DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Specification
Applicant is reminded of the proper language and format for an abstract of the disclosure.
The abstract should be in narrative form and generally limited to a single paragraph on a separate sheet within the range of 50 to 150 words in length. The abstract should describe the disclosure sufficiently to assist readers in deciding whether there is a need for consulting the full patent text for details.
The language should be clear and concise and should not repeat information given in the title. It should avoid using phrases which can be implied, such as, “The disclosure concerns,” “The disclosure defined by this invention,” “The disclosure describes,” etc. In addition, the form and legal phraseology often used in patent claims, such as “means” and “said,” should be avoided.
The abstract of the disclosure is objected to because the abstract exceeds 150 words. A corrected abstract of the disclosure is required and must be presented on a separate sheet, apart from any other text. See MPEP § 608.01(b).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 1-2, 4-12, 14-15 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Paksoy et al US 20060129848 (hereinafter Paksoy) in view of Jeansonne et al US 20210382996 (hereinafter Jeansonne).
As to claim 1, Paksoy teaches an electronic device (abstract and Figure 3 disclose an electronic circuit), comprising:
at least one application processor comprising processing circuitry (Figure 3, reference number 300 “Apps Processor”, (processor has processing circuitry) see also paragraphs 68-69 and 157, wherein paragraph 69 reveals the application processor includes integrated circuit);
at least one communication processor comprising processing circuitry (Figure 3, reference number 200 “Modem Processor”, (processor has processing circuitry); and
a security sub system comprising circuitry (Figure 3, reference number 650 “Security Mode” included within the apps processor 600. Paragraph 90 also reveals the modem processor includes hardware security features. Paragraph 157 discloses secure mode hardware) configured to process a security function related to the application processor or the communication processor (paragraphs 157-158 disclose the service application of the apps processor includes an interrupt service routine for servicing the mailbox in apps processor. Service routine two-way communicates via a path with an operating system driver. The driver two-way communicates via a path with secure mode hardware and Protected Application software associated with secure mode hardware. The service routine is a combination of an interrupt service routine and a low level driver (sometimes called a physical driver). The interrupt service routine is used to identify the command request from the modem processor to application processor. The low level driver is used to receive and transmit IMEI device identification and SIM Lock subscriber identification data to and from the modem interface to the secure environment (SE) Driver that is the high level operating system (HLOS) driver)),
wherein the security sub system is configured to: decrypt the nonce value and transmit the decrypted nonce value to the communication processor (paragraph 183 discloses the concept of the apps processor encrypts the random challenge/nonce. The encrypted random challenge is sent to the modem processor for decryption), and generate a signature using the nonce value and network lock data based on reception of a request for network lock signature from the communication processor and transmit the generated signature to the communication processor (paragraph 185 discloses the app processor generates the signature such as by performing a hash of the combination of the SIM lock file portion (also interpreted as network lock data) combined with the random challenge field. Then, second, the resulting hash value is encrypted with the SIM lock Private Key that was provided to apps processor. Hash value is thus encrypted with the SIM lock Private Key to constitute Signature and, the Signature is sent with the file structure to the modem processor. Abstract and paragraph 11 disclose data transfer request protocol. Paragraph 74 discloses SIM personalization data transfer protocol is based on a request response paradigm between the modem processor and the apps processor. Paragraph 158 discloses the interrupt service routine is used to identify the command request from the modem processor to application processor. The Modem side makes a request for the SIM personalization data. The low level driver is used to receive and transmit IMEI device identification and SIM Lock subscriber identification data to and from the modem interface to the secure environment (SE) Driver that is the high level operating system (HLOS) driver). Therefore, based on the data transfer request protocol, the apps processor that include the secure mode hardware generates the signature), and
at least one communication processor, individually and/or collectively, is configured to: receive a signature value generated from the security sub system (paragraphs 185-188 disclose the modem processor receives the signature that was generated by the application processor[the application processor includes the secure model hardware]),
compare a signature value pre-stored in at least one application processor with the signature value received from the security sub system (paragraphs 186-189 disclose the concept of the modem processor compares the hash value recovered from the signature which was received by the application processor[that has the secure mode hardware] with the hash value independently computed by the model processor. Paragraph 172 reveals there is a pre-computed hash value prestored) , and
determine whether to restrict a use of the electronic device based on whether the signature value pre-stored in at least one application processor and the signature value received from the security sub system are matched to each other (paragraphs 188-190 disclose that base on the comparison, if there is match between the hash value of the signature from the apps processor and the hash value of the signature from the modem processor, the Lock Type, Permission, and IMSI data are thereupon used by modem processor to activate features and enable access to communications in accordance with the Lock Type and Permission information in file portion. If the signature hashes do not match, the software in modem processor is coded to force an immediate reset without any repeat attempt at all).
