DETAILED ACTION
Status of the Application
The present application is being examined under the pre-AIA first to invent provisions.
Status of the Claims
This action is in response to the applicant’s filing on March 26, 2025. Claims 1 – 20 are pending and examined below.
Claim Interpretation
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(f):
(f) Element in Claim for a Combination. – An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
The claims in this application are given their broadest reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the specification as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim element (also commonly referred to as a claim limitation) is limited by the description in the specification when 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is invoked.
As explained in MPEP § 2181, subsection I, claim limitations that meet the following three-prong test will be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph:
(A) the claim limitation uses the term “means” or “step” or a term used as a substitute for “means” that is a generic placeholder (also called a nonce term or a non-structural term having no specific structural meaning) for performing the claimed function;
(B) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is modified by functional language, typically, but not always linked by the transition word “for” (e.g., “means for”) or another linking word or phrase, such as “configured to” or “so that”; and
(C) the term “means” or “step” or the generic placeholder is not modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the claimed function.
Use of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim with functional language creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, material, or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Absence of the word “means” (or “step”) in a claim creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim limitation is not to be treated in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. The presumption that the claim limitation is not interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, is rebutted when the claim limitation recites function without reciting sufficient structure, material or acts to entirely perform the recited function.
Claim limitations in this application that use the word “means” (or “step”) are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action. Conversely, claim limitations in this application that do not use the word “means” (or “step”) are not being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, except as otherwise indicated in an Office action.
This application includes one or more claim limitations that do not use the word “means,” but are nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, because the claim limitation(s) uses a generic placeholder that is coupled with functional language without reciting sufficient structure to perform the recited function and the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier. Such claim limitations are: an obtaining unit and a control unit in claims 12 and 14, respectively.
Because /these claim limitations are being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, they are being interpreted to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification as performing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof.
If applicant does not intend to have these limitations interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, applicant may: (1) amend the claim limitations to avoid them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph (e.g., by reciting sufficient structure to perform the claimed function); or (2) present a sufficient showing that the claim limitations recite sufficient structure to perform the claimed function so as to avoid them being interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 12 – 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
In line 2 of claim 12, the phrase “obtaining unit” is not clearly defined in the
claims or the specification. Although the “obtaining unit” is disclosed as a part of the “Apparatus 600”, neither the claims nor the specification define its physical structure. Clarification is required.
Any claims not specifically mentioned herein above, but nonetheless rejected as failing to comply with the written description requirement, are rejected for incorporating the errors of their respective base claims by dependency.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 12 – 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the invention.
In line 2 of claim 12, the phrase “obtaining unit” is not clearly defined in the
claims or the specification. Although the “obtaining unit” is disclosed as a part of the “Apparatus 600”, neither the claims nor the specification define its physical structure. Clarification is required.
Any claims not specifically mentioned herein above, but nonetheless rejected as being indefinite, are rejected for incorporating the errors of their respective base claims by dependency.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1, 2, 4 – 10, 12, 13 and 15 – 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. The following rejection is based on the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance. (See 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019).
Does claim 1 fall into one of the statutory categories? Yes. The preamble of claim 1 recites a braking control method, and the body of the claim positively recites a series of method steps. Therefore, claim 1 is directed to a process.
Does claim 12 fall into one of four of the statutory categories? Yes. The preamble of claim 12 recites a braking control apparatus. The body of claim 12 recites at least one physical element that forms part of the claimed apparatus. Therefore, claim 12 is directed to an apparatus
Does claim 20 fall into one of the statutory categories? Yes. The preamble of claim 20 recites a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, wherein the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program when executed by a processor of a braking control apparatus, causing the braking control apparatus to perform a braking control method. The body of claim 20 positively recites a series of steps performing a braking control method. Therefore, claim 20 is directed to an apparatus.
Step 2A – Prong 1
Do claims 1, 7, 9, 12, 18 and 20 recite a judicial exception? Yes. The claims recite the limitations of
determining a target braking force based on the vehicle speed and the required braking force, wherein: between a first moment and a second moment, the target braking force first changes to a first threshold and then changes to a second threshold, the first threshold is greater than the required braking force, and the second threshold is equal to the required braking force; the first moment is a moment at which the vehicle speed is equal to a first speed; and the second moment is a moment at which the vehicle speed is equal to a second speed, and the second speed is less than the first speed; and determining a first execution braking force and a second execution braking force based on the target braking force, wherein the first execution braking force is provided through energy regeneration, and the second execution braking force is provided by a braking system (see Claims 1, 12 and 20);
determining the target braking force based on information about a correspondence between the vehicle speed, the required braking force, and the target braking force (see Claims 7 and 18); and
determining that the vehicle currently meets a first condition, wherein the first condition comprises at least one of the following: a vehicle braking deceleration is within a first preset interval, the vehicle speed is lower than a preset speed, a distance between the vehicle and an obstacle is greater than or equal to a preset distance, a pedal stroke of the vehicle is within a second preset interval, or a pedal stroke change rate of the vehicle is within a third preset interval.
