DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This office action is in response to the applicant’s filing on 08/21/2025. Claims 1-20 are pending. Claims 1, 11, 12, and 20 are independent.
Information Disclosure Statement
The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on 08/21/2025 is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claims 1-3 and 7-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Lee et al. (US PGPub No. 2020/0344605; hereinafter “Lee”) in view of Ben Henda et al. (US PGPub No. 2024/0064507; hereinafter “Ben Henda”).
As per claim 1: Lee discloses a user equipment (UE) for wireless communication, comprising:
at least one memory (An apparatus for wireless communication at a UE is described. The apparatus may include a processor, memory in electronic communication with the processor, and instructions stored in the memory [¶ 0008, ¶ 0171, ¶ 0176, Fig. 9]); and
at least one processor coupled with the at least one memory and configured to cause the UE to (An apparatus for wireless communication at a UE is described. The apparatus may include a processor, memory in electronic communication with the processor, and instructions stored in the memory [¶ 0008, ¶ 0171, ¶ 0176, Fig. 9]):
receive a first set of security parameters during registration with a first cell (At 320, UE 115-b may transmit a registration request to the network [¶ 0111]; Registering the UE 115-b with the network may allow the UE 115-b to obtain a valid NAS security context with the network [¶ 0111]; The network may include network policy information in the NAS security mode command [¶ 0112]; For example, the UE 115-b may receive, at 340, an indication that a security feature ( e.g., security protection for the first set of information) is enabled. This indication may be an indication of SIB and/or MIB protection at the RAN [¶ 0113, system information block protection, master information block protection]; In a first example, the indication may be an example of a hash value. This hash value may be based on the first set of information received at UE 115-b. In some cases, the hash value may additionally be based on an SFN value associated with the first set of information. For example, UE 115-b may calculate a hash value for a SIB using at least a portion of the SIB and the corresponding SFN value as inputs to a hashing function [¶ 0114]; As such, a UE may detect any modification of system information (e.g., modification of SIB(s) of interest to the UE) during security setup. Upon detection of system information modification, the UE may request corrected SIB(s) (e.g., from the base station via secure RRC signaling), may select a different cell, etc [¶ 0050, registration taking place in a cell]; The geographic coverage area 110 for a base station 105 may be divided into sectors making up a portion of the geographic coverage area 110, and each sector may be associated with a cell [¶ 0055]);
receive first system information associated with (At 310, UE 115-b may receive a first set of information from base station 105-c. This first set of information may be associated with communicating with a network. For example, the first set of information may include system information in a MIB, a set of SIBs, or a combination thereof [¶ 0109]) [a second cell]; and
monitor a physical downlink control channel (PDCCH) (Physical channels may be multiplexed on a carrier according to various techniques. A physical control channel and a physical data channel may be multiplexed on a downlink carrier, for example, using time division multiplexing (TDM) techniques, frequency division multiplexing (FDM) techniques, or hybrid TDM-FDM techniques. In some examples, control information transmitted in a physical control channel may be distributed between different control regions in a cascaded manner ( e.g., between a common control region or common search space and one or more VE-specific control regions or VE-specific search spaces) [¶ 0080]; For example, in some wireless communications systems, a real base station (e.g., a base station verified by the network) may broadcast a first set of information in an unprotected message to a set of UEs in a coverage area [¶ 0047]; Communication links 125 shown in wireless communications system 100 may include uplink transmissions from a UE 115 to a base station 105, or downlink transmissions from a base station 105 to a UE 115 [¶ 0054]; In some cases, UE 115-d may only read certain SIBs ( e.g., UE 115-d may only monitor for and receive SIBs corresponding to certain desired information [¶ 0146]) for second system information associated with [the second cell] based at least in part on the first set of security parameters (At 350, base station 105-c may determine whether to retransmit, to the UE 115-b, the first set of information in a protected message ( e.g., where the first set of information is protected via ciphering, integrity protection, or a combination thereof) based on the indication of the second set of information … Additionally or alternatively, if base station 105-c identifies a change to the system information for the network since UE 115-b received the system information at 310, the base station 105-c may determine to re-transmit the changed information. In these cases, base station 105-c may re-transmit the first set of information ( e.g., a portion or a complete MIB, set of SIBs, or some combination thereof) to VE 115-b at 355. For example, base station 105-c may re-transmit the first set of information in an RRC re-configuration message, where the first set of information is protected via ciphering, integrity protection, or a combination thereof [¶ 0115, Updated system information sent in protected form]).
