DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Claims
This action is in reply to the communication filed on 10 November 2025.
Claims 1-20 are currently pending and have been examined.
Response to Arguments
Applicant's arguments filed 10 November 2025 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Rejections under 35 USC §101
Citation to the 2025 USPTO Kim Memorandum and Ex Parte Desjardins
Applicant begins on pages 10 through the top of 15 by citing the recent Kim Memorandum which Examiner notes is based on the recent precedential decision of Ex Parte Desjardins and arguing that Examiner has erroneously simply asserted that the computer components are overly generic. This is incorrect. In Ex Parte Desjardins the Examiner in the case did not provide a 101 rejection, but rather a 101 rejection was a new ground of rejection submitted by the board. “This Appeals Review Panel ("ARP") was convened to review the Board's Decision on Appeal ("Dec.") and Decision on Request for Rehearing ("Reh'g Dec."), with particular focus on the Board's new ground of rejection of claims 1-6 and 8-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).” See Appeal 2024-000567 - Ex Parte Desjardins et al Rehearing Decision Sep 26 2025 at page 1. This new grounds of rejection was later overturned and a Memorandum issued by Deputy Commissioner Charles Kim regarding eligibility particularly when evaluating claims related to machine learning or artificial intelligence. As cited below, these updated are not intended to announce any new USPTO practice or procedure and are meant to be consistent with existing USPTO guidance.
“These updates are not intended to announce any new USPTO practice or procedure and are meant to be consistent with existing USPTO guidance. Indeed, the Ex Parte Desjardins
decision analyzed eligibility in terms of whether the claims were directed to an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field under longstanding Federal Circuit precedent in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See also MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(l) and 2106.05(a).” Charles Kim Memorandum Page 1 (emphasis added).
“In Ex Parte Desjardins, Appeal No. 2024-000567 (PTAB September 26, 2025, Appeals Review Panel Decision) (precedential), the claimed invention was a method of training a machine learning model on a series of tasks. The Appeals Review Panel (ARP) overall credited benefits including reduced storage, reduced system complexity and streamlining, and preservation of performance attributes associated with earlier tasks during subsequent computational tasks as technological improvements that were disclosed in the patent application specification. Specifically, the ARP upheld the Step 2A Prong One finding that the claims recited an abstract idea (i.e., mathematical concept). In Step 2A Prong Two, the ARP then determined that the specification identified improvements as to how the machine learning model itself operates, including training a machine learning model to learn new tasks while protecting knowledge about previous tasks to overcome the problem of “catastrophic forgetting” encountered in continual learning systems. Importantly, the ARP evaluated the claims as a whole in discerning at least the limitation “adjust the first values of the plurality of parameters to optimize performance of the machine learning model on the second machine learning task while protecting performance of the machine learning model on the first machine learning task” reflected the improvement disclosed in the specification. Accordingly, the claims as a whole integrated what would otherwise be a judicial exception instead into a practical application at Step 2A Prong Two, and therefore the claims were deemed to be outside any specific, enumerated judicial exception (Step 2A: NO).” Charles Kim Memorandum Page 2; to be added to the end of MPRP §2106.04(d)(III) (emphasis added).
