DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Claims
This is the first office action on the merits in response to the application filed on
09/18/2025.
Claims 1-10 and 23-32 are currently pending and have been examined.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-10 and 23-32 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.
Subject Matter Eligibility Criteria – Step 1:
Claims 1-10 are directed to a computer implement method, claims 23-27 are directed to a computing system, and claims 28-32 are directed to an article of manufacture. Therefore, these claims fall within the four statutory categories of invention.
Subject Matter Eligibility Criteria – Step 2A – Prong One:
Regarding Prong One of Step 2A of the Alice/Mayo test, the claim limitations are to be analyzed to determine whether, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, they “recite” a judicial exception or in other words whether a judicial exception is “set forth” or “described” in the claims. MPEP 2106.04(II)(A)(1). An “abstract idea” judicial exception is subject matter that falls within at least one of the following groups: a) certain methods of organizing human activity, b) mental processes, and/or c) mathematical concepts. MPEP 2106.04(a).
Representative independent claims 1, 23, and 28 include limitations that recite at least one abstract idea.
Claims 1, 23, and 28 are directed to the abstract idea of “executing a data verification application for verifying user data of a plurality of individual users on behalf of a plurality of origin entities that issue the user data, wherein the data verification application is coupled to a database that stores, for each of a plurality of origin entities, (1) a respective origin public key corresponding to a set of user data issued by the respective origin entity to a subset of the plurality of individual users and (2) metadata that is associated with the set of user data and provided by the respective origin entity; receiving, from a first requester account, a data verification request including payload data and a payload digital signature associated with the payload data, the payload data further including first user data of a first individual user and a first digital signature associated with the first user data; and in response to the data verification request: extracting, from the database, a requester public key associated with the first requester account; decrypting the payload digital signature associated with the payload data using the requester public key associated with the first requester account to generate a decrypted payload digital signature; based on the decrypted payload digital signature, verifying whether the payload data, received from the first requester account, are generated by the first requester account; and in accordance with a verification of the payload data: obtaining the payload data including the first digital signature and the first user data of the first individual user; identifying a first origin entity that has issued the first user data of the first individual user based on the payload data; extracting, from the database, an origin public key associated with the first origin entity; decrypting the first digital signature associated with the first user data using the origin public key associated with the first origin entity to generate a decrypted first digital signature; and based on the decrypted first digital signature, verifying whether the first user data, received via the first requester account, are issued by the first origin entity.” Under its broadest reasonable interpretation, this claim is evaluating information to determine the verify the authenticity and source of user data, and hence falls under mental processes (including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).
Dependent Claims:
Claim 4 recites: wherein: decrypting the payload digital signature using the requester public key further comprises determining whether the first requester account is an authorized user of the data verification application ; and in accordance with a verification of the payload data and a verification that the first requester account is the authorized user of the data verification application, the first digital signature is decrypted using the origin public key; further describes the abstract idea of mental processes –including evaluating information and making a determination based on the information.
Claim 5 recites: wherein the payload data and the payload digital signature are intercepted by a second requester account, the method further comprising: receiving, from the second requester account, a second verification request to verify the first user data associated with the first individual user, the second verification request including the payload data and the payload digital signature; and verifying the second requester account for reviewing the payload data; further describes the abstract idea of mental processes –including evaluating information and making a determination based on the information.
Claim 6 recites: verifying the second requester account further comprising, in response to the second verification request: extracting, from the database, a second public key associated with the second requester account; decrypting the payload digital signature associated with the payload data using the second public key associated with the second requester account to generate a second decrypted signature; verifying that the second requester account does not sign the payload data based on the second decrypted signature or determining that the second requester account is not an authorized user of the data verification application; and aborting decrypting the first digital signature of the first user data associated with the first individual user with the origin public key; further describes the abstract idea of mental processes –including evaluating information and making a determination based on the information.
Claim 6 recites: verifying the second requester account further comprising, in response to the second verification request: extracting, from the database, a second public key associated with the second requester account; decrypting the payload digital signature associated with the payload data using the second public key associated with the second requester account to generate a second decrypted signature; verifying that the second requester account does not sign the payload data based on the second decrypted signature or determining that the second requester account is not an authorized user of the data verification application; and aborting decrypting the first digital signature of the first user data associated with the first individual user with the origin public key; further describes the abstract idea of mental processes –including evaluating information and making a determination based on the information.
Claim 9 recites: wherein the message includes one or more of: the first user data, a confirmation indicating that the first user data comply with a first data processing criterion, a confirmation indicating that the first user data does not comply with the first data processing criterion; further describes the abstract idea of mental processes –including evaluating information and making a determination based on the information.
Claim 29 recites: wherein the data verification request includes an identifier of the first origin entity providing the first digital signature of the first user data, and identifying the first origin entity further comprises: searching a list of identifiers associated with authorized origin entities for a match with the identifier of the first origin entity; further describes the abstract idea of mental processes –including evaluating information and making a determination based on the information.
Claim 30 recites: further comprising instructions for: obtaining an identifier of the first requester account; searching a list of identifiers associated with authorized requester accounts for the identifier of the first requester account; further describes the abstract idea of mental processes –including evaluating information and making a determination based on the information.
Subject Matter Eligibility Criteria – Step 2A – Prong Two:
Claims 1, 23, and 28 recites the computing system, data-verification application, database, requester public key, origin public key, digital signatures, and the decrypting and verifying operations using those different cryptographic keys. The claims recite using a requestor public key to process a payload digital signature to verify the source of p[payload data and, after such verification, using an origin public key to process a digital signature associated with the user data to determine whether the user data was issued by the identified origin entity. These additional elements apply the abstract idea of evaluating the authenticity and source of information on generic computing components. The claims used the database to obtain stored information and cryptographic keys and use the respective public keys and digital signatures to perform the claimed source/verifications steps. The claims do not recite an improvement to the operation of the database, the public-key cryptographic algorithms, the digital-signature algorithms, network protocol, or the operation of the computing device itself. Rather, the computer and cryptographic components are used according to their ordinary functions to implement the claimed invention. Accordingly, the additional elements, considered individually and in combination, do not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application.
Dependent Claims:
Claim 2 recites: wherein the first digital signature of the first user data is generated by encrypting a cryptographic hash of the first user data using an origin private key associated with the first origin entity, and the payload digital signature of the payload data is generated by encrypting a cryptographic hash of the payload data using a requester private key associated with the first requester account. These limitations are additional elements that do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 3 recites: wherein the database stores, for each of a plurality of user accounts, a respective requester public key associated with a respective organization user, and the plurality of user accounts are associated with a plurality of organization users. These limitations are additional elements that do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 8 recites: further comprising: in accordance with a verification that the first user data are issued by the first origin entity, generating a message associated with the first individual user based on the first user data and a subset of the metadata, wherein the subset of the metadata is associated with the first user data and provided by the first origin entity; and sending the message to the first requester account. These limitations are additional elements that do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 10 recites: wherein the first user data include one or more of: an age, an account number, transaction data, an email address, an age of an email address, a password, and a flag indicating a personal status of the first individual user that is embedded in the first digital signature generated using a private key of the first origin entity. These limitations are additional elements that do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 24 recites: wherein a mobile device associated with the first individual user stores the first digital signature of the first user data in a digital wallet application, and the first user data include personal information of the first individual user that is embedded in the first digital signature generated using a private key of the first origin entity. These limitations are additional elements that do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 25 recites: wherein the personal information of the first individual user has an encrypted format when the first user data is received and stored in the mobile device, and the personal information is not readable from a user interface of the digital wallet application. These limitations are additional elements that do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 26 recites: wherein an electronic device associated with the first requester account executes the data verification application and imports the first digital signature of the first user data from the digital wallet application of the mobile device, the memory further comprising instructions for: generating, by the mobile device, an individual digital signature associated with an individual data block using an individual private key, the individual data block including the first user data and the first digital signature issued by the first origin entity; sending the individual digital signature and the individual data block to the electronic device associated with the first requester account having an individual public key provided by the mobile device; processing, by the electronic device, the individual digital signature using the individual public key to verify that the mobile device, sending the individual data block, generates the individual digital signature; and in accordance with a verification of the mobile device, generating the data verification request including the payload digital signature based on a requester private key. These limitations are additional elements that do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 27 recites: the memory further comprising instructions for: storing, in the memory, the first user data and the first digital signature of the first user data temporarily; and purging, from the memory, the first user data and the first digital signature of the first user data. These limitations are additional elements that do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 31 recites: wherein a verifiable data structure of the first user data includes one or more of: an identifier of the first individual user, first user data, user metadata including a data processing criterion associated with the first user data, an individual public key, an identifier of the first origin entity, a digital signature of the first origin entity, and a signature parameter of the digital signature of the first origin entity, the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium further comprising instructions for: sending, by the first origin entity, the verifiable data structure of the first user data to a mobile device associated with the first individual user. These limitations are additional elements that do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Claim 32 recites: further comprising instructions for: providing to each of a plurality of origin entities the respective origin public key and an associated origin private key configured to create the first digital signature by the respective origin entity. These limitations are additional elements that do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B:
Viewed as a whole, the instructions/claims do not include additional elements that amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. The claims implement the evaluating the authenticity and source of user data using computing devices, databases, stored public keys, digital signatures, cryptographic hashing, encryption and decryption, digital wallet storage, data transmission, and memory operations. These elements perform their ordinary computer, storage, communication, and cryptographic functions in the claimed invention. The ordered combination uses these components to authenticate the requestor associated with the payload and the origin entity associated with the underlying user data and to communicate or store the resulting verification information. The claims do no not recite any improvement to the operation of the computer, database, cryptographic functions, digital wallet, memory, or network. Therefore, these additional elements, individually or as an ordered combination, do not provide an inventive concept sufficient to amount to significantly more than the recited abstract idea. Accordingly, the claims are not patent eligible under 35 USC § 101.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claim 10 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention. Claim 10 recites that the first user data include “an age of an email address.” It is unclear what an “age” of an email address pertains to. Accordingly, the scope of claimed “age of an email address” cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1-10, 23-26, and 28-32 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Ortiz et al. (US 20220200992 A1), in view of Dixon et al. (US 20130346744 A1), and further in view of Hamel et al. (US 20190305964 A1).