Lee discloses the claimed subject matter as discussed above but does not explicitly disclose a second cell; the second cell. However, Ben Henda teaches a second cell (The wireless device 12 as shown is capable of accessing a first cell 14 [¶ 0058]; A second cell 16 by contrast conceals certain information 18. The concealed information 18 may for instance include system information for the second cell 16, an identifier associated with the second cell 16, information that indicates with which network the second cell 16 is associated, and/or information that indicates which type of network the second cell 16 is associated [¶ 0059, ¶ 0061]; in this regard, the wireless device 12 receives signaling 20 which indicates one or more security parameters 22 usable to obtain the information 18 concealed by the second cell 16 [¶ 0062]; Regardless, the wireless device 12 as shown receives this signaling 20 via the first cell 14. That is, the wireless device 12 receives, via the first cell 14, signaling 20 which indicates one or more security parameters 22 usable by the wireless device 12 to obtain the information 18 concealed by the second cell 16 [¶ 0062]; The signaling 20 may be secured in the sense that it is confidentiality protected, integrity protected, and/or otherwise secured against attack [¶ 0063]; In any event, equipped with the security parameter(s) 22, the wireless device 12 may use the security parameter(s) 22 to obtain the information 18 concealed by the second cell 16 [¶ 0065]; the information 18 concealed by the second cell 16 includes in some embodiments system information for the second cell 16, an identifier (e.g., a CAG ID, PLMN ID, or NID) associated with the second cell 16, and/or information that indicates with which network the second cell 16 is associated and/or with which type of network the second cell 16 is associated [¶ 0069]); the second cell (The wireless device 12 as shown is capable of accessing a first cell 14 [¶ 0058]; A second cell 16 by contrast conceals certain information 18. The concealed information 18 may for instance include system information for the second cell 16, an identifier associated with the second cell 16, information that indicates with which network the second cell 16 is associated, and/or information that indicates which type of network the second cell 16 is associated [¶ 0059, ¶ 0061]; in this regard, the wireless device 12 receives signaling 20 which indicates one or more security parameters 22 usable to obtain the information 18 concealed by the second cell 16 [¶ 0062]; Regardless, the wireless device 12 as shown receives this signaling 20 via the first cell 14. That is, the wireless device 12 receives, via the first cell 14, signaling 20 which indicates one or more security parameters 22 usable by the wireless device 12 to obtain the information 18 concealed by the second cell 16 [¶ 0062]; The signaling 20 may be secured in the sense that it is confidentiality protected, integrity protected, and/or otherwise secured against attack [¶ 0063]; In any event, equipped with the security parameter(s) 22, the wireless device 12 may use the security parameter(s) 22 to obtain the information 18 concealed by the second cell 16 [¶ 0065]; the information 18 concealed by the second cell 16 includes in some embodiments system information for the second cell 16, an identifier (e.g., a CAG ID, PLMN ID, or NID) associated with the second cell 16, and/or information that indicates with which network the second cell 16 is associated and/or with which type of network the second cell 16 is associated [¶ 0069]). Lee and Ben Henda are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor of secure wireless communication. Therefore, based on Lee in view of Ben Henda, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to utilize the teaching of Ben Henda to the system of Lee in order to securely access and communicate with additional cells after communication with an original cell providing cell flexibility. Hence, it would have been obvious to combine the references above to obtain the invention as specified in the instant claim.
As per claim 2: Lee in view of Ben Henda teach all the limitations of claim 1. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the UE to: generate a second set of security parameters based at least in part on the first set of security parameters (the indication may be an example of a hash value. This hash value may be based on the first set of information received at UE 115-b. In some cases, the hash value may additionally be based on an SFN value associated with the first set of information. For example, UE 115-b may calculate a hash value for a SIB using at least a portion of the SIB and the corresponding SFN value as inputs to a hashing function. The hashing function may be pre-configured at UE 115-b, configured by the network or base station 105-c in a protected message, or dynamically determined by UE 115-b. Additionally or alternatively, UE 115-b may determine a hash value for multiple SIBS, a MIB, or some combination thereof. UE 115-b may also include, in the AS security mode complete message, an indication of the MIB and/or SIB(s) (e.g., SIB number) read by UE 115-b at 310 and used to generate the hash. Additionally or alternatively, the indication may include other unprotected information exchanged between the UE 115-b and the real base station 105-c prior to completing the security setup procedure. Such unprotected information may also be used to generate the hash [¶ 0114]); and monitor the PDCCH for the second system information using the second set of security parameters (Base station 105-c may receive, from UE 115-b, the indication of the information received at the UE 115-b. At 350, base station 105-c may determine whether to retransmit, to the UE 115-b, the first set of information in a protected message ( e.g., where the first set of information is protected via ciphering, integrity protection, or a combination thereof) based on the indication of the second set of information. For example, base station 105-c may determine whether VE 115-b received the correct system information by comparing the information indicated by the hash value at 345 to the information transmitted at 310. If base station 105-c detects any prior modification of the first set of information (e.g., if the MIB and/or SIB(s) indicated by the hash value at 345 are different from the MIB and/or SIB(s) transmitted at 310), base station 105-c may determine to re-transmit the modified information. Additionally or alternatively, if base station 105-c identifies a change to the system information for the network since VE 115-b received the system information at 310, the base station 105-c may determine to re-transmit the changed information [¶ 0115]; Physical channels may be multiplexed on a carrier according to various techniques. A physical control channel and a physical data channel may be multiplexed on a downlink carrier, for example, using time division multiplexing (TDM) techniques, frequency division multiplexing (FDM) techniques, or hybrid TDM-FDM techniques. In some examples, control information transmitted in a physical control channel may be distributed between different control regions in a cascaded manner ( e.g., between a common control region or common search space and one or more VE-specific control regions or VE-specific search spaces) [¶ 0080]; For example, in some wireless communications systems, a real base station (e.g., a base station verified by the network) may broadcast a first set of information in an unprotected message to a set of UEs in a coverage area [¶ 0047]; Communication links 125 shown in wireless communications system 100 may include uplink transmissions from a UE 115 to a base station 105, or downlink transmissions from a base station 105 to a UE 115 [¶ 0054]; In some cases, UE 115-d may only read certain SIBs ( e.g., UE 115-d may only monitor for and receive SIBs corresponding to certain desired information [¶ 0146]).
As per claim 3: Lee in view of Ben Henda teach all the limitations of claim 2. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the UE to generate the second set of security parameters by hashing the first set of security parameters with at least one of a cell identity associated with the second cell, a frequency of a synchronization signal block associated with the second cell, or a system frame number associated with the second cell (the indication may be an example of a hash value. This hash value may be based on the first set of information received at UE 115-b. In some cases, the hash value may additionally be based on an SFN value associated with the first set of information. For example, UE 115-b may calculate a hash value for a SIB using at least a portion of the SIB and the corresponding SFN value as inputs to a hashing function. The hashing function may be pre-configured at UE 115-b, configured by the network or base station 105-c in a protected message, or dynamically determined by UE 115-b. Additionally or alternatively, UE 115-b may determine a hash value for multiple SIBS, a MIB, or some combination thereof. UE 115-b may also include, in the AS security mode complete message, an indication of the MIB and/or SIB(s) (e.g., SIB number) read by UE 115-b at 310 and used to generate the hash. Additionally or alternatively, the indication may include other unprotected information exchanged between the UE 115-b and the real base station 105-c prior to completing the security setup procedure. Such unprotected information may also be used to generate the hash [¶ 0114, ¶ 0076, Examiner’s Note: SFN is a system frame number]).
