DETAILED ACTION
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Claims 1-21 are pending under this Office action.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-7, 9, 11-17 and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Beverina, etc. (US 20010027389 A1) in view of Robinson, etc. (US 20250005165 A1), further in view of Hanson (US 20110277034 A1).
Regarding claim 1, Beverina teaches that a process for identifying and mitigating threats to existing critical assets (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0072], “Referring now to FIG. 1, an automated vulnerability assessment tool (AVAT) 100 includes a vulnerability assessment tool (VAT) 200, a theater information management system (TIMS) 130, and a VAT Editor 150. In preferred embodiments, the tool may be run on a personal computer or workstation. Each of these component parts of the AVAT 100 will be discussed in further detail below”) comprising:
identifying environmental features and existing critical assets at a critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 7, and [0085], “The 3D Builder 260, a screen shot 700 of which is shown in FIG. 7, provides an interface for the user to build a 3D representation of his site. The 3D Builder 260 imports files from computer aided design (CAD) programs or images and uses them as the outline for the site layout. The user can then `build` virtual representations of the buildings, roads, and perimeters of the site and identify population centers, VIPs, and countermeasures. This virtual representation of the site is stored in the Database module 220 and is used by the Computational Engine 230 to compute threat vectors and the accessibility of assets and by the Analytic Models to calculate weapon effects against targets”. Note that the roads, building, VIP, center, etc. are mapped to the environment features);
obtaining existing critical asset site data representing the environmental features and the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 6-7, and [0292], “The GUI Engine 210, shown in FIG. 6, reads information from the database and creates screens to allow the user to interact with the system. This area, like the rest of the interface, is completely controlled by the GUI Engine 210, but the 3D Engine 210 is also capable of writing information to it. Whenever the 3D Builder 260 or Viewer 280 is needed, the GUI Engine 210 provides a graphics context to the 3D Engine 210 so that it can display graphics in the dynamic content area. The GUI Engine 210 creates and manages all the toolbars that are required to operate the 3D Builder 260 and Viewer 280. It passes the commands issued by the user to the 3D subsystem for processing. This provides a consistent interface to the user and relieves the 3D sub-system from the duties of handling user input”);
processing the existing critical asset site data to convert the existing critical asset site data into 3D model data representing the critical asset site including the environmental features and the existing critical assets (See Beverina: Fig. 41, and [0329], “The 3D Builder 260 allows the user to construct his base in the VAT 200 system for use with the various modules to calculate vulnerability and mitigate risk. The user is presented with a palette of standard 3D construction tools, camera movement options, and structure types to build. The countermeasure library and structure types are then read in from the database, and the list presented to the user in an appropriate menu so he can select a structure to build. The user then uses the tool to build up his site on top of a base image of the layout (scanned-in map, perhaps) or use a base AutoCAD DXF file if applicable. A flow diagram of the builder process is shown in FIG. 41”);
providing the 3D existing critical asset site data to an interactive 3D modeling system, the interactive 3D modeling system transforming the 3D existing critical asset site data into an interactive 3D model representation of the critical asset site including the environmental features and the existing critical assets (See Beverina: Figs. 42-43, and [0334], “Both the 3D Viewer 280 and the 3D Builder 260 are based upon the same 3D Run-time Environment 270 (also referred to herein as the 3D simulation/gaming environment) that handles the rendering of the scene. The 3D engine stores texture information, polygonal models, and lighting information needed to render the scene quickly and realistically. A detailed look at the sub-modules of the 3D-Run-time Environment 270 is found in FIG. 43”. Note that the 3D builder and viewer is mapped to the interactive 3D modeling system);
identifying potential vulnerabilities associated with the existing critical assets at the critical asset site and generating potential vulnerability data representing the identified potential vulnerabilities associated with the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 21, and [0139], “The calculation of these approach vectors is a multi-step process that takes into consideration the terrain, the layout of the site, physical capabilities of the threat delivery system, and the reasoning process of the threat actor. FIG. 21 outlines the complete process for creating the approach vectors. The primary algorithmic techniques employed in creating these vectors are: a weighted graph search algorithm, first-order physics, decision theory, and pattern recognition”; and [0142], “Risk management support is provided in the VAT 200 by allowing the user to modify the site baseline based on the determination of vulnerabilities to specific threats. Once the user builds the baseline, characterizes assets and determines specific threats, the VAT 200 walks him/her through a susceptibility determination and consequence analysis. Susceptibilities and consequences, coupled with the probability of a specific threat attack, make up the relative risk of a target against that threat. In order to perform risk management, the user must reduce the susceptibility of a target to an attack, the likely consequences of an attack, and/or the probability of the attack occurring. All of these can be reduced through the employment of countermeasures or asset relocation”. Note that susceptibility is mapped to the potential vulnerabilities);
identifying potential threat mitigation features capable of mitigating the determined potential vulnerability of the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 35A-B, and [0307], “In addition to interacting with the primary VAT 200 Influence Network 500, the susceptibility determination and risk mitigation components also make use of local networks in order to make complex decisions, as shown in FIGS. 35 a, b. During the susceptibility determination, threat intentions and capabilities are compared to countermeasure effectiveness to determine the reaction of the threat upon encountering a countermeasure. This complex inference is handled using a miniature Influence Network. Similarly, risk mitigation also uses threat and countermeasure characteristics in making decisions. Various countermeasures are compared to the specific threat to determine which ones are most effective at mitigating the risk of the threat against the target. These local decisions do not directly derive from the prime Influence Network, so they are handled independently”) and generating potential threat mitigation feature data representing the identified potential threat mitigation features;
processing the potential vulnerability data and the potential threat mitigation feature data to generate an interactive visualization of the effectiveness of the potential threat mitigation features for protecting the existing critical assets at the critical asset site(See Beverina: Figs. 19, and [0124], “The 3D Viewer 280 allows the user of the VAT 200 to play various threat scenarios against his/her site. The site layout is read in from the database as constructed in the 3D Builder 260. The Computational Engine 230 is then invoked to calculate threat vectors, and the resulting data displayed on top of the layout in a three-dimensional view. The user is then able to select a vector based on delivery type, risk value, or other such factors, and play the threat against the site in a realistic manner so that the consequences can be viewed. After the threat vector has been played, the user can then switch to the 3D Builder 260 mode to add countermeasures, move countermeasures, or make other changes, and then run the simulations again as he/she builds up a site layout and plan. FIG. 19 displays a simplified example of a 3D Viewer Screen 1900”);
displaying the interactive visualization of the effectiveness of the potential threat mitigation features for protecting the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 15-18, and [0118], “FIG. 14 and FIG. 15 are examples of the types of screens that appear in the main content window. The typical Planner Interface Screen 1400, as shown in FIG. 14, has large fonts, natural English, and establishes context for questions and information before they are presented”);
selecting one or more threat mitigation features based, at least in part, on the visualization of the effectiveness of the potential threat mitigation features for protecting the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Fig. 22, and [0143], “FIG. 22 provides an overview of the risk management process. Based on the current site baseline and the vulnerabilities determined by the VAT 200, the user is presented with countermeasures to employ across their installation. By targeting the placement of these countermeasures against the specific vulnerabilities, the user can reduce risk. To assist in this process, the VAT 200 analyzes the threat and suggests countermeasures that can best reduce the components of risk associated with the threat. Comparing the effectiveness of the countermeasure against the threat accomplishes this. Countermeasures that are most effective against the threat are presented to the user, along with suggestions for successful employment. These countermeasures are not limited to hardening of assets (blast walls, Mylar on windows, etc.) but include countermeasures to:”);
generating selected threat mitigation feature data representing structural parameters (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0094], The Database module 220 retains the relationships among these countermeasures and procedures and the threats that they counter to allow the user to develop a defensive posture. The 3D Builder 260 allows the user to specifically place countermeasures and optimize their placement to be most effective against the threat.”) and the location of the selected threat mitigation features for the existing critical assets at the critical asset site; and
using the selected threat mitigation feature data to generate critical asset site threat mitigation implementation plan data for the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 10, and [0108], “All of the data entered by the user and the information calculated by the system is stored in the Database module 220. This information is therefore available for export and dissemination to reports and other applications as shown in FIG. 10. The VAT 200 will provide, at a minimum, the report formats from the JSIVA Report and the ATIFP Installation Planning Template. Information from the VAT 200 will be used to populate these reports and the user will be able to finish the reports by writing the remaining required text. This document will then be saved to the database and will be available in Microsoft Word.TM. format for reproduction. The VAT 200 will also provide the flexibility for users to create custom reports or to save out and print VAT 200 risk assessment reports”; and Fig. 44, and [0340], “The Report Generator module is built around the design concepts expressed in the User Defined Report Generation Capability section. As described in that section, report formats form the heart of the report generation capability whose structure is reflected in its class hierarchy as shown in FIG. 25, Report Format and FIG. 44, VAT Report Generator module. In addition to the Report Format, Section, Paragraph and Clause object classes discussed in the User Defined Report Generation Capability section; the Report Generator module adds a class for the report that forms the public interface for creating reports in multiple formats, a report generator class that forms the public interface for the subsystem, and several subclasses which implement the specific behaviors for paragraph types, clause types, and output formats”).
However, Beverina fails to explicitly disclose that and generating potential threat mitigation feature data representing the identified potential threat mitigation features; and the location of the selected threat mitigation features for the existing critical assets at the critical asset site.
