Prosecution Insights
Last updated: November 04, 2026
Application No. 19/203,302

SECURITY SYSTEM AND SECURITY METHOD

Non-Final OA §103§112
Filed
May 09, 2025
Priority
May 14, 2024 — JP 2024-078627
Examiner
KHAN, SHER A
Art Unit
2497
Tech Center
2400 — Computer Networks
Assignee
Cyber Defense Institute Inc.
OA Round
1 (Non-Final)
85%
Grant Probability
Favorable
1-2
OA Rounds
10m
Est. Remaining
99%
With Interview

Examiner Intelligence

Grants 85% — above average
85%
Career Allowance Rate
291 granted / 341 resolved
+27.3% vs TC avg
Strong +24% interview lift
Without
With
+23.5%
Interview Lift
resolved cases with interview
Typical timeline
2y 4m
Avg Prosecution
10 currently pending
Career history
355
Total Applications
across all art units

Statute-Specific Performance

§101
16.8%
-23.2% vs TC avg
§103
47.6%
+7.6% vs TC avg
§102
2.6%
-37.4% vs TC avg
§112
22.5%
-17.5% vs TC avg
Black line = Tech Center average estimate • Based on career data from 341 resolved cases

Office Action

§103 §112
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Claim Objection Claim 1 is objected to as it recites “instruct a communication control device that controls communication from the virtual computer to set a communication partner of the virtual computer to a decoy network in a case where the device authenticity is not verified, the decoy network imitating a connection destination of the virtual computer’. As recited it is not clear what this limitation means, especially the underlined portion of the above limitation. Applicant is required to rewrite this limitation to clarify this limitation. Claims 15 & 17 are also objected to for the same reasons as stated above for claim 1. Claim 4 is object to as it recites “determine, that the user authenticity is not verified in a case where the user of the virtual computer fails in the authentication and in a case where the user who is not a registered user registered as a user of the virtual computer succeeds in the authentication; and determine that the user authenticity is verified in a case where the user who is a registered user registered as a user of the virtual computer succeeds in the authentication.” As recited meaning of this limitation is not clear Applicant is required to rewrite this limitation to clarify this limitation. Claims 16 & 20 are also objected for the same reasons as discussed above. Claim 10 is object to as it recites “record a record of an access action of the virtual computer used by a registered user registered as a user of the virtual computer as a history of the access of the virtual computer used by the registered user”. As recited meaning of this limitation is not clear Applicant is required to rewrite this limitation to clarify this limitation. . Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention Claim 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112 (b), as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. Claims 1, 4, 10, 15-16 & 17 & 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112 (b), for the clarity issues mentioned above under “Claim Objection” section. Claims 2-14, & 16 & 18-20 are also rejected under 112b due to their dependencies on claims 1, 15 & 17. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. Claims 1-3, 5-6 & 9-12, 15, 17-19 are rejected under 35 USC 103 as being unpatentable over Scott (US 20160149912 A1) in view of Japanese01 (JP2020503605A-English translated copy with original is attached) Regarding claim 1, a security system comprising: at least one memory storing a set of instructions; and at least one processor configured to execute the set of instructions to: verify device authenticity by using verification information, the device authenticity being authenticity of hardware of an information processing device that achieves a virtual computer, the verification information being generated from information about activation of the information processing device; [0009] Attestation of a VM may be carried out to ensure security of a system that includes the VM and an underlying physical platform. Security implies that the VM has booted with trusted software (e.g., verified by integrity measurements of physical platform, virtualization infrastructure software, virtual platform software, and the VM). Integrity measurement (“measurement” herein) of the physical platform and underlying virtualization infrastructure can be accomplished by a physical trusted platform module (pTPM). The pTPM typically includes a hardware entity and has a trusted public/private key that may be burned into the hardware during production. The pTPM may be capable of public key cryptographic operations, computation of hash functions, integrity measurement, attestation, and other functions associated with trusted computing.] Although, Scott teaches authentication of hardware and virtual computer, he does not teach explicitly, however, Japenese01 teaches instruct a communication control device that controls communication from the virtual computer to set a communication partner of the virtual computer to a decoy network in a case where the device authenticity is not verified, the decoy network imitating a connection destination of the virtual computer. [please see page 7, paragraph 1-3 of the attached translated copy: The mitigation redirector can operate as a standalone module or as a plug-in to a reverse proxy or load balancer of a typical web application stack. In most legitimate interactions with websites, the mitigation redirector acts as a pass-through device where requests from web clients are sent to legitimate web servers. However, based on self-derived and / or external intelligence, if the mitigation redirector detects malicious web traffic, it may send certain requests to the honey trap module instead of the actual web server. The web client does not receive an indication that a mitigation redirector is present or has begun redirecting requests for web traffic identified as malicious to the honey trap. Another role of the mitigation redirector is to learn the site-specific interactions of the web server and supply them to the honey trap so that their behavior can be mimicked by the honey trap module. The honey trap module attempts to mimic a web client's interaction with a web server in a way that looks exactly like interacting with a real web server, but with fake content very similar