Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Objections
Claim 5 is objected to because of the following informalities: In line 1 of claim 5, “comprises” should be “comprising”. Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
There is no antecedent basis for “the sized turf” in claim 4. Claim 1, from which claim 4 depends, recites a “turf feed” and a “sized carpet”, but not a sized turf. The examiner recommends that “the sized turf” in claim 4 be amended to recite “the sized carpet”.
There is also no antecedent basis for “the carpet composition” of claim 6. Claim 1, from which claim 6 depends, recites a sized carpet composition. The examiner recommends that “the carpet composition” be amended to recite “the sized carpet composition”.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1-2, 8, 11-12, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Matsubara (JP 2015-208985 A).
An English-language machine translation of Matsubara, which is attached, has been used in setting forth this rejection, and the paragraph numbers referred to herein are those of the machine translation unless otherwise noted.
In paragraph 5 Matsubara discloses a method for recycling used artificial turf as recycled oil. In paragraph 7 Matsubara discloses that the method includes a step (2) of crushing the artificial turf, meeting the limitations of the first step of claim 1 where the crushed artificial turf meets the limitations of the sized carpet. Matsubara indicates that the artificial turf comprises rubber chips, therefore also meeting the limitations of the first step of claim 11, where the rubber chips are the polymeric infill material, as well as claim 2. The crushing step then also meets the limitations of the sizing step of claim 12. The method disclosed in paragraph 7 of Matsubara further comprises a step (5) of dry distilling the rubber chips, turf yarn, and underpad, and a cooling step (6) of separating the gas obtained by dry distillation into off-gas and recycled oil. In paragraphs 19-23 Matsubara discloses that the step (S5) involves pyrolysis of the artificial turf feed and dry distillation. Pyrolysis of the artificial turf feed, dry distillation, and cooling to obtain a recycled oil meets the limitations of the cracking step recited in the second steps of claims 1 and 11, noting that Matsubara discloses in paragraph 30 that the dry distillation gas is hydrocarbon gas. Separating the off-gas and recycled oil meets the limitations of claim 8 as the recycled oil will contain at least some of a naphtha fraction. Matsubara further discloses in paragraph 32 that coke (carbonized material) remains in the pyrolysis reactor after dry distillation. While Matsubara does not specifically disclose that inorganic filler (such as sand) is recovered in the coke product, since the turf feed and method of Matsubara meets the limitations of the claimed turf feed and method steps, and inorganic filler remaining after the separation steps will not be converted to gas or oil, the inorganic filler will in the feed will be recovered in the coke product in the amount recited in claim 15. Claims 1-2, 8, 11-12, and 15 are therefore anticipated by Matsubara.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claim 7 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Matsubara in view of Andersen (U.S. Pat. No. 9,205,460).
The discussion of Matsubara in paragraph 7 above is incorporated here by reference. Matsubara discloses a method meeting the limitations of claim 1, including steps of reducing the particle size (crushing) of the artificial turf and separating the infill material (sand and rubber). Matsubara does not disclose second sizing and separating steps.
From column 2 line 65 through column 3 line 23 Andersen discloses a method of separating an artificial (synthetic) turf, comprising a sizing (downsizing) step (a) and a separating step (b) which produces a first fraction comprising backing material and additional components and a second fraction substantially comprising grass fiber components. In column 9 lines 21-33 Andersen discloses that the second fraction is subjected to an additional sizing step, corresponding to the second sizing step of claim 7, followed by an additional separation, yielding a lighter fraction substantially comprising grass fiber components and a heavier fraction substantially comprising backing and additional components, corresponding to the second separation step of claim 7. In column 7 lines 16-21 Andersen discloses that the “additional components” include infill, and in column 8 lines 36-38 Andersen discloses that the infill can be rubber and sand, as in the turf of Matsubara. Performing the second downsizing and second separation step of Andersen on the portion comprising grass fibers after the separation step of Matsubara, or more broadly, using the downsizing and separation method of Andersen as the sizing and separation method of Matsubara prior to performing pyrolysis, meets the limitations of claim 7.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to perform the second downsizing and second separation step of Andersen on the portion comprising grass fibers after the separation step of Matsubara, or more broadly, using the downsizing and separation method of Andersen as the sizing and separation method of Matsubara prior to performing pyrolysis, in order to more thoroughly separate the infill from the turf, and in order to obtain more control of the feed to the pyrolysis reactor by separating the turf into its individual components.