However, Robinson teaches that and generating potential threat mitigation feature data representing the identified potential threat mitigation features (See Robinson: Fig. 2, and [0033], “FIG. 2 illustrates, in a block diagram, a computing environment for a 3D model and connection generator in accordance with certain embodiments. The 3D model and connection generator 200 includes a vulnerability dashboard 210 and a generator 220. The generator 220 may invoke or implement a graphing tool 230 and/or a 3D modeler 240. The 3D model and connection generator 200 is connected to a data store 250 and to a data store 260. The data store 250 (e.g., a database) stores vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n for each vulnerability, where each vulnerability may have a vulnerability identifier. Each set of vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n stores vulnerability attributes 254a . . . 254n along with the vulnerability (e.g., a name or a phrase for the vulnerability) and/or the vulnerability identifier. The data store 260 stores identified anchor points 270 and 3D models and connections 280 (e.g., the information used to render (display) the 3D models and connections). Connections may also be referred to as links or chains. Anchor points may also be referred to as hooks. The vulnerability attributes 254a . . . 254n may be variables”; and [0040], “In certain embodiments, the 3D modeler 240 is a 3D modeling utility and ties to the vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n to pull the vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n into a 3D perspective. The vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n may be plugged into the 3D modeler 240 for vulnerability reporting visualization. The 3D modeler 240 integrates with the vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n to take vulnerability attributes 254a . . . 254n and show them as they relate to each other and other systems with the 3D models and connections”. Note that the 3D modeling of the vulnerability and visualization of the 3D model is mapped to “generating potential threat mitigation feature data representing the identified potential threat mitigation features”).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention was effectively filed to modify Beverina to have and generating potential threat mitigation feature data representing the identified potential threat mitigation features as taught by Robinson in order to enable reducing complexity vulnerability management in large and complex environments (See Robinson: Fig. 2, and [0065], “Because every person learns and digests the vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n in a different way, having a text-only approach to vulnerability scoring and methodologies makes it difficult to determine how much context each person gets out of vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n, and so the 3D model and connection generator 200 provides 3D models and connections to provide visual context (i.e., how different vulnerabilities are related to each other) for vulnerabilities. The 3D model and connection generator 200 allows for proper understanding of vulnerability context, which enables appropriate prioritization and remediation activities for secure networks and systems. With the increasing complexity of systems (e.g., using containers, multi-cloud deployments, open-source software implementations, Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), connectivity between cloud environments, and network intricacies), the 3D model and connection generator 200 provides a better and less complex way to view vulnerabilities”). Beverina teaches a method and system that may provide physical critical-asset site process, interactive 3D modeling of the site, vulnerability analysis vis simulation, identify the countermeasures and plan data for implementation of the risk mitigation, while Robinson teaches a system and method that may build interactive 3D model of the assets including potential vulnerability and display the interactive 3D visualization that graphically represents the model. Therefore, it is obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Beverina by Robinson to model 3D environment with vulnerabilities and visualize the 3Dinteractive model. The motivation to modify Beverina by Robinson is “Use of known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or products) in the same way”.
However, Beverina, modified by Robinson, fails to explicitly disclose that the location of the selected threat mitigation features for the existing critical assets at the critical asset site.
However, Hanson teaches that the location of the selected threat mitigation features for the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Hanson: Fig. 1, and [0026], “In one implementation, the active vulnerability scanners 210 may be distributed in locations across the network to reduce stress on the network. For example, the active vulnerability scanners 210 may be distributed at different locations in the network in order to scan certain portions of the network in parallel, whereby an amount of time to perform the active vulnerability scans may be reduced. Furthermore, in one implementation, one or more of the active vulnerability scanners 210 may be distributed at a location that provides visibility into portions of a remote network 260 (e.g., as shown in FIG. 1, one or more of the active vulnerability scanners 210 may be distributed at a location in communication with the remote network 260). Thus, limiting the portions of the network and/or the remote network 260 that the active vulnerability scanners 210 interrogate, probe, or otherwise scan and having the active vulnerability scanners 210 perform the scans in parallel may reduce the amount of time that the active vulnerability scans consume because the active vulnerability scanners 210 can be distributed closer to scanning targets (e.g., routers 240, internal firewalls 280, external firewalls 284, servers 230, hosts 230, devices 230, etc.). In particular, because the active vulnerability scanners 210 may scan limited portions of the network rather than the entire network, and further because the parallel active scans may obtain information from the different portions of the network, the amount of time that the active scans consume may substantially correspond to the amount of time associated with one active scan”; and [0061], “Thus, the three-dimensional routing topology may be referenced (or filtered) in various ways to derive information about the network that can then be used to balance speeds, thoroughness, and invasiveness associated with scanning the network and further to optimize performance in the network. For example, the three-dimensional routing topology may visually represent various hosts, routing nodes, or other systems within a particular address space or subnet that represents a choke point in the network, whereby additional routing nodes, switches, or other infrastructure may be deployed at the choke point to reduce bottlenecks that may occur therein. In another example, assets associated with the scan times that exceed the threshold may be analyzed for common parameters or other criteria (e.g., processor speeds, memory, system firewalls, vulnerabilities, etc.), which may be compared to other assets having faster scan times to determine whether the parameters common to the assets having the longer scan times may be causing the longer scan times. In this example, a first query may be provided to the management console to filter the topology for a target network and a second query may be provided to filter the topology for the hosts that have the longer scan times, whereby different three-dimensional visualizations created in response to the first query and the second query can be visually compared to identify open ports, vulnerabilities, or other criteria that may be causing the longer scan times. Furthermore, although certain exemplary queries and network management techniques have been described herein, any other suitable queries or network management techniques may be applied using the three-dimensional visualizations that can be created with the systems and methods described herein, whether or not explicitly described”. Note that the generation of structural parameters and precis location data for selected physical threat-mitigation features is mapped to “the location of the selected threat mitigation features for the existing critical assets at the critical asset site”).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention was effectively filed to modify Beverina to have the location of the selected threat mitigation features for the existing critical assets at the critical asset site as taught by Hanson in order to enable the three-dimensional visualization to simultaneously display large numbers of nodes (See Hanson: Fig. 1, and [0014], “According to one aspect of the invention, the system and method described herein may further include a three-dimensional visualization tool associated with the management console, wherein the three-dimensional visualization tool may be used to create three-dimensional visualizations of the network topology and/or vulnerabilities. For example, the three-dimensional visualization may place every routing node in the network on a cylindrical spiral or helix, and may further place hosts that communicate with the routing nodes in leaf nodes linked to the routing nodes nearest to the respective hosts (i.e., the leaf nodes may be linked to the nearest routing nodes in vectors directed outward from the helical or cylindrical spiral). Thus, placing the routing nodes in the helical or cylindrical spiral and then placing all leaf nodes in outward vectors that connect to the routing nodes in the helical or cylindrical spiral may enable the three-dimensional visualization to simultaneously display large numbers of nodes”). Beverina teaches a method and system that may provide physical critical-asset site process, interactive 3D modeling of the site, vulnerability analysis vis simulation, identify the countermeasures and plan data for implementation of the risk mitigation, while Hanson teaches a system and method that may provide an explicit asset-centric 3D vulnerability visualization and additional plan-optimization for threat mitigation. Therefore, it is obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Beverina by Hanson to have asset-centric 3D vulnerability visualization and additional plan-optimization for threat mitigation. The motivation to modify Beverina by Hanson is “Use of known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or products) in the same way”.
Regarding claim 2, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 1 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the process of Claim 1 wherein the existing critical asset site is selected from the group of critical asset sites (See Beverina: Fig. 1, and [0071], “Although the invention has many uses, it finds particular utility in the terrorism risk management arena. Thus, the invention will be discussed in connection with terrorism risk management embodiments. However, as will be discussed further below, the invention is useful in many fields and is not limited to terrorism risk management embodiments”; and [0072], “] Referring now to FIG. 1, an automated vulnerability assessment tool (AVAT) 100 includes a vulnerability assessment tool (VAT) 200, a theater information management system (TIMS) 130, and a VAT Editor 150. In preferred embodiments, the tool may be run on a personal computer or workstation. Each of these component parts of the AVAT 100 will be discussed in further detail below”) consisting of:
electrical generation facilities (See Beverina: Fig. 6-7, and [0435], “Military Planning and targeting (inverse of the risk problem)”);
electrical generation substations;
communication stations;
water production facilities;
reservoirs;
pumping stations; airports;
sewage treatment facilities;
government facilities;
law enforcement facilities (See Beverina: Fig. 6-7, and [0446], “Building Security”);
military facilities(See Beverina: Fig. 6-7, and [0443], “Infrastructure Attacks”);
nuclear facilities (See Beverina: Fig. 6-7, and [0271], “ Sites 2730 are composed of a Site Layout 2731 and one or more Information Products 2732, Threats 2733 and Site Baselines 2724. The VAT 200 uses the Site Layout 2731 to store all of the static information about a site's infrastructure, structures, and natural environment. Conversely, Site Baselines 2724 are used to store data about the dynamic elements of a site such as employed countermeasures, asset locations, and organizations as these elements are organized for a particular configuration (e.g. one may speak of the THREATCON Alpha baseline versus the THREATCON Bravo baseline.)”); and
oil and gas production facilities (See Beverina: Figs. 6-7, and [0085], “The 3D Builder 260, a screen shot 700 of which is shown in FIG. 7, provides an interface for the user to build a 3D representation of his site. The 3D Builder 260 imports files from computer aided design (CAD) programs or images and uses them as the outline for the site layout. The user can then `build` virtual representations of the buildings, roads, and perimeters of the site and identify population centers, VIPs, and countermeasures. This virtual representation of the site is stored in the Database module 220 and is used by the Computational Engine 230 to compute threat vectors and the accessibility of assets and by the Analytic Models to calculate weapon effects against targets”. Note that all the listed sites in the Markush members are the infrastructures that need protection against terrorism attacks).
Regarding claim 3, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 1 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the process of Claim 1 wherein the existing critical assets are selected from the group of critical assets (See Beverina: Fig. 1, and [0071], “Although the invention has many uses, it finds particular utility in the terrorism risk management arena. Thus, the invention will be discussed in connection with terrorism risk management embodiments. However, as will be discussed further below, the invention is useful in many fields and is not limited to terrorism risk management embodiments”; and [0072], “] Referring now to FIG. 1, an automated vulnerability assessment tool (AVAT) 100 includes a vulnerability assessment tool (VAT) 200, a theater information management system (TIMS) 130, and a VAT Editor 150. In preferred embodiments, the tool may be run on a personal computer or workstation. Each of these component parts of the AVAT 100 will be discussed in further detail below”) consisting of:
electrical transformers; electrical generators; signal transmission towers; power lines;
dams (See Beverina: Fig. 6-7, and [0271], “ Sites 2730 are composed of a Site Layout 2731 and one or more Information Products 2732, Threats 2733 and Site Baselines 2724. The VAT 200 uses the Site Layout 2731 to store all of the static information about a site's infrastructure, structures, and natural environment. Conversely, Site Baselines 2724 are used to store data about the dynamic elements of a site such as employed countermeasures, asset locations, and organizations as these elements are organized for a particular configuration (e.g. one may speak of the THREATCON Alpha baseline versus the THREATCON Bravo baseline.)”);
aqueducts; control towers;
communication antennas; and
buildings (See Beverina: Figs. 6-7, and [0085], “The 3D Builder 260, a screen shot 700 of which is shown in FIG. 7, provides an interface for the user to build a 3D representation of his site. The 3D Builder 260 imports files from computer aided design (CAD) programs or images and uses them as the outline for the site layout. The user can then `build` virtual representations of the buildings, roads, and perimeters of the site and identify population centers, VIPs, and countermeasures. This virtual representation of the site is stored in the Database module 220 and is used by the Computational Engine 230 to compute threat vectors and the accessibility of assets and by the Analytic Models to calculate weapon effects against targets”. Note that all the listed sites in the Markush members are the infrastructures that need protection against terrorism attacks).
