Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
1. The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
2. EXAMINER’S NOTE: The claims have been reviewed and considered under the new guidance pursuant to the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (PEG 2019) issued January 7, 2019.
3. This communication is in response to Applicant’s claims filed on 06 March 2025. Claims 1-18 remain pending.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
4. 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
5. Claims 1 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. The claims do not fall within at least one of the four categories of patent eligible subject matter because the claim comprises a system claim with no hardware structure element. Although the QPKI “machine” comprises a certificate authority, there is absolutely nothing in the claims that would require hardware, therefore, this is merely software per se. Therefore, in order to overcome the 101 rejection, the Examiner respectfully suggests that the claims be amended to positively recite a hardware element in the body of the claims to make the claim statutory. Dependent claims 2—9 and 11-18 are rejected under the same rationale as claims 1 and 10 as they do not cure the deficiencies of claims 1 and 10.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
6. In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
7. Claims 1-4, 7, 10-13, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. “Post-Quantum TLS on Embedded Systems”.
Referring to the rejection of claim 1, Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. discloses a quantum public key infrastructure (QPKI) machine, comprising (See page 843, left column, lines 1-4, i.e., We replace DH with the PQC scheme Kyber and use this message to send an ephemeral Kyber public key from the server to the client. These data fields and the random values are signed using SPHINCS+)
a quantum resistant cryptography (QRC)-Enabled Certificate Authority, (See page 842, right column, Iines 41-48, i.e., The server answers with a ServerHello message which contains the chosen TLS version, chosen cipher suite, chosen compression algorithm, and a server random. He also sends a Certificate message containing the certificate with the public key of the server as well as the entire certificate chain up to a root certification authority (CA). Currently, the CAs usually use RSA for the signatures in the certificates. RSA needs to be replaced with a PQC scheme to be resistant against quantum computer attacks)
the machine implements QRC-Enabled IP and Web Protocols to provide a QRC-Enabled PKI Ecosystem. (See page 845, left column, Iines 12 – 35, i.e., 3.2 TLS Protocol For our evaluation, we focus on TLS connections with server authentication only. For our scenario where client and server agree on the Kyber-SPHINCS+ post-quantum cipher suite, there are three messages of particular interest: Certificate: The certificate message contains a SPHINCS+ signature. This allows the client to extract all necessary information about server's SPHINCS+ public key. Therefore, we defined an ASN1-based structure for SPHINCS+ to send X509 certificates. ServerKeyExchange: To send a key exchange message, the server performs two steps: First, a new ephemeral Kyber key pair is generated and the public key is pasted into the key-exchange message. Then the key exchange data is signed with the server's SPHINCS+ private key and the signature is added to the key-exchange message, which then is sent to the client. ClientKeyExchange: After receiving the server's key exchange message, the client verifies the SPHINCS+ signature and generates its own client Kyber key-exchange response. In our test scenario, the client key exchange is unauthenticated, but client authentication can be easily implemented since the SPHINCS+ signature scheme is fully integrated into the TLS library)
Referring to the rejection of claims 2 and 11, Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. discloses wherein the QRC-Enabled Certificate Authority implements National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) candidate QRC algorithms. (See page 842, left column, Iines 1-7, i.e., In this work, we combine all three fields - PQC, TLS, and embedded devices. We enable an embedded TLS library (mbed TLS) with post-quantum key exchange (based on Kyber in its IND-CCA variant) and post-quantum digital signatures (SPHINCS+). Both Kyber and SPHINCS+ have been submitted to the NIST PQC standardization process and have been selected for the second round, which makes them likely candidates for future standardization)
Referring to the rejection of claims 3 and 12, Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. discloses wherein the QRC-Enabled Certificate Authority generates QRC-Enabled X.509 compliant certificates to support post-quantum authentication and digital signatures. (See page 845, left column, Iines 17-21, i.e., Certificate: The certificate message contains a SPHINCS+ signature. This allows the client to extract all necessary information about server's SPHINCS+ public key. Therefore, we defined an ASN1-based structure for SPHINCS+ to send X509 certificates)