Regarding Claims 1, 23, and 28, Ortiz discloses a computer implemented method, comprising: at a computing system having one or more processors and memory for storing one or more instructions, (a computing system, comprising: one or more processors; and memory having instructions stored thereon, which when executed by the one or more processors cause the processors to perform operations, and a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, having instructions stored thereon, which when executed by one or more processors of a computing system cause the processors to perform operations)), (Para. 0367-0371),
executing a data verification application for verifying user data of a plurality of individual users on behalf of a plurality of origin entities that issue the user data, wherein the data verification application is coupled to a database that stores, for each of a plurality of origin entities, (1) a respective origin public key corresponding to a set of user data issued by the respective origin entity to a subset of the plurality of individual users and (2) metadata that is associated with the set of user data and provided by the respective origin entity, (Para. 0016, there is provided a system that is configured to give consumers access and control of their own information. The system may include: a data storage unit storing a user profile; and a processor configured with computer readable instructions stored in the data storage unit to: receive and store one or more sets of consumer data, each set of consumer data having a metadata identifying a source of the set of consumer data; categorize the one or more sets of consumer data; present the one or more sets of consumer data through a user interface to the consumer; receive a user request to transmit at least one of the one or more sets of consumer data to a client; transmit the at least one set of consumer data to the client; and make a payment to the consumer in view of the at least one set of consumer data transmitted to the client.; and Para. 0061-0062, The embodiments are implemented using technological devices, including computers, having specialized components and circuitry that are adapted for improved security and privacy of data sets. As noted herein, some embodiments are directed to a secure enclave data processor and uses thereof in conjunction with a computer readable memory having a protected memory region. The secure enclave data processor interfaces with the protected memory region to securely store and encrypt data sets received from a particular data source (e.g., from a data issuing/official/validated/trusted organization) that may, in some embodiments, be encrypted with a key specific to the organization or data source. In an embodiment, the key may be pre-generated and associated with the organization or data source. In another embodiment, the system may include a key generator which performs a key generation ceremony when a new key is required to load data sets into the protected memory region.)
receiving, from a first requester account, a data verification request including payload data and a payload digital signature associated with the payload data, the payload data further including first user data of a first individual user and a first digital signature associated with the first user data, (Para. 0345-0347, The verifier computing device receives, from a prover computing device, a second signed message including at least an enclosed issuer signed message representing one or more encrypted containers storing at least one or more characteristics of an identity profile of a prover entity along with a message authentication code based at least on the proof request data structure. The verifier computing device then transmits the second signed message, the proof request data structure, and the one or more encrypted containers to the secure enclave. The verifier computing device then receives a response data message from the secure enclave indicative of whether all of the one or more logical conditions were satisfied by the at least one or more characteristics of the identity profile of the prover entity. In some embodiments, the secure enclave is configured to provide publicly verifiable remote attestation with a verifiable threat model and a verifiable proof of security.)
and in accordance with a verification of the payload data: obtaining the payload data including the first digital signature and the first user data of the first individual user, (Para. 0344-0347 In this example, the secure enclave is adapted for processing encrypted credentials, challenges, and proof requests. The secure enclave can be a processor or a secured memory location that is configured for maintaining a verifier secret key utilized to generate a first signed message. The verifier computing device receives, from a prover computing device, a second signed message including at least an enclosed issuer signed message representing one or more encrypted containers storing at least one or more characteristics of an identity profile of a prover entity along with a message authentication code based at least on the proof request data structure. The verifier computing device then transmits the second signed message, the proof request data structure, and the one or more encrypted containers to the secure enclave. The verifier computing device then receives a response data message from the secure enclave indicative of whether all of the one or more logical conditions were satisfied by the at least one or more characteristics of the identity profile of the prover entity. In some embodiments, the secure enclave is configured to provide publicly verifiable remote attestation with a verifiable threat model and a verifiable proof of security.)
Ortiz does not explicitly disclose and in response to the data verification request: extracting, from the database, a requester public key associated with the first requester account.
However, Dixon teaches and in response to the data verification request: extracting, from the database, a requester public key associated with the first requester account, (Para. 0021-0022, During message retrieval, the secure messaging environment decrypts the signature using the public key of the originator to recover the digest. The secure messaging environment then compares the digest with a new hash of the received message data performed by the secure messaging environment. The new hash and the digest must be equivalent to confirm that the message data has not changed. The public key used to decrypt the signature is an attribute of the originator's certificate. The originator's certificate also identifies the name of the certificate issuer (e.g., the distinguished name (DN) of the Certificate Authority (CA)) that issued the originator's certificate.; and Para. 0015, As such, the present technology expands the processing of message retrieval in a secure messaging environment to cause signature verification to include an additional check to verify that the message originator certificate is issued by the named issuer according to the extended data-protection policy. If the message originator's certificate is not issued by the designated issuer identified in the data-protection policy, the signature is deemed invalid.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Dixon to the known invention of Ortiz would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate extraction features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include in response to the data verification request: extracting, from the database, a requester public key associated with the first requester account result in an improved invention because applying said technique obtains the correct cryptographic key for checking the identity of the requestor, thus improving the overall security of the invention.
Ortiz does not explicitly disclose decrypting the payload digital signature associated with the payload data using the requester public key associated with the first requester account to generate a decrypted payload digital signature.
However, Dixon teaches decrypting the payload digital signature associated with the payload data using the requester public key associated with the first requester account to generate a decrypted payload digital signature, (Para. 0016-0017, For purposes of the present description, it is noted that one method of digitally signing messages is to use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Using PKI, the originator of a message may use a hashing algorithm on the message data to produce a digest. This digest is then encrypted with a private key of the originator and the resulting bit-string, called the “digital signature,” may be added to the message payload. A recipient of the message may use a public key of the message originator to decrypt the digest and then compare the digest to a re-hash of the message data to confirm that the message data has not changed during transit by verifying that the decrypted digest and the re-hashed digest are identical. This method of digitally signing messages and verification of digital signatures may be used to confirm that the originator of the message possesses the private key that matches the public key used to decrypt the digest, and that the message data has not changed… The specification/correlation of a mandatory issuer of message originator certificates with message originator identifiers within data-protection policies may be applied at the secure messaging environment level (e.g., the system level) or at the message-queue level. At the system level, the specification of a mandatory issuer may be applied to all queues that do not have a queue-level specification. At the message queue level, the specification of a mandatory issuer may be applied to the associated queue or queues managed by the queue-level specification.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Dixon to the known invention of Ortiz would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate decryption features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include decrypting the payload digital signature associated with the payload data using the requester public key associated with the first requester account to generate a decrypted payload digital signature result in an improved invention because applying said technique allows the system to securely check the digital signature associated with the submitted payload, thus improving the overall security of the invention.
Ortiz does not explicitly disclose identifying a first origin entity that has issued the first user data of the first individual user based on the payload data; extracting, from the database, an origin public key associated with the first origin entity; decrypting the first digital signature associated with the first user data using the origin public key associated with the first origin entity to generate a decrypted first digital signature; and based on the decrypted first digital signature, verifying whether the first user data, received via the first requester account, are issued by the first origin entity.