Regarding claim 4, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 1 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the process of Claim 1 wherein the existing critical asset site data includes one or more of:
aerial LiDAR data;
terrestrial LiDAR data;
radar data;
infrared data;
photogrammetry data; and
CAD drawing data (See Beverina: Fig. 41, and [0329], “The 3D Builder 260 allows the user to construct his base in the VAT 200 system for use with the various modules to calculate vulnerability and mitigate risk. The user is presented with a palette of standard 3D construction tools, camera movement options, and structure types to build. The countermeasure library and structure types are then read in from the database, and the list presented to the user in an appropriate menu so he can select a structure to build. The user then uses the tool to build up his site on top of a base image of the layout (scanned-in map, perhaps) or use a base AutoCAD DXF file if applicable. A flow diagram of the builder process is shown in FIG. 41”).
Regarding claim 5, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 1 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the process of Claim 1 wherein the existing critical asset site data is collected using one or more of:
aircraft;
air drones;
land-based drones;
cameras(See Beverina: Fig. 2, and [0126], “An exemplary interface to the 3D Builder module 260 of the VAT 200 is shown in FIG. 7. After all buildings and structures are placed on the map, the road network can be drawn in using line segments, and any bodies of water can be placed. If any structure requires additional information (such as number of people inside, etc.), the text area below the 3D view is used for text input that will be stored with the object. The user can then place any existing countermeasures such as cameras, guard posts, or jersey barriers for each THREATCON level to set the site baselines. The site is then saved out into the database when all structures and countermeasures are placed”);
radar systems; satellites; and
public information systems.
Regarding claim 6, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 1 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the process of Claim 1 wherein processing the existing critical asset site data to convert the critical asset site data into 3D model data is performed using a 3D mesh generation system (See Beverina: Figs. 20A-D, and [0127], “The process of building a structure is outlined in FIG. 20. From the scanned in image, or just the bare grid layout, the user selects, point by point, the outline of the base of the structure (View 1). The system then fills in the outline and creates a solid 2D polygon (View 2). The user is then able to pull up on this polygon with motion of the mouse to extrude the shape into the third dimension up to the required height (number of stories or exact height) (View 3), and the system displays a final rendered building with shading and textures applied (View 4). Building other structures follows a similar method, with differences based on scale/orientation of the object. Smaller objects, or objects that cover large areas are "painted" in using an object brush. For example, water is painted in as one would paint with a certain color in a standard 2D drawing program. Jersey barriers, for example, are placed one at a time; each "paint spot" showing up as one barrier. Once placed it can then be moved or rotated as desired”. Note that the surface polygon to build 3D model is mapped to the mesh generation).
Regarding claim 7, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 1 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the process of Claim 1 wherein the interactive 3D modeling system is a gaming engine (See Beverina: Fig. 2, and [0123], “After accessing the data in tabular form, the user can then view scenarios in a 3D simulation/gaming environment in order to gain more insight into the threat vector as played against his/her site layout and countermeasure setup”).
Regarding claim 9, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 1 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the process of Claim 1 further comprising:
obtaining potential threat data representing potential threats to critical assets (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0152], “The VAT 200 uses analytic models to calculate the consequences of likely threat scenarios. The Influence Network 500 requires an assessment of the consequences of an event in order to calculate the overall risk. For preferred embodiments the VAT 200 potential consequences are simply damage to assets and human casualties. From these results, the risk network 500 calculates additional parameters such as the mission impact and the symbolic victory the terrorist may receive based on biasing values the user has entered for the affected assets”), the potential threat data being provided by one or more of:
local intelligence (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0086], “The GUI 202 must also display complex risk, spatial, temporal, cost, and probabilistic data to the user in a useful and effective manner. Because the terrorist threat is often so vague and multi-dimensional, the information display must present simplified representations of the information and allow the user to interact with the information to see how the data is inter-related-what kinds of assets are most susceptible to a certain threat, which threats bear the highest consequences, and so on. Information from the risk influence network 500 and information in the Database module 220 can be interpreted and displayed in many combinations and representations. The GUI 202 provides sortable tables, text interpretations of data, 3D animations of scenarios, and graphs like the screens 801, 802, 803 shown in FIG. 8. The GUI 202 provides web-like capability to drill-down into any high level information presented by the GUI 202. For example, if the probability of attack for a given threat is described in the GUI 202 as `high`, the user will be able to click on `high` and drill-down to the nodes that caused the value to be high (e.g., Organization X is active in your area, they have Y weapon capabilities, and Z holy day is a trigger for this threat)”; and [0010], “The aforementioned deficiencies have been overcome to a great extent by the present invention which provides an integrated risk management tool. The integrated risk management tool uses a persistent object database to store information about actors (individuals and/or groups), physical surroundings, historical events and other information. The risk management tool also includes a decision support system that uses data objects from the database and advanced decision theory techniques, such as Bayesian Networks, to infer the relative risk of an undesirable event. As part of the relative risk calculation, the tool uses a simulation and gaming environment in which artificially intelligent actors interact with the environment to determine susceptibility to the undesired event. Finally, the tool includes an open "plug-in" architecture that allows the tool to interface with existing consequence calculators. The tool also provides facilities for presenting data in a user-friendly manner as well as report generation facilities”. The local and historical available information used to assess risk is mapped to or equivalent to the local intelligence);
known available weapons systems(See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0011], “In preferred embodiments, the invention takes the form of a software program that may be run on a personal computer or workstation that allows users to evaluate the risk of a terrorist attack at their site, determine their vulnerability to a terrorist attack, assess the damage caused by a successful terrorist attack, and select countermeasures to prevent terrorist attacks. The program provides the user with importing, drawing and modeling tools to allow the user to quickly and easily build a model of the site of interest in both 2 and 3 dimensions. Once the site model is established, simulation is performed to generate information about threat scenarios. The simulation can be viewed by the user from whatever eye-point the user chooses. In the simulation, the user selects a weapons system and location for a terrorist attack, such as a car bomb at the rear of the building. The simulation constructs and analyzes possible routes that the terrorist may take to reach the location, taking into consideration the site model and all site-specific information such as the existence of roads, car barriers, guard stations, hills, etc. The simulation then selects the most probable route and calculates the likelihood of success, or accessibility. The program will allow the user to modify the site model to add physical countermeasures (including hardening the target, denying access to the target, etc.) and re-run the simulation to determine the effectiveness of the countermeasures”);
potentially available weapons systems (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0096], “Much of the risk data presented to the user is generated by the Computational Engine 230. However, when considering risk, one of the most important considerations is the consequence of a specific threat against a specific target. The results of a threat-target pair must be analyzed to determine the casualties and damage that would result from the event so that this data can be used in the risk network 500. Rather than developing a simple routine or a new weapons model, the VAT 200 uses existing blast and nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological (NCBR) models to calculate the consequences used by the Computational Engine 230. In preferred embodiments, six models will be included with the VAT 200:”); and
worst-case scenario analysis (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0222], “One agent, anthrax, is sufficient to represent biological warfare agents. Anthrax is a worst case choice because as a spore it is relatively resistant to ultraviolet light so it has a long linger time (relative to other biological agents) and is also more lethal than most other biological agents. It is also readily available and, unlike the chemical agents, it can kill at a long distance from its point of release. Three different, plausible delivery mechanisms are used-aircraft spray, van spray, and backpack spray”).
