DETAILED ACTION
1. The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . The following FINAL office action is in response to Applicant communication filed on 10/13/2025 regarding application 19/111,320. Claims 1, 3, 9-15, 17 and 20 have been amended. Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 are currently pending have been rejected.
Response to Amendments
2. Applicant’s amendment filed on 10/13/2025 necessitated new grounds of rejection in this office action.
Priority
3. The Examiner has noted the Applicants claiming Priority from Provisional Application PRO 63/378,266 filed on 10/04/2022 and 371 of PCT/US2023/075221 filed on 09/27/2023. Therefore, Examiner notes the effective filing date of this application examined on the record is 10/04/2022.
Response to Arguments
4. Applicant’s arguments, see pages 8-11 filed on 10/13/2025, with respect to the 35 U.S.C. § 112 (a) Claim Rejections for Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 have been fully considered and are found to be not persuasive. Therefore, the 35 U.S.C. § 112 (a) Claim Rejections for Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 have been maintained.
Response to 35 U.S.C. § 101 Arguments
5. Applicant’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 arguments, filed with respect to Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 have been fully considered, but they are found not persuasive (see Applicant Remarks, Pages 11-19, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
Argument #1:
(A). Applicant argues that Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 do not recite an abstract idea, law of nature of natural phenomenon under revised step 2a prong one of the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis (see Applicant Remarks, Pages 15-16, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
Specifically, Applicant argues that the claims are directed to a specific technological process and not to an abstract idea for example, as amended, for Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15 which recite “a greedy heuristic executed by the electronic processor by evaluating drilling equipment assignments and wellbore task sequences” and “the neighborhood being identified based on physical distance relationships between wellbore sites or reservoir resource utilization relationships” under step 2a prong 1 of the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis (see Applicant Remarks, Page 15, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
In response to Applicant’s arguments here, Examiner notes that when factoring the additional elements of (e.g., “electronic processor” & “the set of drilling equipment” & “greedy heuristic” & “a pump”) in view of the claim limitations both considered individually and as an ordered combination, the claim limitation step of “a greedy heuristic executed by the electronic processor by evaluating drilling equipment assignments and wellbore task sequences” is indeed an abstract idea under “Mental Processes” via concepts performed in the human mind as evaluations or judgments or using pen to paper as a physical aid and alternatively as “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activities” via managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including teachings or following rules or instructions). For instance, scheduling is a method of organizing human activity: The claim concerns assigning drilling equipment and sequencing tasks, which is a classic form of scheduling. The specific context of wellbore actions is considered "a new data environment," which is generally not enough to render an otherwise abstract idea patent-eligible. The Federal Circuit has affirmed that simply using conventional technology to speed up human activities does not make a patent eligible. A greedy heuristic is an algorithm, which is often treated as a mathematical concept under Step 2A. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that simply applying a known algorithm to a specific data environment is not patent-eligible. Before computers, a person could perform this scheduling process mentally or with paper and pencil, albeit much more slowly. Automating a mental process on a generic computer is a common way for claims to fail the eligibility test. Moreover, a "mental process" is a concept that can be performed in the human mind, or by using a paper and pencil. The preparation of a schedule by evaluating equipment assignments and task sequences is a type of planning or organizational activity that could be performed by a human.
Secondly, when factoring the additional elements of (e.g., “wellbore” & “reservoir”) in view of the claim limitations both considered individually and as an ordered combination, the claim limitation step of “identify a neighborhood for alternative schedules to the candidate schedule, a boundary of the neighborhood being defined by maximum changes in constraint values within the set of constraints, the neighborhood being identified based on at least one of: physical distance relationships between wellbore sites or reservoir resource utilization relationships” is indeed an abstract idea under “Mental Processes” via concepts performed in the human mind as evaluations or judgments or using pen to paper as a physical aid and alternatively as “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activities” via managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including teachings or following rules or instructions). For instance, the claim limitation step describes identify a neighborhood: This is a conceptual step involving the selection and grouping of items. Define a boundary of the neighborhood: This involves setting parameters based on constraints. Identify based on... relationships: This is a process of comparing and analyzing data. These steps can be carried out mentally by a person, perhaps with a map, a spreadsheet, and information on wellbore sites and resource utilization. The claim does not require a specific, non-conventional machine or an inventive technological solution to execute the steps. Moreover, the claim could also be categorized as a "method of organizing human activity," which is a grouping of abstract ideas including fundamental economic practices, commercial interactions, and managing personal behavior. The process described is one of optimization and scheduling for industrial activities (e.g., wellbore operation), which is a "fundamental economic practice" or alternatively as managing personal behavior (including teachings or following rules or instructions). The claim does not describe a novel way of performing a physical operation but rather a high-level plan for doing so. The reference to "alternative schedules to the candidate schedule" and "wellbore sites" further indicates that the process is related to managing and organizing industrial petroleum operations.
Examiner points out that according to MPEP § 2106.04 (a) (2) section III: Mental Processes part (b): A Claim that Encompasses a Human Performing the Step (s) Mentally with or Without a Physical Aid Recites a Mental Process -> “If a claim recites a limitation that can practically be performed in the human mind, with or without the use of a physical aid such as pen and paper, the limitation falls within the mental processes grouping, and the claim recites an abstract idea. The use of a physical aid (e.g., pencil and paper or a slide rule) to help perform a mental step (e.g., a mathematical calculation) does not negate the mental nature of the limitation, but simply accounts for variations in memory capacity from one person to another.
Furthermore, from MPEP § 2106.04 (a) (2) section III: Mental Processes part (c): A Claim that Requires a Computer May Still Recite a Mental Process -> Examiner has reviewed Applicant’s Specification and determined that the claim invention describes concepts performed in the human mind and applicant is merely claiming that concept performed 1) on a generic computer (see at least Applicant’s Specification ¶ [0090]: “The steps in the processing methods described herein may be implemented by running one or more functional modules in information processing apparatus such as general purpose processors or application specific chips, such as ASICs, FPGAs, PLDs, or other appropriate devices. These modules, combinations of these modules, and/or their combination with general hardware are included within the scope of the present disclosure.”) or 2) in a computer environment, (see at least Applicant’s Specification ¶ [0092]: “Rig scheduling systems according to the present disclosure may be used outside a wellbore or other downhole environment used for the exploration or production of natural resources. For instance, rig scheduling systems of the present disclosure may be used in a borehole used for placement of utility lines.”) or 3) is merely using a computer as a tool to perform these concepts. Thus, based on these factors, Examiner maintains that the claims still recite a mental process. Also, Examiner refers Applicant to MPEP § 2106.04 (a) (2) II which states that: “the sub-groupings encompass both activity of a single person (for example, a person following a set of instructions or a person signing a contract online) and activity that involves multiple people (such as a commercial interaction), and thus, certain activity between a person and a computer may fall within the "Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activities" groupings. It is noted that the number of people involved in the activity is not dispositive as to whether a claim limitation falls within this grouping. Instead, the determination should be based on whether the activity itself falls within one of the sub-groupings.”