However, Dixon teaches identifying a first origin entity that has issued the first user data of the first individual user based on the payload data; extracting, from the database, an origin public key associated with the first origin entity; decrypting the first digital signature associated with the first user data using the origin public key associated with the first origin entity to generate a decrypted first digital signature; and based on the decrypted first digital signature, verifying whether the first user data, received via the first requester account, are issued by the first origin entity, (Para. 0015, As such, the present technology expands the processing of message retrieval in a secure messaging environment to cause signature verification to include an additional check to verify that the message originator certificate is issued by the named issuer according to the extended data-protection policy. If the message originator's certificate is not issued by the designated issuer identified in the data-protection policy, the signature is deemed invalid.; and Para. 0020-0023, In the case where a data-protection policy stipulates that message data should be digitally signed, the secure messaging environment may, for example, apply a hashing algorithm to the data when it is placed on a queue. The hashing algorithm produces a digest (bit-string). The secure messaging environment may also encrypt the digest with the private key of the originator to produce a digital signature. The digital signature may be added to the message payload so that the digital signature may be verified later by a retriever of the message. During message retrieval, the secure messaging environment decrypts the signature using the public key of the originator to recover the digest. The secure messaging environment then compares the digest with a new hash of the received message data performed by the secure messaging environment. The new hash and the digest must be equivalent to confirm that the message data has not changed. The public key used to decrypt the signature is an attribute of the originator's certificate. The originator's certificate also identifies the name of the certificate issuer (e.g., the distinguished name (DN) of the Certificate Authority (CA)) that issued the originator's certificate. The present technology allows the secure messaging environment to verify that the certificate issuer identified in the message originator's certificate is the correct issuer of the message originator's certificate. The present technology also allows the secure messaging environment to verify that the issuer is a trusted CA by checking that the named CA is listed as trusted in the secure messaging environment of the retriever.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Dixon to the known invention of Ortiz would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate cryptographic features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include identifying a first origin entity that has issued the first user data of the first individual user based on the payload data; extracting, from the database, an origin public key associated with the first origin entity; decrypting the first digital signature associated with the first user data using the origin public key associated with the first origin entity to generate a decrypted first digital signature; and based on the decrypted first digital signature, verifying whether the first user data, received via the first requester account, are issued by the first origin entity result in an improved invention because applying said technique determines which trusted source should be used to verify the user’s information, obtains the correct cryptographic key for checking the source of the user data and confirms that the user’s information came from the trusted source, thus improving the overall security of the invention.
Ortiz as modified does not explicitly disclose based on the decrypted payload digital signature, verifying whether the payload data, received from the first requester account, are generated by the first requester account.
However, Hamel teaches based on the decrypted payload digital signature, verifying whether the payload data, received from the first requester account, are generated by the first requester account, (Para. 0016-0017, For purposes of the present description, it is noted that one method of digitally signing messages is to use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Using PKI, the originator of a message may use a hashing algorithm on the message data to produce a digest. This digest is then encrypted with a private key of the originator and the resulting bit-string, called the “digital signature,” may be added to the message payload. A recipient of the message may use a public key of the message originator to decrypt the digest and then compare the digest to a re-hash of the message data to confirm that the message data has not changed during transit by verifying that the decrypted digest and the re-hashed digest are identical. This method of digitally signing messages and verification of digital signatures may be used to confirm that the originator of the message possesses the private key that matches the public key used to decrypt the digest, and that the message data has not changed… The specification/correlation of a mandatory issuer of message originator certificates with message originator identifiers within data-protection policies may be applied at the secure messaging environment level (e.g., the system level) or at the message-queue level. At the system level, the specification of a mandatory issuer may be applied to all queues that do not have a queue-level specification. At the message queue level, the specification of a mandatory issuer may be applied to the associated queue or queues managed by the queue-level specification.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Hamel to the known invention of Ortiz as modified would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate verification features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include based on the decrypted payload digital signature, verifying whether the payload data, received from the first requester account, are generated by the first requester account result in an improved invention because applying said technique confirms that the verification request came from the actual requestor, thus improving the overall security of the invention.
8. Regarding Claims 2, Ortiz does not explicitly disclose the first digital signature of the first user data is generated by encrypting a cryptographic hash of the first user data using an origin private key associated with the first origin entity, and the payload digital signature of the payload data is generated by encrypting a cryptographic hash of the payload data using a requester private key associated with the first requester account.
However, Dixon teaches the first digital signature of the first user data is generated by encrypting a cryptographic hash of the first user data using an origin private key associated with the first origin entity, and the payload digital signature of the payload data is generated by encrypting a cryptographic hash of the payload data using a requester private key associated with the first requester account, (Para. 0016, Using PKI, the originator of a message may use a hashing algorithm on the message data to produce a digest. This digest is then encrypted with a private key of the originator and the resulting bit-string, called the “digital signature,” may be added to the message payload. A recipient of the message may use a public key of the message originator to decrypt the digest and then compare the digest to a re-hash of the message data to confirm that the message data has not changed during transit by verifying that the decrypted digest and the re-hashed digest are identical. This method of digitally signing messages and verification of digital signatures may be used to confirm that the originator of the message possesses the private key that matches the public key used to decrypt the digest, and that the message data has not changed.; and Para. 0020, In the case where a data-protection policy stipulates that message data should be digitally signed, the secure messaging environment may, for example, apply a hashing algorithm to the data when it is placed on a queue. The hashing algorithm produces a digest (bit-string). The secure messaging environment may also encrypt the digest with the private key of the originator to produce a digital signature. The digital signature may be added to the message payload so that the digital signature may be verified later by a retriever of the message.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Dixon to the known invention of Ortiz would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate payload data features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include the first digital signature of the first user data is generated by encrypting a cryptographic hash of the first user data using an origin private key associated with the first origin entity, and the payload digital signature of the payload data is generated by encrypting a cryptographic hash of the payload data using a requester private key associated with the first requester account result in an improved invention because applying said technique makes the user data and payload more secure and easier to verify as authentic, thus improving the overall security and performance of the invention.
Regarding Claims 3, Ortiz as modified does not explicitly disclose wherein the database stores, for each of a plurality of user accounts, a respective requester public key associated with a respective organization user, and the plurality of user accounts are associated with a plurality of organization users.
However, Hamel teaches wherein the database stores, for each of a plurality of user accounts, a respective requester public key associated with a respective organization user, and the plurality of user accounts are associated with a plurality of organization users, (Para. 0155, User and device database 4C22 comprises a database of registered users for a given customer organization and user details (e.g., username, password hash, contact information, email address, relationship to devices, registered public keys, registered mapping documents in a decentralized ledger, etc.). User and device database 4C22 additionally comprises a device directory comprising all the devices for a given customer organization as well as mapping documents associated with the devices and relationships with users associated with the devices. Credential rules 4C24 comprises a set of credential rules for determining a credential that satisfies a given access request, for example rules related to a credential associated schema, a credential associated organization, a credential issuer, a credential associated location, a credential associated class identifier, a credential associated license number, or any other appropriate credential rules. In various embodiments, rules comprise rules related to a credential associated schema, rules related to a credential associated organization, rules related to a credential issuer, rules related to a credential associated location, rules related to a credential associated class identifier or identifier number, rules related to a credential associated license or license number, a credential associated class name, or any other appropriate credential rules. In some embodiments, the rules are applied selectively (e.g., based at least in part on a user identifier)—for example, employees with a credential can access application A, contractors with a credential can access application B, or any other appropriate matching of access with identifiers.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Hamel to the known invention of Ortiz as modified would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate payload data features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include wherein the database stores, for each of a plurality of user accounts, a respective requester public key associated with a respective organization user, and the plurality of user accounts are associated with a plurality of organization users result in an improved invention because applying said technique helps identify and verify different authorized requestors, thus improving the overall performance of the invention.
Regarding Claims 4, Ortiz as modified does not explicitly disclose wherein: decrypting the payload digital signature using the requester public key further comprises determining whether the first requester account is an authorized user of the data verification application; and in accordance with a verification of the payload data and a verification that the first requester account is the authorized user of the data verification application, the first digital signature is decrypted using the origin public key.