Claims 4, 6, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Buck (U.S. Pat. No. 6,818,274) in view of Matsubara.
In column 2 lines 38-53 Buck discloses an artificial turf system comprising a turf backing and an infill layer. In column 4 lines 40-44 Buck discloses that the turf backing can comprise a primary backing and secondary backing, as recited in claims 4 and 6. Buck further discloses in column 5 lines 9-17 that the particular matter of the infill layer comprises hard granules or particles such as sand, and resilient particles such as rubber, including ground tire rubber, as recited in claim 13, as well as crumb rubber, which is a thermoset rubber also as recited in claim 13.
The discussion of Matsubara in paragraph 7 above is incorporated here by reference. Performing the method of Matsubara on the artificial turf of Buck meets the limitations of claims 4 and 13. Additionally, Matsubara discloses in paragraph 7 that the method also includes steps of separating at least some of the infill material from the turf, for example separating the sand from the rubber chips, as recited in claim 6. Performing the method of Matsubara on the artificial turf of Buck therefore also meets the limitations of claim 6.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to perform the method of Matsubara on the artificial turf of Buck, since Matsubara teaches in paragraphs 8-9 that it produces a recycled oil having favorable properties from artificial turf comprising sand and rubber.
Allowable Subject Matter
Claims 3, 5, 9-10, and 14 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
Claim 3 requires that the turf fibers in the turf feed have a median particle size of 0.1 to 5 millimeters. Matsubara, in paragraph 16, teaches that the artificial turf is crushed into pieces of 5 cm x 5 cm to 50 cm x 50 cm and does not provide any teaching about the size of the turf fibers specifically. Andersen, also cited in the above rejections, teaches from column 8 line 64 through column 9 line 6 that the fraction of the sized and separated substantially comprising grass fiber components has a length of the largest dimension above 5 mm, indicating that the median length will be outside the range recited in claim 3. There is no teaching leading one of ordinary skill in the art to size the artificial turf so that the turf feed has turf fibers with a median particle size within the range recited in claim 3.
Claim 5 requires the sized artificial turf to be used as the turf feed without any further separation. Matsubara as discussed in the above rejection, requires separation steps to remove infill material such as sand from the turf. One of ordinary skill in the art would not be motivated to modify Matsubara to eliminate the required separation steps. Similarly, claim 14 requires 0.1 to 50% of the turf feed to be the inorganic filler from the artificial turf. One of ordinary skill in the art would not be motivated to include inorganic filler such as sand in the turf feed of Matsubara, since Matsubara teaches separating the inorganic filler.
Claim 9 requires that the cracking be performed on a feedstock comprising both the turf feed and a petroleum feedstock having a given T10 distillation point. Neither Matsubara nor the prior art as a whole provide any teaching or motivation to combine the sized artificial turf feed with a petroleum feed prior to the pyrolysis of Matsubara.
Claim 10 recites an additional step of producing circular polyolefins from olefins present in the cracking product. Matsubara teaches that the oil fraction of the cracking product is useful as fuel oil and the gas fraction is used for heating. There is no teaching or motivation to isolate olefins present in the cracking product of Matsubara and produce polyolefins from the olefins.
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JAMES C GOLOBOY whose telephone number is (571)272-2476. The examiner can normally be reached M-F, usually about 10:00-6:30.
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/JAMES C GOLOBOY/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1771
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