The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This Office action is in response to communications filed on 3/19/2025.
Claims 1-26 are pending.
DETAILED ACTION
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 1-5 and 14-18 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over AKL et al. (US 20250274818 A1, hereinafter AKL) in view of Kim et al. (US 20220345970 A1).
Regarding claim 1, AKL discloses a user equipment (UE) (¶[0008], "UE") comprising:
a transceiver configured to: receive, from a source base station (BS), a radio resource control (RRC) reconfiguration message that includes a list of at least one next hop chaining counter (NCC) for lower layer triggered mobility (LTM) (¶[0008], "receiving first information indicating at least one LTM candidate configuration"; ¶[0142], "the first information 315 may be signaled to the UE 115-b via an RRC message (e.g., RRCReconfiguration message)"; ¶[0192], "the UE 115-e may receive, from the network entity 105-d, an NCC value. For example, the (serving) network entity 105-d may indicate, based on a key value available at the network entity 105-d, an NCC value to be utilized by the UE 115-e for a subsequent LTM procedure. The NCC value may be indicated to the UE 115-e via an RRC message in some examples"; ); and
receive, from the source BS, an LTM cell switch command to switch to an LTM target cell (¶[0193], "the network entity 105-d may output an LTM trigger to the UE 115-e for an LTM procedure to a second cell provided by the network entity 105-e"); and
a processor operably coupled to the transceiver (¶[0207]-[0208]),
the processor configured to, in response to receipt of the LTM cell switch command: derive a security key for a BS of the LTM target cell based on an NCC in a first entry of the list of at least one NCC for LTM (¶[0118], "UE may receive a handover command, including NCC=5, from a first network entity. The UE 115 may perform horizontal key derivation and perform the handover to a second network entity"; ¶[0143], "The UE 115-b may utilize the NCC value to derive a security key for securing UE communication with the network entity 105-b after the first handover 340-a").
AKL does not disclose update the list of at least one NCC for LTM by removing the NCC in the first entry; and derive, from the security key for the BS of the LTM target cell, RRC and user plane encryption and integrity protection keys for securing RRC and user plane data transmitted to and received from the LTM target cell.
Kim discloses update the list of at least one NCC for LTM by removing the NCC in the first entry (¶[0243], "the UE may derive a new security key of a base station (K.sub.gNB) based on at least one of current K.sub.gNB or next hop (NH) parameters associated to the NCC value"; ¶[0251], "If the stored NCC value is different from the NCC value associated with the current K.sub.gNB, the UE may delete the current AS key K.sub.gNB"); and
derive, from the security key for the BS of the LTM target cell, RRC and user plane encryption and integrity protection keys for securing RRC and user plane data transmitted to and received from the LTM target cell (¶[0243], "the UE may derive a new security key of a base station (K.sub.gNB) based on at least one of current K.sub.gNB or next hop (NH) parameters associated to the NCC value. Based on the new security key of the base station and a previously configured integrity protection algorithm, the UE may derive a security key for integrity protection of an RRC signaling (K.sub.RRCint) and a security key for integrity protection of user plane (UP) data (K.sub.UPint)").
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to combine the teachings of AKL and Kim to arrive at a system which updates the list of at least one NCC for LTM by removing the NCC in the first entry; and derives, from the security key for the BS of the LTM target cell, RRC and user plane encryption and integrity protection keys for securing RRC and user plane data transmitted to and received from the LTM target cell.
One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated because it would "provide for optimization of an RRC-based SDT mechanism that utilizes DU-stateless routing" (Kim, ¶[0054]).
Regarding claim 2, the combined teachings of AKL and Kim disclose the invention substantially as applied to claim 1, above, wherein: the LTM cell switch command includes an NCC; and the processor is further configured to: derive the security key for the BS of the LTM target cell based on the NCC included in the LTM cell switch command (AKL, ¶[0118], "A first example of key derivation from the perspective of a UE 115 during a mobility procedure is given as follows. A UE 115 may use a key associated with the first network entity with NCC=5. A UE may receive a handover command, including NCC=5, from a first network entity. The UE 115 may perform horizontal key derivation and perform the handover to a second network entity. As used herein, the term “horizontal key derivation” may indicate a key derivation that is performed without the involvement of one or more core network entities (e.g., AMF entity). For instance, a horizontal key derivation may not involve the generation of a fresh key by an AMF entity. As used herein, a “fresh key” may be a key that is newly generated (by the AMF entity, for example). The UE 115 may use the key associated with the second network entity with NCC=5").
Regarding claim 3, the combined teachings of AKL and Kim disclose the invention substantially as applied to claim 2, above, wherein: the processor is further configured to determine whether the NCC included in the LTM cell switch command is identical to an NCC of a security key for the source BS; and the security key for the BS of the LTM target cell is derived based on a result of the determination (AKL, ¶[0118], when the new NCC is equal to the previous NCC, the same key is derived, but when the NCC is different a new key is derived. Therefore checking whether the NCC is the same is implied - alternatively, see Kim, ¶[0250], "If the sent NCC value is fresh and belongs to an unused pair of {NCC, NH}, the base station may save the pair of {NCC, NH} in the current UE AS security context and may delete the current AS key K.sub.gNB. If the sent NCC value is equal to the NCC value associated with the current K.sub.gNB, the base station may keep the current AS key K.sub.gNB and NCC").