As such, the specification identified improvements as to how the machine learning model itself operates. In the instant application, the specification does not provide such improvements to any technology applicant asserts. As cited in the previous and instant Office Action (and reproduced here for convenience):
“The computer components mentioned above are disclosed in applicant’s specification. The processor is described (See paragraph [0162] of the specification) as: The CPU may be a microprocessor such as: AMD's Athlon®, Duron® and/or Opteron®; Apple's® A series of processors (e.g., A5, A6, A7, A8, etc.); ARM's® application, embedded and secure processors; IBM® and/or Motorola's DragonBall® and PowerPC®; IBM's® and Sony's® Cell processor; Intel's® 80X86 series (e.g., 80386, 80486), Pentium®, Celeron®, Core (2) Duo®, i series (e.g., i3, i5, i7, etc.), Itanium®, Xeon®, and/or XScale®; Motorola's® 680X0 series (e.g., 68020, 68030, 68040, etc.); and/or the like processor(s). The memory is described (See paragraph [0161]) as: “…a memory 1929 (e.g., a read only memory (ROM) 1906, a random access memory (RAM) 1905, etc.)” The component collection mentioned above is disclosed in applicant’s specification. The component collection is described (See at least paragraph [0175]) as: “The memory 1929 may contain a collection of program and/or database components and/or data such as, but not limited to: operating system component(s) 1915(operating system); information server component(s) 1916(information server); user interface component(s) 1917(user interface); Web browser component(s) 1918(Web browser); database(s) 1919;mail server component(s) 1921;mail client component(s) 1922;cryptographic server component(s) 1920 (cryptographic server); the SKCME component(s) 1935; and/or the like (i.e., collectively a component collection).” Therefore applicant’s own specification supports these components are generic computer components.
The component collection mentioned above is/are disclosed in applicant' s specification as being a collection of program and/or database components and/or data that are unconventional (See paragraph [0175] of the specification). Examiner notes that basic computer functions such as receiving or transmitting data over a network, performing repetitive calculations, electronic recordkeeping, storing and retrieving information in memory, electronically scanning or extracting data from a physical document, and a Web browser’s back and forward button functionality were recognized by the courts as computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g. at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. See MPEP 2106.05(d)(II). If applicant asserts that the collection of components comprise a particular machine it is then important to note that a general purpose computer that applies a judicial exception, such as an abstract idea, by use of conventional computer functions does not qualify as a particular machine. If the applicant asserts that the claim recites significantly more because the generic computer is 'specially programmed' or is a 'particular machine' the examiner should look at whether the added elements provide significantly more than the judicial exception. See MPEP § 2106.05(b)(I).”
Thus, applicant’s specification does not support the idea that the cited additional elements amount to an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or a technical field as the specification did in Ex Parte Desjardins. The instant case is not analogous to Ex Parte Desjardins.
The USPTO Guidelines for Subject Matter Eligibility
Applicant continues by citing how the 101 analysis works and providing examples of patent eligible case law. Applicant’s specific arguments begin on page 26 (with the header present on the end of page 26).
Step 1
Applicant cites Examiner’s Step 1 analysis and asserts it as establishment of the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims. This is incorrect. Examiner’s Step 1 analysis does not establish the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim. The claims at hand do not need further explanation or clarification of their broadest reasonable interpretation as the claim elements are clearly described by their plain meaning. “Under a broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI), words of the claim must be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with the specification. The plain meaning of a term means the ordinary and customary meaning given to the term by those of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time.” See MPEP 2111.01(I). As such an additional section defining the meaning of every term in the claims is unnecessary and is already established by default by the plain meaning of the terms in the claims. Applicant’s interpretation of the Step 1 analysis as establishment of the claims’ BRI is incorrect. As such Applicant’s arguments regarding establishment of BRI are moot as they are being misapplied.
Applicant further argues that several claim limitations are ignored in the Office Action’s analysis for the various steps. Examiner respectfully disagrees. Examiner first notes that the preamble is not given patentable weight since none of the terminology in the preamble imparts structure (beyond embodying the invention as an apparatus) to the claim and merely describes an intended use as an apparatus (the use of which is later on enumerated in the body of the claim). When reading the preamble in the context of the entire claim, the recitation of “A secret key-based counterparty matching apparatus, comprising:” is not limiting because the body of the claim describes a complete invention and the language recited solely in the preamble does not provide any distinct definition of any of the claimed invention' s limitations. Thus, the preamble of the claim(s) is not considered a limitation and is of no significance to claim construction. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See MPEP § 2111.02. Each claim element that was submitted is clearly accounted for throughout the 101 analysis including submitted versions of said generating steps and said adding steps.