Regarding claim 11, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 1 as outlined above. Further, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach that a system for identifying and mitigating threats to existing critical assets (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0072], “Referring now to FIG. 1, an automated vulnerability assessment tool (AVAT) 100 includes a vulnerability assessment tool (VAT) 200, a theater information management system (TIMS) 130, and a VAT Editor 150. In preferred embodiments, the tool may be run on a personal computer or workstation. Each of these component parts of the AVAT 100 will be discussed in further detail below”) comprising:
a critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [011], “In preferred embodiments, the invention takes the form of a software program that may be run on a personal computer or workstation that allows users to evaluate the risk of a terrorist attack at their site, determine their vulnerability to a terrorist attack, assess the damage caused by a successful terrorist attack, and select countermeasures to prevent terrorist attacks. The program provides the user with importing, drawing and modeling tools to allow the user to quickly and easily build a model of the site of interest in both 2 and 3 dimensions. Once the site model is established, simulation is performed to generate information about threat scenarios. The simulation can be viewed by the user from whatever eye-point the user chooses. In the simulation, the user selects a weapons system and location for a terrorist attack, such as a car bomb at the rear of the building. The simulation constructs and analyzes possible routes that the terrorist may take to reach the location, taking into consideration the site model and all site-specific information such as the existence of roads, car barriers, guard stations, hills, etc. The simulation then selects the most probable route and calculates the likelihood of success, or accessibility. The program will allow the user to modify the site model to add physical countermeasures (including hardening the target, denying access to the target, etc.) and re-run the simulation to determine the effectiveness of the countermeasures”);
critical asset site data representing existing and/or proposed environmental features and existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 6-7, and [0292], “The GUI Engine 210, shown in FIG. 6, reads information from the database and creates screens to allow the user to interact with the system. This area, like the rest of the interface, is completely controlled by the GUI Engine 210, but the 3D Engine 210 is also capable of writing information to it. Whenever the 3D Builder 260 or Viewer 280 is needed, the GUI Engine 210 provides a graphics context to the 3D Engine 210 so that it can display graphics in the dynamic content area. The GUI Engine 210 creates and manages all the toolbars that are required to operate the 3D Builder 260 and Viewer 280. It passes the commands issued by the user to the 3D subsystem for processing. This provides a consistent interface to the user and relieves the 3D sub-system from the duties of handling user input”);
a 3D modeling system for processing the critical asset site data to convert the critical asset site data into 3D model data representing the critical asset site including existing and/or proposed environmental features and the existing critical assets (See Beverina: Fig. 41, and [0329], “The 3D Builder 260 allows the user to construct his base in the VAT 200 system for use with the various modules to calculate vulnerability and mitigate risk. The user is presented with a palette of standard 3D construction tools, camera movement options, and structure types to build. The countermeasure library and structure types are then read in from the database, and the list presented to the user in an appropriate menu so he can select a structure to build. The user then uses the tool to build up his site on top of a base image of the layout (scanned-in map, perhaps) or use a base AutoCAD DXF file if applicable. A flow diagram of the builder process is shown in FIG. 41”);
threat mitigation feature data representing potential threat mitigation features capable of mitigating potential vulnerabilities of the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 42-43, and [0334], “Both the 3D Viewer 280 and the 3D Builder 260 are based upon the same 3D Run-time Environment 270 (also referred to herein as the 3D simulation/gaming environment) that handles the rendering of the scene. The 3D engine stores texture information, polygonal models, and lighting information needed to render the scene quickly and realistically. A detailed look at the sub-modules of the 3D-Run-time Environment 270 is found in FIG. 43”. Note that the 3D builder and viewer is mapped to the interactive 3D modeling system);
an interactive 3D modeling system, the interactive 3D modeling system receiving the 3D model data, the interactive 3D modeling system transforming the 3D model data into an interactive 3D model representation of the critical asset site including the existing and/or proposed environmental features and the existing critical assets (See Beverina: Figs. 19, and [0124], “The 3D Viewer 280 allows the user of the VAT 200 to play various threat scenarios against his/her site. The site layout is read in from the database as constructed in the 3D Builder 260. The Computational Engine 230 is then invoked to calculate threat vectors, and the resulting data displayed on top of the layout in a three-dimensional view. The user is then able to select a vector based on delivery type, risk value, or other such factors, and play the threat against the site in a realistic manner so that the consequences can be viewed. After the threat vector has been played, the user can then switch to the 3D Builder 260 mode to add countermeasures, move countermeasures, or make other changes, and then run the simulations again as he/she builds up a site layout and plan. FIG. 19 displays a simplified example of a 3D Viewer Screen 1900”),
wherein the interactive 3D modeling system generates potential vulnerability data representing the vulnerability of the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Robinson: Fig. 2, and [0033], “FIG. 2 illustrates, in a block diagram, a computing environment for a 3D model and connection generator in accordance with certain embodiments. The 3D model and connection generator 200 includes a vulnerability dashboard 210 and a generator 220. The generator 220 may invoke or implement a graphing tool 230 and/or a 3D modeler 240. The 3D model and connection generator 200 is connected to a data store 250 and to a data store 260. The data store 250 (e.g., a database) stores vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n for each vulnerability, where each vulnerability may have a vulnerability identifier. Each set of vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n stores vulnerability attributes 254a . . . 254n along with the vulnerability (e.g., a name or a phrase for the vulnerability) and/or the vulnerability identifier. The data store 260 stores identified anchor points 270 and 3D models and connections 280 (e.g., the information used to render (display) the 3D models and connections). Connections may also be referred to as links or chains. Anchor points may also be referred to as hooks. The vulnerability attributes 254a . . . 254n may be variables”; and [0040], “In certain embodiments, the 3D modeler 240 is a 3D modeling utility and ties to the vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n to pull the vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n into a 3D perspective. The vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n may be plugged into the 3D modeler 240 for vulnerability reporting visualization. The 3D modeler 240 integrates with the vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n to take vulnerability attributes 254a . . . 254n and show them as they relate to each other and other systems with the 3D models and connections”. Note that the 3D modeling of the vulnerability and visualization of the 3D model is mapped to “generating potential threat mitigation feature data representing the identified potential threat mitigation features”),
further wherein the interactive 3D modeling system processes the potential vulnerability data and the potential threat mitigation feature data to generate an interactive visualization of the effectiveness of various potential threat mitigation features for protecting the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 35A-B, and [0307], “In addition to interacting with the primary VAT 200 Influence Network 500, the susceptibility determination and risk mitigation components also make use of local networks in order to make complex decisions, as shown in FIGS. 35 a, b. During the susceptibility determination, threat intentions and capabilities are compared to countermeasure effectiveness to determine the reaction of the threat upon encountering a countermeasure. This complex inference is handled using a miniature Influence Network. Similarly, risk mitigation also uses threat and countermeasure characteristics in making decisions. Various countermeasures are compared to the specific threat to determine which ones are most effective at mitigating the risk of the threat against the target. These local decisions do not directly derive from the prime Influence Network, so they are handled independently”);
a display device, the display device displaying the interactive visualization of the effectiveness of the potential threat mitigation features for protecting the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 15-18, and [0118], “FIG. 14 and FIG. 15 are examples of the types of screens that appear in the main content window. The typical Planner Interface Screen 1400, as shown in FIG. 14, has large fonts, natural English, and establishes context for questions and information before they are presented”);
a user interface device, the user interface device dynamically interacting with the interactive 3D model representation of the critical asset site and capable of selecting one or more mitigation features based, at least in part, on the visualization of the effectiveness of the potential threat mitigation features for protecting the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0094], The Database module 220 retains the relationships among these countermeasures and procedures and the threats that they counter to allow the user to develop a defensive posture. The 3D Builder 260 allows the user to specifically place countermeasures and optimize their placement to be most effective against the threat.”; and [0077], “The GUI Engine 210 receives all of the screens, questions, and display data through the Database module 220. The Database module 220 is a relational database that contains all of the data used by the VAT 200, whether entered by the user, or calculated by the VAT 200, as shown in FIG. 4. Driving the GUI 202 from the Database module 220 allows the user interface 202 to be dynamic, customizable, and readily updateable without reprogramming the user interface 202”); and
selected threat mitigation feature data representing parameters (See Beverina: Fig. 22, and [0143], “FIG. 22 provides an overview of the risk management process. Based on the current site baseline and the vulnerabilities determined by the VAT 200, the user is presented with countermeasures to employ across their installation. By targeting the placement of these countermeasures against the specific vulnerabilities, the user can reduce risk. To assist in this process, the VAT 200 analyzes the threat and suggests countermeasures that can best reduce the components of risk associated with the threat. Comparing the effectiveness of the countermeasure against the threat accomplishes this. Countermeasures that are most effective against the threat are presented to the user, along with suggestions for successful employment. These countermeasures are not limited to hardening of assets (blast walls, Mylar on windows, etc.) but include countermeasures to:”) and location of the selected threat mitigation features for the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Hanson: Fig. 1, and [0026], “In one implementation, the active vulnerability scanners 210 may be distributed in locations across the network to reduce stress on the network. For example, the active vulnerability scanners 210 may be distributed at different locations in the network in order to scan certain portions of the network in parallel, whereby an amount of time to perform the active vulnerability scans may be reduced. Furthermore, in one implementation, one or more of the active vulnerability scanners 210 may be distributed at a location that provides visibility into portions of a remote network 260 (e.g., as shown in FIG. 1, one or more of the active vulnerability scanners 210 may be distributed at a location in communication with the remote network 260). Thus, limiting the portions of the network and/or the remote network 260 that the active vulnerability scanners 210 interrogate, probe, or otherwise scan and having the active vulnerability scanners 210 perform the scans in parallel may reduce the amount of time that the active vulnerability scans consume because the active vulnerability scanners 210 can be distributed closer to scanning targets (e.g., routers 240, internal firewalls 280, external firewalls 284, servers 230, hosts 230, devices 230, etc.). In particular, because the active vulnerability scanners 210 may scan limited portions of the network rather than the entire network, and further because the parallel active scans may obtain information from the different portions of the network, the amount of time that the active scans consume may substantially correspond to the amount of time associated with one active scan”; and [0061], “Thus, the three-dimensional routing topology may be referenced (or filtered) in various ways to derive information about the network that can then be used to balance speeds, thoroughness, and invasiveness associated with scanning the network and further to optimize performance in the network. For example, the three-dimensional routing topology may visually represent various hosts, routing nodes, or other systems within a particular address space or subnet that represents a choke point in the network, whereby additional routing nodes, switches, or other infrastructure may be deployed at the choke point to reduce bottlenecks that may occur therein. In another example, assets associated with the scan times that exceed the threshold may be analyzed for common parameters or other criteria (e.g., processor speeds, memory, system firewalls, vulnerabilities, etc.), which may be compared to other assets having faster scan times to determine whether the parameters common to the assets having the longer scan times may be causing the longer scan times. In this example, a first query may be provided to the management console to filter the topology for a target network and a second query may be provided to filter the topology for the hosts that have the longer scan times, whereby different three-dimensional visualizations created in response to the first query and the second query can be visually compared to identify open ports, vulnerabilities, or other criteria that may be causing the longer scan times. Furthermore, although certain exemplary queries and network management techniques have been described herein, any other suitable queries or network management techniques may be applied using the three-dimensional visualizations that can be created with the systems and methods described herein, whether or not explicitly described”. Note that the generation of structural parameters and precis location data for selected physical threat-mitigation features is mapped to “the location of the selected threat mitigation features for the existing critical assets at the critical asset site”).