As per claim 7: Lee in view of Ben Henda teach all the limitations of claim 1. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the second system information comprises hashed bits of a random access configuration or paging configuration (The connection procedure may include a random access procedure and an RRC configuration procedure [¶ 0110]; the UE 115-b may receive, at 330, an indication that a security feature (e.g., security protection for the first set of information) is enabled [¶ 0112]; In a first example, the indication may be an example of a hash value [¶ 0114]; performing a random access message exchange with the base station, and transmitting a registration request or a service request to the base station following the random access message exchange, where the set of hash values may be received in response at least in part to the registration request or the service request [¶ 0019]), and the at least one processor is configured to cause the UE to verify an integrity of the first system information by comparing the hashed bits with locally generated hashed bits (During an AS SMC procedure, a base station may send a set of hash values corresponding to valid system information (e.g., of previously transmitted MIB/SIB(s)) in an AS SMC message to the UE. As such, the UE may determine a hash value for system information that has been read by the UE, and may determine an authenticity of some read system information by comparing the determined hash value and the at least one hash value ( e.g., at least one hash value corresponding to the read system information) of the set of hash values received from the base station in the AS SMC. If system information modification (e.g., MIB/SIB change) is detected by the UE (e.g., by comparing the hash information received in the AS SMC and locally computed hash), the UE may indicate the hash mismatch in an AS security mode complete message [¶ 0048]).
As per claim 8: Lee in view of Ben Henda teach all the limitations of claim 7. Furthermore, Lee and Ben Henda discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the UE to initiate a random access procedure in response to, at least in part, the hashed bits matching the locally generated hashed bits (the UE may determine a hash value for system information that has been read by the UE, and may determine an authenticity of some read system information by comparing the determined hash value and the at least one hash value ( e.g., at least one hash value corresponding to the read system information) of the set of hash values received from the base station in the AS SMC. If system information modification (e.g., MIB/SIB change) is detected by the UE (e.g., by comparing the hash information received in the AS SMC and locally computed hash), the UE may indicate the hash mismatch in an AS security mode complete message [Lee ¶ 0048]; Having obtained the security parameter(s) 22 via the first cell 14, the wireless device 12 as part of its search determines ( e.g., via decryption or mapping) with which network ( e.g., CAG ID) the second cell 16 is associated. Based on the second cell 16 being associated with the desired network (e.g., desired CAG ID), the wireless device 12 may proceed to access the second cell 16, e.g., by camping on or performing random access to the second cell 16 [Ben Henda ¶ 0066]; Or, in other embodiments, the validity information comprises a hash value, in which case the method further comprises calculating a test hash value using the non concealed information and determining whether or not the non-concealed information is valid depending on whether or not the calculated test hash value matches the hash value comprising the validity information [Ben Henda ¶ 0071]).
As per claim 9: Lee in view of Ben Henda teach all the limitations of claim 1. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the UE to monitor the PDCCH for the second system information in response to receiving a paging message or transmitting a system information request (As such, a UE may detect any modification of system information (e.g., modification of SIB(s) of interest to the UE) during security setup. Upon detection of system information modification, the UE may request corrected SIB(s) (e.g., from the base station via secure RRC signaling), may select a different cell, etc [¶ 0050]).
As per claim 10: Lee in view of Ben Henda teach all the limitations of claim 1. Furthermore, Ben Henda discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the UE to start a timer in response to the registration and initiate a re-registration procedure upon expiry of the timer to obtain an updated first set of security parameters (There are different mechanisms for ensuring that the UE does not use outdated temporary CAG identifiers for the cell selection. For example, during provisioning in steps 2A and 2B, the UE receives a time parameter/value indicating for how long the received temporary identifiers are valid. This time value could be an expiry date upon which the UE must acquire new identifiers in order to determine the cells associated with the requested PNiNPNs. Such time value may exemplify validity information as discussed herein [¶ 0134]; Another possibility is that each cell serving a number of PNiNPNs broadcasts a hash value in addition to the corresponding current temporary CAG identifiers. The hash value must be computed in a way that it changes in case the mapping changes or their value changes. For example, the hash value could be computed over the PNiNPNs identifiers served by the cell and the associated temporary identifiers. In such case, a temporary identifier change would result in a hash value change. Each time the UE attempts a cell selection for PNiNPN access, the UE computes the hash value based on the identifiers and the identifiers broadcasted by the cell. In case there is a mismatch, the UE needs to acquire new parameters, otherwise the UE proceeds with the selection. Such hash value may also exemplify validity information as discussed herein [¶ 0135]).
As per claim 11: Lee in view of Ben Henda teach all the limitations of claim 1. The limitations of claim 11 are substantially similar to claim 1 above, and therefore the claim is likewise rejected.
Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of Ko et al. (US PGPub No. 2019/0215101; hereinafter “Ko”).
