explained above, any improvement to the process of advertising is merely an improvement to the abstract idea and represents ineligible subject matter. To prove eligible over 101, any improvement must be to the additional elements. Applicant has not explained how any additional elements are improved outside of the abstract idea, and therefore the claims remain ineligible.
Applicant argues “Levkovitz does not disclose or suggest querying an external user information big data platform to obtain an audience tag generated through big data analysis of the user's behavior, interests, or demographic characteristics. Thus, there is no user information big data platform in Levkovitz”. However, Examiner notes that there is no “querying” performed in the claim language, and therefore querying of an “external user information big data platform” is not required. Further, Applicant has provided no definition of “big data platform” in the specification and no “big data platform” appears in any of the supplied drawing figures. Further, the word “external” does not appear in the claim language, and therefore, there is no requirement in the claims that a big data platform need be external, or represent anything other than a local storage as a broadest reasonable interpretation. A step of obtaining user information based on a device ID from any stored location is enough for Levkovitz to meet the limitation of “obtaining, based on the device identifier, an audience tag from a user information big data platform”.
Applicant argues “Dunn does not disclose an external user information big data platform that receives a query from the advertising system based on a device identifier and returns an audience tag generated through big data analysis”. However, Dunn was not used to teach this limitation, so this argument is moot.
Applicant argues “While Levkovitz discloses a content items repository storing pre- formed advertisements, Levkovitz does not disclose a creative library including display-style templates, each uploaded by an advertiser and each associated with a different audience parameter, nor does it disclose obtaining a creative based on an audience tag”. However, there is no recitation of “display-style templates”, or any templates whatsoever in the entirety of the claim language. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The claim language merely requires a “target advertisement creative” to come from a preset advertisement creative library, and Levkovitz teaches that for the reasons stated in the rejection.
Applicant argues “Levkovitz's content items repository stores pre-formed, complete advertisements. In this way, it does not disclose display-style templates or layout structures. The Examiner's characterization of Levkovitz's pre-formed advertisements as display styles is unsupported by the text of Levkovitz. A complete, pre-formed advertisement stored in a repository is not a display style”. However, there is no recitation of “display-style templates” or any templates whatsoever, as well as “layout structures”, or any layouts whatsoever, in the entirety of the claim language. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Further, as stated in the rejection, if an advertisement of Levkovitz is capable of being displayed by an application, then it is naturally of a display style of a target advertisement on an advertisement slot of an application”. There is nothing in the claim language that
Applicant argues “While Levkovitz discloses re- formatting a pre-selected content item to accommodate device capabilities, Levkovitz does not disclose obtaining a target advertisement material from a preset material library that is maintained separately from the creative library, based on a previously selected display-style creative” and “Levkovitz re-formats a pre-selected, pre-formed advertisement to fit device capabilities. That is, it does not obtain content assets from a separate material library based on a previously selected display-style creative template”. However, the rejection never stated that Levkovitz teaches this. Rather, the rejection states that Levkovitz teaches “obtaining, based on the target advertisement creative and the device identifier, a target advertisement material”. The Dunn reference is the one relied upon to teach the limitation of a preset material library. Therefore, this argument is moot.
Applicant argues “Dunn's assets and rules are contained together in the single dynamic creative bundle. They are not separately maintained in a creative library and a preset material library from which independent per-user selections are made”. However, nothing in the claim language recites separately maintaining the creative library and the preset material library from one another. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A “library” is not inherently a separate storage device. A “library” could simply be a specific partition of a storage, and more than one library could be stored on the same storage. The database 220 of Dunn stores the data that meets the claim language, and therefore the database 220 is taken to store the preset material library as well as advertisement creatives.
Applicant argues “Dunn's ad assembly component assembles elements from within a single dynamic creative bundle, all of which were submitted together by the advertiser. This is different from the claimed splicing step, which composites separately selected content assets from a separate preset material library into a separately selected display-style template from a separate preset creative library to produce a new advertisement post-request”. However, once again, Examiner notes that “display-style template” or separately maintained libraries are not present in the claim language. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Merriam Webster Online Dictionary defines “splice” as “to unite, link, or insert”. There is nothing in the claim language that differentiates the claimed splicing from that in Dunn. Dunn combines multiple elements to form an advertisement, and this is irrefutably an act of splicing.
Applicant argues “the rationale for combining Levkovitz and Dunn advanced by the Examiner, namely, that it would have been obvious to splice elements of an advertisement based on device capabilities in order to supply appropriate advertising to any possible device regardless of device limitations, is directed to the problem of device capability compatibility, not the problem of per-user variation in display style through audience-tag-based selection from a multi- template creative library indexed by application identifier and accessible on a cloud server. The motivation articulated by the Examiner would not lead a person of ordinary skill to the claimed features, which solve a different technical problem through a different architectural solution”. However, KSR forecloses the argument that a specific teaching is required for a finding of obviousness (citing KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1741, 82 USPQ2d at 1396). See Board decision Exparte Smith, --USPQ2d--, slip op. at 20, (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. June 25, 2007). In many situations there is neither a motivation or evident lack of motivation to make a modification articulated in cited references. Numerous scenarios typically find the prior art reference disclosing aspects of claimed subject matter, but fail to specifically point the way toward the combination to arrive at Applicant's invention. A judgment must be made whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had sufficient motivation to combine individual elements forming the claimed invention, as in this particular situation. In re Clinton, 527 F.2d 1226, 1228, 188 USPQ 365, 367 (CCPA 1976). A suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the relevant prior art teachings does not have to be found explicitly in the prior art, as the teaching, motivation, or suggestion may be implicit from the prior art as a whole, rather than expressly stated in the references ....The test for an implicit showing is what the combined teachings, knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, and the nature of the problem to be solved as a whole would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Leonard R. Kahn (CAFC, 04-1616, 3/22/2006). "It must be presumed that the artisan knows something about the art apart from what the references disclose. In re Jacoby, 309 F.2d 513, 135 USPQ 317 (CCPA 1962). The problem cannot be approached on the basis that artisans would only know what they read in references; such artisans must be presumed to know something about the art apart from what the references disclose. In re Jacoby. Also, the conclusion of obviousness may be made from common knowledge and common sense of a person of ordinary skill in the art without any specific hint of suggestion a particular reference. In re Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385, USPQ 545 (CCPA 1969). And, every reference relies to some extent on knowledge or persons skilled in the art to complement that which is disclosed therein. In re Bode, 550 F.2d 656, USPQ 12 (CCPA 1977)."
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/MICHAEL BEKERMAN/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3621
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