Applicant further argues against presented arguments relating to elements which do not pertain to the instant set of claims. As the noted set of claims cited on page 31 of the remarks are not the instant set, do not have highlights as asserted, and as such the arguments associated therewith are moot. Examiner further notes that all the claim elements are clearly present throughout the 101 rejection starting on page 28 of the Office Action mailed on 18 July 2024 which plainly includes the generating a secret matched key associated with a security identifier limitation and continuing on with the remainder of the claim limitations throughout the rejection. Examiner recommends highlight limitations from the current set of claims as those are the ones under prosecution.
Applicant appears to argue in paragraphs [0036]-[0040] that not giving the preamble patentable weight is the same as admitting to not giving patentable weight to body claim elements. This is incorrect. As stated above, the preamble is not given patentable weight (beyond recitation as an apparatus) since none of the terminology in the preamble imparts structure to the claim and merely describes an intended use of an apparatus (the use of which is later enumerated in the body of the claim). When reading the preamble in the context of the entire claim, the recitation of “A secret key-based counterparty matching apparatus, comprising:” is not limiting because the body of the claim fully and intrinsically sets forth all of the limitations of the claimed invention, the preamble merely states the purpose or intended use of the invention, rather than any distinct definition of any of the claimed invention' s limitations. Thus, the preamble of the claim(s) is not considered a limitation and is of no significance to claim construction. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See MPEP § 2111.02(II). Thus all the claim elements are clearly considered when evaluating the claims.
Step 2A
Applicant argues throughout paragraphs [0041]-[0045] that the Office Action improperly provided a mere assertion that all claim elements are “abstract”, “conventional” and/or “generic”. Examiner respectfully disagrees. Examiner first notes that nowhere in the Step 2A analysis were the cited claim limitations analyzed as “conventional”. Said analysis is clearly reserved for Step 2B as is appropriate. “Another consideration when determining whether a claim recites significantly more than a judicial exception is whether the additional element(s) are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry.” (MPEP 2106.05(d)). Indeed the MPEP regularly uses the terminology of “generic” when performing an analysis under Step 2A Prong 2 (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) and reserves usage of the terms “conventional”, “well-understood” or “routine” for evaluation under Step 2B (See MPEP 2106.05(f)). Consideration of whether or not a claim element is “well-understood”, “routine”, or “conventional” is only evaluated in Step 2B of the eligibility analysis.” See MPEP 2106.05(d). As such any argument regarding usage of the term “generic” requiring factual determination is moot as usage of such a term does not require a factual determination. The claims are abstract because they describe a marketing or sales activity by describing an implementation of setting up a cross (prior Office Action at page 28). This is further supported by applicant’s own specification at paragraph [0032] “The overnight process may generate (e.g., precompute before market opens) cross info (e.g., sets of matched keys, cross times, cross venues, and/or the like) to be used by the engine server to match counterparties, such as users 1-Nu 110. When the engine server receives orders for a security from the users, the engine server uses the cross info to determine the next scheduled time when the orders should be sent, and, at the next scheduled time, sends the orders to the next scheduled venue, from venues 1-Ny 150, for execution.” If a claim limitation(s), under their broadest reasonable interpretation, describes commercial or legal interactions but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it falls within the “Certain Methods of Organizing Activity” grouping of abstract ideas. The claims recite an abstract idea.
Applicant argues that their claims are eligible for reasons similar to those in DDR Holdings. In DDR Holdings the case was eligible due to the unique problem introduced by integration of the abstract idea into the realm of computer implementation. The instant application has no such problem being created by implementation of the abstract idea onto a computer system and thus are mere instructions to apply the exception using a computer. Applicant’s claims do not present the same issue present in DDR.
Applicant argues that their claims are eligible for reasons similar to those in Enfish. The claims here are unlike the claims in Enfish. In Enfish, the claims at issue focused not on asserted advances in uses to which existing computer capabilities could be put, but on a specific improvement-a particular database technique-in how computers could carry out one of their basic functions of storage and retrieval of data. In Enfish v. Microsoft, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision… that “the self-referential table recited in the claims on appeal is a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory” which is “directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts.” See also details in re TLI Communication LLC. In contrast, the instant claims provide a generically computer-implemented solution to a business-related or economic problem and are thus incomparable to the claims at issue in Enfish,. The present case is different: the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools. The claims here are not directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality nor an inventive solution to any computer specific problem.