Regarding claim 12, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 11 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the system of Claim 11 wherein the critical asset site is selected from the group of critical asset sites (See Beverina: Fig. 1, and [0071], “Although the invention has many uses, it finds particular utility in the terrorism risk management arena. Thus, the invention will be discussed in connection with terrorism risk management embodiments. However, as will be discussed further below, the invention is useful in many fields and is not limited to terrorism risk management embodiments”; and [0072], “] Referring now to FIG. 1, an automated vulnerability assessment tool (AVAT) 100 includes a vulnerability assessment tool (VAT) 200, a theater information management system (TIMS) 130, and a VAT Editor 150. In preferred embodiments, the tool may be run on a personal computer or workstation. Each of these component parts of the AVAT 100 will be discussed in further detail below”) consisting of:
electrical generation facilities (See Beverina: Fig. 6-7, and [0435], “Military Planning and targeting (inverse of the risk problem)”);
electrical generation substations;
communication stations;
water production facilities;
reservoirs;
pumping stations;
airports;
sewage treatment facilities;
government facilities (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0006], “One problem faced by those with responsibility for assessing the threat of terrorism and its prevention is the lack of suitable tools to help them perform their tasks. Known tools generally fall into one of two categories: a) terrorist attack damage assessors; and b) terrorist attack likelihood predictors (i.e., probability calculators). The first type of tool, terrorist attack damage assessors (i.e., consequence calculators), are generally computer based. These tools attempt to answer the questions like "What will happen if a car carrying a 500 pound bomb explodes at the front door of my building?" (Blast model tools) and "What will happen if a 50 gallon drum of nerve gas is opened in the parking garage?" ("CBR"--chemical, biological and radiological-tools). The tools, which typically employ complex computer modeling algorithms such as those found in CAD/CAM programs, have three important drawbacks. First, they require detailed information (which can be difficult, time consuming and expensive to obtain) to construct the model and are often not flexible enough to handle situations in which the detailed data is not available. It is likely that data required to use these tools on the Murrah building in Oklahoma City would still not be collected at this point due to the time and costs associated with collecting such data. Second, these tools require expertise on the part of the user. Third, and perhaps most importantly, programs such as these provide no guidance as to the likelihood that the attack will succeed (the accessability), the likely location of an attack (e.g., the front or rear of the building, which building, etc., the type of weapon (explosive, chemical, biological or radiological) likely to be used, and how to prevent or at least minimize the occurrence of the attack in the first place”);
law enforcement facilities (See Beverina: Fig. 6-7, and [0446], “Building Security”);
military facilities (See Beverina: Fig. 6-7, and [0443], “Infrastructure Attacks”);
nuclear facilities (See Beverina: Fig. 6-7, and [0271], “Sites 2730 are composed of a Site Layout 2731 and one or more Information Products 2732, Threats 2733 and Site Baselines 2724. The VAT 200 uses the Site Layout 2731 to store all of the static information about a site's infrastructure, structures, and natural environment. Conversely, Site Baselines 2724 are used to store data about the dynamic elements of a site such as employed countermeasures, asset locations, and organizations as these elements are organized for a particular configuration (e.g. one may speak of the THREATCON Alpha baseline versus the THREATCON Bravo baseline.)”); and
oil and gas production facilities (See Beverina: Figs. 6-7, and [0085], “The 3D Builder 260, a screen shot 700 of which is shown in FIG. 7, provides an interface for the user to build a 3D representation of his site. The 3D Builder 260 imports files from computer aided design (CAD) programs or images and uses them as the outline for the site layout. The user can then `build` virtual representations of the buildings, roads, and perimeters of the site and identify population centers, VIPs, and countermeasures. This virtual representation of the site is stored in the Database module 220 and is used by the Computational Engine 230 to compute threat vectors and the accessibility of assets and by the Analytic Models to calculate weapon effects against targets”. Note that all the listed sites in the Markush members are the infrastructures that need protection against terrorism attacks).
Regarding claim 13, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 11 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the system of Claim 11 wherein the existing critical assets are selected from the group of critical assets See Beverina: Fig. 1, and [0071], “Although the invention has many uses, it finds particular utility in the terrorism risk management arena. Thus, the invention will be discussed in connection with terrorism risk management embodiments. However, as will be discussed further below, the invention is useful in many fields and is not limited to terrorism risk management embodiments”; and [0072], “] Referring now to FIG. 1, an automated vulnerability assessment tool (AVAT) 100 includes a vulnerability assessment tool (VAT) 200, a theater information management system (TIMS) 130, and a VAT Editor 150. In preferred embodiments, the tool may be run on a personal computer or workstation. Each of these component parts of the AVAT 100 will be discussed in further detail below”) consisting of:
electrical transformers; electrical generators;
signal transmission towers;
power lines;
dams (See Beverina: Fig. 6-7, and [0271], “ Sites 2730 are composed of a Site Layout 2731 and one or more Information Products 2732, Threats 2733 and Site Baselines 2724. The VAT 200 uses the Site Layout 2731 to store all of the static information about a site's infrastructure, structures, and natural environment. Conversely, Site Baselines 2724 are used to store data about the dynamic elements of a site such as employed countermeasures, asset locations, and organizations as these elements are organized for a particular configuration (e.g. one may speak of the THREATCON Alpha baseline versus the THREATCON Bravo baseline.)”);
aqueducts;
control towers;
communication antennas; and
buildings (See Beverina: Figs. 6-7, and [0085], “The 3D Builder 260, a screen shot 700 of which is shown in FIG. 7, provides an interface for the user to build a 3D representation of his site. The 3D Builder 260 imports files from computer aided design (CAD) programs or images and uses them as the outline for the site layout. The user can then `build` virtual representations of the buildings, roads, and perimeters of the site and identify population centers, VIPs, and countermeasures. This virtual representation of the site is stored in the Database module 220 and is used by the Computational Engine 230 to compute threat vectors and the accessibility of assets and by the Analytic Models to calculate weapon effects against targets”. Note that all the listed sites in the Markush members are the infrastructures that need protection against terrorism attacks).
Regarding claim 14, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 11 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the system of Claim 11 wherein the critical asset site data includes one or more of:
aerial LiDAR data; terrestrial LiDAR data; radar data;
infrared data; photogrammetry data; and
CAD drawing data (See Beverina: Fig. 41, and [0329], “The 3D Builder 260 allows the user to construct his base in the VAT 200 system for use with the various modules to calculate vulnerability and mitigate risk. The user is presented with a palette of standard 3D construction tools, camera movement options, and structure types to build. The countermeasure library and structure types are then read in from the database, and the list presented to the user in an appropriate menu so he can select a structure to build. The user then uses the tool to build up his site on top of a base image of the layout (scanned-in map, perhaps) or use a base AutoCAD DXF file if applicable. A flow diagram of the builder process is shown in FIG. 41”).
Regarding claim 15, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 11 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the system of Claim 11 wherein the critical asset site data is collected using one or more of:
aircraft; air drones;
land-based drones;
cameras (See Beverina: Fig. 2, and [0126], “An exemplary interface to the 3D Builder module 260 of the VAT 200 is shown in FIG. 7. After all buildings and structures are placed on the map, the road network can be drawn in using line segments, and any bodies of water can be placed. If any structure requires additional information (such as number of people inside, etc.), the text area below the 3D view is used for text input that will be stored with the object. The user can then place any existing countermeasures such as cameras, guard posts, or jersey barriers for each THREATCON level to set the site baselines. The site is then saved out into the database when all structures and countermeasures are placed”);
radar systems;
satellites; and
public information systems.
Regarding claim 16, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 11 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the system of Claim 11 wherein processing the critical asset site data to convert the critical asset site data into 3D model data is performed using a 3D mesh generation system (See Beverina: Figs. 20A-D, and [0127], “The process of building a structure is outlined in FIG. 20. From the scanned in image, or just the bare grid layout, the user selects, point by point, the outline of the base of the structure (View 1). The system then fills in the outline and creates a solid 2D polygon (View 2). The user is then able to pull up on this polygon with motion of the mouse to extrude the shape into the third dimension up to the required height (number of stories or exact height) (View 3), and the system displays a final rendered building with shading and textures applied (View 4). Building other structures follows a similar method, with differences based on scale/orientation of the object. Smaller objects, or objects that cover large areas are "painted" in using an object brush. For example, water is painted in as one would paint with a certain color in a standard 2D drawing program. Jersey barriers, for example, are placed one at a time; each "paint spot" showing up as one barrier. Once placed it can then be moved or rotated as desired”. Note that the surface polygon to build 3D model is mapped to the mesh generation).
Regarding claim 17, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 11 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the system of Claim 11 wherein the interactive 3D modeling system is a gaming engine (See Beverina: Fig. 2, and [0123], “After accessing the data in tabular form, the user can then view scenarios in a 3D simulation/gaming environment in order to gain more insight into the threat vector as played against his/her site layout and countermeasure setup”) .