As per claim 4: Lee in view of Ben Henda teach all the limitations of claim 2. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the UE to [descramble a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) of downlink control information (DCI) for the second system information] using at least one of the second set of security parameters (This hash value may be based on the first set of information received at UE 115-b. In some cases, the hash value may additionally be based on an SFN value associated with the first set of information. For example, UE 115-b may calculate a hash value for a SIB using at least a portion of the SIB and the corresponding SFN value as inputs to a hashing function. The hashing function may be pre-configured at UE 115-b, configured by the network or base station 105-c in a protected message, or dynamically determined by UE 115-b. Additionally or alternatively, UE 115-b may determine a hash value for multiple SIBS, a MIB, or some combination thereof. UE 115-b may also include, in the AS security mode complete message, an indication of the MIB and/or SIB(s) (e.g., SIB number) read by UE 115-b at 310 and used to generate the hash. Additionally or alternatively, the indication may include other unprotected information exchanged between the UE 115-b and the real base station 105-c prior to completing the security setup procedure. Such unprotected information may also be used to generate the hash [¶ 0114]).
Lee in view of Ben Henda discloses the claimed subject matter as discussed above but does not explicitly disclose descramble a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) of downlink control information (DCI) for the second system information. However, Ko teaches descramble a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) of downlink control information (DCI) for the second system information (With reference to FIG. 11, the aforementioned embodiments will be described from the perspective of a system. A BS generates DCI by configuring a bit value for identifying a type of an SIB using a bit for an HARQ process ID [S1101] and scrambles a CRC of the DCI using one same SI-RNTI [S1103]. Thereafter, the BS transmits the DCI to a UE [S1105]. Upon receiving the DCI, the UE descrambles the CRC of the DCI using the one same SI-RNTI [S1107] and identifies the type of the SIB scheduled by the DCI using the bit for the HARQ process ID [S1109]. Thereafter, the UE receives, from the BS, the SIB according to the identified SIB type based on scheduling information of the DCI [S1111] [¶ 0116]). Lee in view of Ben Henda and Ko are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor of secure wireless communication. Therefore, based on Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of Ko, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to utilize the teaching of Ko to the system of Lee in view of Ben Henda in order to efficiently understand the type of system information received (¶ 0017). Hence, it would have been obvious to combine the references above to obtain the invention as specified in the instant claim.
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of NPL1 (3GPP, “3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; NR; Physical channels and modulation (Release 18)”, 3GPP TS 38.211 V18.7.0, June 2025, pages 1-166).
As per claim 5: Lee in view of Ben Henda teach all the limitations of claim 2. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the UE to monitor a PDCCH (Physical channels may be multiplexed on a carrier according to various techniques. A physical control channel and a physical data channel may be multiplexed on a downlink carrier, for example, using time division multiplexing (TDM) techniques, frequency division multiplexing (FDM) techniques, or hybrid TDM-FDM techniques. In some examples, control information transmitted in a physical control channel may be distributed between different control regions in a cascaded manner ( e.g., between a common control region or common search space and one or more VE-specific control regions or VE-specific search spaces) [¶ 0080]; For example, in some wireless communications systems, a real base station (e.g., a base station verified by the network) may broadcast a first set of information in an unprotected message to a set of UEs in a coverage area [¶ 0047]; Communication links 125 shown in wireless communications system 100 may include uplink transmissions from a UE 115 to a base station 105, or downlink transmissions from a base station 105 to a UE 115 [¶ 0054]; In some cases, UE 115-d may only read certain SIBs ( e.g., UE 115-d may only monitor for and receive SIBs corresponding to certain desired information [¶ 0146]) according to [an interleaver for control channel element (CCE) to resource element group (REG) mapping, the interleaver being determined using at least one of the second set of security parameters, wherein a CCE comprises a first number of REGs and a REG comprises a second number of resource elements].
Lee in view of Ben Henda discloses the claimed subject matter as discussed above but does not explicitly disclose an interleaver for control channel element (CCE) to resource element group (REG) mapping, the interleaver being determined using at least one of the second set of security parameters, wherein a CCE comprises a first number of REGs and a REG comprises a second number of resource elements. However, NPL1 teaches an interleaver for control channel element (CCE) to resource element group (REG) mapping, the interleaver being determined using at least one of the second set of security parameters, wherein a CCE comprises a first number of REGs and a REG comprises a second number of resource elements (A physical downlink control channel consists of one or more control-channel elements (CCEs) as indicated in Table … A control-resource set consists of N(CORESET, RB) resource blocks in the frequency domain and N(CORESET, symb) element of {1, 2, 3} symbols in the time domain. A control-channel element consists of 6 resource-element groups (REGs) where a resource-element group equals one resource block during one OFDM symbol… A UE can be configured with multiple control-resource sets. Each control-resource set is associated with one CCE-to-REG mapping only [Pages 122-124, 7.3.2 Physical downlink control channel (PDCCH)]). Lee in view of Ben Henda and NPL1 are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor of secure wireless communication. Therefore, based on Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of NPL1, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to utilize the teaching of NPL1 to the system of Lee in view of Ben Henda in order to effectively implement known standards as set out by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project. Hence, it would have been obvious to combine the references above to obtain the invention as specified in the instant claim.
Claims 6, 12, and 16-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA et al. (US PGPub No. 2018/0035386; hereinafter “YAMADA”).
As per claim 6: Lee in view of Ben Henda teach all the limitations of claim 2. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the UE to receive [a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH)] for the second system information (At 350, base station 105-c may determine whether to retransmit, to the UE 115-b, the first set of information in a protected message ( e.g., where the first set of information is protected via ciphering, integrity protection, or a combination thereof) based on the indication of the second set of information … Additionally or alternatively, if base station 105-c identifies a change to the system information for the network since UE 115-b received the system information at 310, the base station 105-c may determine to re-transmit the changed information. In these cases, base station 105-c may re-transmit the first set of information ( e.g., a portion or a complete MIB, set of SIBs, or some combination thereof) to VE 115-b at 355. For example, base station 105-c may re-transmit the first set of information in an RRC re-configuration message, where the first set of information is protected via ciphering, integrity protection, or a combination thereof [¶ 0115, Updated system information sent in protected form]), [the PDSCH comprising codewords that have been scrambled based on at least one of the second set of security parameters and descramble the codewords based on the at least one of the second set of security parameters].