However, Hamel teaches wherein: decrypting the payload digital signature using the requester public key further comprises determining whether the first requester account is an authorized user of the data verification application; and in accordance with a verification of the payload data and a verification that the first requester account is the authorized user of the data verification application, the first digital signature is decrypted using the origin public key, (Para. 0160, In 4G04, an authentication response comprising a device credential is received. For example, the authentication response from the user device is received and checked to make sure that the response is valid, wherein validating the authentication response comprises checking a device signature of the authentication response. In 4G06, a user identifier and an authentication device associated with the user are determined based at least in part on the device credential. In 4G08, a proof request is provided to the authentication device. For example, the DCIAMS creates the proof request. In some embodiments, the proof request comprises a request for one or more credentials of a set of credentials (e.g., a set of credentials that can enable authorization to access). In some embodiments, the DCIAMS is further configured to determine the set of credentials that can enable authorization to access (e.g., using a set of rules). In 4G10, a proof response is received. For example, the proof response comprises a credential retrieved from a credential wallet wherein the credential retrieved from the credential wallet is based at least in part on rules specified in the proof request. In some embodiments, the proof response is signed with an authentication device private key. In 4G12, it is determined whether the proof response is valid. For example, determining that the proof response is valid comprises determining that a credential is not revoked and/or determining that a credential signature is valid by checking the credential against information stored in the distributed ledger.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Hamel to the known invention of Ortiz as modified would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate payload data features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include wherein: decrypting the payload digital signature using the requester public key further comprises determining whether the first requester account is an authorized user of the data verification application; and in accordance with a verification of the payload data and a verification that the first requester account is the authorized user of the data verification application, the first digital signature is decrypted using the origin public key result in an improved invention because applying said technique checks that the requestor is authorized before allowing the system to continue verifying user’s data, thus improving the overall security of the invention.
Regarding Claims 5, Ortiz as modified does not explicitly disclose wherein the payload data and the payload digital signature are intercepted by a second requester account, the method further comprising: receiving, from the second requester account, a second verification request to verify the first user data associated with the first individual user, the second verification request including the payload data and the payload digital signature; and verifying the second requester account for reviewing the payload data.
However, Hamel teaches wherein the payload data and the payload digital signature are intercepted by a second requester account, the method further comprising: receiving, from the second requester account, a second verification request to verify the first user data associated with the first individual user, the second verification request including the payload data and the payload digital signature; and verifying the second requester account for reviewing the payload data, (Para. 0163, In the example shown, in 4I00, a second request for authorization to access is received from a second application, wherein access to the second application is requested by the user using the user device. In 4I02, a second authentication request (e.g., a second U2F authentication request) is provided to the user device. For example, the second authentication request (e.g., a U2F challenge) is received from the DCIAMS at the user device. The second authentication request is intercepted by a kernel plugin running on the user device. In some embodiments, the kernel plugin is running at the OS level as a privileged process, not in the context of any given browser. The kernel plugin is able to detect whether there is a session key (e.g., the encrypted private key component of the session keypair) available, and in the event that there is a session key available, encrypts (using a user device key) a message to a nearby authentication device (e.g., a user's phone) using a proximity communication protocol. In various embodiments, a proximity communication protocol comprises a Bluetooth protocol, a near field communication (NFC) protocol, or any other appropriate communication protocol. The session key as stored on the user device is encrypted with the authentication device public key so the user device sends it via the proximity communication protocol to the authentication device to have the session key decrypted. The authentication device returns the session key decrypted to the user device and the authentication response (e.g., signed with a private key component of the session keypair) is generated using the decrypted private key component of the session key and is passed back to the DCIAMS as the authentication response. The authentication token comprises a challenge request/challenge response using U2F. The authentication token comprises a split key scenario to unlock the session key and sign the challenge response.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Hamel to the known invention of Ortiz as modified would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate payload data features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include wherein the payload data and the payload digital signature are intercepted by a second requester account, the method further comprising: receiving, from the second requester account, a second verification request to verify the first user data associated with the first individual user, the second verification request including the payload data and the payload digital signature; and verifying the second requester account for reviewing the payload data result in an improved invention because applying said technique allows the system to manage a verification request from another requestor while still checking whether that requester is allowed is permitted to review the data, thus improving the overall security and performance of the invention.
12. Regarding Claims 6, Ortiz as modified does not explicitly disclose verifying the second requester account further comprising, in response to the second verification request: extracting, from the database, a second public key associated with the second requester account; decrypting the payload digital signature associated with the payload data using the second public key associated with the second requester account to generate a second decrypted signature; verifying that the second requester account does not sign the payload data based on the second decrypted signature or determining that the second requester account is not an authorized user of the data verification application; and aborting decrypting the first digital signature of the first user data associated with the first individual user with the origin public key.
However, Hamel teaches verifying the second requester account further comprising, in response to the second verification request: extracting, from the database, a second public key associated with the second requester account; decrypting the payload digital signature associated with the payload data using the second public key associated with the second requester account to generate a second decrypted signature; verifying that the second requester account does not sign the payload data based on the second decrypted signature or determining that the second requester account is not an authorized user of the data verification application; and aborting decrypting the first digital signature of the first user data associated with the first individual user with the origin public key, (Para. 0105, The identity mapping enables being able to securely and verifiably provide credentials from a user's authentication device to a requestor (e.g., a requesting application). The authentication device comprises a computing device (e.g., a computer, a smartphone, a tablet, etc.). For example, the authentication device comprises a mobile computing device. An identity mapping comprises a mapping from a user identifier to an authentication device public key. For example, an authentication device public key comprises a public key of an identity key pair (IKP) of the authentication device. The IKP comprises a public key and a private key (e.g., a public identity key and a private identity key). The public key is public (e.g., publicly known and shared widely) and the private key is private (e.g., known only to the authentication device as a carefully guarded secret).; and Para. 0159, In 4F02, the decrypted authentication token is received signed with the session key and encrypted with the user device public key via the proximity radio system. For example, the authentication device decrypts the session key, signs the challenge, and encrypts the challenge to send back to the user device. In 4F04, the authentication token is decrypted. In 4F06, it is determined whether the device key signature is valid. For example, the In the event it is determined that the device key signature is not valid, the process ends. In the event it is determined that the device key signature is valid, control passes to 4F08. In 4F08, the authentication token is provided to the DCIAMS. For example, the user device then replies via the U2F protocol to the DCIAMS, which determines that the challenge is signed correctly and matches the session key and then indicates to the application that access is authorized.; and Para. In 5F02, it is determined whether a public key from a decentralized ledger matches a DID (e.g., a decentralized identifier) in a credential (e.g., a credential of the proof response). In the event it is determined that a public key from a decentralized ledger does not match a DID in the credential, control passes to 5F14. In the event it is determined in 5F02 that that a public key from a decentralized ledger matches a DID in the credential, control passes to 5F04. In 5F04, it is determined whether the credential is one of a set of credentials that can enable authorization to access. In the event it is determined that the credential is not one of the set of credentials that can enable authorization to access, control passes to 5F14. In the event it is determined in 5F04 that the credential is one of the set of credentials that can enable authorization to access, control passes to 5F06. In 5F06, it is determined whether the credential is expired. In the event it is determined that the credential is expired, control passes to 5F14. In the event it is determined in 5F06 that the credential is not expired, control passes to 5F08. In 5F08, it is determined whether the credential signature is valid. In the event it is determined that the credential signature is not valid, control passes to 5F14. In the event it is determined in 5F08 that the credential signature is valid, control passes to 5F10. In 5F10, it is determined whether the credential is revoked.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Hamel to the known invention of Ortiz as modified would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate payload data features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include verifying the second requester account further comprising, in response to the second verification request: extracting, from the database, a second public key associated with the second requester account; decrypting the payload digital signature associated with the payload data using the second public key associated with the second requester account to generate a second decrypted signature; verifying that the second requester account does not sign the payload data based on the second decrypted signature or determining that the second requester account is not an authorized user of the data verification application; and aborting decrypting the first digital signature of the first user data associated with the first individual user with the origin public key result in an improved invention because applying said technique by cancelling further verification when the second requestor cannot properly be authenticated or is not authorized to prevent unauthorized access to user data, thus improving the overall security and performance of the invention.