Paksoy does not teach decrypt, based on reception of a request for decrypting a nonce value from the communication processor, the nonce value.
Jeansonne teaches decrypt, based on reception of a request for decrypting a nonce value from the communication processor, the nonce value (paragraph 70 discloses request include request to decrypt a nonce. Paragraph 76 discloses server include decryption instructions to decrypt the nonce).
It would have been obvious for one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Paksoy’s teachings of decrypting the nonce with Jeansonne’s teachings of decrypting a nonce value based on a request such that the system can provide timely response for the access to the features of the electronic device (paragraph 70 of Jeansonne).
As to claim 2, the combination of Paksoy in view of Jeansonne teaches wherein the security sub system is configured to: encrypt, based on reception of a request for encrypting the nonce value from the communication processor, the nonce value (Jeansonne: paragraphs 49-53 provide the concept teachings of receiving a request for encrypting the nonce based password from the firmware of the computing device. Paksoy: paragraph 183 discloses random challenge is encrypted by the apps processor, which has the secure mode hardware) and transmit the encrypted nonce value to the communication processor (Paksoy: paragraph 183 discloses the concept of the apps processor encrypts the random challenge/nonce. The encrypted random challenge is sent to the modem processor for decryption), and
generate, based on reception of data to be signed from the communication processor, the signature using the nonce value and the network lock data and transmit the generated signature to the communication processor (Paksoy: paragraph 185 discloses the app processor generates the signature such as by performing a hash of the combination of the SIM lock file portion (also interpreted as network lock data) combined with the random challenge field. Then, second, the resulting hash value is encrypted with the SIM lock Private Key that was provided to apps processor. Hash value is thus encrypted with the SIM lock Private Key to constitute Signature and, the Signature is sent with the file structure to the modem processor), and
at least one communication processor, individually and/or collectively, is configured to: store, based on reception of the encrypted nonce value from the security sub system (Paksoy: paragraph 183 discloses the concept encrypted random challenge is sent to the modem processor), the encrypted nonce value in at least one application processor (Paksoy: paragraph 163 discloses the concept of using the secure storage mechanism for encrypting the data with the derived key and storing the encrypted data in secure memory or hardware protected memory. Paragraph 132 reveals the random number is stored in memory of the modem processor, wherein paragraph 90 reveals the modem processor includes hardware security features. Paragraph 126 also discloses the random generated seed that was generated by the application processor is stored in the modem software side), and store, based on reception of the signature value from the security sub system (Paksoy: paragraph 185 discloses the app processor generates the signature such as by performing a hash of the combination of the SIM lock file portion (also interpreted as network lock data) combined with the random challenge field. Then, second, the resulting hash value is encrypted with the SIM lock Private Key that was provided to apps processor. Hash value is thus encrypted with the SIM lock Private Key to constitute Signature and, the Signature is sent with the file structure to the modem processor), the signature value and the network lock data in at least one application processor (Paksoy: paragraph 90 discloses storing the SIM lock data, IMEI data in the Modem processor wherein the Modem processor includes hardware security features. Paragraph 164 discloses the IMEI data is stored in the hardware protected space of the apps processor. Paragraph 165 discloses the SIM lock file is stored in the apps processor secure memory. Paragraphs 172 and 176 discloses the concept of a prestored hashed value which can be signature data is stored in the modem processor. Paragraph 226 discloses the concept of storing new MEPC signature in the flash ). Motivation similar to the motivation presented in claim 1.