Lee in view of Ben Henda discloses the claimed subject matter as discussed above but does not explicitly disclose a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH); the PDSCH comprising codewords that have been scrambled based on at least one of the second set of security parameters and descramble the codewords based on the at least one of the second set of security parameters. However, YANG teaches a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH) (The PDSCH is used to transmit the downlink data (the downlink transport block or the DL-SCH). Furthermore, the PDSCH is used to transmit a system information block type-1 message. The system information block type-1 message is cell-specific (cell-peculiar) information [¶ 0057]); the PDSCH comprising codewords that have been scrambled based on at least one of the second set of security parameters and descramble the codewords based on the at least one of the second set of security parameters (In a case where the MU-NAICS assist information is transmitted or in a case of a predetermined transmission mode, the base station apparatus 1A can allocate two types of RNTIs to the terminal apparatus 2A. The two types of RNTIs are referred to as a first RNTI (for example, Cell RNTI) and a second RNTI, respectively. The base station apparatus 1A can include the second RNTI in the MU-NAICS assist information. The base station apparatus 1A can transmit the second RNTI using the higher layer signaling or the physical layer signal. The base station apparatus 1A can mask the Downlink Control Information with the first RNTI, and can scramble a codeword that is carried on the PDSCH, based on the second RNTI, for transmission. Furthermore, in a case where the terminal apparatuses 2A and 2B are non-orthogonally multiplexed, the base station apparatus 1A can scramble a signal (a codeword) on PDSCH 1 and a signal (a codeword) on PDSCH 2 based on the second RNTI with the same ID, for transmission. In a case where a predetermined transmission mode is configured, or in a case where the MU-NAICS information is received, the terminal apparatus 2A blind-decodes the Downlink Control Information based on the first RNTI, and performs the cancellation or suppression of the interference signal based on the second RNTI. Furthermore, the terminal apparatus 2A performs descrambling on the signal on the PDSCH for the terminal apparatus 2A itself, based on the second RNTI, and thus performs the error correction decoding. For example, in a case where the base station apparatus 1A configures a C-RNTI of the terminal apparatus 2B as a second RNTI of the terminal apparatus 2A, because it is not desirable that additional information is transmitted to the terminal apparatus 2B, an increase in an amount of control information can be suppressed [¶ 0089]). Lee in view of Ben Henda and YANG are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor of secure wireless communication. Therefore, based on Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YANG, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to utilize the teaching of YANG to the system of Lee in view of Ben Henda in order to reduce interference which improves throughput (abstract). Hence, it would have been obvious to combine the references above to obtain the invention as specified in the instant claim.
As per claim 12: Lee discloses a network equipment (NE) for wireless communication, comprising:
at least one memory (The memory 1330 may include RAM, ROM, or a combination thereof. The memory 1330 may store computer-readable code or software 1335 including instructions that, when executed by a processor (e.g., the processor 1340) cause the device to perform various functions described herein. [¶ 0202, Fig. 13]; The device 1305 may be an example of or include the components of device 1005, device 1105, or a base station 105 as described herein [¶ 0197]); and
at least one processor coupled with the at least one memory and configured to cause the NE to (The processor 1340 may include an intelligent hardware device, (e.g., a general-purpose processor, a DSP, a CPU, a microcontroller, an ASIC, an FPGA, a programmable logic device, a discrete gate or transistor logic component, a discrete hardware component, or any combination thereof). In some cases, the processor 1340 may be configured to operate a memory array using a memory controller. In some cases, a memory controller may be integrated into processor 1340. The processor 1340 may be configured to execute computer-readable instructions stored in a memory (e.g., the memory 1330) to cause the device 1305 to perform various functions [¶ 0203, Fig. 13]):
broadcast first system information of a cell (At 310, UE 115-b may receive a first set of information from base station 105-c. This first set of information may be associated with communicating with a network. For example, the first set of information may include system information in a MIB, a set of SIBs, or a combination thereof [¶ 0109]; For example, in some wireless communications systems, a real base station (e.g., a base station verified by the network) may broadcast a first set of information in an unprotected message to a set of UEs in a coverage area [¶ 0047]); and
schedule (The inter-station communications manager 1345 may manage communications with other base station 105, and may include a controller or scheduler for controlling communications with UEs 115 in cooperation with other base stations 105 [¶ 0204]), via a physical downlink control channel (PDCCH) (Physical channels may be multiplexed on a carrier according to various techniques. A physical control channel and a physical data channel may be multiplexed on a downlink carrier, for example, using time division multiplexing (TDM) techniques, frequency division multiplexing (FDM) techniques, or hybrid TDM-FDM techniques. In some examples, control information transmitted in a physical control channel may be distributed between different control regions in a cascaded manner ( e.g., between a common control region or common search space and one or more VE-specific control regions or VE-specific search spaces) [¶ 0080]; For example, in some wireless communications systems, a real base station (e.g., a base station verified by the network) may broadcast a first set of information in an unprotected message to a set of UEs in a coverage area [¶ 0047]; Communication links 125 shown in wireless communications system 100 may include uplink transmissions from a UE 115 to a base station 105, or downlink transmissions from a base station 105 to a UE 115 [¶ 0054]; In some cases, UE 115-d may only read certain SIBs ( e.g., UE 115-d may only monitor for and receive SIBs corresponding to certain desired information [¶ 0146]), transmission of second system information [of the cell] [on a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH)], wherein at least a portion of the PDCCH transmission and the PDSCH transmission for the second system information is based on parameters derived from a security context shared with registered user equipment (UE) (Registering the UE 115-b with the network may allow the UE 115-b to obtain a valid NAS security context with the network [¶ 0111]; The network may include network policy information in the NAS security mode command [¶ 0112]; For example, the UE 115-b may receive, at 340, an indication that a security feature ( e.g., security protection for the first set of information) is enabled. This indication may be an indication of SIB and/or MIB protection at the RAN [¶ 0113, system information block protection, master information block protection]; In a first example, the indication may be an example of a hash value. This hash value may be based on the first set of information received at UE 115-b. In some cases, the hash value may additionally be based on an SFN value associated with the first set of information. For example, UE 115-b may calculate a hash value for a SIB using at least a portion of the SIB and the corresponding SFN value as inputs to a hashing function [¶ 0114]; At 350, base station 105-c may determine whether to retransmit, to the UE 115-b, the first set of information in a protected message ( e.g., where the first set of information is protected via ciphering, integrity protection, or a combination thereof) based on the indication of the second set of information … Additionally or alternatively, if base station 105-c identifies a change to the system information for the network since UE 115-b received the system information at 310, the base station 105-c may determine to re-transmit the changed information. In these cases, base station 105-c may re-transmit the first set of information ( e.g., a portion or a complete MIB, set of SIBs, or some combination thereof) to VE 115-b at 355. For example, base station 105-c may re-transmit the first set of information in an RRC re-configuration message, where the first set of information is protected via ciphering, integrity protection, or a combination thereof [¶ 0115, Updated system information sent in protected form]).