Regarding Claim 7, Ortiz discloses wherein the metadata associated with the set of users include one or more data processing criteria for using the set of user data issued by the respective origin entity to the subset of the plurality of individual users, the method further comprising: after identifying the first origin entity, extracting, from the database, a first data processing criterion; applying the first data processing criterion to the first user data associated with the first individual user to generate a confirmation indicating whether the first user data satisfy the first data processing criterion, (Para. 0187-0191, There are two different types of proofs that are proposed in some embodiments, these being exact match proofs (non-zeroness protocol; e.g., this person either matches someone on a whitelist or doesn't match anyone on a blacklist), and conditional proofs (e.g., based on an inequality condition being matched, such as over 18 years old?). As described in various embodiments herein, improved cryptographic protocols are proposed that, relative to prior approaches, reduce an overall cryptographic complexity without a significant reduction in security. Accordingly, the proofs can be generated more quickly, which improves convenience, especially where a system is being established for mass adoption and client device characteristics are highly variable across the users (e.g., some users may be using devices with extremely limited capabilities). An enhanced solution is described herein that is adapted for protecting a client's personal information and only providing what is needed by leveraging a client's special space using a secure enclave and a blockchain solution, in accordance with some embodiments. A blockchain infrastructure and the secure enclave each store data sets representing aspects of signed attributes and, in some embodiments, a proof response logic. The block chain infrastructure can include distributed logic technologies and combination with cascading encryption to provide an immutable ledger. In some embodiments, the proof requests and responses can be conducted using intelligent connected devices such as a mobile device, or wearable devices (e.g., a smartwatch that is connected to a mobile device across Bluetooth low energy). In an example embodiment, there are multiple authoritative issuers who are able to provide signed attributes (e.g., for storage in secure enclaves or on a distributed ledger blockchain data structure). Secure enclaves can be utilized, or other types of hardware protected spaces are usable.; and Para. 0273-0276, the system includes a credential parsing engine provided to receive one or more credentials which in combination, validate one or more characteristics of an identity profile of a prover entity. A proof generation engine is provided that receives, from a verifier computing system, the one or more proof request data structures and the one or more credentials; and for each logical condition provided in the one or more proof request data structures, parse the one or more characteristics of the identity profile to determine whether the logical condition has been satisfied. One or more proof output data structures storing signatures or zero knowledge proofs of satisfaction of a subset or all of the one or more logical conditions is returned by the system (e.g., in the form of data fields). A secure encryption engine and a secure processing enclave may be included…A proof generation engine, in some embodiments, resides at or is coupled to a data center of a financial institution, and wherein parsing the one or more characteristics of the identity profile includes invoking an electronic comparison against a stored user profile of the financial institution corresponding to the prover entity.)
Regarding Claim 8, Ortiz discloses further comprising: in accordance with a verification that the first user data are issued by the first origin entity, generating a message associated with the first individual user based on the first user data and a subset of the metadata, wherein the subset of the metadata is associated with the first user data and provided by the first origin entity; and sending the message to the first requester account, (Para. 0188-0193, improved cryptographic protocols are proposed that, relative to prior approaches, reduce an overall cryptographic complexity without a significant reduction in security. Accordingly, the proofs can be generated more quickly, which improves convenience, especially where a system is being established for mass adoption and client device characteristics are highly variable across the users (e.g., some users may be using devices with extremely limited capabilities). An enhanced solution is described herein that is adapted for protecting a client's personal information and only providing what is needed by leveraging a client's special space using a secure enclave and a blockchain solution, in accordance with some embodiments. A blockchain infrastructure and the secure enclave each store data sets representing aspects of signed attributes and, in some embodiments, a proof response logic. The block chain infrastructure can include distributed logic technologies and combination with cascading encryption to provide an immutable ledger. In some embodiments, the proof requests and responses can be conducted using intelligent connected devices such as a mobile device, or wearable devices (e.g., a smartwatch that is connected to a mobile device across Bluetooth low energy)…there are multiple authoritative issuers who are able to provide signed attributes (e.g., for storage in secure enclaves or on a distributed ledger blockchain data structure). Secure enclaves can be utilized, or other types of hardware protected spaces are usable. A registration mechanism and method is utilized to initialize and populate the attributes using public and secret (private) encryption keys. Issuer devices create attribute data records that are generated using a combination of a client's public key and an issuer's secret key (e.g., using digital signatures or encryption/decryption). The attributes can be made publicly available, for example, on a blockchain, whereby the attributes can be signed by an issuer's secret key but encrypted using the client's public key. A verification mechanism and method is provided whereby a communications channel can be established with an authenticated verifier device, which initiates a proof request, which triggers a process to establish a proof response that is transmitted to the verifier.; and Para. 0274-0275, A proof generation engine is provided that receives, from a verifier computing system, the one or more proof request data structures and the one or more credentials; and for each logical condition provided in the one or more proof request data structures, parse the one or more characteristics of the identity profile to determine whether the logical condition has been satisfied. One or more proof output data structures storing signatures or zero knowledge proofs of satisfaction of a subset or all of the one or more logical conditions is returned by the system (e.g., in the form of data fields). A secure encryption engine and a secure processing enclave may be included, in accordance with various embodiments.)
Regarding Claim 9, Ortiz discloses wherein the message includes one or more of: the first user data, a confirmation indicating that the first user data comply with a first data processing criterion, a confirmation indicating that the first user data does not comply with the first data processing criterion, (Para. 0190-0193, A blockchain infrastructure and the secure enclave each store data sets representing aspects of signed attributes and, in some embodiments, a proof response logic. The block chain infrastructure can include distributed logic technologies and combination with cascading encryption to provide an immutable ledger. In some embodiments, the proof requests and responses can be conducted using intelligent connected devices such as a mobile device, or wearable devices (e.g., a smartwatch that is connected to a mobile device across Bluetooth low energy)…there are multiple authoritative issuers who are able to provide signed attributes (e.g., for storage in secure enclaves or on a distributed ledger blockchain data structure). Secure enclaves can be utilized, or other types of hardware protected spaces are usable. A registration mechanism and method is utilized to initialize and populate the attributes using public and secret (private) encryption keys. Issuer devices create attribute data records that are generated using a combination of a client's public key and an issuer's secret key (e.g., using digital signatures or encryption/decryption). The attributes can be made publicly available, for example, on a blockchain, whereby the attributes can be signed by an issuer's secret key but encrypted using the client's public key. A verification mechanism and method is provided whereby a communications channel can be established with an authenticated verifier device, which initiates a proof request, which triggers a process to establish a proof response that is transmitted to the verifier.; and Para. 0272-0276, the scale up may occur if the credential verification system is utilized across a large number of users…the system includes a credential parsing engine provided to receive one or more credentials which in combination, validate one or more characteristics of an identity profile of a prover entity. A proof generation engine is provided that receives, from a verifier computing system, the one or more proof request data structures and the one or more credentials; and for each logical condition provided in the one or more proof request data structures, parse the one or more characteristics of the identity profile to determine whether the logical condition has been satisfied. One or more proof output data structures storing signatures or zero knowledge proofs of satisfaction of a subset or all of the one or more logical conditions is returned by the system (e.g., in the form of data fields). A secure encryption engine and a secure processing enclave may be included, in accordance with various embodiments. A proof generation engine, in some embodiments, resides at or is coupled to a data center of a financial institution, and wherein parsing the one or more characteristics of the identity profile includes invoking an electronic comparison against a stored user profile of the financial institution corresponding to the prover entity. The example implementations are not restricted to such a topology, and other topologies are contemplated, including a cloud/distributed resources based proof generation engine.; and Para. 0280-0281, The one or more token data objects are generated (e.g., as signed objects or encrypted objects) using at least an issuer computing device private issuance key. The one or more token data objects each including one or more signed data elements representing at least one of the one or more characteristics of the client associated with the portable client computing device…the verifier computing system is configured to encapsulate the one or more credentials along with the one or more proof request data structures in a single data container transmitted to the proof generation engine.)
Regarding Claim 10, Ortiz discloses wherein the first user data include one or more of: an age, an account number, transaction data, an email address, an age of an email address, a password, and a flag indicating a personal status of the first individual user that is embedded in the first digital signature generated using a private key of the first origin entity, (Para. 0065, Disclosed herein is a system for storing, protecting and distributing consumer information. Entity data such as consumer information herein may refer to various types of information related to a consumer, such as name, age, occupation, salary, interests, marital status, address, professional association, political affiliation and so on. Consumer information may also include financial data, transactional data and social network data. The term “consumer information” may be used interchangeably with the term “consumer data” throughout the disclosure.; and Para. 0070] A vendor system 130 may be a system at or connected to a vendor that interacts with the consumer in some capacity. For example, a vendor may be a physical store, a restaurant, a social network website, a media, a brand, a workplace, and so on. In some embodiments, a vendor system 130 may have pre-registered with system 100 to share information regarding one or more consumers, provided that the consumers have given explicit consent to share the information. A consent may be given when a consumer signs up with system 100 as a user, and has selected the specific vendor as one source of consumer information. Each time a consumer interacts with the vendor, some type of electronic data may be stored by vendor system 130. The electronic data may include transactional data generated during a purchase transaction, fitness data generated by a fitness device wore by the consumer, items ordered by the consumer at a restaurant, books bought by the consumer at a bookstore, and so on. If the consumer is registered with system 100 and the vendor has been selected as a vendor that can share information regarding the consumer, then the electronic data may be transmitted to system 100 for storage and further processing.; and Para. 0279-0280, the electronic comparison against the stored user profile of the financial institution corresponding to the prover entity includes querying one or more attributes of the stored user profile and comparing the queried one or more attributes against the one or more logical conditions to determine whether individual logical conditions of the one or more logical conditions have been satisfied. The characteristics and attributes of the user profile can be used established and stored thereon the portable client computing device as one or more token data objects that can be received from or computed jointly in a multiparty protocol with an issuer computing device. The one or more token data objects are generated (e.g., as signed objects or encrypted objects) using at least an issuer computing device private issuance key. The one or more token data objects each including one or more signed data elements representing at least one of the one or more characteristics of the client associated with the portable client computing device.)