As to claim 4, the combination of Paksoy in view Jeansonne teaches wherein at least one communication processor, individually and/or collectively, is configured to: complete, based on a match between the signature value received from the security sub system and a signature value for another nonce value stored in the application processor, verification of the electronic device and release a security lock (Paksoy: paragraphs 188-190 disclose that base on the comparison, if there is match between the hash value of the signature from the apps processor and the hash value of the signature from the modem processor, the Lock Type, Permission, and IMSI data are thereupon used by modem processor to activate features and enable access to communications in accordance with the Lock Type and Permission information in file portion. The step is performed by the modem processor).
As to claim 5, the combination of Paksoy in view Jeansonne teaches wherein at least one communication processor, individually and/or collectively, is configured to: determine, based on a mismatch between the signature value received from the security sub system and the signature value stored in the application processor, that verification of the electronic device fails and restrict the use of the electronic device (Paksoy: paragraphs 188-190 disclose that base on the comparison, if there is match no between the hash value of the signature from the apps processor and the hash value of the signature from the modem processor, the software in the modem processor is coded to force an immediate reset without any repeat attempt at all).
As to claim 6, the combination of Paksoy in view Jeansonne teaches wherein the network lock data includes at least one of network lock information, whether the network lock is activated/deactivated, network lock type information, network lock service provider information, subscriber identity module (SIM) lock information, a network control key (NCK), a network subset control key (NSCK), a service provider control key (SPCK), a master control key (MCK), a corporate control key (CCK), a personalization control key (PCK), personal identification number (PIN) information, a network lock password, a password, network information, MCC/MNC allow list of the SIM, MCC/MNC block list of the SIM, temporary unlock status, a temporary unlock time, or temporary unlock validity period (Paksoy: paragraph 185 reveals the network lock information include the SIM lock file portion).
As to claim 7, the combination of Paksoy in view Jeansonne teaches further comprising: a key module comprising circuitry (Paksoy: Figure 4, reference number 2105 “Key Generator”), wherein the key module is configured to use, as a security key, a unique value fused to an onetime programmable (OTP) memory or an eFuse to perform the security function of the security sub system, and to encrypt or sign data received from at least one communication processor to which an access right is assigned based on the security key (Paksoy: paragraph 35 discloses the device-unique security key is suitably also provided in the E-fuses. Paragraphs 130-131 disclose1 a Device-Unique Secret Key is a symmetric key, randomly generated and burned in an E-fuse. A Derived Key is a symmetric key derived from the Device-Unique Secret Key. Many such Derived Keys can be derived during the lifetime of the device. A Derived Key is used to encrypt data to be placed in secure storage. Paragraph 162 discloses a unique SIM locking public key for encryption/decryption is generated by the key generator for the modem processor. Paragraphs 188-190 disclose that base on the comparison, if there is match between the hash value of the signature from the apps processor and the hash value of the signature from the modem processor, the Lock Type, Permission, and IMSI data are thereupon used by modem processor to activate features and enable access to communications in accordance with the Lock Type and Permission information in file portion).
As to claim 8, the combination of Paksoy in view Jeansonne teaches wherein the key module is configured to: perform at least one of a crypto operation, a hash operation, or a key derivation function (KDF) operation based on the security key (Paksoy: paragraph 162 reveals the SIM locking public key for encryption/decryption (crypto operation)), and the security sub system is configured to generate a signature for the data received from at least one communication processor using the key module (Paksoy: paragraph 185 discloses the apps processor that includes the secure core hardware generates the signature using the SIM lock Private key that was provided to the apps processor. Paragraphs 162-163 reveal the SIM lock private key corresponds to the SIM lock Public Key is stored in hardware-protected secure space 650 of the apps processor. The SIM lock Public Key is stored the modem processor).