Referring to the rejection of claims 4 and 13, Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. discloses wherein the QRC-Enabled Certificate Authority provides a QRC-Enabled Certificate Authority prototype that implements services/APIs. (See page 843, left column, lines 4-30, and page 844, left column, lines 48-52, i.e., In case client authentication is required, the server also sends a CertificateRequest message. With the ServerHelloDone message the server gives the client the signal to continue the handshake. The client sends the client Certificate message in case mutual authentication is required, i.e., the server has sent a Certificate Request message. Again, PQC schemes have to be used for signatures in the certificate to be resistant against quantum computer at tacks. In any case, the client sends a ClientKeyExchange message. If RSA is used, the message contains a pre-master-secret, generated by the client, and is encrypted with the public key of the server. When using DH, it contains the public DH key of the client. In our work, we use this message to send a shared secret encrypted as Kyber ciphertext from the client to the server. In case the client needs to authenticate itself (and has sent a client Certificate message), the client also sends a CertificateVerify message. Basically, this message contains a digital signature over all handshake messages sent or received, starting at ClientHello and up to, but not including, this message. With the ChangeCipherSpec protocol message, the client indicates to switch to the negotiated algorithms. The Finished message completes the handshake and contains a message authentication code (MAC) over all handshake messages sent or received, starting at ClientHello. The server answers also with a ChangeCipherSpec protocol message and a Finished message. After that, application data can be securely exchanged. In Ring LWE based key agreement was integrated into OpenSSL and tested on classical hardware. Open Quantum Safe7 provides a library with implementations of PQC primitives and prototype integrations into OpenSSL)
Referring to the rejection of claims 7 and 16, Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. discloses further comprises a test harness for conducting a QRC-Enabled PKI Ecosystem Performance Assessment. (See page 845, right column, Iines 33-56 and page 846, left column, Iines 1-7, i.e., 3.3 Tools Running and measuring a complete post-quantum handshake also requires some utilities in addition to the TLS library (i.e. for certificate generation as well as client and server testing applications). Therefore, we added some extensions to existing tools accompanying the mbed TLS library and to its configuration 3.3.2 Test Programs. We modified and added some tools to enable PQC key generation, client and server tests, and performance measurements with our modification. Key Generation: We enabled the gen_key tool to generate keys for Kyber and SPHINCS+ The tool exports the SPHINCS+ keys encoded in the newly defined ASN1-based structure for SPHINCS+. Server/Client: The library already has a test server and client. We extended these programs to allow various performance measurements on the target platforms. Benchmark: We added a benchmark for SPHINCS+ and Kyber to the existing benchmark structure)
Referring to the rejection of claim 10, Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. discloses a quantum public key infrastructure (QPKI) system allowing for secure communications between a plurality of users and/or systems, comprising (See Abstract and page 845, left column, lines 12-35, i.e., Our results show that post-quantum key establishment with Kyber performs well in TLS on embedded devices compared to ECC variants. The use of SPHINCS+ signatures comes with certain challenges in terms of signature size and signing time, which mainly affects the use of embedded systems as PQC-TLS server but does not necessarily prevent embedded systems to act as PQC-TLS clients. 3.2 TLS Protocol For our evaluation, we focus on TLS connections with server authentication only. For our scenario where client and server agree on the Kyber-SPHINCS+ post-quantum cipher suite, there are three messages of particular interest: Certificate: The certificate message contains a SPHINCS+ signature. This allows the client to extract all necessary information about server's SPHINCS+ public key. Therefore, we defined an ASN1-based structure for SPHINCS+ to send X509 certificates. ServerKeyExchange: To send a key exchange message, the server performs two steps: First, a new ephemeral Kyber key pair is generated and the public key is pasted into the key-exchange message. Then the key exchange data is signed with the server's SPHINCS+ private key and the signature is added to the key-exchange message, which then is sent to the client. ClientKeyExchange: After receiving the server's key exchange message, the client verifies the SPHINCS+ signature and generates its own client Kyber key-exchange response. In our test scenario, the client key exchange is unauthenticated, but client authentication can be easily implemented since the SPHINCS+ signature scheme is fully integrated into the TLS library)
a quantum public key infrastructure (QPKI) machine, (See page 842, right column, Iines 41-48, i.e., The server answers with a ServerHello message which contains the chosen TLS version, chosen cipher suite, chosen compression algorithm, and a server random. He also sends a Certificate message containing the certificate with the public key of the server as well as the entire certificate chain up to a root certification authority (CA). Currently, the CAs usually use RSA for the signatures in the certificates. RSA needs to be replaced with a PQC scheme to be resistant against quantum computer attacks)
