Remarks
Claims 1-20 are pending.
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Information Disclosure Statement
The listing of references in the specification is not a proper information disclosure statement. 37 CFR 1.98(b) requires a list of all patents, publications, or other information submitted for consideration by the Office, and MPEP § 609.04(a) states, "the list may not be incorporated into the specification but must be submitted in a separate paper." Therefore, unless the references have been cited by the examiner on form PTO-892, they have not been considered.
The specification refers to a number of references, including at least in paragraphs 51, 54, and 63. None of these appear to have been mentioned in any IDS and, thus, have not necessarily been considered.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 3, 5, 9, 13, 16, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 3 recites the limitation "the provers". There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim. The claim only has antecedent basis for “one or more provers”, not explicitly plural provers. Claims 5, 9, and 16 have the same issue.
Claim 13 recites the limitation "the other proofs". There is insufficient antecedent basis for this limitation in the claim. Again, the claim only has antecedent basis for “one or more other proofs”, not explicitly plural other proofs. Claim 20 has the same issue.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 7-13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. The claim(s) does/do not fall within at least one of the four categories of patent eligible subject matter because the claims are directed to an apparatus, but fail to include any physical components. For example, claim 7 is directed to “An apparatus, comprising one or more provers comprising memory having instructions stored thereon and one or more processors coupled to the memory and configured to execute the instructions to:” in the preamble, but then does not include any physical components within the body of the claim. Moreover, even if the processor(s) and/or memory were moved into the preamble, the application as originally filed describes use of virtual machines (e.g., paragraph 27), so more would be needed (e.g., within the body of the claims, discuss hardware/physical components). None of claims 8-13 fix this issue and they are rejected for the same reasons.
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Regarding claim 1, with respect to step 1, this part of the eligibility analysis evaluates whether the claim falls within any statutory category. MPEP 2106.03. The claim recites a non-transitory computer readable medium having stored thereon instructions comprising executable code that, when executed by one or more provers, causes the provers to: obtain a result of a computation on data performed based on a query; generate a proof to show the data is maintained in a decentralized database and the result of the computation on the data is correct; and provide the proof and the result of the computation on the data to one or more verifiers for verification and return of the result in response to the query. Therefore, this claim appears to be a medium, which is a statutory category of invention. Please see MPEP 2106.3.I:
A process defines "actions", i.e., an invention that is claimed as an act or step, or a series of acts or steps. As explained by the Supreme Court, a "process" is "a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70, 175 USPQ 673, 676 (1972) (italics added) (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788, 24 L. Ed. 139, 141 (1876)). See also Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1355, 84 USPQ2d at 1501 ("The Supreme Court and this court have consistently interpreted the statutory term ‘process’ to require action"); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1763, 1791 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[A] process is a series of acts.") (quoting Minton v. Natl. Ass’n. of Securities Dealers, 336 F.3d 1373, 1378, 67 USPQ2d 1614, 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). As defined in 35 U.S.C. 100(b), the term "process" is synonymous with "method."
The other three categories (machines, manufactures and compositions of matter) define the types of physical or tangible "things" or "products" that Congress deemed appropriate to patent. Digitech Image Techs. v. Electronics for Imaging, 758 F.3d 1344, 1348, 111 USPQ2d 1717, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("For all categories except process claims, the eligible subject matter must exist in some physical or tangible form."). Thus, when determining whether a claimed invention falls within one of these three categories, examiners should verify that the invention is to at least one of the following categories and is claimed in a physical or tangible form.
• A machine is a "concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices." Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1348-49, 111 USPQ2d at 1719 (quoting Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 531, 570, 17 L. Ed. 650, 657 (1863)). This category "includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result." Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1355, 84 USPQ2d at 1501 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267, 14 L. Ed. 683, 690 (1854)).
• A manufacture is "a tangible article that is given a new form, quality, property, or combination through man-made or artificial means." Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1349, 111 USPQ2d at 1719-20 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308, 206 USPQ 193, 197 (1980)). As the courts have explained, manufactures are articles that result from the process of manufacturing, i.e., they were produced "from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery." Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 120 USPQ2d 1749, 1752-3 (2016) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 308, 206 USPQ 193, 196-97 (1980)); Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356-57, 84 USPQ2d at 1502. Manufactures also include "the parts of a machine considered separately from the machine itself." Samsung Electronics, 137 S. Ct. at 435, 120 USPQ2d at 1753 (quoting 1 W. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions §183, p. 270 (1890)).