Applicant argues that their claims are eligible for reasons similar to those in Finjan. Examiner respectfully disagrees. In Finjan Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018), the claimed invention involves a method of virus scanning that scans an application program, generates a security profile identifying any potentially suspicious code in the program, and links the security profile to the application program. The claims were held patent eligible because the court concluded that the claimed method recites specific steps that accomplish a result that realizes an improvement in computer functionality. In particular, the method generates a security profile that identifies both hostile and potentially hostile operations, and can protect the user against both previously unknown viruses and "obfuscated code." This is an improvement over traditional virus scanning, which only recognized the presence of previously-identified viruses. The method also enables more flexible virus filtering and greater user customization. The instant claim sets do not involve virus scanning and do not recite more than mere implementation of an abstract idea onto a computer such that the claim set does not recite specific steps that accomplish a result that realizes an improvement in computer functionality. The case of Finjan does not apply.
Step 2B
Applicant once again argues that the Office Action improperly provided a mere assertion that all claim elements are “abstract”, “conventional” and/or “generic”. Examiner respectfully disagrees. The claim limitations afford the claim as reciting an abstract idea as noted in Step 2A Prong 1. With regards to Step 2B: “Although the conclusion of whether a claim is eligible at Step 2B requires that all relevant considerations be evaluated, most of these considerations were already evaluated in Step 2A Prong Two. Thus, in Step 2B, examiners should:
• Carry over their identification of the additional element(s) in the claim from Step 2A Prong Two;
• Carry over their conclusions from Step 2A Prong Two on the considerations discussed in MPEP §§ 2106.05(a) - (c), (e) (f) and (h):
• Re-evaluate any additional element or combination of elements that was considered to be insignificant extra-solution activity per MPEP § 2106.05(g), because if such re-evaluation finds that the element is unconventional or otherwise more than what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, this finding may indicate that the additional element is no longer considered to be insignificant; and
• Evaluate whether any additional element or combination of elements are other than what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, per MPEP § 2106.05(d).” (MPEP 2106.05(II)
Each claim limitation that is considered to be insignificant extra-solution activity per MPEP §2106.05(g) is clearly re-evaluated and determined to be conventional using the required factual determination of a citation to one or more of the court decisions discussed in MPEP 2106.05(d)(II) “The required factual determination must be expressly supported in writing, as discussed in MPEP § 2106.07(a). Appropriate forms of support include one or more of the following:… (b) A citation to one or more of the court decisions discussed in Subsection II below as noting the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s);…” (MPEP 2106.05(d)(I)). Thus, there are no further elements to evaluate under Step 2B. Most considerations relating to any additional elements were already evaluated in Step 2A Prong Two and thus do not require further re-evaluation in Step 2B. The Step 2B analysis is proper.
Applicant argues that their claims are eligible for reasons similar to those in Amdocs. Examiner respectfully disagrees. Applicant’s citation of Amdocs is non-persuasive because the claims at issue in Amdocs are readily distinguishable over the instant claims. In Amdocs the courts construed “enhance” as being dependent upon the invention’s distributed architecture. 761 F.3d at 1338–40 (quoting ’065 patent at 7:51–57, 10:45–50, 7:7–8). “… We construed “enhance” as meaning “to apply a number of field enhancements in a distributed fashion.” The enhancing limitation depends not only on the invention’s distributed architecture, but also depends upon the network devices and gatherers—even though these may be generic—working together in a distributed manner. The patent explains that field enhancements are defined by network service providers for each field in which the network service provider wants to collect data. ’065 patent at 12:43–47. “A field enhancement specifies how the data obtained from the trigger of the enhancement procedure is processed before it is placed in a single field in the central database 175.” Id. at 11:2–5.” The instant claims do not attempt to solve an unconventional technological solution. Using the processor as a tool to implement the abstract idea and the way the information is processed and displayed does not make it less abstract. The case of Amdocs does not apply.