Furthermore, Applicant asserts that the features of “controlling the automated drilling system to automatically operate the set of drilling equipment to implement at least one action” and “the at least one action including activating a pump included in the set of drilling equipment to flow drilling fluid through a wellbore included in the plurality of wellbore sites” are not an abstract idea under step 2a prong 1 (see Applicant’s Remarks, last ¶ of Page 15, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
Examiner reiterates previous points and states that the “controlling” step is not supported under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (a) due to a lack of written description. When factoring the additional elements of (e.g. “the set of drilling equipment” & “a pump” & “drilling system”) in view of the claim limitation steps, these steps are interpreted as “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activities” which pertains to managing personal behavior (including teachings or following rules or instructions). Moreover, under MPEP § 2106.04 (d) I: “It is notable that mere physicality or tangibility of an additional element or elements is not a relevant consideration in Step 2A Prong Two. As the Supreme Court explained in Alice Corp., mere physical or tangible implementation of an exception does not guarantee eligibility. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 224, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1983-84 (2014) ("The fact that a computer ‘necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual, realm,’ is beside the point"). See also Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1377, 118 USPQ2d 1541, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (steps of DNA amplification and analysis are not "sufficient" to render claim 1 patent eligible merely because they are physical steps).” Also, Examiner cites the court case of TDE Petroleum Data Solutions v. AKM Enterprise (Fed. Cir. 2016) as being patent ineligible over 35 U.S.C. § 101. TDE Petroleum Data Solutions v. AKM Enterprise (Fed. Cir. 2016) court case claim recited “an automated method for determining the state of a well operation.” Here, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, ruling that the claims of TDE's patent for a process of processing sensor data from an oil well drill were not eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they were directed to an abstract idea. The court agreed with the district court that the claims were directed to an abstract idea—using a computer to process information from an oil well drill—and did not constitute a patent-eligible invention. The court found that the patent, which described a software-based method, was similar to the invalid patent in Alice v. CLS Bank and did not transform the claim into a patent-eligible application. Therefore, the Examiner does not agree that the claims are patent eligible due to MPEP § 2106.05 (c) which is a particular transformation.
Argument #2:
(B). Applicant argues that Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application under revised step 2a prong two of the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis (see Applicant Remarks, Pages 16-17, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
Specifically, Applicant argues that due to the amended claim limitations recited for Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15 regarding for example; “preparing …. a candidate schedule for performing wellbore actions using the set of drilling equipment, the candidate schedule being constrained by a set of constraints and prepared using a greedy heuristic executed by the electronic processor, the set of constraints including at least one action performed by the set of drilling equipment, the at least one action including activating a pump included in the set of drilling equipment to flow drilling fluid through a wellbore included in the plurality of wellbore sites” and “controlling the automated drilling system to automatically operate the set of drilling equipment to implement, after at least one of: a predetermined period of processing time or a predetermined number of iterations of selecting the favorite alternative schedule” recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application under revised step 2a prong two of the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis (see Applicant’s Remarks, Page 16, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
Accordingly, it appears that what is argued here is an improvement in the business process itself, as an entrepreneurial objective, [argued here as “preparing petroleum rig-based scheduling for performing wellbore action at a plurality of wellbore sites”] which is not a technological solution improving the computer itself or another technological field (see comparison to the unpersuasive argument in the Versata Case). Simply said the claims’ focus is not on an improvement in computers as tools, but rather on independently identified abstract ideas that use computers as tools to aid the above abstract process” itself, or used in conjunction with computer tools.
With respect to the additional elements of (e.g., “automated drilling system” & “pump” & “set of drilling equipment” & “wellbore equipment” & “greedy heuristic”) when considered individually and as an ordered combination (as a whole) for the claim limitations for Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15, these additional elements does not provide limitations that are indicative of integration into a practical application due to: (1) reciting mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer or using a computer as a tool to “apply” the recited judicial exceptions (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)) or (2) limiting a particular field of use or technological environment pertaining to preparing the candidate schedules for a petroleum or oil rig system at a plurality of wellbores using a computer in a petroleum based operations environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(h)).
Applicant asserts that the claimed approach imparts the technological improvement of efficiently identifying improved alternative schedules that satisfy the constraints of drilling equipment. Examiner discloses that “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer” does not provide an inventive concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 115 USPQ2d 1636, 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Furthermore, according to MPEP § 2106.04 (d): “It is notable that mere physicality or tangibility of an additional element or elements is not a relevant consideration in Step 2A Prong Two. As the Supreme Court explained in Alice Corp., mere physical or tangible implementation of an exception does not guarantee eligibility. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 224, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1983-84 (2014) ("The fact that a computer ‘necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual, realm,’ is beside the point"). See also Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1377, 118 USPQ2d 1541, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (steps of DNA amplification and analysis are not "sufficient" to render claim 1 patent eligible merely because they are physical steps).”
With respect to Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15, certain/particular limitations shown recite (1) selecting a particular data source or type of data to be manipulated (e.g., “selecting a favorite alternative schedule of the first plurality of alternative schedules with respect to one or more quality metrics, the favorite alternative schedule including the at least one action”) and (2) mere data outputting/transmitting (e.g., “transmitting, via a network interface, the favorite alternative schedule to an automated drilling system associated with the set of drilling equipment”) wherein which each of these claim limitations reflects mere insignificant extra-solution activities (see MPEP § 2106.05 (g)).