• A composition of matter is a "combination of two or more substances and includes all composite articles." Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1348-49, 111 USPQ2d at 1719 (citation omitted). This category includes all compositions of two or more substances and all composite articles, "'whether they be the results of chemical union or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids.'" Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308, 206 USPQ at 197 (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C. 1957); id. at 310 holding genetically modified microorganism to be a manufacture or composition of matter).
With respect to step 2A, prong one, this part of the eligibility analysis evaluates whether the claim recites a judicial exception. As explained in MPEP 2106.04(II) and the October 2019 Update, a claim ‘recites’ a judicial exception when the judicial exception is ‘set forth’ or ‘described’ in the claim. There are no nature-based product limitations in the claim, and thus the markedly different characteristics analysis is not performed. However, the claim still must be reviewed to determine if it recites any other type of judicial exception.
Claim 1, recites the following limitations that are directed to abstract ideas:
when executed by one or more provers, causes the provers to (mental process and/or certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., human is the prover, performing the below):
obtain a result of a computation on data performed based on a query (mental process and/or certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., computing update for certificate of authenticity/ownership document/contract by signing/initialing when changes are made (including, for example, adding 1 to the date from the day before), such as a change in ownership is recorded or a contract term is modified, such certificate/document/contract being part of a database by being in a stack of papers on a desk, or on a bookshelf, or in a filing cabinet, as examples);
generate a proof to show the data is maintained in a decentralized database and the result of the computation on the data is correct (mental process and/or certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., signature/initials from above, query result which may be the document itself or any information regarding it (e.g., a document with data regarding all prior owners of a particular collectible (perhaps a signed first edition of a rare book), or a page including information regarding what the collectible looks like, or the like), as well as a proof that the collectible is, itself, the real thing (e.g., the certificate of authenticity, that attests to the fact that the collectible has changed hands and is now owned by someone new, signed by a collectibles dealer); and
provide the proof and the result of the computation on the data to one or more verifiers for verification and return of the result in response to the query (mental process and/or certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., provide the book once ownership or a new sale is verified including verifying the previous owners).
As noted, these can be performed by a human either completely mentally or by using certain methods of organizing human activity, such as a human writing and reading via documentation or filing systems.
As explained in the MPEP and the October 2019 Update, situations like this where a series of steps recite judicial exceptions, examiners should combine all recited judicial exceptions and treat the claim as containing a single abstract idea for purposes of further eligibility. See MPEP 2106.04 and 2106.05(ii). Thus, for purposes of further discussion, this rejection may consider all limitations as a single abstract idea.
With respect to step 2A, prong two, this part of the eligibility analysis evaluates whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. 2019 PEG Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54-55. The independent claims also recite the following additional elements: “A non-transitory computer readable medium having stored thereon instructions comprising executable code”.
However, this/these additional element(s) is/are recited so generically (no details are provided other than a non-transitory computer readable medium having stored thereon instructions comprising executable code – this could be any medium, including generic computer media) that it represents no more than mere instructions to apply the judicial exception on a computer system. This limitation can also be viewed as nothing more than an attempt to generally link the use of the judicial exception to the technological environment of a computer. It should be noted that because the courts have made clear that mere physicality or tangibility of an additional element or elements is not a relevant consideration in the eligibility analysis, the nature of these components being physical or tangible does not affect this analysis. See MPEP 2106.05(I) for more information on this point, including explanations from judicial decisions including Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. V. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 224-26 (2014).
Even when viewed in combination, any additional elements in this claim do no more than automate the abstract ideas that the human can perform, using computer components as a tool. There is no improvement to any computers or other technology achieved by the claim by automating the abstract ideas, and thus this claim cannot improve computer functionality or other technology. See, e.g., Trading Technologies Int’l v. IBG, Inc., 921 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (using a computer to provide a trader with more information to facilitate market trades improved the business process of market trading, but not the computer) and the cases discussed in MPEP 2106.05(a)(I), particularly FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (accelerating a process of analyzing audit log data is not an improvement when the increased speed comes solely from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer) and Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017)(using a generic computer to automate a process of applying to finance a purchase is not an improvement to the computer’s functionality). Accordingly, the claim as a whole does not integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application and the claim is directed to the judicial exception.