17. Regarding Claims 24, Ortiz as modified does not explicitly disclose wherein a mobile device associated with the first individual user stores the first digital signature of the first user data in a digital wallet application, and the first user data include personal information of the first individual user that is embedded in the first digital signature generated using a private key of the first origin entity.
However, Hamel teaches wherein a mobile device associated with the first individual user stores the first digital signature of the first user data in a digital wallet application, and the first user data include personal information of the first individual user that is embedded in the first digital signature generated using a private key of the first origin entity, (Para. Authentication device 4B00 additionally comprises storage 4B18. Storage 4B18 comprises encryption keys 4B20—for example, comprising a public key of an identity key pair, a private key of an identity key pair, a private key of an identity key pair encrypted using mobile encryption key 4B14, etc. For example, an identity key pair of authentication device 4B00 comprises a public key used by other systems for encrypting data in such a way that it can only by decrypted by authentication device 4B00, and a private key for decrypting data encrypted using the public key or for signing data for proving it came from authentication device 4B00. Storage 4B18 additionally comprises digital credentials 4B22, comprising digital certificates representing qualifications (e.g., a college degree, work experience, time living at an apartment, time enrolled in a health insurance plan, etc.). For example, digital credentials 4B22 comprises a credential wallet. In some embodiments, digital credentials 4B22 comprises a locked digital wallet able to be unlocked by a user. For example, digital credentials 4B22 are unlocked using a biometric or a PIN. Once the locked digital wallet is unlocked, a credential is retrieved. Authentication device 4B00 additionally comprises memory 4B24. Memory 4B24 comprises executing application data 4B26, comprising data associated with applications 4B08.; and Para. 0160, In 4G04, an authentication response comprising a device credential is received. For example, the authentication response from the user device is received and checked to make sure that the response is valid, wherein validating the authentication response comprises checking a device signature of the authentication response. In 4G06, a user identifier and an authentication device associated with the user are determined based at least in part on the device credential. In 4G08, a proof request is provided to the authentication device. For example, the DCIAMS creates the proof request. In some embodiments, the proof request comprises a request for one or more credentials of a set of credentials (e.g., a set of credentials that can enable authorization to access). In some embodiments, the DCIAMS is further configured to determine the set of credentials that can enable authorization to access (e.g., using a set of rules). In 4G10, a proof response is received. For example, the proof response comprises a credential retrieved from a credential wallet wherein the credential retrieved from the credential wallet is based at least in part on rules specified in the proof request. In some embodiments, the proof response is signed with an authentication device private key. In 4G12, it is determined whether the proof response is valid. For example, determining that the proof response is valid comprises determining that a credential is not revoked and/or determining that a credential signature is valid by checking the credential against information stored in the distributed ledger.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Hamel to the known invention of Ortiz as modified would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate cryptographic features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include wherein a mobile device associated with the first individual user stores the first digital signature of the first user data in a digital wallet application, and the first user data include personal information of the first individual user that is embedded in the first digital signature generated using a private key of the first origin entity result in an improved invention because applying said technique stores signed personal information in a user’s digital wallet so the information can be securely presented and verified when needed, thus improving the overall security and performance of the invention.
18. Regarding Claim 25, Ortiz discloses wherein the personal information of the first individual user has an encrypted format when the first user data is received and stored in the mobile device, and the personal information is not readable from a user interface of the digital wallet application, (Para. 0189-0192, An enhanced solution is described herein that is adapted for protecting a client's personal information and only providing what is needed by leveraging a client's special space using a secure enclave and a blockchain solution,...A blockchain infrastructure and the secure enclave each store data sets representing aspects of signed attributes and, in some embodiments, a proof response logic. The block chain infrastructure can include distributed logic technologies and combination with cascading encryption to provide an immutable ledger. In some embodiments, the proof requests and responses can be conducted using intelligent connected devices such as a mobile device, or wearable devices (e.g., a smartwatch that is connected to a mobile device across Bluetooth low energy)… there are multiple authoritative issuers who are able to provide signed attributes (e.g., for storage in secure enclaves or on a distributed ledger blockchain data structure). Secure enclaves can be utilized, or other types of hardware protected spaces are usable. A registration mechanism and method is utilized to initialize and populate the attributes using public and secret (private) encryption keys. Issuer devices create attribute data records that are generated using a combination of a client's public key and an issuer's secret key (e.g., using digital signatures or encryption/decryption). The attributes can be made publicly available, for example, on a blockchain, whereby the attributes can be signed by an issuer's secret key but encrypted using the client's public key.)
19. Regarding Claim 26, Ortiz as modified does not explicitly disclose wherein an electronic device associated with the first requester account executes the data verification application and imports the first digital signature of the first user data from the digital wallet application of the mobile device, the memory further comprising instructions for: generating, by the mobile device, an individual digital signature associated with an individual data block using an individual private key, the individual data block including the first user data and the first digital signature issued by the first origin entity; sending the individual digital signature and the individual data block to the electronic device associated with the first requester account having an individual public key provided by the mobile device; processing, by the electronic device, the individual digital signature using the individual public key to verify that the mobile device, sending the individual data block, generates the individual digital signature; and in accordance with a verification of the mobile device, generating the data verification request including the payload digital signature based on a requester private key.
However, Hamel teaches wherein an electronic device associated with the first requester account executes the data verification application and imports the first digital signature of the first user data from the digital wallet application of the mobile device, the memory further comprising instructions for: generating, by the mobile device, an individual digital signature associated with an individual data block using an individual private key, the individual data block including the first user data and the first digital signature issued by the first origin entity; sending the individual digital signature and the individual data block to the electronic device associated with the first requester account having an individual public key provided by the mobile device; processing, by the electronic device, the individual digital signature using the individual public key to verify that the mobile device, sending the individual data block, generates the individual digital signature; and in accordance with a verification of the mobile device, generating the data verification request including the payload digital signature based on a requester private key, (Para. 0153-0155, Digital identity application 4B10 comprises an application for providing a proof response in response to a proof request. For example, digital identity application 4B10 comprises an application for receiving a proof request challenge from a DCIAMS (e.g., DCIAMS 4A06 of FIG. 4A), determining one or more credentials that match the request, providing a credential list to a user for credential selection, in the event it is determined that a credential is selected, creating a proof response, providing a request to sign the proof response, and in the event permission to sign the proof response is received, unlocking a mobile encryption key, decrypting an identity key pair private key using the mobile encryption key, signing the proof response using the identity key pair private key, and providing the signed proof response. Digital identity application 4B10 additionally comprises an application for receiving (e.g., via proximity radio system 4B04) a request comprising an authentication token and a lease key encrypted with an authentication device public key and signed with a user device private key, determining whether the user device signature is valid, and in response to a determination that the user device signature is valid, decrypting the lease key and the authentication token, signing the authentication token with the lease key, encrypting the signed authentication token with the user device public key, and providing (e.g., via proximity radio system 4B04) the encrypted signed authentication token to the user device. For example, prior to utilizing digital identity application 4B10, authentication device 4B00 requires the user to login…User and device database 4C22 comprises a database of registered users for a given customer organization and user details (e.g., username, password hash, contact information, email address, relationship to devices, registered public keys, registered mapping documents in a decentralized ledger, etc.). User and device database 4C22 additionally comprises a device directory comprising all the devices for a given customer organization as well as mapping documents associated with the devices and relationships with users associated with the devices. Credential rules 4C24 comprises a set of credential rules for determining a credential that satisfies a given access request, for example rules related to a credential associated schema, a credential associated organization, a credential issuer, a credential associated location, a credential associated class identifier, a credential associated license number, or any other appropriate credential rules. In various embodiments, rules comprise rules related to a credential associated schema, rules related to a credential associated organization, rules related to a credential issuer, rules related to a credential associated location, rules related to a credential associated class identifier or identifier number, rules related to a credential associated license or license number, a credential associated class name, or any other appropriate credential rules. In some embodiments, the rules are applied selectively (e.g., based at least in part on a user identifier)—for example, employees with a credential can access application A, contractors with a credential can access application B, or any other appropriate matching of access with identifiers. In various embodiments, the rules are applied selectively based at least in part on current employment, employee type, location of user, qualification by training class, credential from a third party issuer (e.g., division of motor vehicle license, certification from school, etc.), or any other appropriate criterion. As examples of configurable credential rules to grant access: 1) access is granted in the event that a credential indicates that the holder is a current employee (e.g., issuing company is valid, employee status is not expired, and not revoked); 2) access is granted in the event that a credential indicates that the holder is an employee in an organization of the company (e.g., issuing company is valid, organization is specified organization, employee status is not expired, and not revoked); 3) access is granted in the event that a credential indicates that the holder is an employee in a specified location (e.g., issuing company is valid, location is a specified location, employee status is not expired, and not revoked); 4) access is granted in the event that a credential indicates that the holder has necessary training (e.g., issuing company is valid, training status is complete, employee status is not expired, and not revoked); and 5) access is granted in the event that a credential indicates that the holder has outside credential (e.g., issuing company is valid, outside credential is valid, outside credential issuer is third party, employee status is not expired, and not revoked).)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Hamel to the known invention of Ortiz as modified would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate authentication features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include wherein an electronic device associated with the first requester account executes the data verification application and imports the first digital signature of the first user data from the digital wallet application of the mobile device, the memory further comprising instructions for: generating, by the mobile device, an individual digital signature associated with an individual data block using an individual private key, the individual data block including the first user data and the first digital signature issued by the first origin entity; sending the individual digital signature and the individual data block to the electronic device associated with the first requester account having an individual public key provided by the mobile device; processing, by the electronic device, the individual digital signature using the individual public key to verify that the mobile device, sending the individual data block, generates the individual digital signature; and in accordance with a verification of the mobile device, generating the data verification request including the payload digital signature based on a requester private key result in an improved invention because applying said technique adds another authentication level so the mobile device signs the already verified user data so the requestor can confirm that the data actually came from the mobile device, thus improving the overall security and performance of the invention.