Lee discloses the claimed subject matter as discussed above but does not explicitly disclose of the cell. However, Ben Henda teaches of the cell (The wireless device 12 as shown is capable of accessing a first cell 14 [¶ 0058]; A second cell 16 by contrast conceals certain information 18. The concealed information 18 may for instance include system information for the second cell 16, an identifier associated with the second cell 16, information that indicates with which network the second cell 16 is associated, and/or information that indicates which type of network the second cell 16 is associated [¶ 0059, ¶ 0061]; in this regard, the wireless device 12 receives signaling 20 which indicates one or more security parameters 22 usable to obtain the information 18 concealed by the second cell 16 [¶ 0062]; Regardless, the wireless device 12 as shown receives this signaling 20 via the first cell 14. That is, the wireless device 12 receives, via the first cell 14, signaling 20 which indicates one or more security parameters 22 usable by the wireless device 12 to obtain the information 18 concealed by the second cell 16 [¶ 0062]; The signaling 20 may be secured in the sense that it is confidentiality protected, integrity protected, and/or otherwise secured against attack [¶ 0063]; In any event, equipped with the security parameter(s) 22, the wireless device 12 may use the security parameter(s) 22 to obtain the information 18 concealed by the second cell 16 [¶ 0065]; the information 18 concealed by the second cell 16 includes in some embodiments system information for the second cell 16, an identifier (e.g., a CAG ID, PLMN ID, or NID) associated with the second cell 16, and/or information that indicates with which network the second cell 16 is associated and/or with which type of network the second cell 16 is associated [¶ 0069]). Lee and Ben Henda are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor of secure wireless communication. Therefore, based on Lee in view of Ben Henda, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to utilize the teaching of Ben Henda to the system of Lee in order to securely access and communicate with additional cells after communication with an original cell providing cell flexibility. Hence, it would have been obvious to combine the references above to obtain the invention as specified in the instant claim.
Lee in view of Ben Henda discloses the claimed subject matter as discussed above but does not explicitly disclose on a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH). However, YANG teaches on a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH) (The PDSCH is used to transmit the downlink data (the downlink transport block or the DL-SCH). Furthermore, the PDSCH is used to transmit a system information block type-1 message. The system information block type-1 message is cell-specific (cell-peculiar) information [¶ 0057]; In a case where the MU-NAICS assist information is transmitted or in a case of a predetermined transmission mode, the base station apparatus 1A can allocate two types of RNTIs to the terminal apparatus 2A. The two types of RNTIs are referred to as a first RNTI (for example, Cell RNTI) and a second RNTI, respectively. The base station apparatus 1A can include the second RNTI in the MU-NAICS assist information. The base station apparatus 1A can transmit the second RNTI using the higher layer signaling or the physical layer signal. The base station apparatus 1A can mask the Downlink Control Information with the first RNTI, and can scramble a codeword that is carried on the PDSCH, based on the second RNTI, for transmission. Furthermore, in a case where the terminal apparatuses 2A and 2B are non-orthogonally multiplexed, the base station apparatus 1A can scramble a signal (a codeword) on PDSCH 1 and a signal (a codeword) on PDSCH 2 based on the second RNTI with the same ID, for transmission. In a case where a predetermined transmission mode is configured, or in a case where the MU-NAICS information is received, the terminal apparatus 2A blind-decodes the Downlink Control Information based on the first RNTI, and performs the cancellation or suppression of the interference signal based on the second RNTI. Furthermore, the terminal apparatus 2A performs descrambling on the signal on the PDSCH for the terminal apparatus 2A itself, based on the second RNTI, and thus performs the error correction decoding. For example, in a case where the base station apparatus 1A configures a C-RNTI of the terminal apparatus 2B as a second RNTI of the terminal apparatus 2A, because it is not desirable that additional information is transmitted to the terminal apparatus 2B, an increase in an amount of control information can be suppressed [¶ 0089]). Lee in view of Ben Henda and YANG are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor of secure wireless communication. Therefore, based on Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YANG, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to utilize the teaching of YANG to the system of Lee in view of Ben Henda in order to reduce interference which improves throughput (abstract). Hence, it would have been obvious to combine the references above to obtain the invention as specified in the instant claim.