Applicant asserts that the amended features include integral use of a machine under MPEP § 2106.05 (b) to achieve performance of a method that integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application (see Applicant’s Remarks, last ¶ of Page 16, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
It is noted that while the application of a judicial exception by or with a particular machine is an important clue, it is not a stand-alone test for eligibility. The claim merely recites the use of a computer to perform wellbore tasks in a petroleum-based environment or petroleum-based field of use. Examiner notes that the applicant's argument that the machine is "integral" to the method is insufficient on its own. For an abstract idea to be integrated into a practical application, the machine must do more than just serve as a generic tool for performing the idea. The additional machine elements must impose a "meaningful limit" on the judicial exception. For the machine integration to be meaningful, it must provide a specific technical improvement to the underlying technology. A claim is not eligible if it merely applies an abstract idea in a generic way within a computer environment. Examiner notes that even with the addition of a generic machine, the claim is so broad that it still covers the abstract idea and prevents others from implementing it with any conventional computer. Also, that there is no transformation or specific application being applied here. The machine's use must effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing, or apply the judicial exception in some other meaningful way that goes beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. Regarding the “automated drilling system”, Examiner points out that its control system merely uses computer components to perform abstract functions, lacking the "inventive concept" to be patent eligible. Moreover, the automated drilling machine is simply performing a drilling operation guided by the recited judicial exception, without a demonstrable inventive application or a specific, non-conventional interaction that is central to the claimed invention, the integration into a "practical application" is not established.
Thus, these limitations shown in Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15 fail to provide an improvement to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field, fail to apply the exception with a particular machine, fail to apply the judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, fail to effect a transformation of a particular article to a different state or thing, and fail to apply/use the abstract idea in a meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. In conclusion, Examiner maintains that Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 as currently recited do not contain additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application under step 2a prong 2 of the 35 U.S.C. 101 analysis.
Argument #3:
(C). Applicant argues that Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the recited judicial exceptions under revised step 2B of the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis (see Applicant Remarks, Pages 16-17, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
Specifically, Applicant argues in amended Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15 for example; recites additional elements that amount to significantly more than the recited judicial exception due to “applying the scheduling approach to a specific technological environment with specific technological components including “a set of drilling equipment located at a plurality of wellbore sites” and “an automated drilling system” and “a pump included in the set of drilling equipment”” provides significantly more than any abstract idea under step 2B via “Pathway C” (see Applicant Remarks, Page 17, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
In response, Examiner refers Applicant to Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. 101 analysis section (e.g., Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 101 section shown below) shown for step 2B particularly for Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15. The claims do not recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the recited judicial exceptions, because they are merely directed to the particulars of the abstract idea and likewise do not add significantly more to the above-identified judicial exceptions. The limitations are directed to limitations referenced in MPEP § 2106.05I.A. that are not enough to qualify as significantly more when recited in these claims with the abstract idea which include: (1) adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, (2) or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer and providing the results to the user on a computer, and (3) generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use.
With respect to Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15, certain/particular limitations shown recite (1) selecting a particular data source or type of data to be manipulated (e.g., “selecting a favorite alternative schedule of the first plurality of alternative schedules with respect to one or more quality metrics, the favorite alternative schedule including the at least one action”) and (2) mere data outputting/transmitting (e.g., “transmitting, via a network interface, the favorite alternative schedule to an automated drilling system associated with the set of drilling equipment”) wherein which each of these claim limitations reflects mere insignificant extra-solution activities (see MPEP § 2106.05 (g)). Moreover, regarding the “transmitting” step for Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15, this step has been recognized as Well-Understood, Routine and Conventional (WURC), and thus insufficient to add significantly more to the abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.05(d) ii - Receiving or transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data, Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1321, 120 USPQ2d at 1362 (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); TLI Communications LLC v. AV Auto. LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610, 118 USPQ2d 1744, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image transmission); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363, 115 USPQ2d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network).
The claim limitation recited in Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15: “preparing, by an electronic processor communicatively connected to a set of drilling equipment located at a plurality of wellbore sites, a candidate schedule for performing wellbore actions using the set of drilling equipment, the candidate schedule being constrained by a set of constraints and prepared using a greedy heuristic executed by the electronic processor by evaluating drilling equipment assignments and wellbore task sequences, the set of constraints including at least one action performed by the set of drilling equipment, the at least one action including activating a pump included in the set of drilling equipment to flow drilling fluid through a wellbore included in the plurality of wellbore sites” is deemed patent ineligible under step 2B. For instance, the claim describes a process of automating scheduling using a greedy heuristic, which, on its own, is an abstract process. The claim is likely to fail Step 2B for the following reasons: using a greedy heuristic for scheduling is a common activity. Claiming the use of such an algorithm for a specific purpose, like scheduling drilling equipment, is not "significantly more" than the abstract idea of scheduling itself. The electronic processor and its connection to the equipment perform generic computer functions, such as evaluating assignments and sequences based on predefined inputs and rules. The claim does not describe an improvement to the computer's functionality, but rather the application of generic computing to a new field. The claim attempts to add an inventive concept by limiting the abstract idea to a specific field: drilling equipment at wellbore sites. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that merely limiting an abstract idea to a particular technological environment is not enough to confer patent eligibility. The inclusion of a physical act—"activating a pump... to flow drilling fluid through a wellbore"—does not automatically guarantee eligibility if it is merely a generic, post-solution activity. The claim's core is the abstract scheduling algorithm, not the physical output. The pump activation is the result of the scheduling process in the drilling industry. It does not transform the abstract scheduling concept into a patent-eligible application. The use of a greedy heuristic on a general-purpose processor to solve a scheduling problem—even in a specialized field like wellbore drilling—does not constitute an inventive concept. The claim merely implements an abstract idea using computer technology, which the Supreme Court has consistently held to be ineligible.
Secondly, Examiner notes that the step recited in Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15: of “identify a neighborhood for alternative schedules to the candidate schedule, a boundary of the neighborhood being defined by maximum changes in constraint values within the set of constraints, the neighborhood being identified based on at least one of: physical distance relationships between wellbore sites or reservoir resource utilization relationships” is deemed patent ineligible under step 2B. For instance, the query's claim language in this claim limitation step lacks the specific details needed to meet the "significantly more" requirement of Step 2B. The potential deficiencies include No specific technological solution: The method identifies a neighborhood of solutions but does not specify a non-conventional or improved way of using a computer or other technology to do so. Use of generic computing: Implementing the abstract idea "on a computer" or using a computer to perform routine data processing steps is not considered "significantly more". Merely applies an idea to a new field: The claim applies a general optimization concept (finding a "neighborhood" of solutions) to the oil and gas industry. This does not automatically confer eligibility. For example, simply applying a known machine-learning algorithm to a new data set is insufficient. Also defining relationships based on "physical distance" or "resource utilization" and setting "maximum changes in constraint values" are considered optimization techniques.
Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15: With respect to reliance on (e.g., “automated drilling system” & “automatically” & “pump” & “set of drilling equipment” & “wellbore equipment” & “greedy heuristic”) as additional elements when considered individually and as an ordered combination (as a whole) in view of the claim limitations for Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15, these additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the judicial exceptions under step 2B due to: (1) reciting mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer or using a computer as a tool to “apply” the recited judicial exceptions (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)) or (2) limiting a particular field of use or technological environment pertaining to preparing the candidate schedules for a petroleum or oil rig system at a plurality of wellbores using a computer in a petroleum based operations environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(h)).