20. Regarding Claim 29, Ortiz does not explicitly disclose wherein the data verification request includes an identifier of the first origin entity providing the first digital signature of the first user data, and identifying the first origin entity further comprises: searching a list of identifiers associated with authorized origin entities for a match with the identifier of the first origin entity.
However, Dixon teaches wherein the data verification request includes an identifier of the first origin entity providing the first digital signature of the first user data, and identifying the first origin entity further comprises: searching a list of identifiers associated with authorized origin entities for a match with the identifier of the first origin entity, (Para. 0023-0030, The present technology allows the secure messaging environment to verify that the certificate issuer identified in the message originator's certificate is the correct issuer of the message originator's certificate. The present technology also allows the secure messaging environment to verify that the issuer is a trusted CA by checking that the named CA is listed as trusted in the secure messaging environment of the retriever. This secure messaging environment may be configured to perform the verification that the message originator's certificate is the correct certificate issuer for that particular message originator either before or after the verification of the trust of the CA of the originator certificate. To perform this verification, the secure messaging environment may check the relevant data-protection policy of the target queue, or a system-level policy, for a policy extension that indicates that the originator certificate must be issued by a specific/designated CA. If the message originator certificate is not issued by the issuer designated within the relevant data-protection policy, the message signature is deemed invalid. For example, if a data-protection policy identifies an authorized originator of messages to a particular queue by a distinguished name (DN), such as a common name, organization, and country (e.g., “CN=ValidSender, O=CompanyName, C=AU”), then any message arriving on the queue associated with the data-protection policy will be deemed valid if it is signed by a message originator with this distinguished name. If there are, for example, two trusted certificate issuers (CAs), CA1 and CA2, the present technology expands the data-protection policy to indicate whether a mandatory issuer of the originator certificate is required. An example data-protection policy extension may include, for example, both an authorized originator (AuthorizedOriginator) and a mandatory certificate issuer (Mandatory Issuer) within separate fields, as follows:… As such, within the example above, the single authorized originator tag (AuthorizedOriginator) is updated with the mandatory issuer information. Many other possibilities for configuration of data-protection policy extensions are possible and all are considered to be within the scope of the present subject matter. Utilizing an extended data-protection policy, such as one of the examples above, the secure messaging environment may perform verification of the mandatory issuer of the message originator's certificate when a mandatory issuer is specified. For example, on message retrieval, the secure messaging environment may perform a certificate issuer verification check when the mandatory issuer is stipulated within the extended data-protection policy. The certificate issuer verification check may be used to ensure that the certificate issuer of the message originator's certificate is equivalent to the mandatory issuer named within the policy. As an additional example, if the message originator's certificate issuer was determined based upon the certificate issuer verification check to be CA2 (rather than the mandatory specified CA1), the secure messaging environment may determine that the signature of the message originator is invalid because CA2 is not named as the mandatory issuer within the data-protection policy, even though CA2 is listed as a trusted CA.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Dixon to the known invention of Ortiz would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate cryptographic features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include wherein the data verification request includes an identifier of the first origin entity providing the first digital signature of the first user data, and identifying the first origin entity further comprises: searching a list of identifiers associated with authorized origin entities for a match with the identifier of the first origin entity result in an improved invention because applying said technique compares and checks the identified origin entity to the list of authorized origin entities so data from unauthorized sources can be rejected, thus improving the overall security and performance of the invention.
21. Regarding Claim 30, Ortiz does not explicitly disclose further comprising instructions for: obtaining an identifier of the first requester account; searching a list of identifiers associated with authorized requester accounts for the identifier of the first requester account.
However, Dixon teaches further comprising instructions for: obtaining an identifier of the first requester account; searching a list of identifiers associated with authorized requester accounts for the identifier of the first requester account, (Para. 0062-0065, The logical flow of the messaging interaction 300 begins with the Requester (USER_1) 302 initiating a “PUT” for a request message at logical flow point (1) within FIG. 3 (e.g., “(1) PUT (REQUEST)”). The request message includes a static request queue name for a Request Queue 310. The Request Queue 310 has an associated Request Queue Policy 312 on the requester side of the messaging interaction. The requester-side Request Queue Policy 312 identifies the sender of the request message as “USER_1,” which represents the Requester (USER_1) 302, and lists one potential responder as “USER_A,” which represents the Responder (USER_A) 304. Additional potential responders may be listed as appropriate for a given implementation. As such, the Responder (USER_A) 304 is a potential recipient and, in this example, a responder to the request message. It should be noted that the identity of the sender may be identified by examining the operating system assigned user identifier (ID) associated with the requester application. As such, it may or may not be available within and to be extracted from the requester-side Request Queue Policy 312. Additionally, the requester-side Request Queue Policy 312 may have more than one valid sender. In such a situation, the associated user ID associated with the requester application may be used to determine which of the authorized requester applications has issued the particular request message…Requester applications/modules may be configured to “know” the names of the request queues that they choose to use to “PUT” request messages. The requester applications/modules tell the respective queue manager to “PUT” a request message to a particular request queue and the responder applications/modules tell the respective queue manager to “PUT” the response message to the respective reply queue. A queue manager (not shown within FIG. 3) places the request message on the designated request queue and the reply message on the designated reply queue. The data protection module 306 (and 308) sits between the respective requester or responder applications, respectively, and the queue manager so that the data protection module 306 (and 308) may intercept these requests. This allows the data protection module 306 (and 308) to sign and verify signatures “on the fly” during run time. The requester application may request the queue manager use a specific queue name. The requester application subsequently uses this name when it gets reply messages. The data protection module 306 digitally signs the request message using the digital certificate of the sender (e.g., the Requester (USER_1) 302. It is this digital signature that may be verified by the data protection module 308, as described in more detail below. The data protection module 306 submits the digitally-signed request message to the queue manager for placement on the Request Queue 310. The queue manager places the digitally-signed request message on the Request Queue 310 at logical flow point (2) within FIG. 3 (e.g., (2) SIGNED REQUEST).)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Dixon to the known invention of Ortiz would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate cryptographic features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include further comprising instructions for: obtaining an identifier of the first requester account; searching a list of identifiers associated with authorized requester accounts for the identifier of the first requester account result in an improved invention because applying said technique compares and checks the identified origin entity to the list of authorized origin entities before allowing the verification process to continue, thus improving the overall security and performance of the invention.
22. Regarding Claim 31, Ortiz as modified does not explicitly disclose wherein a verifiable data structure of the first user data includes one or more of: an identifier of the first individual user, first user data, user metadata including a data processing criterion associated with the first user data, an individual public key, an identifier of the first origin entity, a digital signature of the first origin entity, and a signature parameter of the digital signature of the first origin entity, the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium further comprising instructions for: sending, by the first origin entity, the verifiable data structure of the first user data to a mobile device associated with the first individual user.