to real content To achieve this. While performing this function, the honey trap module does not interact with the actual web server or database. In one example, a malicious user attempts a set of stolen username and password combinations on a login page of a website, and each set of credentials is retried to a page or user that contains account information (successful login attempts). A script may be executed to check whether the page leads to a page requesting the user (failed login attempt). Based on the returned page, the script determines whether the credentials worked. The honey trap module acts to deceive automatic attacks by serving erroneous web content that mimics interaction with a real web server and also mimics different behavior based on web pages. For example, honey traps can mimic failed and successful logins against attacks that repeatedly try different credentials lists on the login page. In addition to mimicking web server responses, the honey trap module can also mimic behavioral results based on the type of attack. For example, the honey trap may randomly provide some fake successful logins, while providing fake failed logins when detecting the type of account verification attack activity described above. Attack tools analyzing pages returned by honey traps do not have the ability to identify content as artificial. Data generated by the attack, such as login credentials identified as returning a successful login page, is not really useful because it cannot be used to access a real web server. Other examples of behaviors that can be mimicked by a honey trap are the password reset feature for a password reset page, a new account creation flow for an account registration page, or someone trying to purchase something on a website using automation Includes the checkout flow when shopping, and other interactions with web pages. By utilizing a mitigation redirector to identify and redirect web requests related to automated attacks to the honey trap module, web servers and databases allow fraudulent transactions with web services, DDoS attacks, and other malicious behavior. Protected from. In addition, by providing fake web content that mimics the expected response from a real web server, the honeytrap module tricks the attacker into thinking that the attacker is actually working Functioning, they are less likely to change attack methodology, thereby facilitating attack mitigation efforts. In this way, the honey trap module provides an effective tool to stop malicious web service attacks. Referring now to FIG. 5, an exemplary operation of communication system 400 will be discussed.] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Scott with the disclosure of Japanese01. The motivation or suggestion would have been to implement a system that will provide efficient and improved techniques for detecting malware or attack and preventing it by redirecting by the computing system, the web request to an isolation mitigation server configured to mimic the web server response. The quarantine mitigation server processes the web request to generate artificial content based on the web request that looks like real content provided by the web server and presents the artificial content in response to the web request. (abstract, pages 2 & 3, paras last and first two paras respectively of the attached translated copy, Japanese01) Regarding claim 2, although, Scott teaches authentication of hardware and virtual computer, he does not teach explicitly, however, Japenese01 teaches Japanese01 teaches wherein the at least one processor is further configured to execute the instructions to verify, from an action of a user of the computer, user authenticity that is authenticity of the user, wherein the communication control device sets a communication partner of the virtual computer to the decoy network in a case where the user authenticity of the user is not verified. [please see page 7, paragraph 2nd of the attached translated copy: The honey trap module attempts to mimic a web client's interaction with a web server in a way that looks exactly like interacting with a real web server, but with fake content very similar to real content to achieve this. While performing this function, the honey trap module does not interact with the actual web server or database. In one example, a malicious user attempts a set of stolen username and password combinations on a login page of a website, and each set of credentials is retried to a page or user that contains account information (successful login attempts). A script may be executed to check whether the page leads to a page requesting the user (failed login attempt). Based on the returned page, the script determines whether the credentials worked. [please see page 7The honey trap module acts to deceive automatic attacks by serving erroneous web content that mimics interaction with a real web server and also mimics different behavior based on web pages. For example, honey traps can mimic failed and successful logins against attacks that repeatedly try different credentials lists on the login page. In addition to mimicking web server responses, the honey trap module can also mimic behavioral results based on the type of attack. For example, the honey trap may randomly provide some fake successful logins, while providing fake failed logins when detecting the type of account verification attack activity described above. Attack tools analyzing pages returned by honey traps do not have the ability to identify content as artificial. Data generated by the attack, such as login credentials identified as returning a successful login page, is not really useful because it cannot be used to access a real web server. Other examples of behaviors that can be mimicked by a honey trap are the password reset feature for a password reset page, a new account creation flow for an account registration page, or someone trying to purchase something on a website using automation Includes the checkout flow when shopping, and other interactions with web pages.] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Scott with the disclosure of Japanese01. The motivation or suggestion would have been to implement a system that will provide efficient and improved techniques for detecting malware or attack and preventing it by redirecting by the computing system, the web request to an isolation mitigation server configured to mimic the web server response. The quarantine mitigation server processes the web request to generate artificial content based on the web request that looks like real content provided by the web server and presents the artificial content in response to the web request. (abstract, pages 2 & 3, paras last and first two paras respectively of the attached translated copy, Japanese01) Regarding claim 3, although, Scott teaches authentication of hardware and virtual computer, he does not teach explicitly, however, Japenese01 teaches wherein the at least one processor is further configured to execute the instructions to verify the user authenticity of the user using a result of authentication of the user. [please see page 7, paragraph 2nd of the attached translated copy: The honey trap module attempts to mimic a web client's interaction with a web server in a way that looks exactly like interacting with a real web server, but with fake content very similar to real content To achieve this. While performing this function, the honey trap module does not interact with the actual web server or database. In one example, a malicious user attempts a set of stolen username and password combinations on a login page of a website, and each set of credentials is retried to a page or user that contains account information (successful login attempts). A script may be executed to check whether the page leads to a page requesting the user (failed login attempt). Based on the returned page, the script determines whether the credentials worked. [please see page 7The honey trap module acts to deceive automatic attacks by serving erroneous web content that mimics interaction with a real web server and also mimics different behavior based on web pages. For example, honey traps can mimic failed and successful logins against attacks that repeatedly try different credentials lists on the login page. In addition to mimicking web server responses, the honey trap module can also mimic behavioral results based on the type of attack. For example, the honey trap may randomly provide some fake successful logins, while providing fake failed logins when detecting the type of account verification attack activity described above. Attack tools analyzing pages returned by honey traps do not have the ability to identify content as artificial. Data generated by the attack, such as login credentials identified as returning a successful login page, is not really useful because it cannot be used to access a real web server. Other examples of behaviors that can be mimicked by a honey trap are the password reset feature for a password reset page, a new account creation flow for an account registration page, or someone trying to purchase something on a website using automation Includes the checkout flow when shopping, and other interactions with web pages.] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Scott with the disclosure of Japanese01. The motivation or suggestion would have been to implement a system that will provide efficient and improved techniques for detecting malware or attack and preventing it by redirecting by the computing system, the web request to an isolation mitigation server configured to mimic the web server response. The quarantine mitigation server processes the web request to generate artificial content based on the web request that looks like real content provided by the web server and presents the artificial content in response to the web request. (abstract, pages 2 & 3, paras last and first two paras respectively of the attached translated copy, Japanese01) Regarding claim 5, although, Scott teaches authentication of hardware and virtual computer, he does not teach explicitly, however, Japenese01 teaches wherein the at least one processor is further configured to execute the instructions to verify authenticity of the user using information about an access action of the computer, the access action being an action of accessing a resource of a network. [please see page 3, paragraph 4 of the attached translated copy: Action 200 can be employed to facilitate preventing malicious attacks on web services. As shown in the operational flow of FIG. 2, the redirect system 130 intercepts a web request directed to a web server 140 that provides a web service (201). In this example, a web request is sent by client computing system 101. Typically, a web request comprises instructions to execute functions on web server 140, retrieve data from database 145, and instruct the web service to store data transferred by client computing system 101 in database 145. . For example, a web service request may comprise any other communication between the client computing system 101 and the web server 140 including a query, a message, a notification, a command, a request, an instruction, or a combination thereof. In some implementations, the redirection system 130 can include network security equipment that monitors network traffic and mitigates detected security threats. For example, the redirection system 130 can include an active in-line security device configured to intercept network traffic en route to its final destination, which can include a web server 140, another computing system, a cloud server, a mobile application. It may be a server, an application programming interface (API) flow, or any other computing resource. In some examples, the redirection system 130 may be included in a reverse proxy and / or load balancer used in providing a web service, where the active inline security module of the redirection system 130 includes a web service. Prior to distribution, network traffic is received and analyzed from multiple users, such as client computing system 101.] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Scott with the disclosure of Japanese01. The motivation or suggestion would have been to implement a system that will provide efficient and improved techniques for detecting malware or attack and preventing it by redirecting by the computing system, the web request to an isolation mitigation server configured to mimic the web server response. The quarantine mitigation server processes the web request to generate artificial content based on the web request that looks like real content provided by the web server and presents the artificial content in response to the web request. (abstract, pages 2 & 3, paras last and first two paras respectively of the attached translated copy, Japanese01) Regarding claim 6, although, Scott teaches authentication of hardware, he does not teach explicitly, however, Japanese01 wherein the at least one processor is further configured to execute the instructions to: determine that the user authenticity of the user is not verified in a case where the access action of the computer does not satisfy a predetermined action criterion; and determine that the user authenticity of the user is verified in a case where the access action of the computer satisfies the predetermined action criterion. [page 04, paragraphs first & second of the attached translated copy: the redirection system 130 determines whether the web request is malicious (202). In some examples, web requests may be identified as malicious by redirect system 130 using self-derived and / or external intelligence. For example, the redirect system 130 may determine whether the web request is malicious by analyzing the web request and / or information associated with the client computing system 101 that created the request to identify the web request as malicious. Can be identified. However, in other examples, the determination is made by one or more systems, processes, modules, servers, etc., to process and analyze the request and the information associated with the requesting client to identify a malicious request. May be unloaded. Identification of a web request as malicious may also be based on a series of requests in web traffic associated with the same client computing system 101 or user. For example, in at least one implementation, a passive analysis system may receive a copy of web traffic and perform in-depth analysis on it to detect malicious behavior patterns. Passive analysis systems can detect large-scale attacks by analyzing behavioral patterns, but these are usually identified in a stream of packets over time. Some exemplary behaviors that may be identified include the length of time the connection lasts, the transition from idle to active on the connection, the frequency of requests sent from the endpoint, the header information associated with the request, or the client. Contains any other contextual or behavioral data observable from the web request submitted by the computing system 101. Whether or not the redirect system 130 or some other external system or systems is involved in identifying web requests as malicious, this determination may be based on a number of different criteria and considerations. it can. In at least one implementation, the redirection system 130 may process the connection-level information to identify whether the web request is malicious. For example, the identification of web requests as malicious includes transmission control protocol (TCP) / IP and secure sockets layer (SSL) characteristics, the number of connections made by the client, the number of requests sent per connection, It can be based on connection level information and behavior, such as how long the connection lasts, and any other data observable from the interaction of the computing system 101 and web requests. Further, in some implementations, the redirection system 130 can identify whether a web request is malicious by processing a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) header associated with the web request. For example, the determination of a malicious web request could be based on the order of the fields in the request header, the presence or absence of certain fields, the values of fields such as protocol, language, media type, compression algorithm, and other characteristics supported by the client, New features found in newer versions of browsers that were not in the version, a list of cipher suites sent by the client 101 during the establishment of an HTTP secure (HTTPS) session, and any other information that could be gathered from the request header. May be based on an HTTP header associated with the web request. IP address whitelists, blacklists, regular expressions, behavioral fingerprints, data models, or any other information that might be matched against similar traffic are also employed to identify malicious requests. It is possible to include these combinations. In some implementations, user / client behavior information such as timing of clicks, keystrokes, and other user input, page navigation, page scrolling, content requests, etc., may be considered. Of course, the above criteria and considerations are merely exemplary and non-limiting, and are used to identify any other information that may be gathered from a web request and / or whether the web request is malicious. A resulting requesting client computing system 101 is also possible and within the scope of the present disclosure.] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Scott with the disclosure of Japanese01. The motivation or suggestion would have been to implement a system that will provide efficient and improved techniques for detecting malware or attack and preventing it by redirecting by the computing system, the web request to an isolation mitigation server configured to mimic the web server response. The quarantine mitigation server processes the web request to generate artificial content based on the web request that looks like real content provided by the web server and presents the artificial content in response to the web request. (abstract, pages 2 & 3, paras last and first two paras respectively of the attached translated copy, Japanese01) Regarding claim 9, although, Scott teaches authentication of hardware and virtual computer, he does not teach explicitly, however, Japanese01 teaches wherein the at least one processor is further configured to execute the instructions to monitor an access action of the computer, the access action being an action of accessing a resource of a network. [please see page 3, paragraph 4 of the attached translated copy: Action 200 can be employed to facilitate preventing malicious attacks on web services. As shown in the operational flow of FIG. 2, the redirect system 130 intercepts a web request directed to a web server 140 that provides a web service (201). In this example, a web request is sent by client computing system 101. Typically, a web request comprises instructions to execute functions