the machine comprises a quantum resistant cryptography (QRC)-Enabled Certificate Authority, the machine implements QRC-Enabled IP and Web Protocols to provide a QRC-Enabled PKI Ecosystem. (See page 845, left column, Iines 12 – 35, i.e., 3.2 TLS Protocol For our evaluation, we focus on TLS connections with server authentication only. For our scenario where client and server agree on the Kyber-SPHINCS+ post-quantum cipher suite, there are three messages of particular interest: Certificate: The certificate message contains a SPHINCS+ signature. This allows the client to extract all necessary information about server's SPHINCS+ public key. Therefore, we defined an ASN1-based structure for SPHINCS+ to send X509 certificates. ServerKeyExchange: To send a key exchange message, the server performs two steps: First, a new ephemeral Kyber key pair is generated and the public key is pasted into the key-exchange message. Then the key exchange data is signed with the server's SPHINCS+ private key and the signature is added to the key-exchange message, which then is sent to the client. ClientKeyExchange: After receiving the server's key exchange message, the client verifies the SPHINCS+ signature and generates its own client Kyber key-exchange response. In our test scenario, the client key exchange is unauthenticated, but client authentication can be easily implemented since the SPHINCS+ signature scheme is fully integrated into the TLS library)
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
8. In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
9. Claims 8-9, and 17-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. “Post-Quantum TLS on Embedded Systems” in view of Yunakovsky et al. “Towards Security Recommendations for Public Key Infrastructures for production environments in the post quantum era”.
Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. discloses the invention as described above, however, Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. fail to explicitly disclose hybrid certificates.
Yunakovsky et al. discloses the impact of the quantum threat on public key infrastructures (PKIs), which are used as a part of security systems for protecting production environments and provide a set of security recommendations regarding the PKI from the viewpoints of attacks with quantum computers.
Referring to the rejection of claims 8 and 17, (Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. modified by Yunakovsky et al.) discloses further comprises a crypto discovery service. (See Yunakovsky et al., page 11, Section 5 Appropriate post-quantum cryptography scheme, i.e., we present the results of collecting benchmarks for various post quantum signature schemes, which can be used for deploying quantum-secured PKI. We use (i) security and (ii) performance (time and key sizes) of the algorithms. All of the presented algorithms are currently in the third round of the NIST standardization process. For this analysis, we take algorithms with classical security on the level of about 190 bits; see Table 1. We note that all basic mathematical approaches used in post-quantum cryptography: multivariate cryptography, zero-knowledge proof systems, cryptographic hash functions, and lattices–are presented)
Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date the claimed invention was made to combine Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al.’s integration of post-quantum cryptography (PQC), more specifically of the post-quantum KEM scheme Kyber for key establishment and the post-quantum signature scheme SPHINCS+, into the embedded TLS library mbed TLS modified with Yunakovsky et al.’s impact of the quantum threat on public key infrastructures (PKIs), which are used as a part of security systems for protecting production environments and provide a set of security recommendations regarding the PKI from the viewpoints of attacks with quantum computers.
Motivation for such an implementation would enable hybrid operations for both support of existing standards in cryptography and ensuring post quantum security. (See Yunakovsky et al., page 13, lines 24-29)
Referring to the rejection of claims 9 and 18, (Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. modified by Yunakovsky et al.) discloses wherein the QRC-Enabled PKI Ecosystem supports hybrid operations. (See Yunakovsky et al., Abstract and page 13, lines 24-29, i.e., in the related art of security recommendations regarding the PKI from the viewpoints of attacks with quantum computers and we recommend using the X.509 format for the certificate. This due to the fact that it supports an extensible scheme of embedded data. It is possible to store multiple public keys from different algorithms in the same certificate. For example, it is possible to embed in the signed certificate both keys RSA key and post-quantum Falcon key. Such a hybrid approach allows both supporting existing standards in cryptography and ensuring post quantum security)
The rationale for combining Burstinghaus-Steinbach et al. in view of Yunakovsky et al. is the same as claim 8.
Allowable Subject Matter
10. Claims 5 and 14 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims and overcome the 35 U.S.C 101 rejections. Claims 6 and 15 are also objected for being dependent upon objected claims 5 and 14.
Conclusion
11. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to COURTNEY D FIELDS whose telephone number is (571)272-3871. The examiner can normally be reached IFP M-F 8am-4:30pm.
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/COURTNEY D FIELDS/Examiner, Art Unit 2436 September 11, 2026
/SHEWAYE GELAGAY/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2436