However, Hamel teaches wherein a verifiable data structure of the first user data includes one or more of: an identifier of the first individual user, first user data, user metadata including a data processing criterion associated with the first user data, an individual public key, an identifier of the first origin entity, a digital signature of the first origin entity, and a signature parameter of the digital signature of the first origin entity, the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium further comprising instructions for: sending, by the first origin entity, the verifiable data structure of the first user data to a mobile device associated with the first individual user, (Para. 0125-0127, FIG. 2D is a diagram illustrating an embodiment of a distributed ledger. In some embodiments, distributed ledger 2D00 of FIG. 2D is used to implement distributed ledger 2A08 of FIG. 2A. In the example shown, distributed ledger 2D00 receives information to write and read on ledger 2D02 using smart contract 2D09. Smart contract 2D09 comprises a software module that is installed in distributed ledger 2D00 that is executed to customize interactions for the system with ledger 2D02—for example, reading from the ledger and writing to the ledger are mediated by the smart contract that is configured to check signatures, check uniqueness, check that storage proceeded correctly, check schema of a credential with stored information, check a credential definition of a credential with stored information, and/or check whether a credential is on a revocation list (e.g., where the revocation list is stored in or associated with smart contract 2D09, For example, information is received from a network via network interface 2D12 and written to ledger 2D02 using ledger writer 2D06 of processor 2D10 or information is provided to the network via network interface 2D12 after being read from ledger 2D02 using ledger reader 2D08 of processor 2D10. In some cases, ledger 2D02 stores DID documents, credential schema, credential definitions, or any other appropriate information. In some embodiments, information is checked to make sure that its one or more signatures is/are valid and/or it is unique and has not previously been stored on ledger 2D02 prior to being stored on ledger 2D02. In some cases ledger 2D02 is read to obtain DID documents, credential schema, credential definitions, revocation information, or any other appropriate information that can be used to verify that a credential is valid… FIG. 2F is a diagram illustrating an embodiment of a presentation. In some embodiments, the presentation is presented to a DCIAMS (e.g., DCIAMS 2A04 of FIG. 2A) in order to request verification of a credential. In the example shown, the presentation includes holder DID 2F00 (e.g., “did:example:76e12ec21ebhyu1f712ebc6f1z2”). The presentation also includes issuer DID 2F02 (e.g., “did:example: ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21”). The presentation also includes revocation information 2F04 (e.g., “id”: “http://example.gov/revocations/738” and “type”: “SimpleRevocationList2017”). The presentation also includes information to prevent replay 2F06 (e.g., a cryptographically random nonce, a create date, etc.). In addition, the presentation includes notations that indicate modification prevention (e.g., a signature over the presentation) and communication channel information (e.g., the presentation can be encrypted with the public key of the target recipient, allowing a channel specific authorization and additional privacy and security over the message).; and Para. 0128, a dual signature authentication scheme is employed to authorize storing the DID document based at least in part on an individual signature and a ledger writer signature. For example, an item stored on the distributed ledger is signed using a permissioned writer and this is used to verify that the item as it has arrived at the distributed ledger is valid. This item is then prepared to be stored by checking another associated signature with the item and storing the item with this signature—for example, a DID document associated with a holder signature, a DID document associated with a user signature, a schema associated with an issuer signature, a credential definition associated with an issuer signature (and in some cases also a credential definition key), In 2G04, it is indicated to store in the distributed ledger a schema associated with issuer of the credential. For example, the credential schema associated with the issuer of the credential is stored on the distributed ledger so that during verification a check can be performed on the schema of the credential. In 2G06, it is indicated to store in the distributed ledger a credential definition associated with the schema.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of Hamel to the known invention of Ortiz as modified would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate cryptographic features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include wherein a verifiable data structure of the first user data includes one or more of: an identifier of the first individual user, first user data, user metadata including a data processing criterion associated with the first user data, an individual public key, an identifier of the first origin entity, a digital signature of the first origin entity, and a signature parameter of the digital signature of the first origin entity, the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium further comprising instructions for: sending, by the first origin entity, the verifiable data structure of the first user data to a mobile device associated with the first individual user result in an improved invention because applying said technique stores verification information that can be securely sent to the user’s mobile device, thus improving the overall security and performance of the invention.
Regarding Claim 32, Ortiz discloses further comprising instructions for: providing to each of a plurality of origin entities the respective origin public key and an associated origin private key configured to create the first digital signature by the respective origin entity, (Para. 0189-0192, An enhanced solution is described herein that is adapted for protecting a client's personal information and only providing what is needed by leveraging a client's special space using a secure enclave and a blockchain solution, in accordance with some embodiments. A blockchain infrastructure and the secure enclave each store data sets representing aspects of signed attributes and, in some embodiments, a proof response logic. The block chain infrastructure can include distributed logic technologies and combination with cascading encryption to provide an immutable ledger…there are multiple authoritative issuers who are able to provide signed attributes (e.g., for storage in secure enclaves or on a distributed ledger blockchain data structure). Secure enclaves can be utilized, or other types of hardware protected spaces are usable. A registration mechanism and method is utilized to initialize and populate the attributes using public and secret (private) encryption keys. Issuer devices create attribute data records that are generated using a combination of a client's public key and an issuer's secret key (e.g., using digital signatures or encryption/decryption). The attributes can be made publicly available, for example, on a blockchain, whereby the attributes can be signed by an issuer's secret key but encrypted using the client's public key.; and Para. 0227-0230, Any solution requiring the issuer to be online at verification time risks exposing additional information about the client to the issuer. This is especially concerning in cases where the issuer and the verifier collude to track client activities. Reduced complexity is desirable as a solution may be less likely to suffer implementation flaws, be more easily understood, and less likely to theoretically break due to reliance on unusual hardness assumptions. If computational operations that have optimized/low-level implementations, the solution may be able to operate using less computing resources and/or time…The parties hold corresponding public/secret (e.g., private) key pairs. The public keys can be utilized to determine the veracity of information signed using the private keys, and to encrypt information that can be decrypted using the corresponding private key.)
Claim 27 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Ortiz et al. (US 20220200992 A1), in view of Dixon et al. (US 20130346744 A1), in view of Hamel et al. (US 20190305964A1), and further in view of D'Agostino et al. (US 20050278778 A1).
25. Regarding Claim 27, Ortiz as modified does not explicitly the memory further comprising instructions for: storing, in the memory, the first user data and the first digital signature of the first user data temporarily; and purging, from the memory, the first user data and the first digital signature of the first user data.
However, D'Agostino teaches the memory further comprising instructions for: storing, in the memory, the first user data and the first digital signature of the first user data temporarily; and purging, from the memory, the first user data and the first digital signature of the first user data, (Para. 0048-0049, storage option 406 can employ a methodology of retaining the user credentials in a volatile (e.g., random access memory (RAM)) data store. Again, for security, the user credentials can be stored in an encrypted format. In accordance with this embodiment, the user credentials can reside in the data store until a soft-reset (e.g., warm boot) of the remote device is generated…the user credentials can be stored in the data store for a user-defined predetermined length of time. Upon expiration of the time period, the credentials can be purged from the data store thus requiring re-entry of the user credentials in order to re-authenticate with the network.; and Para. 0052, inputting, storing and/or purging of the user credentials can be utilized in accordance with the present system and/or method without departing from the spirit and/or scope of the invention. By way of example, it will be appreciated that the present invention can be configured to prompt for the manual or automatic input of user credentials upon detection of a network. It will further be appreciated that the retention variable may be automatically defined based upon a predefined set of parameters (e.g., zone, data type) and/or device type (e.g., handheld, laptop). By way of example, in relation to a highly classified zone, the retention variable can be automatically defined to expire upon exit of the zone thus requiring re-entry of the user credentials in order re-access the classified zone.)
One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique of D'Agostino to the known invention of Ortiz as modified would have been recognized that the application of the technique would have yielded predictable results because the level of ordinary skill in the art demonstrated by the references applied shows the ability to incorporate cryptographic features into a similar invention. Further, it would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art that modifying the method to include the memory further comprising instructions for: storing, in the memory, the first user data and the first digital signature of the first user data temporarily; and purging, from the memory, the first user data and the first digital signature of the first user data result in an improved invention because applying said technique temporarily stores the user data and signature before deleting to reduce the amount of sensitive data stored in the memory, thus improving the overall security and performance of the invention.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
System And Method For Generating Trust Tokens (US 20220286287 A1) teaches a trust token may be created including authentication data for a user and his or her associated communication device. The trust token may be transmitted by the communication device to one or more recipients, such as a token server. The recipients may interpret the trust token and verify it against data written to one or more nodes of a blockchain when the user and the communication device registered for the trust token. Once the trust token is verified, the token server may be configured to generate, maintain, and provision account tokens representing sensitive data. The token server may push one or multiple account tokens to the communication device, thereby allowing the communication device to perform transactions with the account tokens. In other words, the implementation of a trust token may allow the communication device to be provisioned with multiple account tokens, without requiring multiple logins or transmissions of sensitive data.
In addition to the foregoing, other aspects are described in the claims, drawings, and text. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Davida L. King whose telephone number is (571) 272-4724. The examiner can normally be reached M-F 8am-5pm.
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If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Neha Patel can be reached on (571) 270-1492. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
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/D.L.K./Examiner, Art Unit 3699