As per claim 16: Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA teach all the limitations of claim 12. Furthermore, Lee and YAMADA disclose wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the NE to scramble codewords of the PDSCH using parameters derived from the security context (At 350, base station 105-c may determine whether to retransmit, to the UE 115-b, the first set of information in a protected message ( e.g., where the first set of information is protected via ciphering, integrity protection, or a combination thereof) based on the indication of the second set of information … Additionally or alternatively, if base station 105-c identifies a change to the system information for the network since UE 115-b received the system information at 310, the base station 105-c may determine to re-transmit the changed information. In these cases, base station 105-c may re-transmit the first set of information ( e.g., a portion or a complete MIB, set of SIBs, or some combination thereof) to VE 115-b at 355. For example, base station 105-c may re-transmit the first set of information in an RRC re-configuration message, where the first set of information is protected via ciphering, integrity protection, or a combination thereof [Lee ¶ 0115, Updated system information sent in protected form]; The PDSCH is used to transmit the downlink data (the downlink transport block or the DL-SCH). Furthermore, the PDSCH is used to transmit a system information block type-1 message. The system information block type-1 message is cell-specific (cell-peculiar) information [¶ 0057]; In a case where the MU-NAICS assist information is transmitted or in a case of a predetermined transmission mode, the base station apparatus 1A can allocate two types of RNTIs to the terminal apparatus 2A. The two types of RNTIs are referred to as a first RNTI (for example, Cell RNTI) and a second RNTI, respectively. The base station apparatus 1A can include the second RNTI in the MU-NAICS assist information. The base station apparatus 1A can transmit the second RNTI using the higher layer signaling or the physical layer signal. The base station apparatus 1A can mask the Downlink Control Information with the first RNTI, and can scramble a codeword that is carried on the PDSCH, based on the second RNTI, for transmission. Furthermore, in a case where the terminal apparatuses 2A and 2B are non-orthogonally multiplexed, the base station apparatus 1A can scramble a signal (a codeword) on PDSCH 1 and a signal (a codeword) on PDSCH 2 based on the second RNTI with the same ID, for transmission. In a case where a predetermined transmission mode is configured, or in a case where the MU-NAICS information is received, the terminal apparatus 2A blind-decodes the Downlink Control Information based on the first RNTI, and performs the cancellation or suppression of the interference signal based on the second RNTI. Furthermore, the terminal apparatus 2A performs descrambling on the signal on the PDSCH for the terminal apparatus 2A itself, based on the second RNTI, and thus performs the error correction decoding. For example, in a case where the base station apparatus 1A configures a C-RNTI of the terminal apparatus 2B as a second RNTI of the terminal apparatus 2A, because it is not desirable that additional information is transmitted to the terminal apparatus 2B, an increase in an amount of control information can be suppressed [¶ 0089]).
As per claim 17: Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA teach all the limitations of claim 12. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the NE to transmit the second system information based on the security context when a paged UE supports decoding using the security context (This indication may be an indication of SIB and/or MIB protection at the radio access network (RAN). In one example, the NAS security mode command may include an information element (e.g., one or more bits) to indicate whether the security feature is enabled. For example, a first bit value ( e.g., a one (1) value) for this information element may indicate that SIB and/or MIB protection is enabled for the network, while a second bit value (e.g., a zero (0) value) may indicate that SIB and/or MIB protection is not enabled or disabled for the network. The UE 115-b may receive the NAS security mode command message, identify the value of this indication, and determine whether to perform detection of system information modification using AS SMC, as described herein, based on the identified value [¶ 0112-0113]).
As per claim 18: Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA teach all the limitations of claim 12. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the NE to transmit the second system information in response to receiving a system information request (As such, a UE may detect any modification of system information (e.g., modification of SIB(s) of interest to the UE) during security setup. Upon detection of system information modification, the UE may request corrected SIB(s) (e.g., from the base station via secure RRC signaling), may select a different cell, etc [¶ 0050]), wherein resources for system information requests are divided into subsets corresponding to UEs that support or do not support decoding using the security context (This indication may be an indication of SIB and/or MIB protection at the radio access network (RAN). In one example, the NAS security mode command may include an information element (e.g., one or more bits) to indicate whether the security feature is enabled. For example, a first bit value ( e.g., a one (1) value) for this information element may indicate that SIB and/or MIB protection is enabled for the network, while a second bit value (e.g., a zero (0) value) may indicate that SIB and/or MIB protection is not enabled or disabled for the network. The UE 115-b may receive the NAS security mode command message, identify the value of this indication, and determine whether to perform detection of system information modification using AS SMC, as described herein, based on the identified value [¶ 0112-0113]).
As per claim 19: Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA teach all the limitations of claim 12. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the second system information comprises hashed bits of at least one of a random access configuration or a paging configuration, the hashing being based on the security context (The connection procedure may include a random access procedure and an RRC configuration procedure [¶ 0110]; the UE 115-b may receive, at 330, an indication that a security feature (e.g., security protection for the first set of information) is enabled [¶ 0112]; In a first example, the indication may be an example of a hash value [¶ 0114]; performing a random access message exchange with the base station, and transmitting a registration request or a service request to the base station following the random access message exchange, where the set of hash values may be received in response at least in part to the registration request or the service request [¶ 0019]; During an AS SMC procedure, a base station may send a set of hash values corresponding to valid system information (e.g., of previously transmitted MIB/SIB(s)) in an AS SMC message to the UE. As such, the UE may determine a hash value for system information that has been read by the UE, and may determine an authenticity of some read system information by comparing the determined hash value and the at least one hash value ( e.g., at least one hash value corresponding to the read system information) of the set of hash values received from the base station in the AS SMC. If system information modification (e.g., MIB/SIB change) is detected by the UE (e.g., by comparing the hash information received in the AS SMC and locally computed hash), the UE may indicate the hash mismatch in an AS security mode complete message [¶ 0048]).