The determining limitations, as drafted, are processes that, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, cover performances of the limitations in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components. That is, other than reciting “a determining unit” nothing in the claim precludes the determining steps from practically being performed in the human mind/visually. For example, but for the “determining unit” language, the claims encompass the user to manually and/or visually perform the aforementioned steps. As such, these limitations in claims 1, 7, 9, 12, 18 and 20 are considered mental processes.
Step 2A – Prong 2
Do claims 1, 7, 9, 12, 18 and 20 integrate the judicial exception into a practical application? No. Claims 1, 7, 9, 12, 18 and 20 recite one additional element: an obtaining unit, configured to obtain a vehicle speed and a required braking force of a vehicle. The obtaining steps recited in the claim recited at a high level of generality (i.e., as a general means of gathering an electronic representation of a vehicle speed and a required braking force of a vehicle), and amount to mere data gathering, which is a form of insignificant extra-solution activity. This generic processor limitation is no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. Accordingly, this additional element does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. As such, Claims 1, 7, 9, 12, 18 and 20 are directed to the abstract idea.
Step 2B
Do claims1, 7, 9, 12, 18 and 20 provide an inventive concept? No. As discussed with respect to Step 2A Prong Two, the additional element in the claim amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. The same analysis applies here in 2B, i.e., mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component cannot integrate a judicial exception into a practical application at Step 2A or provide an inventive concept in Step 2B. Claims 1, 7, 9, 12, 18 and 20 are ineligible.
As to claims 2, 4 – 6, 8, 10, 13, 15 – 17 and 19,
these claims further define the abstract idea and fail to impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.
Therefore, claims 1, 2, 4 – 10, 12, 13 and 15 – 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1, 2, 4, 7 – 8, 11 – 13, 15 and 18 – 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) or 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by cited JP 2005-348497 A to Fujita (herein after “Fujita publication”).
Note: Text written in bold typeface is claim language from the instant application.
Texts written in normal typeface are comments made by the Examiner and/or passages from the prior art reference(s).
As to claims 1, 12 and 20,
the Fujita publication discloses a braking control apparatus (6, 8), comprising:
an obtaining unit (9, 10, 15), configured to obtain a vehicle speed and a required braking force of a vehicle (see ¶7 for “means for detecting the vehicle speed and deceleration during braking by the brake means” and ¶11, where “the motor controller 8 receives the following signals: vsp from the vehicle speed sensor 9 which detects the vehicle speed of the vehicle 21, on/off from the brake switch 10 which detects the depression of the brake pedal (not shown), and G from the deceleration sensor 15 which detects deceleration in the longitudinal direction”); and
a determining unit (6, 8), configured to:
determine a target braking force (or a command value) based on the vehicle speed and the required braking force (see ¶24), wherein:
between a first moment (t3) and a second moment (t4), the target braking force first changes to a first threshold and then changes to a second threshold, the first threshold is greater than the required braking force, and the second threshold is equal to the required braking force (see ¶24);
the first moment is a moment at which the vehicle speed is equal to a first speed (see ¶24); and
the second moment is a moment at which the vehicle speed is equal to a second speed, and the second speed is less than the first speed (see ¶24); and
determine a first execution braking force and a second execution braking force based on the target braking force, wherein the first execution braking force is provided through energy regeneration, and the second execution braking force is provided by a braking system (see ¶22 – ¶24).
As to claims 2 and 13,
the Fujita publication discloses after the second moment, the target braking force changes to a third threshold, and the third threshold is a braking force required for keeping the vehicle stationary. (See ¶25.)
As to claims 4 and 15,
the Fujita publication discloses a sum of the first execution braking force and the second execution braking force is equal to the target braking force. (See ¶24.)
As to claims 7, 8, 18 and 19,
the Fujita publication discloses that a command value to the motor controller 6 is output based on the vehicle speed and the deceleration G1. (See ¶13 and ¶15). In that case, it is recognized that the command value to the motor controller 6 is obtained based on the information on the correspondence between the vehicle speed, the deceleration G1, and the command value to the motor controller 6.
As to claim 11,
the Fujita publication discloses the braking system comprises at least one of the following: a hydraulic braking system, an electrical parking braking (EPB) system, or an electro-mechanical braking (EMB) system. (See ¶10.)
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 3 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over the Fujita publication in view of U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2020/0017082 A1 to Takahashi et al. (herein after “Takahashi et al. publication").
Note: Text written in bold typeface is claim language from the instant application.
Texts written in normal typeface are comments made by the Examiner and/or passages from the prior art reference(s).
As to claims 3 and 14,
the Fujita publication discloses the invention substantially as claimed, except for
controlling the vehicle to perform parking braking.
Controlling a vehicle to perform parking braking is old and well-known, as demonstrated by the Takahashi et al. publication who discloses a vehicle braking control device applicable to a vehicle equipped with an electric-powered parking braking device, a hydraulic braking device and a regenerative braking device. (See Abstract.) Therefore, when the parking braking operation is performed while the vehicle is traveling, it is possible to appropriately increase the braking force to the vehicle, in response to the driver's request. (See ¶9.)