Applicant asserts that the incorporation of their invention includes improvements to increased processing efficiency and security (See at least paragraph [0049]) The October 2019 Update clarifies how additional elements can impose meaningful limits on a recited judicial exception:
“Consideration of improvements is relevant to the integration analysis regardless of the technology of the claimed invention. That is, the consideration applies equally whether it is a computer-implemented invention, an invention in the life sciences, or any other technology. See, e.g., Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., in which the court noted that a claimed process for preserving hepatocytes could be eligible as an improvement to technology because the claim achieved a new and improved way for preserving hepatocyte cells for later use, even though the claim is based on the discovery of something natural.71 Notably, the court did not distinguish between the types of technology when determining that the invention improved technology. However, it is important to keep in mind that an improvement in the judicial exception itself (e.g., a recited fundamental economic concept) is not an improvement in technology. For example, in Trading Technologies Int’l v. IBG LLC, the court determined that the claim simply provided a trader with more information to facilitate market trades, which improved the business process of market trading but did not improve computers or technology.72 Note, there is no requirement for the judicial exception to provide the improvement. The improvement can be provided by one or more additional elements (as in Diehr), or by the additional element(s) in combination with the recited judicial exception (as in Finjan).73 Thus, it is important for examiners to analyze the claim as a whole when determining whether the claim provides an improvement to the functioning of computers or an improvement to other technology or technical field.” (October 2019 Eligibility Update, page 13)
Drawing attention to the emphasized section, improvements in the judicial exception itself is not an improvement in technology. In the current case, regardless of whether or not applicant’s invention improves the recited judicial exception, improving a method, algorithm, or process of a judicial exception absent of any technological modification, would be an improvement to the judicial exception (e.g. via the improvement in the efficiency of the judicial exception), but does not improve computers or technology. Examiner notes that applicant’s purported improvement (as explained above) comes from potential improvements in the judicial exception, and not from improvements to computers or technology as the recitation of computing components in the claimed invention amounts to no more than invoking computers merely as a tool. See at least MPEP 2106.05(a)(I). The recitation of generic computing components to perform an otherwise ineligible judicial exception does not confer patent eligibility.
Applicant argues that the features of the claims simply did not exist. Although the courts often evaluate considerations such as the conventionality of an additional element in the eligibility analysis, the search for an inventive concept should not be confused with a novelty or non-obviousness determination. See MPEP § 2106.05(I). Although the second step in the Alice/Mayo framework is termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself. Furthermore, tests for whether an element is conventional under Step 2B only applies to the additional elements recited and not to the abstract idea present within the claims. Improvement of technology by virtue of novelty or non-obviousness is not a test of eligibility.
Applicant argues that the Office Action has provided no factual determination and that the claims include unconventional features not available in the prior art. Examiner notes these arguments regarding providing of a factual determination, the conventional nature of the elements in Step 2B, and availability in the prior art have already been addressed above and Examiner incorporates their prior response herein.
Applicant argues that their claims are eligible for reasons similar to those in Berkheimer. Examiner respectfully disagrees. In Berkheimer, a computer parsed data files and transformed the structure of the data itself from source to object code to archive said data and the combination of elements improved computers through elimination of redundant storage of common text and graphical elements. The instant case is not so concerned with data storage problems and does not transform data to remove redundant storage. The case of Berkheimer does not apply.