on web server 140, retrieve data from database 145, and instruct the web service to store data transferred by client computing system 101 in database 145. . For example, a web service request may comprise any other communication between the client computing system 101 and the web server 140 including a query, a message, a notification, a command, a request, an instruction, or a combination thereof. In some implementations, the redirection system 130 can include network security equipment that monitors network traffic and mitigates detected security threats. For example, the redirection system 130 can include an active in-line security device configured to intercept network traffic en route to its final destination, which can include a web server 140, another computing system, a cloud server, a mobile application. It may be a server, an application programming interface (API) flow, or any other computing resource. In some examples, the redirection system 130 may be included in a reverse proxy and / or load balancer used in providing a web service, where the active inline security module of the redirection system 130 includes a web service. Prior to distribution, network traffic is received and analyzed from multiple users, such as client computing system 101.] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Scott with the disclosure of Japanese01. The motivation or suggestion would have been to implement a system that will provide efficient and improved techniques for detecting malware or attack and preventing it by redirecting by the computing system, the web request to an isolation mitigation server configured to mimic the web server response. The quarantine mitigation server processes the web request to generate artificial content based on the web request that looks like real content provided by the web server and presents the artificial content in response to the web request. (abstract, pages 2 & 3, paras last and first two paras respectively of the attached translated copy, Japanese01) Regarding claim 10, although, Scott teaches authentication of hardware and virtual computer, he does not teach explicitly, however, Japanese01 teaches wherein at least one processor is further configured to execute the instructions to record a record of an access action of the computer used by a registered user registered as a user of the computer as a history of the access of the computer used by the registered user. [please see page 3, paragraph 4 of the attached translated copy: Action 200 can be employed to facilitate preventing malicious attacks on web services. As shown in the operational flow of FIG. 2, the redirect system 130 intercepts a web request directed to a web server 140 that provides a web service (201). In this example, a web request is sent by client computing system 101. Typically, a web request comprises instructions to execute functions on web server 140, retrieve data from database 145, and instruct the web service to store data transferred by client computing system 101 in database 145. . For example, a web service request may comprise any other communication between the client computing system 101 and the web server 140 including a query, a message, a notification, a command, a request, an instruction, or a combination thereof. In some implementations, the redirection system 130 can include network security equipment that monitors network traffic and mitigates detected security threats. For example, the redirection system 130 can include an active in-line security device configured to intercept network traffic en route to its final destination, which can include a web server 140, another computing system, a cloud server, a mobile application. It may be a server, an application programming interface (API) flow, or any other computing resource. In some examples, the redirection system 130 may be included in a reverse proxy and / or load balancer used in providing a web service, where the active inline security module of the redirection system 130 includes a web service. Prior to distribution, network traffic is received and analyzed from multiple users, such as client computing system 101.] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Scott with the disclosure of Japanese01. The motivation or suggestion would have been to implement a system that will provide efficient and improved techniques for detecting malware or attack and preventing it by redirecting by the computing system, the web request to an isolation mitigation server configured to mimic the web server response. The quarantine mitigation server processes the web request to generate artificial content based on the web request that looks like real content provided by the web server and presents the artificial content in response to the web request. (abstract, pages 2 & 3, paras last and first two paras respectively of the attached translated copy, Japanese01) Regarding claim 11, although, Scott teaches authentication of hardware and virtual computer, he does not teach explicitly, however, Japanese01 teaches wherein the at least one processor is further configured to execute the instructions to record a record of an access action from the computer to the decoy network as a record of an attack. [please see page 7, paragraph 01 of the attached translated copy: the mitigation redirector can operate as a standalone module or as a plug-in to a reverse proxy or load balancer of a typical web application stack. In most legitimate interactions with websites, the mitigation redirector acts as a pass-through device where requests from web clients are sent to legitimate web servers. However, based on self-derived and / or external intelligence, if the mitigation redirector detects malicious web traffic, it may send certain requests to the honey trap module instead of the actual web server. The web client does not receive an indication that a mitigation redirector is present or has begun redirecting requests for web traffic identified as malicious to the honey trap. Another role of the mitigation redirector is to learn the site-specific interactions of the web server and supply them to the honey trap so that their behavior can be mimicked by the honey trap module.] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Scott with the disclosure of Japanese01. The motivation or suggestion would have been to implement a system that will provide efficient and improved techniques for detecting malware or attack and preventing it by redirecting by the computing system, the web request to an isolation mitigation server configured to mimic the web server response. The quarantine mitigation server processes the web request to generate artificial content based on the web request that looks like real content provided by the web server and presents the artificial content in response to the web request. (abstract, pages 2 & 3, paras last and first two paras respectively of the attached translated copy, Japanese01) Regarding claim 12, although, Scott teaches authentication of hardware and virtual computer, he does not teach explicitly, however, Japanese01 teaches wherein the at least one processor is further configured to execute the instructions to record a packet of communication from the computer to the decoy network as a record of the attack. [please see page 07, paragraph 2nd of the attached translated copy: the honey trap module attempts to mimic a web client's interaction with a web server in a way that looks exactly like interacting with a real web server, but with fake content very similar to real content To achieve this. While performing this function, the honey trap module does not interact with the actual web server or database. In one example, a malicious user attempts a set of stolen username and password combinations on a login page of a website, and each set of credentials is retried to a page or user that contains account information (successful login attempts). A script may be executed to check whether the page leads to a page requesting the user (failed login attempt). Based on the returned page, the script determines whether the credentials worked. The honey trap module acts to deceive automatic attacks by serving erroneous web content that mimics interaction with a real web server and also mimics different behavior based on web pages. For example, honey traps can mimic failed and successful logins against attacks that repeatedly try different credentials lists on the login page. In addition to mimicking web server responses, the honey trap module can also mimic behavioral results based on the type of attack. For example, the honey trap may randomly provide some fake successful logins, while providing fake failed logins when detecting the type of account verification attack activity described above. Attack tools analyzing pages returned by honey traps do not have the ability to identify content as artificial. Data generated by the attack, such as login credentials identified as returning a successful login page, is not really useful because it cannot be used to access a real web server. Other examples of behaviors that can be mimicked by a honey trap are the password reset feature for a password reset page, a new account creation flow for an account registration page, or someone trying to purchase something on a website using automation Includes the checkout flow when shopping, and other interactions with web pages.] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Scott with the disclosure of Japanese01. The motivation or suggestion would have been to implement a system that will provide efficient and improved techniques for detecting malware or attack and preventing it by redirecting by the computing system, the web request to an isolation mitigation server configured to mimic the web server response. The quarantine mitigation server processes the web request to generate artificial content based on the web request that looks like real content provided by the web server and presents the artificial content in response to the web request. (abstract, pages 2 & 3, paras last and first two paras respectively of the attached translated copy, Japanese01) Regarding claim 15, this claim is interpreted to be similar to claim 1 and is rejected for the same reasons as set forth as claim 1. Regarding claim 17, this claim is interpreted to be similar to claim 1 and is rejected for the same reasons as set forth as claim1. Regarding claim 18, this claim is interpreted to be similar to claim 2 and is rejected for the same reasons as set forth as claim 2. Regarding claim 19, this claim is interpreted to be similar to claim 3 and is rejected for the same reasons as set forth as claim 3. Claims 4, 16 & 20 are rejected under 35 USC 103 as being unpatentable over Scott (US 20160149912 A1) in view of Japanese01 (JP2020503605A-English translated copy with original is attached) and Japanese02 (JP 4567228 B2-English translated copy with original is attached) Regarding claim 4, although Scott and Japanese 01 teach user authentication as well as virtual computer, they do not teach explicitly, however, Japanese02 teaches wherein the at least one processor is further configured to execute the instructions to: determine, that the user authenticity is not verified in a case where the user of the computer fails in the authentication and in a case where the user who is not a registered user registered as a user of the computer succeeds in the authentication; and determine that the user authenticity is verified in a case where the user who is a registered user registered as a user of the virtual computer succeeds in the authentication. The present invention also relates to whether or not a user terminal trying to access the information is valid in a network system in which the first server in which information that can be accessed by the user terminal is recorded in a predetermined network exists. An authentication device for performing authentication is arranged, and the authentication device The email address for the user terminal is User identification information assigned to the user In association with Record it, Said The user identification information of the user who uses the user terminal is received from the user terminal, and the received user identification information is Registration User identification information Whether or not Judgment When it is determined that the user identification information is the same, the content of the content that the user cannot substantially know Generate terminal identification information and transmit the generated terminal identification information to the user terminal Registration Aside, Sending an e-mail indicating that the terminal identification information has been registered to the e-mail address specified by the user identification information, and using the terminal identification information until approval is received from the user who has received the e-mail And stop When a user terminal accesses predetermined information Accepts terminal identification information transmitted from the user terminal in a form unknown to the operator, Accepted terminal identification information and already Registration In contrast with the terminal identification information Whether the use of the registered device identification information has been suspended Determine whether Use of the terminal identification information has not been stopped An authentication method for a user terminal in a network system is provided that permits the access by the user terminal.] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Scott and Japanese01 with the disclosure of Japanese02. The motivation or suggestion would have been to implement a system that will provide efficient techniques to provide a new authentication technique that can surely prevent the above-mentioned “spoofing” problem that could not be prevented even by using a conventional authentication technique. (background, paragraphs 0002-0005, Japanese02) Regarding claim 16, this claim is interpreted to be similar to claim 4 and is rejected for the same reasons as set forth as claim 4. Regarding claim 20, this claim is interpreted to be similar to claim 4 and is rejected for the same reasons as set forth as claim 4. Claims 7-8 are rejected under 35 USC 103 as being unpatentable over Scott (US 20160149912 A1) in view of Japanese01 (JP2020503605A-English translated copy with original is attached) and Gadge (US 20190171807 A1) Regarding claim 7, although Scott and Japanese 01 teach user authentication as well as virtual computer, they do not teach explicitly, however, Gadge teaches wherein the at least one processor is further configured to execute the instructions to: determine that the user authenticity of the user is not verified in a case where the access action of the virtual computer is out of an access action range that is a range of the access action determined from a past access action of a registered user who is registered as a user of the virtual computer; and determine that the user authenticity of the user is verified in a case where the access action of the virtual computer is not out of the access action range. [0022] Once the action/movement data is captured, the authenticating system can validate it by determining whether the choices and actions performed by the user match the choices and actions that were previously registered 204. If the performed series of actions and movements in the VR virtual world are a match with the registered actions within a predetermined threshold, the authenticating system can acknowledge the approval/successful authentication and allow access to the program module 205. Additionally, the virtual reality user authentication system can communicate the authentication result to a third-party receiver (such as a security suite or program) 206. In an embodiment, the predetermined threshold can be a small margin of error, and in some embodiments, can require an error-free performance of all required choices/actions. In the event the user fails to reach the predetermined threshold, the virtual reality user authentication system can deny the user access 207 and can return the user back to the main program screen. In an embodiment, the virtual reality user authentication system can communicate the authentication failure to the third-party receiver (such as a security suite or program) 206.] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Scott and Japanese01 with the disclosure of Gadge. The motivation or suggestion would have been to implement a system that will provide efficient and a new authentication technique that utilizes customization based on user personal profiles and/or interests. (abstract, paragraphs 0001-0004, Gadge) Regarding claim 8, although Scott and Japanese 01 teach user authentication as well as virtual computer, they do not teach explicitly, however, Gadge teaches wherein at least one processor is further configured to execute the instructions to determine the access action range from a history of a past access action of the virtual computer used by the registered user. [0022] Once the action/movement data is captured, the authenticating system can validate it by determining whether the choices and actions performed by the user match the choices and actions that were previously registered 204. If the performed series of actions and movements in the VR virtual world are a match with the registered actions within a predetermined threshold, the authenticating system can acknowledge the approval/successful authentication and allow access to the program module 205. Additionally, the virtual reality user authentication system can communicate the authentication result to a third-party receiver (such as a security suite or program) 206. In an embodiment, the predetermined threshold can be a small margin of error, and in some embodiments, can require an error-free performance of all required choices/actions. In the event the user fails to reach the predetermined threshold, the virtual reality user authentication system can deny the user access 207 and can return the user back to the main program screen. In an embodiment, the virtual reality user authentication system can communicate the authentication failure to the third-party receiver (such as a security suite or program) 206.] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Scott and Japanese01 with the disclosure of Gadge. The motivation or suggestion would have been to implement a system that will provide efficient and a new authentication technique that utilizes customization based on user personal profiles and/or interests. (abstract, paragraphs 0001-0004, Gadge) Allowable Subject Matter Claims 13 & 14 are objected to but would become allowable if their limitations are fully incorporated into their base claims (claim 1) and provided the Applicant revises independent claim 1 to overcome claim objection and rejection 112b issued without broadening the scope of the claim. Reasons of allowance will be provided once the Applicant officially files the response and the response places the claim in allowable condition. Claims 13 & 14 are objected to but would become allowable if their limitations are fully incorporated into independent claims 15 & 17 and provided the Applicant revises independent claims 15 & 17 to overcome claim objection and rejection 112b issued without broadening the scope of the claim. Reasons of allowance will be provided once the Applicant officially files the response and the response places the claim in allowable condition. Examiner’s Note: The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure are followings: 1. Stickle (US 10873601 B1) discloses a decoy network-based service uses a decoy credential to lure an attacker to access the decoy network-based service, and monitors the attacker's activity with respect to the decoy network-based service to determine the attacker's motivation. In various examples, a decoy credential is published on an Internet-accessible site, and a system that provides a network-based service (e.g., a service provider network) subsequently receives an access request from a computing device that includes the decoy credential. Based on the decoy credential, the computing device may be provided access to a decoy network-based service, and application programming interface (API) calls made by the computing device may be routed through a decoy control plane. The data relating to the API calls may be stored and analyzed to determine a motivation of the attacker, which may be used in various downstream applications to improve security for customers of the network-based service. 2.Niu (CN 111552937 A-English translated copy and original are attached)), teaches the invention that relates to artificial intelligence technology field, claims a user identity authentication method, device, medium and electronic device. The method comprises: in response to the human-computer interaction of the user on the terminal interface, collecting the first behaviour data set of the user; based on the first behaviour data set, determining a first characteristic data sequence for verifying the user identity; inputting the first characteristic data sequence into the pre-determined user identity verification model, obtaining the user identity verification index, the user identity verification index is used for characterizing the real degree of the user identity; according to the user identity verification index, verifying the authenticity of the user identity. Under the method, the behavior data generated by the human-computer interaction between the user and the terminal interface is used as the basis for verifying the authenticity of the user identity; and the security for verifying the authenticity of the user identity is improved. The invention further relates to block chain technology, the first characteristic data sequence is stored in the block chain. 3. Lieberman (US 11240268 B1) discloses dynamic honeypots for computer program execution environments are described. A determination is made whether a time period has expired since a computer program execution environment, of multiple computer program execution environments, began executing a computer program that provides a user service. The computer program execution environment is changed into a computer security mechanism that counteracts an attempt of unauthorized use of a system that comprises the computer program execution environment, in response to a determination that the time period has expired since the computer program execution environment began executing the computer program that provides the user service. 4. Capalik (US 20080016570 A1) teaches the method analyzes unauthorized intrusion into a computer network. Access is allowed through one or more open ports to one or more virtualized decoy operating systems running on a hypervisor operating system hosted on a decoy network device. This may be done by opening a port on one of the virtualized decoy operating systems. A network attack on the virtualized operating system is then intercepted by an introspection module running on the hypervisor operating system. The attack-identifying information is communicated through a private network interface channel and stored on a database server as forensic data. A signature-generation engine uses this forensic data to generate a signature of the attack. An intrusion prevention system then uses the attack signature to identify and prevent subsequent attacks. A web-based visualization interface facilitates configuration of the system and analysis of (and response to) forensic data generated by the introspection module and the signature generation engine, as well as that stored in the processing module's relational databases .5. Araujo (US 20190068642 A1), this disclosure describes decoy network ports and services are projected onto existing production workloads to facilitate cyber deception, without the need to modify production machines. The approach may be implemented in a production network that includes two segments. A production machine is reachable via the first segment, while a decoy machine that offers the network service expected from the production machine is reachable via the second segment. A deception router is configured in front of the two segments, and it is not visible on the link and network layers. The router inspects network traffic destined for the production machine. Based on a set of one or more conditions being met, the router determines whether to relay network packets to the production machine, or to redirect the packet to the decoy machine. Special Note: Although few prior are mentioned above, in fact, the prior arts made of record and listed on the PTO-892 and not relied upon are considered pertinent to applicant’s disclosure. Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to SHER KHAN whose telephone number is (571)272-8574. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Friday-8:00am - 5:00pm (EST).If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Eleni Shiferaw can be reached on 571-272-3867. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /SHER A KHAN/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2497
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Prosecution Timeline

May 09, 2025
Application Filed
Oct 20, 2026
Non-Final Rejection mailed — §103, §112 (current)

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