Regarding claim 19, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 11 as outlined above. Further, Beverina teaches that the system of Claim 11 further comprising potential threat data representing potential threats to critical assets (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0152], “The VAT 200 uses analytic models to calculate the consequences of likely threat scenarios. The Influence Network 500 requires an assessment of the consequences of an event in order to calculate the overall risk. For preferred embodiments the VAT 200 potential consequences are simply damage to assets and human casualties. From these results, the risk network 500 calculates additional parameters such as the mission impact and the symbolic victory the terrorist may receive based on biasing values the user has entered for the affected assets”), the potential threat data being provided by one or more of:
local intelligence (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0086], “The GUI 202 must also display complex risk, spatial, temporal, cost, and probabilistic data to the user in a useful and effective manner. Because the terrorist threat is often so vague and multi-dimensional, the information display must present simplified representations of the information and allow the user to interact with the information to see how the data is inter-related-what kinds of assets are most susceptible to a certain threat, which threats bear the highest consequences, and so on. Information from the risk influence network 500 and information in the Database module 220 can be interpreted and displayed in many combinations and representations. The GUI 202 provides sortable tables, text interpretations of data, 3D animations of scenarios, and graphs like the screens 801, 802, 803 shown in FIG. 8. The GUI 202 provides web-like capability to drill-down into any high level information presented by the GUI 202. For example, if the probability of attack for a given threat is described in the GUI 202 as `high`, the user will be able to click on `high` and drill-down to the nodes that caused the value to be high (e.g., Organization X is active in your area, they have Y weapon capabilities, and Z holy day is a trigger for this threat)”; and [0010], “The aforementioned deficiencies have been overcome to a great extent by the present invention which provides an integrated risk management tool. The integrated risk management tool uses a persistent object database to store information about actors (individuals and/or groups), physical surroundings, historical events and other information. The risk management tool also includes a decision support system that uses data objects from the database and advanced decision theory techniques, such as Bayesian Networks, to infer the relative risk of an undesirable event. As part of the relative risk calculation, the tool uses a simulation and gaming environment in which artificially intelligent actors interact with the environment to determine susceptibility to the undesired event. Finally, the tool includes an open "plug-in" architecture that allows the tool to interface with existing consequence calculators. The tool also provides facilities for presenting data in a user-friendly manner as well as report generation facilities”. The local and historical available information used to assess risk is mapped to or equivalent to the local intelligence);
known available weapons systems (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0011], “In preferred embodiments, the invention takes the form of a software program that may be run on a personal computer or workstation that allows users to evaluate the risk of a terrorist attack at their site, determine their vulnerability to a terrorist attack, assess the damage caused by a successful terrorist attack, and select countermeasures to prevent terrorist attacks. The program provides the user with importing, drawing and modeling tools to allow the user to quickly and easily build a model of the site of interest in both 2 and 3 dimensions. Once the site model is established, simulation is performed to generate information about threat scenarios. The simulation can be viewed by the user from whatever eye-point the user chooses. In the simulation, the user selects a weapons system and location for a terrorist attack, such as a car bomb at the rear of the building. The simulation constructs and analyzes possible routes that the terrorist may take to reach the location, taking into consideration the site model and all site-specific information such as the existence of roads, car barriers, guard stations, hills, etc. The simulation then selects the most probable route and calculates the likelihood of success, or accessibility. The program will allow the user to modify the site model to add physical countermeasures (including hardening the target, denying access to the target, etc.) and re-run the simulation to determine the effectiveness of the countermeasures”);
potentially available weapons systems (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0096], “Much of the risk data presented to the user is generated by the Computational Engine 230. However, when considering risk, one of the most important considerations is the consequence of a specific threat against a specific target. The results of a threat-target pair must be analyzed to determine the casualties and damage that would result from the event so that this data can be used in the risk network 500. Rather than developing a simple routine or a new weapons model, the VAT 200 uses existing blast and nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological (NCBR) models to calculate the consequences used by the Computational Engine 230. In preferred embodiments, six models will be included with the VAT 200:”); and
worst-case scenario analysis (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0222], “One agent, anthrax, is sufficient to represent biological warfare agents. Anthrax is a worst case choice because as a spore it is relatively resistant to ultraviolet light so it has a long linger time (relative to other biological agents) and is also more lethal than most other biological agents. It is also readily available and, unlike the chemical agents, it can kill at a long distance from its point of release. Three different, plausible delivery mechanisms are used-aircraft spray, van spray, and backpack spray”).
Claims 8, 10, 18, and 20-21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Beverina, etc. (US 20010027389 A1) in view of Robinson, etc. (US 20250005165 A1), further in view of Hanson (US 20110277034 A1) and Doyle (US 8325178 B1).
Regarding claim 8, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 1 as outlined above. However, Beverina, modified by Robinson and Hanson, fails to explicitly disclose that the process of Claim 1 wherein identifying potential vulnerabilities includes the use of virtual light/illumination sources.
However, Doyle teaches that the process of Claim 1 wherein identifying potential vulnerabilities includes the use of virtual light/illumination sources (See Doyle: Figs. 2-3 and Col. 4 Lines 35-42, “The subject reference includes a figure, included herein as FIG. 2 (and maintaining the original reference numerals of the reference), it shows a three dimensional scene 305 including objects 320 and light sources 325. Scene 305 may be rendered into a two dimensional picture by an image processing system, described further below, which may also display it on a monitor 310. Monitor 310 includes pixels 330 of different colors to render the two dimensional picture”; and Col. 4 Lines 43-55, “Ray tracing is applied by the image processing system to render the three dimensional scene into the two dimensional picture. The image processing system shoots rays 340 from the viewer 315 into the scene 305. The rays have properties and behavior similar to light rays. Ray 340 passes through a plane, represented by monitor 310, where the final two dimensional picture will be rendered by the image processing system, where pixel 335 is the point where ray 340 passes through the plane/monitor. Image processing systems employ a grid 330 of possibly millions of pixels to render the final scene on the monitor, and calculate the colors assigned to the pixels, which as already mentioned is then further refined by the technique of the invention”).
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filling date of the claimed invention was effectively filed to modify Beverina to have the process of Claim 1 wherein identifying potential vulnerabilities includes the use of virtual light/illumination sources as taught by Doyle in order to process three-dimensional scene (See Doyle: Fig. 1, and [0014], “According to one aspect of the invention, the system and method described herein may further include a three-dimensional visualization tool associated with the management console, wherein the three-dimensional visualization tool may be used to create three-dimensional visualizations of the network topology and/or vulnerabilities. For example, the three-dimensional visualization may place every routing node in the network on a cylindrical spiral or helix, and may further place hosts that communicate with the routing nodes in leaf nodes linked to the routing nodes nearest to the respective hosts (i.e., the leaf nodes may be linked to the nearest routing nodes in vectors directed outward from the helical or cylindrical spiral). Thus, placing the routing nodes in the helical or cylindrical spiral and then placing all leaf nodes in outward vectors that connect to the routing nodes in the helical or cylindrical spiral may enable the three-dimensional visualization to simultaneously display large numbers of nodes”). Beverina teaches a method and system that may provide physical critical-asset site process, interactive 3D modeling of the site, vulnerability analysis vis simulation, identify the countermeasures and plan data for implementation of the risk mitigation, while Doyle teaches a system and method that may use virtual illumination/ray traced light source to determine which surfaces or locations are visible and therefore vulnerable within a 3D scene. Therefore, it is obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Beverina by Doyle to place virtual light sources at potential threat or observer positions and determine illuminated versus shadowed regions. The motivation to modify Beverina by Doyle is “Use of known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or products) in the same way”.
Regarding claim 10, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 1 as outlined above. Further, Beverina and Doyle teaches that the process of Claim 1 wherein the one or more mitigation features are selected from the group of mitigation features (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0143], “FIG. 22 provides an overview of the risk management process. Based on the current site baseline and the vulnerabilities determined by the VAT 200, the user is presented with countermeasures to employ across their installation. By targeting the placement of these countermeasures against the specific vulnerabilities, the user can reduce risk. To assist in this process, the VAT 200 analyzes the threat and suggests countermeasures that can best reduce the components of risk associated with the threat. Comparing the effectiveness of the countermeasure against the threat accomplishes this. Countermeasures that are most effective against the threat are presented to the user, along with suggestions for successful employment. These countermeasures are not limited to hardening of assets (blast walls, Mylar on windows, etc.) but include countermeasures to”) including:
physical walls (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0143], “FIG. 22 provides an overview of the risk management process. Based on the current site baseline and the vulnerabilities determined by the VAT 200, the user is presented with countermeasures to employ across their installation. By targeting the placement of these countermeasures against the specific vulnerabilities, the user can reduce risk. To assist in this process, the VAT 200 analyzes the threat and suggests countermeasures that can best reduce the components of risk associated with the threat. Comparing the effectiveness of the countermeasure against the threat accomplishes this. Countermeasures that are most effective against the threat are presented to the user, along with suggestions for successful employment. These countermeasures are not limited to hardening of assets (blast walls, Mylar on windows, etc.) but include countermeasures to”);
ballistic curtains (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0087], “Understanding risk and the inter-relationships among threat, critical assets, and vulnerabilities is essential to developing an AT/FP plan. The Computational Engine 230 interprets threat data and recommends countermeasures to the user that should be used to reduce the threat or the consequences of an attack. These countermeasures are not limited to hardening of assets (blast walls, FRF, etc.) but include countermeasures to”. Note that FRF may be mapped to curtains);
landscape features (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0011], “In preferred embodiments, the invention takes the form of a software program that may be run on a personal computer or workstation that allows users to evaluate the risk of a terrorist attack at their site, determine their vulnerability to a terrorist attack, assess the damage caused by a successful terrorist attack, and select countermeasures to prevent terrorist attacks. The program provides the user with importing, drawing and modeling tools to allow the user to quickly and easily build a model of the site of interest in both 2 and 3 dimensions. Once the site model is established, simulation is performed to generate information about threat scenarios. The simulation can be viewed by the user from whatever eye-point the user chooses. In the simulation, the user selects a weapons system and location for a terrorist attack, such as a car bomb at the rear of the building. The simulation constructs and analyzes possible routes that the terrorist may take to reach the location, taking into consideration the site model and all site-specific information such as the existence of roads, car barriers, guard stations, hills, etc. The simulation then selects the most probable route and calculates the likelihood of success, or accessibility. The program will allow the user to modify the site model to add physical countermeasures (including hardening the target, denying access to the target, etc.) and re-run the simulation to determine the effectiveness of the countermeasures”);
Kevlar structures (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0143], “FIG. 22 provides an overview of the risk management process. Based on the current site baseline and the vulnerabilities determined by the VAT 200, the user is presented with countermeasures to employ across their installation. By targeting the placement of these countermeasures against the specific vulnerabilities, the user can reduce risk. To assist in this process, the VAT 200 analyzes the threat and suggests countermeasures that can best reduce the components of risk associated with the threat. Comparing the effectiveness of the countermeasure against the threat accomplishes this. Countermeasures that are most effective against the threat are presented to the user, along with suggestions for successful employment. These countermeasures are not limited to hardening of assets (blast walls, Mylar on windows, etc.) but include countermeasures to”. Note that Mylar may be mapped to Kevlar structure);
radar detection systems (See Doyle: Figs. 1-2, and Col. 9 Lines 11-16, “In addition, computer readable media that can be used to store and/or transmit instructions for carrying out methods described herein can include non-physical media such as an electromagnetic carrier wave, acoustic wave, or light wave such as those generated during radio wave and infrared data communications”);
infrared detection systems (See Doyle: Figs. 1-4, and Col. 5 Lines 10-21, “Suitable data acquisition systems can include airborne-based LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), stereoscopic satellite imagery, and space shuttle radar topography data. The software is a complete visual solution for 3D data sets. Any questions concerning visual surveillance, line-of-sight, concealment, enfilade, defilade, or restricted fields of fire will be answered with color-coded imagery or animations produced by the software. The software will be deployed for both offensive and defensive operations. The software uses ray tracing for measurements within any 3D scene and is therefore very flexibles”); and
visual detection systems (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0126], “An exemplary interface to the 3D Builder module 260 of the VAT 200 is shown in FIG. 7. After all buildings and structures are placed on the map, the road network can be drawn in using line segments, and any bodies of water can be placed. If any structure requires additional information (such as number of people inside, etc.), the text area below the 3D view is used for text input that will be stored with the object. The user can then place any existing countermeasures such as cameras, guard posts, or jersey barriers for each THREATCON level to set the site baselines. The site is then saved out into the database when all structures and countermeasures are placed.”).