With respect to step 2B, this part of the eligibility analysis evaluates whether the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more than the recited exception, i.e., whether any additional element, or combination of additional elements, adds an inventive concept to the claim. MPEP 2106.05. As explained with respect to Step 2A Prong Two, the additional element(s) described above is/are at best the equivalent of merely adding the words “apply it” to the judicial exception. Mere instructions to apply an exception cannot provide an inventive concept. Any other additional elements identified above are extra-solution activity, which for purposes of Step 2A Prong Two was considered insignificant. Under the 2019 PEG, however, a conclusion that an additional element is insignificant extra-solution activity in Step 2A should be re-evaluated in Step 2B. 2019 PEG Section III(B), 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. At Step 2B, the evaluation of the insignificant extra-solution activity consideration takes into account whether or not the extra-solution activity is well-known. See MPEP 2106.05(g). Here, any insignificant extra solution activity is within the examples provided in USPTO guidance, such as MPEP 2106.05(g), for example. Thus, any subject matter that may be considered extra-solution activity therefore remain insignificant extra-solution activity even upon reconsideration, and do not amount to significantly more. Even when considered in combination, these additional elements represent mere instructions to apply an exception and insignificant extra-solution activity, which cannot provide an inventive concept.
The other independent claims, 7 (apparatus claim – this is rejected here despite having the above 101 rejection, in case the above 101 rejection is corrected, for purposes of compact prosecution) and 14 (method claim), include a similar analysis as above and are rejected for the same reasons. It is noted that claim 7’s “memory” and “one or more processors” is/are recited so generically (no details are provided other than that there is a memory and one or more processors – these could be any memory and any processor(s), including generic computer media and processor(s)). This represents no more than mere instructions to apply the judicial exception on a computer system in order to perform the abstract idea. The additional element(s) described above is/are at best the equivalent of merely adding the words “apply it” to the judicial exception. This limitation can also be viewed as nothing more than an attempt to generally link the use of the judicial exception to the technological environment of a computer. It should be noted that because the courts have made clear that mere physicality or tangibility of an additional element or elements is not a relevant consideration in the eligibility analysis, the nature of these components being physical or tangible does not affect this analysis. See MPEP 2106.05(I) for more information on this point, including explanations from judicial decisions including Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. V. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 224-26 (2014).
Even when viewed in combination, any additional elements in this claim do no more than automate the abstract ideas that the human can perform, using computer components as a tool. There is no improvement to any computers or other technology achieved by the claim by automating the abstract ideas, and thus this claim cannot improve computer functionality or other technology. See, e.g., Trading Technologies Int’l v. IBG, Inc., 921 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (using a computer to provide a trader with more information to facilitate market trades improved the business process of market trading, but not the computer) and the cases discussed in MPEP 2106.05(a)(I), particularly FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (accelerating a process of analyzing audit log data is not an improvement when the increased speed comes solely from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer) and Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017)(using a generic computer to automate a process of applying to finance a purchase is not an improvement to the computer’s functionality). Accordingly, the claim as a whole does not integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application and the claim is directed to the judicial exception.
With respect to step 2B, this part of the eligibility analysis evaluates whether the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more than the recited exception, i.e., whether any additional element, or combination of additional elements, adds an inventive concept to the claim. MPEP 2106.05. As explained with respect to Step 2A Prong Two, the additional element(s) described above is/are at best the equivalent of merely adding the words “apply it” to the judicial exception (please see the above). Mere instructions to apply an exception cannot provide an inventive concept. Even when considered in combination, these additional elements represent mere instructions to apply an exception, which cannot provide an inventive concept. The claim is not eligible.
With respect to claim 2, the following is directed to the abstract idea: wherein the decentralized database comprises a distributed ledger database and one or more of the provers or the verifiers comprise one or more members of a distributed ledger network (e.g., the above information is distributed and stored by multiple dealers/authenticators in the network noted above). The distributed ledger being a blockchain is an additional element. A blockchain is also simply a generic computer construct that is ubiquitously used and has the same analysis as the computer components described and analyzed above.
Claims 8 and 15 include a similar analysis as above and are rejected for the same reasons.
Claim 3 has the same analysis as above, as it merely states that some entity is external to the blockchain network.
Claims 9 and 16 include a similar analysis as above and are rejected for the same reasons.
Claim 4 has the same analysis as above, as it merely describes information.
Claims 10 and 17 include a similar analysis as above and are rejected for the same reasons.
Claim 5 has the same analysis as above, since it only adds receiving of the already discussed query, which is readily performed by a human.
Claims 11 and 18 include a similar analysis as above and are rejected for the same reasons.
Claim 6 has the same analysis as above, as it merely describes information.