As to claim 9, the combination of Paksoy in view Jeansonne teaches wherein the security sub system is configured to: perform, based on the reception of the request for encrypting or decrypting the nonce value from at least one communication processor (Paksoy: paragraph 183 discloses the concept of the apps processor encrypts the random challenge/nonce. The encrypted random challenge is sent to the modem processor for decryption. Jeansonne: paragraph 70 discloses request include request to decrypt a nonce. Paragraph 76 discloses server include decryption instructions to decrypt the nonce), the encryption and/or decryption of the nonce value using a symmetric key scheme or an asymmetric key scheme, and a symmetric key encryption scheme includes at least one of encryption algorithms of advanced encryption standard (AES), data encryption standard (DES), 3DES, Aria, IDEA, SEED, RC5,or Twofish scheme, and an asymmetric key encryption scheme includes at least one of encryption algorithms of RSA, Robin, ECC, ECDH, ECIES, DSS, DSA, ElGamal, Rabin scheme, or post quantum cryptography (PQC). Paksoy: paragraph 67 reveals the encryption/decryption processes supports AES. Paragraph 246 reveals DES/3DES, AES processes). Motivation similar to the motivation presented in claim 1.
As to claim 10, the combination of Paksoy in view Jeansonne teaches wherein the security sub system is configured to generate the signature based on the reception of the request for the network lock signature from at least one communication processor, a signature scheme includes an asymmetric key message authentication scheme or a message authentication code (MAC) scheme, and a type of the signature includes at least one of an RSA digital signature, a Lamport signature, an ElGamal signature, a Schnorr signature, a digital signature standard (DSS), a digital signature algorithm (DSA), ECDSA, KCDSA/EC-KCDSA, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC), a cipher-based MAC (CMAC), NMAC, a cipher block chaining MAC (CBC-MAC), a quantum signature, or a quantum digital signature (QDS) (Paksoy: paragraph 185 discloses the app processor which includes the secure mode hardware generates the signature such as by performing a hash of the combination of the SIM lock file portion( also interpreted as network lock data) combined with the random challenge field. Then, second, the resulting hash value is encrypted with the SIM lock Private Key that was provided to apps processor. Hash value is thus encrypted with the SIM lock Private Key to constitute Signature and, the Signature is sent with the file structure to the modem processor. Paragraph 158 discloses the interrupt service routine is used to identify the command request from the modem processor to application processor. The low level driver is used to receive and transmit IMEI device identification and SIM Lock subscriber identification data to and from the modem interface to the secure environment (SE) Driver that is the high level operating system (HLOS) driver). Paragraphs 160, 226, and 231-232 reveals HMAC operations for certificate/signature).
As to claim 11, Paksoy teaches a method for configuring a network lock function of an electronic device (Figure 4 discloses a system and process diagram), comprising:
receiving an encrypted nonce value and … decryption from a security sub system (paragraph 183 discloses the concept of the apps processor encrypts the random challenge/nonce. The encrypted random challenge is sent to the modem processor for decryption);
receiving a decrypted nonce value from the security sub system (paragraph 183 discloses the concept of the apps processor encrypts the random challenge/nonce. The encrypted random challenge is sent to the modem processor for decryption) and requesting a signature from the security sub system based on the nonce value (abstract and paragraph 11 disclose data transfer request protocol. Paragraph 74 discloses SIM personalization data transfer protocol is based on a request response paradigm between the modem processor and the apps processor. Paragraph 158 discloses the interrupt service routine is used to identify the command request from the modem processor to application processor. The Modem side makes a request for the SIM personalization data. The low level driver is used to receive and transmit IMEI device identification and SIM Lock subscriber identification data to and from the modem interface to the secure environment (SE) Driver that is the high level operating system (HLOS) driver). Therefore, based on the data transfer request protocol, the apps processor that include the secure mode hardware generates the signature);
receiving a signature generated based on the nonce value and network lock data from the security sub system (paragraph 185 discloses the app processor generates the signature such as by performing a hash of the combination of the SIM lock file portion (also interpreted as network lock data) combined with the random challenge field. Then, second, the resulting hash value is encrypted with the SIM lock Private Key that was provided to apps processor. Hash value is thus encrypted with the SIM lock Private Key to constitute Signature and, the Signature is sent with the file structure to the modem processor); and
performing verification by comparing the signature received from the security sub system with a pre-stored signature (paragraphs 186-189 disclose the concept of the modem processor compares the hash value recovered from the signature which was received by the application processor[that has the secure mode hardware] with the hash value independently computed by the model processor. Paragraph 172 reveals there is a pre-computed hash value prestored).