Regarding claim 18, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 11 as outlined above. Further, Doyle teaches that the system of Claim 11 wherein generating the potential vulnerability data includes the use of virtual light/illumination sources (See Doyle: Figs. 2-3 and Col. 4 Lines 35-42, “The subject reference includes a figure, included herein as FIG. 2 (and maintaining the original reference numerals of the reference), it shows a three dimensional scene 305 including objects 320 and light sources 325. Scene 305 may be rendered into a two dimensional picture by an image processing system, described further below, which may also display it on a monitor 310. Monitor 310 includes pixels 330 of different colors to render the two dimensional picture”; and Col. 4 Lines 43-55, “Ray tracing is applied by the image processing system to render the three dimensional scene into the two dimensional picture. The image processing system shoots rays 340 from the viewer 315 into the scene 305. The rays have properties and behavior similar to light rays. Ray 340 passes through a plane, represented by monitor 310, where the final two dimensional picture will be rendered by the image processing system, where pixel 335 is the point where ray 340 passes through the plane/monitor. Image processing systems employ a grid 330 of possibly millions of pixels to render the final scene on the monitor, and calculate the colors assigned to the pixels, which as already mentioned is then further refined by the technique of the invention”).
Regarding claim 20, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 11 as outlined above. Further, Beverina and Doyle teaches that the system of Claim 11 wherein the one or more mitigation features are selected from the group of mitigation features (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0143], “FIG. 22 provides an overview of the risk management process. Based on the current site baseline and the vulnerabilities determined by the VAT 200, the user is presented with countermeasures to employ across their installation. By targeting the placement of these countermeasures against the specific vulnerabilities, the user can reduce risk. To assist in this process, the VAT 200 analyzes the threat and suggests countermeasures that can best reduce the components of risk associated with the threat. Comparing the effectiveness of the countermeasure against the threat accomplishes this. Countermeasures that are most effective against the threat are presented to the user, along with suggestions for successful employment. These countermeasures are not limited to hardening of assets (blast walls, Mylar on windows, etc.) but include countermeasures to”) including:
physical walls See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0143], “FIG. 22 provides an overview of the risk management process. Based on the current site baseline and the vulnerabilities determined by the VAT 200, the user is presented with countermeasures to employ across their installation. By targeting the placement of these countermeasures against the specific vulnerabilities, the user can reduce risk. To assist in this process, the VAT 200 analyzes the threat and suggests countermeasures that can best reduce the components of risk associated with the threat. Comparing the effectiveness of the countermeasure against the threat accomplishes this. Countermeasures that are most effective against the threat are presented to the user, along with suggestions for successful employment. These countermeasures are not limited to hardening of assets (blast walls, Mylar on windows, etc.) but include countermeasures to”);
ballistic curtains (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0087], “Understanding risk and the inter-relationships among threat, critical assets, and vulnerabilities is essential to developing an AT/FP plan. The Computational Engine 230 interprets threat data and recommends countermeasures to the user that should be used to reduce the threat or the consequences of an attack. These countermeasures are not limited to hardening of assets (blast walls, FRF, etc.) but include countermeasures to”. Note that FRF may be mapped to curtains;
landscape features (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0011], “In preferred embodiments, the invention takes the form of a software program that may be run on a personal computer or workstation that allows users to evaluate the risk of a terrorist attack at their site, determine their vulnerability to a terrorist attack, assess the damage caused by a successful terrorist attack, and select countermeasures to prevent terrorist attacks. The program provides the user with importing, drawing and modeling tools to allow the user to quickly and easily build a model of the site of interest in both 2 and 3 dimensions. Once the site model is established, simulation is performed to generate information about threat scenarios. The simulation can be viewed by the user from whatever eye-point the user chooses. In the simulation, the user selects a weapons system and location for a terrorist attack, such as a car bomb at the rear of the building. The simulation constructs and analyzes possible routes that the terrorist may take to reach the location, taking into consideration the site model and all site-specific information such as the existence of roads, car barriers, guard stations, hills, etc. The simulation then selects the most probable route and calculates the likelihood of success, or accessibility. The program will allow the user to modify the site model to add physical countermeasures (including hardening the target, denying access to the target, etc.) and re-run the simulation to determine the effectiveness of the countermeasures”);
Kevlar structures (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0143], “FIG. 22 provides an overview of the risk management process. Based on the current site baseline and the vulnerabilities determined by the VAT 200, the user is presented with countermeasures to employ across their installation. By targeting the placement of these countermeasures against the specific vulnerabilities, the user can reduce risk. To assist in this process, the VAT 200 analyzes the threat and suggests countermeasures that can best reduce the components of risk associated with the threat. Comparing the effectiveness of the countermeasure against the threat accomplishes this. Countermeasures that are most effective against the threat are presented to the user, along with suggestions for successful employment. These countermeasures are not limited to hardening of assets (blast walls, Mylar on windows, etc.) but include countermeasures to”. Note that Mylar may be mapped to Kevlar structure;
radar detection systems (See Doyle: Figs. 1-2, and Col. 9 Lines 11-16, “In addition, computer readable media that can be used to store and/or transmit instructions for carrying out methods described herein can include non-physical media such as an electromagnetic carrier wave, acoustic wave, or light wave such as those generated during radio wave and infrared data communications”) ;
infrared detection systems (See Doyle: Figs. 1-4, and Col. 5 Lines 10-21, “Suitable data acquisition systems can include airborne-based LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), stereoscopic satellite imagery, and space shuttle radar topography data. The software is a complete visual solution for 3D data sets. Any questions concerning visual surveillance, line-of-sight, concealment, enfilade, defilade, or restricted fields of fire will be answered with color-coded imagery or animations produced by the software. The software will be deployed for both offensive and defensive operations. The software uses ray tracing for measurements within any 3D scene and is therefore very flexibles”); and
visual detection systems (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0126], “An exemplary interface to the 3D Builder module 260 of the VAT 200 is shown in FIG. 7. After all buildings and structures are placed on the map, the road network can be drawn in using line segments, and any bodies of water can be placed. If any structure requires additional information (such as number of people inside, etc.), the text area below the 3D view is used for text input that will be stored with the object. The user can then place any existing countermeasures such as cameras, guard posts, or jersey barriers for each THREATCON level to set the site baselines. The site is then saved out into the database when all structures and countermeasures are placed”).
Regarding claim 21, Beverina, Robinson and Hanson teach all the features with respect to claim 1 as outlined above. Further, Beverina, Robinson, Hanson and Doyle teach that a process for identifying and mitigating threats to existing critical assets (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0072], “Referring now to FIG. 1, an automated vulnerability assessment tool (AVAT) 100 includes a vulnerability assessment tool (VAT) 200, a theater information management system (TIMS) 130, and a VAT Editor 150. In preferred embodiments, the tool may be run on a personal computer or workstation. Each of these component parts of the AVAT 100 will be discussed in further detail below”) comprising:
identifying environmental features and existing critical assets at a critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 7, and [0085], “The 3D Builder 260, a screen shot 700 of which is shown in FIG. 7, provides an interface for the user to build a 3D representation of his site. The 3D Builder 260 imports files from computer aided design (CAD) programs or images and uses them as the outline for the site layout. The user can then `build` virtual representations of the buildings, roads, and perimeters of the site and identify population centers, VIPs, and countermeasures. This virtual representation of the site is stored in the Database module 220 and is used by the Computational Engine 230 to compute threat vectors and the accessibility of assets and by the Analytic Models to calculate weapon effects against targets”. Note that the roads, building, VIP, center, etc. are mapped to the environment features);
obtaining existing critical asset site data representing the environmental features and the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 6-7, and [0292], “The GUI Engine 210, shown in FIG. 6, reads information from the database and creates screens to allow the user to interact with the system. This area, like the rest of the interface, is completely controlled by the GUI Engine 210, but the 3D Engine 210 is also capable of writing information to it. Whenever the 3D Builder 260 or Viewer 280 is needed, the GUI Engine 210 provides a graphics context to the 3D Engine 210 so that it can display graphics in the dynamic content area. The GUI Engine 210 creates and manages all the toolbars that are required to operate the 3D Builder 260 and Viewer 280. It passes the commands issued by the user to the 3D subsystem for processing. This provides a consistent interface to the user and relieves the 3D sub-system from the duties of handling user input”);
using a 3D mesh generation system to process the existing critical asset site data to convert the existing critical asset site data into 3D model data representing the critical asset site including the environmental features and the existing critical assets (See Beverina: Fig. 41, and [0329], “The 3D Builder 260 allows the user to construct his base in the VAT 200 system for use with the various modules to calculate vulnerability and mitigate risk. The user is presented with a palette of standard 3D construction tools, camera movement options, and structure types to build. The countermeasure library and structure types are then read in from the database, and the list presented to the user in an appropriate menu so he can select a structure to build. The user then uses the tool to build up his site on top of a base image of the layout (scanned-in map, perhaps) or use a base AutoCAD DXF file if applicable. A flow diagram of the builder process is shown in FIG. 41”);
providing the 3D existing critical asset site data to a gaming engine, the gaming engine transforming the 3D existing critical asset site data into an interactive 3D model representation of the critical asset site including the environmental features and the existing critical assets (See Beverina: Figs. 42-43, and [0334], “Both the 3D Viewer 280 and the 3D Builder 260 are based upon the same 3D Run-time Environment 270 (also referred to herein as the 3D simulation/gaming environment) that handles the rendering of the scene. The 3D engine stores texture information, polygonal models, and lighting information needed to render the scene quickly and realistically. A detailed look at the sub-modules of the 3D-Run-time Environment 270 is found in FIG. 43”. Note that the 3D builder and viewer is mapped to the interactive 3D modeling system);