Furthermore, according to MPEP § 2106.05 (a): “(It is notable that mere physicality or tangibility of an additional element or elements is not a relevant consideration in Step 2B. As the Supreme Court explained in Alice Corp., mere physical or tangible implementation of an exception is not in itself an inventive concept and does not guarantee eligibility: The fact that a computer "necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual, realm," is beside the point. There is no dispute that a computer is a tangible system (in § 101 terms, a "machine"), or that many computer-implemented claims are formally addressed to patent-eligible subject matter. But if that were the end of the § 101 inquiry, an applicant could claim any principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting a computer system configured to implement the relevant concept. Such a result would make the determination of patent eligibility "depend simply on the draftsman’s art," Flook, supra, at 593, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 57 L. Ed. 2d 451, thereby eviscerating the rule that "‘[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable,’" Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 1289, 186 L. Ed. 2d 124, 133).”
Applicant asserts that the Office’s reliance is misplaced referring to ¶ [0090] of Applicant’s Specification because the claims require specific drilling equipment, automated drilling systems, wellbores and pumps which are not generic computer components. The fact that automated drilling systems generally exist is immaterial to the eligibility analysis – simply being a particular machine that is more than general-purpose computer is sufficient (see Applicant Remarks, 2nd ¶ of Page 18, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
In response to Applicant’s arguments here, the presence of specific hardware, even non-generic components like drilling equipment, does not automatically transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. The analysis focuses on whether the claims, viewed as a whole, amount to an "inventive concept" that provides a technical solution beyond the mere application of the abstract idea. To refute Applicant’s assertions here, Examiner points to the following factors. The machine-or-transformation test is no longer the sole standard: The argument relies on an outdated understanding of patent eligibility. While the machine-or-transformation test was once a key part of the analysis, the Supreme Court's decisions in Mayo and Alice established a two-step framework. Step 2 of this framework, in particular, requires more than just the presence of a "particular machine." The question is whether the claim, as a whole, provides an inventive concept. The problem isn't that the automated drilling system uses a "general-purpose computer." The issue is that the system is described at a high level of generality, performing "generic computer functions" such as receiving, analyzing, and transmitting data. For example, the Federal Circuit has held that methods of operating an oil drilling rig were directed to the abstract idea of "storing data, receiving data, and using mathematics or a computer to organize that data and generate additional information". The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that merely implementing a known method on generic computer components is not enough for patent eligibility. To satisfy Step 2B, the claims must integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in a way that is not well-understood, routine, or conventional. Also, Examiner distinguishes the inventive concept tied to the technology, not the process. For an invention to be patent-eligible, the "inventive concept" must lie in the technological improvement itself, not in the automation of an existing process. The claimed automated drilling system uses drilling equipment, wellbores, and pumps, but the inventive concept appears to be the abstract idea of a method for controlling these components. The fact that the equipment exists is immaterial if the claims merely describe using a conventional automated system to carry out the abstract idea. In other words, if the claims simply state the process is to be carried out by a computer, the specific details of the equipment being controlled do not make the claims non-abstract.
Applicant asserts that the Office’s characterization as field-of-use limitation is incorrect whereby the drilling-specific elements are not merely limiting the claims to a particular field of use, but rather define the specific technological implementation that achieves the improved results under step 2B (see Applicant Remarks, 3rd ¶ of Page 18, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
As previously described, the “physical distance relationships between wellbore sites” and “reservoir resource utilization relationships” are interpreted as (1) mere instructions to apply a judicial exception under MPEP § 2106.05 (f) or (2) alternatively limiting a particular field of use or technological environment pertaining to preparing the candidate schedules for a petroleum or oil rig system at a plurality of wellbores using a computer in a petroleum based operations environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(h)) under step 2B of the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis. The claim does not appear to improve the functioning of a computer or other technology. It applies a process of identifying alternatives within certain parameters to the field of wellbore scheduling. In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court found a claim for hedging in the energy market to be an abstract idea, noting that simply limiting the use of an abstract idea to a particular field is not enough to confer eligibility. The claim's elements—defining constraints, analyzing physical distance, and considering resource utilization in the field of resource management and scheduling. Simply automating these steps or applying them to a new data environment is insufficient to create an inventive concept.
Applicant asserts that the claims that the ordered combination is not well-understood, routine, or conventional which Applicant asserts makes the claims eligible under step 2B (see Applicant Remarks, 4th ¶ of Page 18, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
Applicant asserts that the specific combination of preparing a candidate schedule using a greedy heuristic by evaluating drilling equipment assignments and wellbore task sequences, identifying a neighborhood based on physical distance relationships between wellbore sites or reservoir resource utilization relationships, preparing a first plurality of alternative schedules within the neighborhood, iteratively analyzing and selecting schedules, and controlling the automated drilling system to automatically operate the set of drilling equipment as recited in Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15 represents a novel technological approach.
In response, Examiner refers Applicant to BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons Inc. decision (Aug. 15, 2018) court case noting that: “But the relevant inquiry is not whether the claimed invention as a whole is unconventional or non-routine. At Step two, we “search for an ‘inventive concept’… that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). But this simply restates what we have already determined is an abstract idea. At Alice step two, it is irrelevant whether considering historical usage information while inputting data may have been non-routine or unconventional as a factual matter. As a matter of law, narrowing or reformulating an abstract idea does not add “significantly more” to it. See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC. No. 2017-2081, slip op. at 14 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Applicant’s suggestion that specific limitations (or the claimed invention as a whole) must be shown to be well-understood, routine, and conventional to support the conclusion of subject matter ineligibility is not persuasive.
Furthermore, Examiner submits that the question of novelty and non-obviousness evidence (application of prior art) is not relevant to the question of determining whether the claims as constructed contain an inventive concept. Examiner cites the case of (Two-Way Media v. Comcast, (Fed. Cir. 2017)) and the District Court from this case concluded that “the proffered materials are irrelevant to the § 101 motion for judgment on the pleadings. None of the proffered materials addresses a § 101 challenge to claims of the asserted patents. The novelty and non-obviousness of the claims under §§ 102 and 103 does not bear on whether the claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. . . . Because the proffered materials are irrelevant to the instant§ 101 issue, I have not considered them.” The appeal to Federal Circuit Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling that “eligibility and novelty are separate inquiries.”