Regarding claim 4, the combined teachings of AKL and Kim disclose the invention substantially as applied to claim 3, above, wherein the processor is further configured to, in response to a determination that the NCC received in the LTM cell switch command is not identical to the NCC of the security key for the source BS: derive a next hop (NH) corresponding to the NCC included in the LTM cell switch command; and derive the security key for the BS of the LTM target cell from the NH (Kim, ¶[0243], "the UE may derive a new security key of a base station (K.sub.gNB) based on at least one of current K.sub.gNB or next hop (NH) parameters associated to the NCC value" - this implies that the UE derives the NH as it is associated with the NCC value which the UE did not previously had).
Regarding claim 5, the combined teachings of AKL and Kim disclose the invention substantially as applied to claim 3, above, wherein the processor is further configured to, in response to a determination that the NCC included in the LTM cell switch command is identical to the NCC of the security key for the source BS, derive the security key for the BS of the LTM target cell from the security key for the source base station (AKL, ¶[0118], when the new NCC is equal to the previous NCC, the same key is derived, but when the NCC is different a new key is derived. Therefore checking whether the NCC is the same is implied - also, see Kim, ¶[0250], "If the sent NCC value is fresh and belongs to an unused pair of {NCC, NH}, the base station may save the pair of {NCC, NH} in the current UE AS security context and may delete the current AS key K.sub.gNB. If the sent NCC value is equal to the NCC value associated with the current K.sub.gNB, the base station may keep the current AS key K.sub.gNB and NCC").
Regarding claims 14-18, AKL discloses a method of operating a user equipment (UE) (¶[0008], "A method by a UE is described").
The remaining limitations of claims 14-18 are similar in scope to those of claims 1-5. Therefore, claims 14-18 are rejected for the same reasons as set forth in the rejection of claims 1-5, above (i.e., in view of the combination of AKL and Kim).
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 6-13 and 19-26 are allowed.
The following is an examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance:
The prior art of record fails to teach, neither singly nor in combination, the claimed limitations of “derive a security key for a BS of the LTM target cell based on the selected NH; and in response to transmission of the LTM cell switch command to the UE, cause the transceiver to transmit, to the BS of the LTM target cell, the derived security key for the BS of the LTM target cell, wherein the derived security key for the BS of the LTM target cell is for derivation of, by the LTM target cell, radio resource control (RRC) and user plane encryption and integrity protection keys used to protect RRC and user plane data transmitted to and received from the UE” as recited in claim 6 and similarly stated in claim(s) 19. These limitations, in conjunction with other limitations in the independent claim(s), are not specifically disclosed or remotely suggested in the prior art of record. A review of claim(s) 6-13 and 19-26 indicates claim(s) 6-13 and 19-26 are allowable over the prior art of record.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure:
US 20260107136 A1, which discloses "The UE and MN shall derive the security key K.sub.SN of the SN. The SN RRC and UP (User Plane) keys shall be derived from the K.sub.SN both at the SN and the UE using the function given in Annex A.7 of TS 33.401[10] if the SN is a ng-eNB. Once all the SN RRC and UP keys have been derived from the K.sub.SN, the SN and UE may delete the K.sub.SN" (¶[0067]).
US 20220117006 A1, which discloses "a next hop chaining counter parameter (NCC) used for next hop access key derivation, identifiers of selected AS level cryptographic algorithms, and counters used for replay protection. The gNB may choose the ciphering and integrity algorithm that has the highest priority from its configured list and is also present in the UE 5G security capabilities. The chosen algorithm may be indicated to the UE in the AS security mode command (SMC), where the AS SMC procedure may be for RRC and UP security algorithms negotiation and RRC security activation. During initial AS security context establishment at the gNB, the UE may derive a gNB key (a K.sub.gNB) and a NH parameter directly from an access and mobility management function (AMF) key (a K.sub.AMF). An NCC may also be associated with the K.sub.gNB and NH parameter, initially having a value equal to, for example, one" (¶[0044]).
CATT, "Discussion on R19 mobility enhancements", 3GPP TSG-RAN Meeting #102, RP-232995, Dec 2023, which discloses "the UE can generate the target cell's complete configuration based on reference configuration mechanism after it receives the target cell ID included in cell switch command MAC CE […] UE needs to derive security keys for the target cell autonomously [...] a SN security key can be generated at UE side based on the pre-configured sk-counter values. For each candidate SN, a list of sk-counter values is provided to UE. And for each PSCell change, if SN changes simultaneously, a UE will use the next unused sk-counter value of the corresponding SN for security key generation [...] At UE side, UE performs key derivation based on stored NCC, and also increases its locally kept NCC value by one and compute a new fresh NH for next hop as illustrated in figure 3" (page 6, section 5.3).
US 12677224 B2, which discloses "At some point of time, GNB 2A-02 may decide to hand over UE from a cell to another cell. In 2A-16, GNB 2A-02 transmits to UE a first RRCReconfiguration to command handover. UE receives from GNB 2A-02 the first RRCReconfiguration" (col. 10, lines 60-64).
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to BORIS D GRIJALVA LOBOS whose telephone number is (571)272-0767. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 10:30AM to 6:30PM EST. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Jorge L Ortiz-Criado can be reached at 571-272-7624. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/BORIS D GRIJALVA LOBOS/ Primary Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2496
Prosecution Insights