Paksoy does not teach requesting decryption from a security sub system.
Jeansonne teaches requesting decryption from a security sub system (paragraph 70 discloses request include request to decrypt a nonce. Paragraph 76 discloses server include decryption instructions to decrypt the nonce).
It would have been obvious for one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Paksoy’s teachings of decrypting the nonce with Jeansonne’s teachings of decrypting a nonce value based on a request such that the system can provide timely response for the access to the features of the electronic device (paragraph 70 of Jeansonne).
As to claim 12, the combination of Paksoy in view Jeansonne teaches encrypting, based on reception of a request for encrypting the nonce value from at least one communication processor, the nonce value (Jeansonne: Paragraphs 49-53 provide the concept teachings of receiving a request for encrypting the nonce based password from the firmware of the computing device. Paksoy: paragraph 183 discloses random challenge is encrypted by the apps processor, which has the secure mode hardware) and transmitting the encrypted nonce value to at least one communication processor (Paksoy: paragraph 183 discloses the concept of the apps processor encrypts the random challenge/nonce. The encrypted random challenge is sent to the modem processor for decryption); storing, based on reception of the encrypted nonce value from the security sub system (Paksoy: paragraph 183 discloses the concept encrypted random challenge is sent to the modem processor), the encrypted nonce value on at least one application processor (Paksoy: paragraph 163 discloses the concept of using the secure storage mechanism for encrypting the data with the derived key and storing the encrypted data in secure memory or hardware protected memory. Paragraph 132 reveals the random number is stored in memory of the modem processor, wherein paragraph 90 reveals the modem processor includes hardware security features. Paragraph 126 also discloses the random generated seed that was generated by the application processor is stored in the modem software side); generating, based on reception of the data to be signed from at least one communication processor, the signature using the nonce value and the network lock data and transmitting the generated signature to at least one communication processor (Paksoy: paragraph 185 discloses the app processor generates the signature such as by performing a hash of the combination of the SIM lock file portion (also interpreted as network lock data) combined with the random challenge field. Then, second, the resulting hash value is encrypted with the SIM lock Private Key that was provided to apps processor. Hash value is thus encrypted with the SIM lock Private Key to constitute Signature and, the Signature is sent with the file structure to the modem processor); and storing, based on reception of a signature value from the security sub system (Paksoy: paragraph 183 discloses the concept encrypted random challenge is sent to the modem processor), the signature value and the network lock data on at least one application processor (Paksoy: paragraph 90 discloses storing the SIM lock data, IMEI data in the Modem processor wherein the Modem processor includes hardware security features. Paragraph 164 discloses the IMEI data is stored in the hardware protected space of the apps processor. Paragraph 165 discloses the SIM lock file is stored in the apps processor secure memory. Paragraphs 172 and 176 discloses the concept of a prestored hashed value which can be signature data is stored in the modem processor. Paragraph 226 discloses the concept of storing new MEPC signature in the flash ). Motivation similar to the motivation presented in claim 11.
As to claim 14, the combination of Paksoy in view Jeansonne teaches wherein the performing of the verification by comparing the signature received from the security sub system with the pre-stored signature further includes completing, based on a match between a signature value received from the security sub system and a signature value for another nonce value stored in at least one application processor, the verification of the electronic device, and releasing a security lock (Paksoy: paragraphs 188-190 disclose that base on the comparison, if there is match between the hash value of the signature from the apps processor and the hash value of the signature from the modem processor, the Lock Type, Permission, and IMSI data are thereupon used by modem processor to activate features and enable access to communications in accordance with the Lock Type and Permission information in file portion. The step is performed by the modem processor).