Applicant asserts that the claims here are analogous to McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), involving specific technological processes with improved results whereby the amended claims recite a specific technological process using specific rules to achieve an improved technological result (see Applicant Remarks, 5th ¶ of Page 18, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
Next, responding to the Applicant’s asserted analogy of the current claims to the ones in “McRO” (see Applicant Remarks, 5th ¶ of Page 18, dated 10/13/2025), Examiner resubmits that just because the claims are limited or narrowed to few rules does not make them eligible under Federal Circuit’s decision in “McRO” (see “FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, No. 2015-1985, October 11, 2016, 2016 BL 337879 839 F.3d 1089” at p.1295 last ¶). Specifically, “McRO” was not found eligible just for applying rules having particular requirements to a data set for manipulating video content as asserted here. Instead, what made “McRO” eligible was it capability to provide technological solution that clearly and deliberately improved 3D-lip synchronization in computer animation by automatically setting keyframe at correct point to depict more realistic speech, fine tuning and generate transition parameters and apply such transition parameters to create a final morph weight set (“McRO Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, Nos.2015-1080-1081-1082-1083-1084-1086-1087-1088-1089-1090-1092-1093-1094-1095-1096-1097-1098-1099-1100-101, September 13 2016, 2016 BL 297537, 837 F.3d 1299, 120 USPQ2d 1091”, p.1092 ¶2, p.1096 ¶1, p.1102 ¶1) More specifically, “McRO’s” technological improvement “defined output morph weight set stream as a function of phoneme sequence and time of said phoneme sequence” that “adjust for the fact that a phoneme may look different when spoken depending on the phonemes preceding and/or following it” varying by character as, for example, “a swamp monster will use different rules than a tight-lipped cat” (“McRO” supra at p.1098 ¶2-¶4). Accordingly, “McRO’s” 3D technological improvement, of keyframe lip-synchronization in computer animation, produced a final morphology of more accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions, compensating for differences in mouth positions for similar phonemes based on context (“McRO” supra at p.1095-1096, 1098-1099, p.1101 ¶2, p.1102 ¶1 recognized by Federal Circuit in “Fairwarning” supra at p.1296 ¶4). Examiner submits that while technological improvements need not to solely stem from: phoneme to keyframe lip synchronization in facial 3D animation in “McRO” supra, it is still worth noting that each of “McRO” raised above, are relevant in providing valuable insight to ascertain what actual technology is, and most importantly, to ascertain what constitutes deliberate improvement to actual technology or the computer itself as opposed to a mere entrepreneurial improvement. In this instant case however, Applicant merely argues in favor of performing constraint-relationship-based neighborhoods and greedy heuristic evaluation of equipment assignments for achieving optimized drilling schedules with reduced processing requirements and global optimization capability.
Regarding the Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018) court case, Examiner notes that “Finjan” claims determined whether a code performs dangerous or unwanted operations such as renaming or deleting file, in contrast to traditional code-matching systems, which simply look for presence of known viruses. Specifically, “Finjan’s” security profiles protected against previously unknown viruses as well as obfuscated code of known viruses that have been modified to avoid detection by code-matching virus scans, while at same time, enabling more flexible and nuanced virus filtering such that after generation of security profile, the computer determines whether to access the downloadable code by reviewing its security profile according to highly granular, security policy rules to alter those security policies in response to evolving threats (see “Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, No. 2016-2520 January 10, 2018, 2018 BL 8121, 879 F.3d 1299, 125 USPQ2d 1282”, p. 1286 ¶3 - ¶5).
Turning now to “Enfish”, also relied upon by Applicant at Applicant Remarks, Page 19, dated 10/13/2025, Examiner reveals that the Federal Circuit did not find its claims as an eligible improvement, by simple virtue of mere allowing the computer to perform tasks not previously, but instead found a database improvement (see “Elec. Power Grp.p.1482 ¶2-¶3), further explain by configuring a memory according to a logical table that need not be stored contiguously in the computer memory, but instead appended with new columns that are available for immediate use through the creation of new column definition records, with one or more cells defined by the intersection of the rows and columns, and with the object identification number that, acting as a pointer of variable length between databases, to identify each said logical row, corresponding to a record of information (“Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp. , 118 USPQ2d 1684, U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit, No. 2015-1244, May 12, 2016, 2016 BL 151342, 822 F.3d 1327”, hereinafter “Enfish” noting at p.1688 second to last ¶, pp. 1689-1690) providing a trifecta improvements in: increasing flexibility, providing faster search times, and smaller memory requirements (“Enfish” p.1690, second to last ¶).
Therefore, these claims do not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea because they neither (1) recite any improvements to another technology or technical field; (2) recite any improvements to the functioning of the computer itself; (3) apply the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine; (4) effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing; (5) add a specific limitation other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the field; (6) add unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular useful application; nor (7) provide other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. Therefore, under Step 2B, Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the recited judicial exceptions. Thus, Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 are ineligible with respect to the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis.
Response to 35 U.S.C. § 112 Arguments
6. Argument #1: Applicant asserts that the specification explicitly discloses that “the rig scheduling system may implement the first favorite alternative schedule when none of the second plurality of alternative schedules are better than the first alternative schedules based on the one or more quality metrics” and the Specification provides specific support for the claimed pump activation task disclosing that “a constraint to drill the wellbore 102 may include activating pumps to flow drilling fluid through the wellbore while the drill string and the but is being rotated” (see Applicant Remarks, Pages 8-11, dated 10/13/2025). Examiner respectfully disagrees.
Specifically, Examiner points out that the last limitation of the “controlling” step in Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15 is not supported under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (a) as lacking written description for performing the claimed function.
Examiner does not agree that a constraint related to activating pumps is the same as actually controlling drilling equipment. The Spec is confined to planning/scheduling, but doesn't appear to show possession for the claimed approach for what is actually controlling the drilling system to be able to perform the activities for which it is scheduled.
Applicant appears to conflate from Applicant’s Original Specification ¶ [0028] which recites that “the scheduler 112 may prepare a schedule for the drilling system 100 to drill the wellbore 102. The schedule may include a series of tasks that the drilling system 100 may perform to drill the wellbore 102. The schedule may be bound by one or more constraints. For example, a constraint to drill the wellbore 102 may include activating pumps 114 to flow drilling fluid 116 through the wellbore 102 while the drill string 105 and the bit 110 is being rotated.” This does not equate to actually “controlling the automated drilling system to automatically operate the set of drilling equipment to implement, after at least one of: a predetermined period of processing time or a predetermined number of iterations of selecting the favorite alternative schedule...” The difference here is that the “activating pumps to flow drilling fluid” cited from Applicant’s Specification ¶ [0028] is an after effect or direct consequence/outcome of implementing the petroleum-based schedules for performing wellbore-based tasks, but does not cause “how” controlling or precipitate how the automated drilling system is able to automatically operate the set of drilling equipment to implement is achieved.