Claims 12 and 19 include a similar analysis as above and are rejected for the same reasons.
With respect to claim 13, generating one or more of the overall proof or one or more of the other proofs is part of the abstract idea (mental process and/or certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., placing multiple proofs in the same file and providing a signature on the file). With respect to the one or more graphics processing units, this/these additional element(s) is/are recited so generically (no details are provided other than that there is a GPU(s) that can process data – this/these could be any GPU(s), including generic GPU(s)) that it represents no more than mere instructions to apply the judicial exception on a computer system in order to perform the abstract idea. The additional element(s) described above is/are at best the equivalent of merely adding the words “apply it” to the judicial exception. This limitation can also be viewed as nothing more than an attempt to generally link the use of the judicial exception to the technological environment of a computer. It should be noted that because the courts have made clear that mere physicality or tangibility of an additional element or elements is not a relevant consideration in the eligibility analysis, the nature of these components being physical or tangible does not affect this analysis. See MPEP 2106.05(I) for more information on this point, including explanations from judicial decisions including Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. V. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 224-26 (2014).
Even when viewed in combination, any additional elements in this claim do no more than automate the abstract ideas that the human can perform, using computer components as a tool. There is no improvement to any computers or other technology achieved by the claim by automating the abstract ideas, and thus this claim cannot improve computer functionality or other technology. See, e.g., Trading Technologies Int’l v. IBG, Inc., 921 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (using a computer to provide a trader with more information to facilitate market trades improved the business process of market trading, but not the computer) and the cases discussed in MPEP 2106.05(a)(I), particularly FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (accelerating a process of analyzing audit log data is not an improvement when the increased speed comes solely from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer) and Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017)(using a generic computer to automate a process of applying to finance a purchase is not an improvement to the computer’s functionality). Accordingly, the claim as a whole does not integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application and the claim is directed to the judicial exception.
With respect to step 2B, this part of the eligibility analysis evaluates whether the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more than the recited exception, i.e., whether any additional element, or combination of additional elements, adds an inventive concept to the claim. MPEP 2106.05. As explained with respect to Step 2A Prong Two, the additional element(s) described above is/are at best the equivalent of merely adding the words “apply it” to the judicial exception (please see the above). Mere instructions to apply an exception cannot provide an inventive concept. Even when considered in combination, these additional elements represent mere instructions to apply an exception, which cannot provide an inventive concept. The claim is not eligible.
Claim 20 includes a similar analysis as above and is rejected for the same reasons.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1, 4-7, 10-12, 14, and 17-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and/or 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Thompson (Thompson, Brian et al., “Privacy-Preserving Computation and Verification of Aggregate Queries on Outsourced Databases”, 8/5/2009, pp. 1-17).
Regarding Claim 1,
Thompson discloses a non-transitory computer readable medium having stored thereon instructions comprising executable code that, when executed by one or more provers, causes the provers to:
Obtain a result of a computation on data performed based on a query (Exemplary Citations: for example, Sections 4 and 6; any computation, such as at least a share of an aggregate result, an updated commitment upon a database update (as in section 6), or the like, for example);
Generate a proof to show the data is maintained in a decentralized database and the result of the computation on the data is correct (Exemplary Citations: for example, Sections 4 and 6; proof (e.g., proof with sibling hashes, signature on Merkle root), for example. Section 6 also relevant to show that the database was added to, for example, thus changing the set of commitments, aggregate commitments, Merkle tree, root hash, etc.); and
Provide the proof and the result of the computation on the data to one or more verifiers for verification and return of the result in response to the query (Exemplary Citations: for example, Sections 4 and 6; providing such for verification, for example. Exemplary Citations: for example, Section 4 (e.g., VERIFY step) disclosing verifying results using the above, for example. Section 6 also relevant to show that the database was added to, for example, thus changing the set of commitments, aggregate commitments, Merkle tree, root hash, etc.).
Regarding Claim 7,
Claim 7 is an apparatus claim that corresponds to medium claim 1 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Regarding Claim 14,
Claim 14 is a method claim that corresponds to medium claim 1 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Regarding Claim 4,
Thompson discloses that the query is associated with at least a portion of the decentralized database, the data comprises at least part of the at least a portion of the decentralized database, one or more of the query, the result, or the proof are associated with a commitment to the at least a portion of the database, and the commitment enables the verification of the result against the proof (Exemplary Citations: for example, Sections 4 and 6; query regarding at least a subset of data, commitments associated with everything in the database, and commitment verification using the Merkle tree, for example).