Based on a reasonable expectation of success, it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the time the invention was filed to modify the Fujita publication so that the braking control apparatus controls the vehicle to perform parking braking, as taught by the Takahashi et al. publication, in order to provide a braking system that can perform a parking braking electronically and a primary braking electromechanically.
Claims 5, 6, 16 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over the Fujita publication in view of the Takahashi et al. publication.
Note: Text written in bold typeface is claim language from the instant application.
Texts written in normal typeface are comments made by the Examiner and/or passages from the prior art reference(s).
As to claims 5, 6, 16 and 17,
the Fujita publication discloses the invention substantially as claimed, except for
when the vehicle speed is less than or equal to a second vehicle speed threshold, or when the vehicle is incapable of performing energy regeneration braking, the first execution braking force is configured to be 0, and the second execution braking force is configured to be equal to the target braking force.
The Takahashi et al. publication discloses that when the vehicle speed is equal to or higher than the predetermined vehicle speed (v1), braking is performed only by the regenerative braking force (see FIG. 2, ¶34 and ¶41), and when the vehicle speed is equal to or lower than the predetermined vehicle speed (v11), braking is performed by a braking force other than the regenerative braking force. (See FIG. 2, ¶40 and ¶41).
Such disclosure suggests that when the vehicle speed is less than or equal to a second vehicle speed threshold, or when the vehicle is incapable of performing energy regeneration braking, the first execution braking force is configured to be 0, and the second execution braking force is configured to be equal to the target braking force
Based on a reasonable expectation of success, it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the time the invention was filed to modify the Fujita publication so that when the vehicle speed is less than or equal to a second vehicle speed threshold, or when the vehicle is incapable of performing energy regeneration braking, the first execution braking force is configured to be 0, and the second execution braking force is configured to be equal to the target braking force, as taught by the Takahashi et al. publication, in order to provide a braking system that does not rely primarily on regenerative braking.
Claim 9 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over the Fujita publication in view of CN 113276851 A to Liu (herein after “Liu patent").
Note: Text written in bold typeface is claim language from the instant application.
Texts written in normal typeface are comments made by the Examiner and/or passages from the prior art reference(s).
As to claim 9,
the Fujita publication discloses the invention substantially as claimed, except for
determining that the vehicle currently meets a first condition, wherein the first condition comprises at least one of the following: a vehicle braking deceleration is within a first preset interval, the vehicle speed is lower than a preset speed, a distance between the vehicle and an obstacle is greater than or equal to a preset distance, a pedal stroke of the vehicle is within a second preset interval, or a pedal stroke change rate of the vehicle is within a third preset interval.
Determining that the vehicle currently meets a first braking condition is old and well-known, as demonstrated by the Liu patent who discloses “the process of controlling the vehicle braking . . . under the condition that the current driving speed of the vehicle is less than or equal to the preset speed threshold value”. (See Page 10.) Such disclosure suggests at least the vehicle speed is lower than a preset speed.
Based on a reasonable expectation of success, it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the time the invention was filed to modify the Fujita publication so that at least the vehicle speed is lower than a preset speed, as taught by the Liu patent, in order to provide a braking system that does not rely primarily on regenerative braking.
Conclusion
Examiner's Note(s): The Examiner has cited particular paragraphs or columns and line numbers in the references applied to the claims above for the convenience of the applicant. Although the specified citations are representative of the teachings of the art and are applied to specific limitations within the individual claim, other passages and figures may apply as well. It is respectfully requested of the applicant in preparing responses, to fully consider the references in their entirety as potentially teaching all or part of the claimed invention, as well as the context of the passage as taught by the prior art or disclosed by the Examiner. SEE MPEP 2141.02 [R-07.2015] VI. PRIOR ART MUST BE CONSIDERED IN ITS ENTIRETY, INCLUDING DISCLOSURES THAT TEACH AWAY FROM THE CLAIMS: A prior art reference must be considered in its entirety, i.e., as a whole, including portions that would lead away from the claimed invention. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984). See also MPEP §2123.
In addition, disclosures in a reference must be evaluated for what they would fairly teach one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Snow, 471 F.2d 1400, 176 USPQ 328 (CCPA 1973) and In re Boe, 355 F.2d 961, 148 USPQ 507 (CCPA 1966). Specifically, in considering the teachings of a reference, it is proper to take into account not only the specific teachings of the reference, but also the inferences that one skilled in the art would reasonably have been expected to draw from the reference. See In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 159 USPQ 342 (CCPA 1968) and In re Shepard, 319 F.2d 194, 138 USPQ 148 (CCPA 1963). Likewise, it is proper to take into consideration not only the teachings of the prior art, but also the level of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Luck, 476 F.2d 650, 177 USPQ 523 (CCPA 1973). Specifically, those of ordinary skill in the art are presumed to have some knowledge of the art apart from what is expressly disclosed in the references. See In re Jacoby, 309 F.2d 513, 135 USPQ 317 (CCPA 1962).
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to RODNEY A. BUTLER whose telephone number is (313)446-6513. The examiner can normally be reached on weekdays, Monday through Friday, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Anne M. Antonucci can be reached on weekdays, Monday through Friday, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. at (313) 446-6519. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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Electronic Communications
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/RODNEY A BUTLER/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3666
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