Examiner notes from Applicant’s Specification ¶ [0034] which recites the following: “The scheduling system 218 includes a scheduler 212 that develops plans. For example, the scheduler 212 may develop plans for drilling operations. The plans may include plans to drill a single wellbore, plans to drill multiple wellbores, plans to plug and abandon wellbores, plans to drill doglegs for wellbores, plans to perform fracking operations, plans to control or monitor wellbore production, any other type of drilling operation plans, and combinations thereof.” Here, Examiner interprets based from Applicant’s Specification ¶ [0034] that a “software scheduler” develops the petroleum plans for performing drilling/petroleum tasks at wellbore site locations. Once the petroleum plans are generated, the plans guide or inform the operator or petroleum manager to monitor and control wellbore productions which therefore are not the same as “controlling the automated drilling system to automatically operate the set of drilling equipment to implement, after at least one of: a predetermined period of processing time or a predetermined number of iterations of selecting the favorite alternative schedule…” as currently recited in Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15.
Here, the burden is to prove that the features were inherent and that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have known or understood that they were necessarily present. Examiner notes that while a POSITA might devise one method of controlling an automated system, the specific combination of steps in your claim is not the inevitable or necessary result. It's just one possibility among many. Drilling automation is not a predictable field due to a generic understanding of automation to inherently describe a complex, multi-variable optimization process. The specific combination of timing and comparative metrics is not something a POSITA would assume was an inherent result. Examiner notes that this general disclosure covers a broad genus of inventions, but that the specific claim is directed to a particular species that is not inherent to the general description. The specific process limitations—the predetermined time/iterations and the comparative metrics—are not trivial or obvious additions to the general automated system. The "predetermined period of processing time" is a specific design choice, not an inevitable outcome of developing a scheduling algorithm. An alternative, non-inherent embodiment might not use time at all, but only iterations. The "predetermined number of iterations" is a specific parameter that had to be chosen and implemented. Another system could use a different number of iterations or a different stopping condition entirely. The "determining that none of the second plurality of alternative schedules exceeds" is a specific comparative logic, not an inherent function of any scheduling process. A different system could use different criteria or a different comparison method.
An inherency argument cannot be supported by applying hindsight. Examiner notes that Applicant’s assertion of the specific claim language and retroactively reading it into the general disclosure is improper. The court that the test for written description is whether the specification communicates to a POSITA that the inventor was in possession of the claimed invention at the time of filing, not that the invention could be created based on the disclosure. The inherency argument requires an improper leap from the generic concept of automated drilling to the specific, detailed, and optimized control system claimed.
Moreover, Examiner reminds the Applicant that “One shows possession of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious. Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 41 USPQ2d 1961, No. 96-1168, 107 F3d 1565, pp1961 ¶3,1966 ¶2 (emphasis added). The written description requirement is not necessarily met when the claim language appears in ipsis verbis in the specification. "Even if a claim is supported by the specification, the language of the specification, to the extent possible, must describe the claimed invention so that one skilled in the art can recognize what is claimed. The appearance of mere indistinct words in a specification or a claim, even an original claim, does not necessarily satisfy that requirement. “Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968, 63 USPQ2d 1609, 1616 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Thus, Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15 fail to satisfy the written description requirement of §112(a) because there is no evidence of a complete specific application or embodiment to satisfy the requirement that the description is set forth “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms” to show possession of the claimed invention. See Fields v. Conover, 443 F.2d 1386, 1392, 170 USPQ 276, 280 (CCPA 1971). Dependent Claims 3, 7-9, 11-14, 17 and 20 depend from Claims 1/10/15 and therefore inherit the § 112(a) deficiency of Claims 1/10/15 discussed above. Appropriate corrections are required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
7. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
8. Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 requires that the “specification shall contain a written description of the invention.” This requirement is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 920-23, 69 USPQ2d 1886, 1890-93 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing history and purpose of the written description requirement). To satisfy the written description requirement, a patent specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. See, e.g., Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1319, 66 USPQ2d 1429, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d at 1563, 19 USPQ2d at 1116. However, a showing of possession alone does not cure the lack of a written description. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 969-70, 63 USPQ2d 1609, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
(A). In this instance, Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15 were amended on 07/08/2025 to include the limitations of: “controlling the automated drilling system to automatically operate the set of drilling equipment to implement, after at least one of: a predetermined period of processing time or a predetermined number of iterations of selecting the favorite alternative schedule..” The language in the Spec doesn’t appear to be enough to satisfy 35 U.S.C. 112(a) in this instance because of the complete absence of the “how” to support the claimed result. For instance, there is no support shown in Applicant’s Specification to corroborate “how” the “automated drilling system” physically controls a favorite alternative schedule in order to implement at least one task, as the “automated drilling system” is not producing a task included in the favorite alternative schedule but it appears rather the scheduling system coupled with the scheduler develops the petroleum plan whereby the plans control or monitor wellbore production outcomes.
Furthermore, the generic recitation of "...a constraint to drill...may include activating pumps" at par. 28 of the Spec doesn't appear to relate to actually controlling the pumps, but refers to a constraint related to scheduling of activities.
Examiner refers to the following sections in Applicant’s Specification.
Applicant’s Specification ¶ [0034]: “The scheduling system 218 includes a scheduler 212 that develops plans. For example, the scheduler 212 may develop plans for drilling operations. The plans may include plans to drill a single wellbore, plans to drill multiple wellbores, plans to plug and abandon wellbores, plans to drill doglegs for wellbores, plans to perform fracking operations, plans to control or monitor wellbore production, any other type of drilling operation plans, and combinations thereof.”
Applicant’s Specification ¶ [0072]: “In some embodiments, the rig scheduling system may implement the first favorite alternative schedule when none of the second plurality of alternative schedules are better than the first alternative schedules based on the one or more quality metrics. For example, the rig scheduling system may transmit the first favorite alternative schedule to a drilling operator and/or an automated drilling system. The drilling operator and/or the automated drilling system may review and implement the acts of the first favorite alternative schedule.”