Regarding Claim 10,
Claim 10 is an apparatus claim that corresponds to medium claim 4 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Regarding Claim 17,
Claim 17 is a method claim that corresponds to medium claim 4 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Regarding Claim 5,
Thompson discloses that the executable code, when executed by the provers, further causes the provers to receive the query from a client, an intermediary, a gateway, or one of the verifiers (Exemplary Citations: for example, Sections 4 and 6; receiving query, for example. It is noted that any entity making a query could be considered a client).
Regarding Claim 11,
Claim 11 is an apparatus claim that corresponds to medium claim 5 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Regarding Claim 18,
Claim 18 is a method claim that corresponds to medium claim 5 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Regarding Claim 6,
Thompson discloses that the proof comprises an overall proof and the executable code, when executed by the provers, further causes the provers to generate the overall proof from one or more other proofs (Exemplary Citations: for example, Sections 4 and 6; overall proof, such as Merkle tree root/hash, for example).
Regarding Claim 12,
Claim 12 is an apparatus claim that corresponds to medium claim 6 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Regarding Claim 19,
Claim 19 is a method claim that corresponds to medium claim 6 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 2, 3, 8, 9, 15, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Thompson in view of Sung (U.S. Patent Application Publication 2022/0216999).
Regarding Claim 2,
Thompson discloses that the decentralized database comprises a database and one or more of the provers or the verifiers comprise one or more members of a network (Exemplary Citations: for example, Sections 1 and 6; outsourced databases and multiple service providers, for example);
But does not explicitly disclose that the database is a blockchain database and the network is a blockchain network.
Sung, however, discloses that the database comprises a blockchain database and the network is a blockchain network (Exemplary Citations: for example, Abstract, Paragraphs 7, 9, 11, 13, 33, and many more; blockchain system with database and network, for example). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of applicant’s invention, which is before any effective filing date of the claimed invention, to incorporate the blockchain of Sung into the aggregate query verification system of Thompson in order to allow the system to take advantage of blockchain technology and benefits thereof, to allow an owner to change and/or erase data as required, but no one else, and/or to increase security in the system.
Regarding Claim 8,
Claim 8 is an apparatus claim that corresponds to medium claim 2 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Regarding Claim 15,
Claim 15 is a method claim that corresponds to medium claim 2 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Regarding Claim 3,
Thompson as modified by Sung discloses the medium of claim 2, in addition, Thompson as modified by Sung discloses that the provers are external to the blockchain network and separate from the verifiers (Thompson: Exemplary Citations: for example, Sections 1, 4, and 6; Sung: Exemplary Citations: for example, Abstract, Paragraphs 7, 9, 11, 13, 33, and many more; provers, while they may be members of the blockchain network, are external thereto since they are not fully encapsulated by such, for example).
Regarding Claim 9,
Claim 9 is an apparatus claim that corresponds to medium claim 3 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Regarding Claim 16,
Claim 16 is a method claim that corresponds to medium claim 3 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Claims 13 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Thompson in view of Naser (Naser, Mohammed, “How GPUs Are Impacting Blockchain Technology”, 11/23/2018, 8 pages, obtained from https://vexxhost.com/blog/gpus-impacting-blockchain-technology/).
Regarding Claim 13,
Thompson discloses that the processors are further configured to execute the instructions to generate one or more of the overall proof or one or more of the other proofs using one or more processing units (Exemplary Citations: for example, Sections 4 and 6; processing unit generates proofs, hashes, for example);
But does not explicitly disclose that the one or more processing units comprise one or more graphics processing units.
Naser, however, discloses that the processors are further configured to execute the instructions to generate one or more of the overall proof or one or more of the other proofs using one or more graphics processing units (Exemplary Citations: for example, Pages 1-3; GPU performing blockchain processing, including hashing, for example). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of applicant’s invention, which is before any effective filing date of the claimed invention, to incorporate the GPU-based blockchain processing techniques of Naser into the aggregate query verification system of Thompson in order to allow the system to perform blockchain processing at lower costs, to increase flexibility in the system, and/or to increase the speed of processing.
Regarding Claim 20,
Claim 20 is a method claim that corresponds to apparatus claim 13 and is rejected for the same reasons.
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Jeffrey D Popham whose telephone number is (571)272-7215. The examiner can normally be reached Monday through Friday 9:00-5:30.
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Jeffrey Nickerson can be reached at (469) 295-9235. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/Jeffrey D. Popham/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2432
Prosecution Insights