generating one or more virtual light/illumination sources and using the one or more virtual light/illumination sources to identify potential vulnerabilities associated with the existing critical assets at the critical asset site and generating potential vulnerability data representing the identified potential vulnerabilities associated with the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Doyle: Figs. 2-3 and Col. 4 Lines 35-42, “The subject reference includes a figure, included herein as FIG. 2 (and maintaining the original reference numerals of the reference), it shows a three dimensional scene 305 including objects 320 and light sources 325. Scene 305 may be rendered into a two dimensional picture by an image processing system, described further below, which may also display it on a monitor 310. Monitor 310 includes pixels 330 of different colors to render the two dimensional picture”; and Col. 4 Lines 43-55, “Ray tracing is applied by the image processing system to render the three dimensional scene into the two dimensional picture. The image processing system shoots rays 340 from the viewer 315 into the scene 305. The rays have properties and behavior similar to light rays. Ray 340 passes through a plane, represented by monitor 310, where the final two dimensional picture will be rendered by the image processing system, where pixel 335 is the point where ray 340 passes through the plane/monitor. Image processing systems employ a grid 330 of possibly millions of pixels to render the final scene on the monitor, and calculate the colors assigned to the pixels, which as already mentioned is then further refined by the technique of the invention”);
identifying potential threat mitigation features capable of mitigating the determined potential vulnerability of the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 35A-B, and [0307], “In addition to interacting with the primary VAT 200 Influence Network 500, the susceptibility determination and risk mitigation components also make use of local networks in order to make complex decisions, as shown in FIGS. 35 a, b. During the susceptibility determination, threat intentions and capabilities are compared to countermeasure effectiveness to determine the reaction of the threat upon encountering a countermeasure. This complex inference is handled using a miniature Influence Network. Similarly, risk mitigation also uses threat and countermeasure characteristics in making decisions. Various countermeasures are compared to the specific threat to determine which ones are most effective at mitigating the risk of the threat against the target. These local decisions do not directly derive from the prime Influence Network, so they are handled independently”) and generating potential threat mitigation feature data representing the identified potential threat mitigation features) (See Robinson: Fig. 2, and [0033], “FIG. 2 illustrates, in a block diagram, a computing environment for a 3D model and connection generator in accordance with certain embodiments. The 3D model and connection generator 200 includes a vulnerability dashboard 210 and a generator 220. The generator 220 may invoke or implement a graphing tool 230 and/or a 3D modeler 240. The 3D model and connection generator 200 is connected to a data store 250 and to a data store 260. The data store 250 (e.g., a database) stores vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n for each vulnerability, where each vulnerability may have a vulnerability identifier. Each set of vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n stores vulnerability attributes 254a . . . 254n along with the vulnerability (e.g., a name or a phrase for the vulnerability) and/or the vulnerability identifier. The data store 260 stores identified anchor points 270 and 3D models and connections 280 (e.g., the information used to render (display) the 3D models and connections). Connections may also be referred to as links or chains. Anchor points may also be referred to as hooks. The vulnerability attributes 254a . . . 254n may be variables”; and [0040], “In certain embodiments, the 3D modeler 240 is a 3D modeling utility and ties to the vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n to pull the vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n into a 3D perspective. The vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n may be plugged into the 3D modeler 240 for vulnerability reporting visualization. The 3D modeler 240 integrates with the vulnerability data 252a . . . 252n to take vulnerability attributes 254a . . . 254n and show them as they relate to each other and other systems with the 3D models and connections”. Note that the 3D modeling of the vulnerability and visualization of the 3D model is mapped to “generating potential threat mitigation feature data representing the identified potential threat mitigation features”);
processing the potential vulnerability data and the potential threat mitigation feature data to generate an interactive visualization of the effectiveness of the potential threat mitigation features for protecting the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 19, and [0124], “The 3D Viewer 280 allows the user of the VAT 200 to play various threat scenarios against his/her site. The site layout is read in from the database as constructed in the 3D Builder 260. The Computational Engine 230 is then invoked to calculate threat vectors, and the resulting data displayed on top of the layout in a three-dimensional view. The user is then able to select a vector based on delivery type, risk value, or other such factors, and play the threat against the site in a realistic manner so that the consequences can be viewed. After the threat vector has been played, the user can then switch to the 3D Builder 260 mode to add countermeasures, move countermeasures, or make other changes, and then run the simulations again as he/she builds up a site layout and plan. FIG. 19 displays a simplified example of a 3D Viewer Screen 1900”);
displaying the interactive visualization of the effectiveness of the potential threat mitigation features for protecting the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 15-18, and [0118], “FIG. 14 and FIG. 15 are examples of the types of screens that appear in the main content window. The typical Planner Interface Screen 1400, as shown in FIG. 14, has large fonts, natural English, and establishes context for questions and information before they are presented”);
selecting one or more threat mitigation features based, at least in part, on the visualization of the effectiveness of the potential threat mitigation features for protecting the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Beverina: Fig. 22, and [0143], “FIG. 22 provides an overview of the risk management process. Based on the current site baseline and the vulnerabilities determined by the VAT 200, the user is presented with countermeasures to employ across their installation. By targeting the placement of these countermeasures against the specific vulnerabilities, the user can reduce risk. To assist in this process, the VAT 200 analyzes the threat and suggests countermeasures that can best reduce the components of risk associated with the threat. Comparing the effectiveness of the countermeasure against the threat accomplishes this. Countermeasures that are most effective against the threat are presented to the user, along with suggestions for successful employment. These countermeasures are not limited to hardening of assets (blast walls, Mylar on windows, etc.) but include countermeasures to:”);
generating selected threat mitigation feature data representing structural parameters (See Beverina: Figs. 1-2, and [0094], The Database module 220 retains the relationships among these countermeasures and procedures and the threats that they counter to allow the user to develop a defensive posture. The 3D Builder 260 allows the user to specifically place countermeasures and optimize their placement to be most effective against the threat.”) and the location of the selected threat mitigation features for the existing critical assets at the critical asset site (See Hanson: Fig. 1, and [0026], “In one implementation, the active vulnerability scanners 210 may be distributed in locations across the network to reduce stress on the network. For example, the active vulnerability scanners 210 may be distributed at different locations in the network in order to scan certain portions of the network in parallel, whereby an amount of time to perform the active vulnerability scans may be reduced. Furthermore, in one implementation, one or more of the active vulnerability scanners 210 may be distributed at a location that provides visibility into portions of a remote network 260 (e.g., as shown in FIG. 1, one or more of the active vulnerability scanners 210 may be distributed at a location in communication with the remote network 260). Thus, limiting the portions of the network and/or the remote network 260 that the active vulnerability scanners 210 interrogate, probe, or otherwise scan and having the active vulnerability scanners 210 perform the scans in parallel may reduce the amount of time that the active vulnerability scans consume because the active vulnerability scanners 210 can be distributed closer to scanning targets (e.g., routers 240, internal firewalls 280, external firewalls 284, servers 230, hosts 230, devices 230, etc.). In particular, because the active vulnerability scanners 210 may scan limited portions of the network rather than the entire network, and further because the parallel active scans may obtain information from the different portions of the network, the amount of time that the active scans consume may substantially correspond to the amount of time associated with one active scan”; and [0061], “Thus, the three-dimensional routing topology may be referenced (or filtered) in various ways to derive information about the network that can then be used to balance speeds, thoroughness, and invasiveness associated with scanning the network and further to optimize performance in the network. For example, the three-dimensional routing topology may visually represent various hosts, routing nodes, or other systems within a particular address space or subnet that represents a choke point in the network, whereby additional routing nodes, switches, or other infrastructure may be deployed at the choke point to reduce bottlenecks that may occur therein. In another example, assets associated with the scan times that exceed the threshold may be analyzed for common parameters or other criteria (e.g., processor speeds, memory, system firewalls, vulnerabilities, etc.), which may be compared to other assets having faster scan times to determine whether the parameters common to the assets having the longer scan times may be causing the longer scan times. In this example, a first query may be provided to the management console to filter the topology for a target network and a second query may be provided to filter the topology for the hosts that have the longer scan times, whereby different three-dimensional visualizations created in response to the first query and the second query can be visually compared to identify open ports, vulnerabilities, or other criteria that may be causing the longer scan times. Furthermore, although certain exemplary queries and network management techniques have been described herein, any other suitable queries or network management techniques may be applied using the three-dimensional visualizations that can be created with the systems and methods described herein, whether or not explicitly described”. Note that the generation of structural parameters and precis location data for selected physical threat-mitigation features is mapped to “the location of the selected threat mitigation features for the existing critical assets at the critical asset site”); and
using the selected threat mitigation feature data to generate critical asset site threat mitigation implementation plan data for the critical asset site (See Beverina: Figs. 10, and [0108], “All of the data entered by the user and the information calculated by the system is stored in the Database module 220. This information is therefore available for export and dissemination to reports and other applications as shown in FIG. 10. The VAT 200 will provide, at a minimum, the report formats from the JSIVA Report and the ATIFP Installation Planning Template. Information from the VAT 200 will be used to populate these reports and the user will be able to finish the reports by writing the remaining required text. This document will then be saved to the database and will be available in Microsoft Word.TM. format for reproduction. The VAT 200 will also provide the flexibility for users to create custom reports or to save out and print VAT 200 risk assessment reports”; and Fig. 44, and [0340], “The Report Generator module is built around the design concepts expressed in the User Defined Report Generation Capability section. As described in that section, report formats form the heart of the report generation capability whose structure is reflected in its class hierarchy as shown in FIG. 25, Report Format and FIG. 44, VAT Report Generator module. In addition to the Report Format, Section, Paragraph and Clause object classes discussed in the User Defined Report Generation Capability section; the Report Generator module adds a class for the report that forms the public interface for creating reports in multiple formats, a report generator class that forms the public interface for the subsystem, and several subclasses which implement the specific behaviors for paragraph types, clause types, and output formats”).
Conclusion
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/GORDON G LIU/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2618