Therefore, Examiner notes that there's nothing in Applicant’s Specification ¶ [0034] or elsewhere in the Spec showing possession of something that actually controls any automated drilling equipment. At most, the Spec describes transmitting a schedule related to the automated drilling equipment (e.g., Applicant’s Specification ¶ [0072]), but the Spec seems to lack descriptive support for executing the new step for "controlling an automated....," and the scheduling by itself does not actually control the equipment.
Also, Examiner does not agree that a constraint related to activating pumps is the same as actually controlling drilling equipment. The Spec is confined to planning/scheduling, but doesn't appear to show possession for the claimed approach to actually controlling the drilling system to perform the activities for which it is scheduled.
The written description requirement is not necessarily met when the claim language appears in ipsis verbis in the specification. "Even if a claim is supported by the specification, the language of the specification, to the extent possible, must describe the claimed invention so that one skilled in the art can recognize what is claimed. The appearance of mere indistinct words in a specification or a claim, even an original claim, does not necessarily satisfy that requirement. “Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968, 63 USPQ2d 1609, 1616 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Thus, Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15 fail to satisfy the written description requirement of §112(a) because there is no evidence of a complete specific application or embodiment to satisfy the requirement that the description is set forth “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms” to show possession of the claimed invention. See Fields v. Conover, 443 F.2d 1386, 1392, 170 USPQ 276, 280 (CCPA 1971). Dependent Claims 3, 7-9, 11-14, 17 and 20 depend from Claims 1/10/15 and therefore inherit the §112(a) deficiency of Claims 1/10/15 discussed above. Appropriate corrections are required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
9. 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
10. Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Step 1: Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 are each focused to a statutory category namely, 2 “methods” or 2 “processes” (Claims 1, 3 and 7-15) and a “system” or an “apparatus” (Claims 15, 17 and 20).
Step 2A Prong One: Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15 recites limitations that set forth the abstract idea(s), namely (see in bold except where strikethrough):
“” (see Independent Claim 15);
“” (see Independent Claims 1 and 15);
“preparing, communicatively connected to a set of drilling located at a plurality of wellbore sites, a candidate schedule for performing wellbore actions using the set of drilling the candidate schedule being constrained by a set of constraints and prepared evaluating drilling assignments and wellbore task sequences, the set of constraints including at least one action performed by the set of drilling equipment, the at least one action including activating a included in the set of drilling to flow drilling fluid through a wellbore included in the plurality of wellbore sites” (see Independent Claims 1 and 10);
“prepare, , a candidate schedule, the candidate schedule being based on a set of constraints” (see Independent Claim 15);
“identify a neighborhood for alternative schedules to the candidate schedule, a boundary of the neighborhood being defined by maximum changes in constraint values within the set of constraints, the neighborhood being identified based on at least one of: physical distance relationships between wellbore sites or resource utilization relationships” (see Independent Claims 1 and 15);
“prepare a first plurality of alternative schedules within the neighborhood, each of the first plurality of alternative schedules including the at least one action” (see Independent Claims 1 and 15);
“analyze each alternative schedule of the first plurality of alternative schedules with respect to one or more quality metrics” (see Independent Claims 1 and 15);
“select a favorite alternative schedule of the first plurality of alternative schedules based on the one or more quality metrics, the favorite alternative schedule including the at least one action” (see Independent Claims 1 and 15);
“preparing a second plurality of alternative schedules within a neighborhood of the favorite alternative schedule, each of the second plurality of alternative schedules including the at least one action” (see Independent Claims 1 and 15);
“analyzing each alternative schedule of the second plurality of alternative schedules with respect to the one or more quality metrics” (see Independent Claims 1 and 15);
“transmitting, the favorite alternative schedule associated with the set of drilling ” (see Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15);
“controlling to automatically operate the set of drilling to implement, after at least one of: a predetermined period of processing time or a predetermined number of iterations of selecting the favorite alternative schedule, the at least one action included in the favorite alternative schedule, the controlling responsive to determining that none of the second plurality of alternative schedules exceeds the one or more quality metrics relative to the favorite alternative schedule” (see Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15);
“identifying a second set of constraints based on the first set of constraints, each of the second set of constraints including the at least one action” (see Independent Claim 10);
“identifying a neighborhood for alternative schedules to the candidate schedule, a boundary of the neighborhood being defined by maximum changes in constraint values of the second set of constraints relative to the first set of constraints, the neighborhood being identified based on at least one of: physical distance relationships between wellbore sites or resource utilization relationships” (see Independent Claim 10);
“preparing a first plurality of alternative schedules within the neighborhood, each of the first plurality of alternative schedules including the at least one action” (see Independent Claim 10);
“analyzing each alternative schedule of the first plurality of alternative schedules with respect to one or more quality metrics” (see Independent Claim 10);
“selecting a favorite alternative schedule of the first plurality of alternative schedules based on the one or more quality metrics, the favorite alternative schedule including the at least one action” (see Independent Claim 10);
“preparing a second plurality of alternative schedules within a neighborhood of the favorite alternative schedule, each of the second plurality of alternative schedules including the at least one action” (see Independent Claim 10);
“analyzing each alternative schedule of the second plurality of alternative schedules with respect to the one or more quality metrics” (see Independent Claim 10).
These abstract idea limitations (as identified above in bold), under their broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims as a whole, cover performance of their limitations as “Mental Processes” which pertains to (1) concepts performed in the human mind (including observations or evaluations or judgments) or (2) using pen and paper as a physical aid, which in order to help perform these mental steps does not negate the mental nature of these limitations. The use of "physical aids" in implementing the abstract mental process, does not preclude the claim from reciting an abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.04(a) III C.
Additionally, or alternatively, these abstract idea limitations (as identified above in bold), under their broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims as a whole, cover performance of their limitations as “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activities” which pertains to (3) managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including teachings or following rules or instructions).
That is, other than reciting (e.g., “a processor” & “memory” & “automated drilling system” & “network interface” & “wellbore equipment” & “pump” & “set of drilling equipment” & “greedy heuristic”), nothing in the claim elements precludes the steps from being performed as “Mental Processes” which pertains to (1) concepts performed in the human mind (including observations or evaluations or judgments) or (2) using pen and paper as a physical aid and additionally or alternatively as “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activities” which pertains to (3) managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including teachings or following rules or instructions).
Therefore, at step 2a prong 1, Yes, Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 recite an abstract idea. We proceed onto analyzing the claims at step 2a prong 2.