As per claim 20: Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA teach all the limitations of claim 12. The limitations of claim 20 are substantially similar to claim 12 above, and therefore the claim is likewise rejected.
Claim 13 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA in view of Ko.
As per claim 13: Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA teach all the limitations of claim 12. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the NE to [scramble a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) of downlink control information (DCI) in the PDCCH] using bits derived from the security context (This hash value may be based on the first set of information received at UE 115-b. In some cases, the hash value may additionally be based on an SFN value associated with the first set of information. For example, UE 115-b may calculate a hash value for a SIB using at least a portion of the SIB and the corresponding SFN value as inputs to a hashing function. The hashing function may be pre-configured at UE 115-b, configured by the network or base station 105-c in a protected message, or dynamically determined by UE 115-b. Additionally or alternatively, UE 115-b may determine a hash value for multiple SIBS, a MIB, or some combination thereof. UE 115-b may also include, in the AS security mode complete message, an indication of the MIB and/or SIB(s) (e.g., SIB number) read by UE 115-b at 310 and used to generate the hash. Additionally or alternatively, the indication may include other unprotected information exchanged between the UE 115-b and the real base station 105-c prior to completing the security setup procedure. Such unprotected information may also be used to generate the hash [¶ 0114]).
Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA discloses the claimed subject matter as discussed above but does not explicitly disclose scramble a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) of downlink control information (DCI) in the PDCCH. However, Ko teaches scramble a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) of downlink control information (DCI) in the PDCCH (With reference to FIG. 11, the aforementioned embodiments will be described from the perspective of a system. A BS generates DCI by configuring a bit value for identifying a type of an SIB using a bit for an HARQ process ID [S1101] and scrambles a CRC of the DCI using one same SI-RNTI [S1103]. Thereafter, the BS transmits the DCI to a UE [S1105]. Upon receiving the DCI, the UE descrambles the CRC of the DCI using the one same SI-RNTI [S1107] and identifies the type of the SIB scheduled by the DCI using the bit for the HARQ process ID [S1109]. Thereafter, the UE receives, from the BS, the SIB according to the identified SIB type based on scheduling information of the DCI [S1111] [¶ 0116]). Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA and Ko are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor of secure wireless communication. Therefore, based on Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA in view of Ko, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to utilize the teaching of Ko to the system of Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA in order to efficiently understand the type of system information received (¶ 0017). Hence, it would have been obvious to combine the references above to obtain the invention as specified in the instant claim.
Claims 14 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA in view of NPL1.
As per claim 14: Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA teach all the limitations of claim 12. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the NE to [scramble channel bits of the PDCCH using a pseudo-random sequence] initialized based on the security context (Registering the UE 115-b with the network may allow the UE 115-b to obtain a valid NAS security context with the network [¶ 0111]; The network may include network policy information in the NAS security mode command [¶ 0112]; For example, the UE 115-b may receive, at 340, an indication that a security feature ( e.g., security protection for the first set of information) is enabled. This indication may be an indication of SIB and/or MIB protection at the RAN [¶ 0113]).
Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA discloses the claimed subject matter as discussed above but does not explicitly disclose scramble channel bits of the PDCCH using a pseudo-random sequence. However, NPL1 teaches scramble channel bits of the PDCCH using a pseudo-random sequence (The UE shall assume the block of bits b(0), … , b(Mbit – 1), where Mbit is the number of bits transmitted on the physical channel, is scrambled prior to modulation, resulting in a block of scrambled bits … where the scrambling sequence c(i) is given by clause 5.2.1 (Pseudo-random sequence generation) [Page 124, 7.3.2.3 Scrambling; Page 18, 5.2.1 Pseudo-random sequence generation]). Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA and NPL1 are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor of secure wireless communication. Therefore, based on Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA in view of NPL1, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to utilize the teaching of NPL1 to the system of Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA in order to effectively implement known standards as set out by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project. Hence, it would have been obvious to combine the references above to obtain the invention as specified in the instant claim.
As per claim 15: Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA teach all the limitations of claim 12. Furthermore, Lee discloses wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the NE (base station 105-c [¶ 0109]) to determine [an interleaver for control channel element (CCE) to resource element group (REG) mapping in the PDCCH using bits derived from the security context, wherein a CCE comprises a first number of REGs and a REG comprises a second number of resource elements].
Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA discloses the claimed subject matter as discussed above but does not explicitly disclose an interleaver for control channel element (CCE) to resource element group (REG) mapping in the PDCCH using bits derived from the security context, wherein a CCE comprises a first number of REGs and a REG comprises a second number of resource elements. However, NPL1 teaches an interleaver for control channel element (CCE) to resource element group (REG) mapping in the PDCCH using bits derived from the security context, wherein a CCE comprises a first number of REGs and a REG comprises a second number of resource elements (A physical downlink control channel consists of one or more control-channel elements (CCEs) as indicated in Table … A control-resource set consists of N(CORESET, RB) resource blocks in the frequency domain and N(CORESET, symb) element of {1, 2, 3} symbols in the time domain. A control-channel element consists of 6 resource-element groups (REGs) where a resource-element group equals one resource block during one OFDM symbol… A UE can be configured with multiple control-resource sets. Each control-resource set is associated with one CCE-to-REG mapping only [Pages 122-124, 7.3.2 Physical downlink control channel (PDCCH)]). Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA and NPL1 are analogous art because they are from the same field of endeavor of secure wireless communication. Therefore, based on Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA in view of NPL1, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to utilize the teaching of NPL1 to the system of Lee in view of Ben Henda in view of YAMADA in order to effectively implement known standards as set out by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project. Hence, it would have been obvious to combine the references above to obtain the invention as specified in the instant claim.
Conclusion
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/JAMES P MOLES/Examiner, Art Unit 2494
/JUNG W KIM/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2494
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