As to claim 15, the combination of Paksoy in view Jeansonne teaches wherein the performing of the verification by comparing the signature received from the security sub system with the pre-stored signature further includes determining, based on a mismatch between a signature value received from the security sub system and a signature value stored in at least one application processor, that the verification of the electronic device fails and restricting a use of the electronic device (Paksoy: paragraphs 188-190 disclose that base on the comparison, if there is match no between the hash value of the signature from the apps processor and the hash value of the signature from the modem processor, the software in the modem processor is coded to force an immediate reset without any repeat attempt at all).
Claim(s) 3 and 13 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Paksoy et al US 20060129848 (hereinafter Paksoy), in view of Jeansonne et al US 20210382996 (hereinafter Jeansonne), and in further view of Sun et al US 20120057701 (hereinafter Sun).
As to claim 3, the combination of Paksoy in view of Jeansonne teaches all the limitations above in claim 2 and further teaches wherein based on at least one application processor receiving an initialization request signal from at least one communication processor, at least one application processor, individually and/or collectively, is configured to delete the stored signature value and network lock data (Paksoy: paragraph 226 discloses the concept of removing the signature on the MEPC. Paragraph 74 discloses SIM personalization data transfer protocol is based on a request response paradigm between the modem processor and the apps processor. Paragraph 158 discloses the interrupt service routine is used to identify the command request from the modem processor to application processor. The Modem side makes a request for the SIM personalization data. The low level driver is used to receive and transmit IMEI device identification and SIM Lock subscriber identification data to and from the modem interface to the secure environment (SE) Driver that is the high level operating system (HLOS) driver). Therefore, based on the data transfer request protocol, there is the deletion of the signature value).
The combination of Paksoy in view of Jeansonne does not teach but Sun teaches deletion of the network lock data (paragraph 30 discloses the chip erases the network lock access information).
It would have been obvious for one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Paksoy’s teachings of deleting/replacing a previous signature in view of Jeansonne’s teachings of decrypting nonce based on a request with Sun’s teachings of deleting network lock data to provide an update of the network lock information by an authorized unlocking device and increase the security of the mobile terminal (paragraph 30 of Sun).
As to claim 13, the combination of Paksoy in view of Jeansonne teaches all the limitations above in claim 12 and further teaches upon receiving an initialization request signal from at least one communication processor, deleting the network lock data stored in at least one application processor (Paksoy: paragraph 226 discloses the concept of removing the signature on the MEPC. Paragraph 74 discloses SIM personalization data transfer protocol is based on a request response paradigm between the modem processor and the apps processor. Paragraph 158 discloses the interrupt service routine is used to identify the command request from the modem processor to application processor. The Modem side makes a request for the SIM personalization data. The low level driver is used to receive and transmit IMEI device identification and SIM Lock subscriber identification data to and from the modem interface to the secure environment (SE) Driver that is the high level operating system (HLOS) driver). Therefore, based on the data transfer request protocol, there is the deletion of the signature value).
The combination of Paksoy in view of Jeansonne does not teach but Sun teaches deletion of the network lock data (paragraph 30 discloses the chip erases the network lock access information).
It would have been obvious for one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Paksoy’s teachings of deleting/replacing a previous signature in view of Jeansonne’s teachings of decrypting nonce based on a request with Sun’s teachings of deleting network lock data to provide an update of the network lock information by an authorized unlocking device and increase the security of the mobile terminal (paragraph 30 of Sun).
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure: Chu et al US 20170214662(hereinafter Chu) and Rager et al US 20070050622 (hereinafter Rager).
Chu teaches the concept of storing a generated certificate that includes digital signature (paragraph 43) as recited in claims 2 and 12.
Rager teaches in paragraphs 46-48 and 57 the concept of computing an encrypted digital signature based on an encrypted random number as disclosed in claims 1 and 11.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to FELICIA FARROW whose telephone number is (571)272-1856. The examiner can normally be reached M - F 7:30am-4:00pm (EST).
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/F.F/Examiner, Art Unit 2437
/BENJAMIN E LANIER/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2437
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