DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statements (IDS) submitted on 3/17/2025 and 12/1/2025 were filed in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statements are being considered by the examiner
Claim Interpretation
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitation(s) is/are:
A “sensor configured to detect” in claim 1, which is disclosed in par. 0011 as a pneumatic sensor
A “frequency analysis unit configured to perform” in claim 1, which is disclosed in par. 0030 as circuitry
A “filter processing unit configured to generate” in claim 1, which is disclosed in par. 0030 as circuitry
A “detection unit configured to detect” in claim 1, which is disclosed in par. 0030 as circuitry
An “estimation unit configured to estimate” in claim 2, which is disclosed in par. 0030 as circuitry
A “correction unit configured to correct” in claim 13, which is disclosed in par. 0030 as circuitry
Because this/these claim limitation(s) is/are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, it/they is/are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If applicant does not intend to have this/these limitation(s) interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitation(s) to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitation(s) recite(s) sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid it/them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Claim 1 is directed to a device/apparatus (Step 1 of MPEP 2106). The claim recites receiving data, performing analysis on the data, generating filters and detecting biological information. These limitations, as currently drafted, recite functional limitations that covers performance of the limitations in the mind. Nothing in the claim precludes the steps from practically being performed in the mind. As a specific example, a user can receive data and the user can perform frequency analysis on the data, generate filters based on the frequency analysis and apply the filter, and detect biological information. No tangible therapy or change in structure/operation is claimed. That is, the claim does not require actually doing anything tangible as a result of the detecting or even specifically describing specialized circuitry or structures. If a claim limitation, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance of the limitation in the mind, then it falls within the “Mental Processes” grouping of abstract ideas. Accordingly, the claim recites an abstract idea (Step 2A in MPEP 2106).
This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. As described above, the claims do not attempt to apply the abstract idea to deliver treatment to a patient or to change operation of a device itself based on the detecting. In particular, the claims merely recites a generic “sensor” and “units These additional limitations are recited at a high-level of generality (i.e., as a generic component with no details in the claims). Additionally, the specification goes into no detail of the specific structure of the “units”, instead disclosing in par. 0030 that the units can be any type of software or hardware. The mere fact that a computing device is recited to perform certain tasks does not make the circuitry "special purpose," based on the Supreme Court's decisions in Alice and Bilski, wherein providing a programmed computer with no further details is insufficient to impart eligibility. The current claims amount to no more than an abstract idea and trying to claim a generic computing device to “apply it." Additionally, data gathering and its generic components have been deemed an “extra-solution activity” that does not amount to an inventive concept when the activity is well-understood and/or conventional (see MPEP 2106.05(g)). Accordingly, these additional “sensor” elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea (Step 2B of MPEP 2106).
Additionally, even if the claims invoked computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an existing process, this will generally not amount to significantly more than a judicial exception. See. e.g., Versata Development Group v, SAP America, 793 F.3d 1306, 1335, 115 USPG2d 1681, 1702 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in order for a machine to add significantly more, it must “play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly"). In this case, as described above, there is no specific structure of computers, tools, structure, etc. recited in the claims. The claim is directed to an abstract idea.
As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional element of using generic structures to perform certain functional language steps and/or to collect data amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component or to perform extra-solution activity in a conventional way. Mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component cannot provide an inventive concept. Additionally, a generic computer that has not been claimed with any specificity is considered by the Examiner to be well-understood, routine and conventional in the art and thus cannot be considered significantly more than the judicial exception. The recited “sensor” and “units” have not been claimed with any specificity and are considered by the Examiner to be well-understood, routine and conventional in the art and thus cannot be considered significantly more than the judicial exception.
Furthermore, the Examiner takes Official Notice that the “sensor” and “units” broadly and generically disclosed and claimed in the current application are well-understood, routine and conventional in the art for receiving and processing cardiac signals.
Therefore, the claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception (Step 2B of MPEP 2106).
Furthermore, the applicant has not shown that the claimed apparatus is necessarily and inextricably rooted in any specific technologies. For example, in DDR Holdings it was found that the claimed subject matter was significantly more because the abstract method was not just applied on/using the internet but it changed how the internet itself worked. In this case, the applicant’s claims do not change the functioning of the recited device.