Step 2A Prong Two: With respect to Step 2A Prong Two of the eligibility inquiry (as explained in MPEP § 2106.04(d)), the judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. Independent Claims 1 and 10 recites additional elements directed to: (e.g., “a processor” & “network interface”). Independent Claim 15 recites additional elements directed to: (e.g., “a processor” & “network interface” & “memory”). These additional elements have been considered individually and in combination, but fail to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they amount to using generic computing elements or instructions (software) to perform the abstract idea, similar to adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), which merely serves to link the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. See MPEP § 2106.05(f) and MPEP § 2106.05(h).
Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15: With respect to reliance on (e.g., “automated drilling system” & “automatically” & “pump” & “set of drilling equipment” & “wellbore equipment” & “greedy heuristic”) as additional elements when considered individually and as a ordered combination (as a whole) for the claim limitations for Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15, these additional elements do not provide limitations that are indicative of integration into a practical application due to: (1) reciting mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer or using a computer as a tool to “apply” the recited judicial exceptions (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)) or (2) limiting a particular field of use or technological environment pertaining to preparing the candidate schedules for a petroleum or oil rig system at a plurality of wellbores using a computer in a petroleum based operations environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(h)).
In addition, these limitations fail to provide an improvement to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field, fail to apply the exception with a particular machine, fail to apply the judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, fail to effect a transformation of a particular article to a different state or thing, and fail to apply/use the abstract idea in a meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment.
Accordingly, because the Step 2A Prong One and Prong Two analysis resulted in the conclusion that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, additional analysis under Step 2B of the eligibility inquiry must be conducted in order to determine whether any claim element or combination of elements amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Therefore, at step 2a prong 2, Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 are directed to the abstract idea and do not recite additional elements that integrate into a practical application.
Step 2B: (As explained in MPEP § 2106.05), it has been determined that the claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Independent Claims 1 and 10 recites additional elements directed to: (e.g., “a processor” & “network interface”). Independent Claim 15 recites additional elements directed to: (e.g., “a processor” & “network interface” & “memory”). These elements have been considered individually and in combination, but fail to add significantly more to the claims because they amount to using computing elements or instructions (software) to perform the abstract idea, similar to adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent), which merely serves to link the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment (computing environment) and does not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See MPEP § 2106.05 (f) and MPEP § 2106.05 (h). Notably, Applicant’s Specification suggests that the claimed invention relies on nothing more than a general-purpose computer executing the instructions to implement the invention (e.g., see at least Applicant’s Specification ¶ [0090]: “The steps in the processing methods described herein may be implemented by running one or more functional modules in information processing apparatus such as general purpose processors or application specific chips, such as ASICs, FPGAs, PLDs, or other appropriate devices. These modules, combinations of these modules, and/or their combination with general hardware are included within the scope of the present disclosure.”)
Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15: With respect to reliance on (e.g., “automated drilling system” & “automatically” & “pump” & “set of drilling equipment” & “wellbore equipment” & “greedy heuristic”) as additional elements when considered individually and as an ordered combination (as a whole) in view of the claim limitations for Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15, these additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the judicial exceptions under step 2B due to: (1) reciting mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer or using a computer as a tool to “apply” the recited judicial exceptions (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)) or (2) limiting a particular field of use or technological environment pertaining to preparing the candidate schedules for a petroleum or oil rig system at a plurality of wellbores using a computer in a petroleum based operations environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(h)).
In addition, when taken as an ordered combination, the ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present as when the elements are taken individually. There is no indication that the combination of elements integrates the abstract idea into a practical application. Therefore, when viewed as a whole, these additional claim elements do not provide meaningful limitations to transform the abstract idea into a practical application of the abstract idea or that, as an ordered combination, amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.
Dependent Claims 3, 7-9, 11-14, 17 and 20 recite substantially the same or similar additional elements as addressed above and when considered individually and as an ordered combination (as a whole) with these limitations recite the same abstract idea(s) as shown in Independent 1, 10 and 15 along with further steps/details pertaining to “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activities” which pertains to (1) managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including teachings or following rules or instructions) and additionally or alternatively as “Mental Processes” which pertains to (2) concepts performed in the human mind (including observations or evaluations or judgments) or (3) using pen and paper as a physical aid.
Dependent Claims 3, 7-9, 11-12, 14, 17 and 20 further narrow the abstract ideas, and are therefore still ineligible for the reasons previously provided in Steps 2A Prong 2 and 2B for Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15. Dependent Claim 13: With respect to reliance on “a plurality of wellbores” (at Dependent Claim 13) as additional elements shown in Dependent Claim 13 when considered individually and as an ordered combination (as a whole) in view of these claim limitations, these additional elements do not provide limitations that are indicative of integration into a practical application under step 2a prong 2 and also do not recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the recited judicial exceptions under step 2B due to: (1) recites mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer or using a computer as a tool to “apply” the recited judicial exceptions by providing the results to the user on a computer (see MPEP § 2106.05 (f)) or (2) limiting a particular field of use or technological environment pertaining to preparing the candidate schedules for a petroleum or oil rig system at a plurality of wellbores using a computer in a petroleum based operations environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(h)).
The additional element of “greedy heuristic” in Independent Claims 1, 10 and 15 does not amount to significantly more than the judicial exceptions under step 2B due being expressly recognized as Well-Understood, Routine and Conventional (WURC) in the art. See for example; US PG Pub (US 2021/0095559 A1) hereinafter Karn, et. al. Karn at ¶ [0022]: “Two approaches were tried in the optimization phase, one using a constructive heuristic which is a greedy approach for ordering and sequencing of wells until all wells allocated. The second approach is variant of the earlier approach used to escape local optima. Other example scheduling approaches, include reservoir simulation, a greedy randomized adaptive search for finding an approximate solution to combinatorial optimization problems, and a branch-price and cut algorithm that relies on vehicle routing was developed.” See for example; US PG Pub (US 2014/0136165 A1) hereinafter Sarma, et. al. Sarma at ¶ [0032]: “The most common approach for solution of such combinatorial optimization problems are Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approaches such as the well-known Simulated Annealing (SA). SA was applied to a few real and synthetic datasets, but did not perform very well compared to a "greedy" algorithm discussed below.”
The ordered combination of elements in the Dependent Claims (including the limitations inherited from the parent claim(s)) add nothing that is not already present as when the elements are taken individually. There is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other technology. Accordingly, the subject matter encompassed by the dependent claims fails to amount to a practical application or significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Therefore, under Step 2B, Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the recited judicial exceptions. Thus, Claims 1, 3, 7-15, 17 and 20 are ineligible with respect to the 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis.
Conclusion
Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/DERICK J HOLZMACHER/Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3625A
/BRIAN M EPSTEIN/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3625
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