While it seems clear that there is not a particular machine required by the claims, it also appears that there is not a particular transformation, either. It has been held that manipulation or signal processing of data to produce new data is NOT a transformation CyberSource v. Retail Decisions, 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 n.2, 99 USPQ2d 1690, 1695 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
Finally claim 1 is analogous to the case Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A. (Fed. Cir. 2016) which contains the following analysis: Information as such is an intangible. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 451 n.12 (2007). Accordingly, we have treated collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas. See, e.g., Internet Patents, 790 F.3d at 1349; OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon. com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In a similar vein, we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category. See, e.g., TLI Commc’ns, 823 F.3d at 613; Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351; SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x 950, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). And we have recognized that merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis. See, e.g., Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Here, the claims are clearly focused on the combination of those abstract-idea processes. The advance they purport to make is a process of gathering and analyzing information of a specified content, and not any particular assertedly inventive technology for performing those functions. They are therefore directed to an abstract idea. Applicant should add some sort of active use to the claims, such as applying a SPECIFIC therapy or updating the functioning of the processor based on the determination/comparison.
Additional case law that is relevant to this analysis include Digitech (Organizing and manipulating information through mathematical correlations), and Grams (An algorithm for calculating parameters indicating an abnormal condition).
Therefore, the Examiner must conclude that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Regarding dependent claims 2-15, the recited limitations fall under a mental process using the same rationale as above.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 5-8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 5 recites the limitation "a second threshold" in the claim. There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim, as a first threshold was never previously recited in claim 5 (or claims 1 and 2 from which claim 5 depends). Therefore, it is unclear if there is a first threshold and what that threshold is. It is believed that claim 5 should depend from claim 3 for proper support. Claims 6-8 are rejected based on their dependence to claim 5.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-4, 9, 12 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by WO 2016/102184 (hereinafter WIPO).
Regarding claims 1 and 14, WIPO discloses a biological information detection unit (see abstract). A sensor 12 is configured to detect body motion related to heartbeat (page 2, lines 11-14). A frequency analysis unit is configured to perform frequency analysis on a signal detected by the sensor (page 2, lines 14-16, paragraph overlapping pages 2 and 3, page 7, lines 1-13). A filter processing unit is configured to generate a filter based on the analysis and apply the filter to the detected signal (page 7, lines 6-18). A detection unit is configured to detect a heartbeat based on the detection signal before applying the filter corresponding to a peak of the detection signal after applying the filter (page 7, lines 6-18, such that the filter allows the desired peaks from the initial detection signal to passthrough.
Regarding claims 2 and 4, see page 7, lines 14-28 of WIPO describing passband filters generated at the fundamental frequency and a harmonic higher.
Regarding claim 3, WIPO discloses determining the SNR of the fundamental frequency and harmonics signals. Therefore, as long as the SNR exists (i.e., the threshold is zero) then the filter is generated.
Regarding claims 9 and 12, WIPO discloses detecting peaks “around” the fundamental frequency, which includes peaks before and after the peaks of the fundamental frequency, and ignored peaks that are not around the fundamental frequency (page 7, lines 14-28).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claim 13 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over WIPO in view of Driscoll (US 2006/0283652).
WIPO, as described above, discloses the applicant’s basic invention, including a sensor for determining heartbeat. However, WIPO is silent as to correcting the position of peaks in the detected signal. Attention is directed to Driscoll, which discloses analogous art of a sensor configured to detect heartbeat (see abstract). Driscoll discloses correcting the position of erroneous peaks to provide better results (par. 0120 and 0273-0276). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the applicant’s effective filing date to correct the position of peaks in WIPO as taught by Driscoll in order to fix anomalies and provide better data (see abstract).
Claim 15 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over WIPO in view of Yanai et al. (US 2006/0283652, hereinafter Yanai).
WIPO, as described above, discloses the applicant’s basic invention, including a sensor for detecting motion. However, WIPO is silent as to using a pneumatic sensor to detect a signal from a user while seated. Attention is directed to Yanai, which discloses analogous art of a sensor configured to detect motion based on pressure changes of a seated person (par. 0013). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the applicant’s effective filing date to substitute the pneumatic sensor of Yanai for the sensor of WIPO as both sensors are for the same purpose and the substitution would have predictable results and would not affect the overall functionality or purpose of WIPO.
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 10-11 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. See attached PTO-892, specifically US 2020/0317207 which discloses frequency analysis and filter generation to motion signals to determine a heartbeat signal.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Eric D Bertram whose telephone number is (571)272-3446. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday 8am-6pm Central Time.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Jennifer McDonald can be reached at 571-270-3061. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/Eric D. Bertram/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3796
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