Applicant argues that the claims must be analyzed using the machine-or-transformation test and that the claims are eligible under said test. Examiner respectfully disagrees. “When determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception, into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two and whether a claim recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B, examiners should consider whether the judicial exception is applied with, or by use of, a particular machine. "The machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, and investigative tool" for determining whether a claim is patent eligible under § 101. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1007 (2010).” See MPEP 2106.05(b). Examiner’s analysis of whether or not each of the computing elements comprises generic computing components satisfies the machine-or-transformation test. Applicant further asserts that the computer components are disclosed as transforming the system into a unique specific machine module/component structure (See paragraph [0049] of the remarks). It is important to note that a general purpose computer that applies a judicial exception, such as an abstract idea, by use of conventional computer functions does not qualify as a particular machine. If the applicant asserts that the claim recites significantly more because the generic computer is 'specially programmed' or is a 'particular machine' the examiner should look at whether the added elements provide significantly more than the judicial exception. See MPEP § 2106.05(b)(I). This analysis is already performed in Steps 2A prong 2 and Step 2B. Furthermore, since the claim does not amount to significantly more than the exception in Step 2B, the result of the machine-or-transformation test is irrelevant and cannot render the claims eligible. “And if a claim fails the Alice/Mayo test (i.e., is directed to an exception at Step 2A and does not amount to significantly more than the exception in Step 2B), then the claim is ineligible even if it passes the M-or-T test. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256, 113 USPQ2d 1097, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[I]n Mayo, the Supreme Court emphasized that satisfying the machine-or-transformation test, by itself, is not sufficient to render a claim patent-eligible, as not all transformations or machine implementations infuse an otherwise ineligible claim with an 'inventive concept.'").” See MPEP 2106.05(b). The claims do not pass Step 2B and are not eligible.
Applicant further repeats that Examiner has provided no factual determination for Step 2B and impermissibly provided a mere assertion that all claim elements/components are generic. Examiner respectfully disagrees. Examiner notes these arguments regarding providing of a factual determination and the conventional nature of the elements in Step 2B have already been addressed above and Examiner incorporates their prior response herein. The claims are not eligible.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101
35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Step 1 of the 101 Analysis:
Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. The claims recite an apparatus, system, non-transient physical medium, and method for secret-key based counterparty matching. These are machines, an article of manufacture, and process which are within the four categories of statutory subject matter.
Step 2A Prong 1 of the 101 Analysis:
The following limitations and/or similar versions are found in claim(s) 1 and 18-20:
Claims 1 and 18-20:
“generating a secret matched key associated with a security identifier;”
“converting the matched key into an initializer value using a conversion calculation;”
“determining a cross frequency for the security identifier;”
“generating a set of cross times for the security identifier using a sequence from the random number generator and the cross frequency;”
“generating a set of cross venue identifiers for the security identifier using a sequence from the random number generator and the cross frequency, in which the cardinality of the set of cross times is equal to the cardinality of the set of cross venue identifiers;”
“obtaining a first order associated with the security identifier from a first counterparty;”
“determining a scheduled cross time, from the set of cross times for the security identifier, for the first order;”
“determining a cross venue identifier, from the set of cross venue identifiers for the security identifier, that corresponds to the scheduled cross time;”
“adding a first order data structure for the first order to a set of pending orders for the security specified by the security identifier for execution at the scheduled cross time at the venue specified by the cross venue identifier;”
“obtaining a second order associated with the security identifier from a second counterparty;”
“determining the scheduled cross time, from the set of cross times for the security identifier, for the second order;”
“determining the cross venue identifier, from the set of cross venue identifiers for the security identifier, that corresponds to the scheduled cross time;”
“adding a second order data structure for the second order to the set of pending orders for the security specified by the security identifier for execution at the scheduled cross time at the venue specified by the cross venue identifier;”
“sending orders in the set of pending orders for the security specified by the security identifier for execution at the venue specified by the cross venue identifier.”
These limitations, as drafted, are a process that, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, describes commercial or legal interactions but for the recitation of generic computer components. That is, other than reciting “a memory”, “a processor”, “a matched key generating component [means]”, “an order processing component [means]”, “a non-transient physical medium storing processor-executable instructions” or “processor-implemented” nothing in the claims’ elements precludes the steps from practically describing commercial or legal interactions. For example, but for the recited computer language, the limitations in the context of this claim describes marketing or sales activities or behaviors. A marketing or sales activity is described when setting up and facilitating a cross. If a claim limitations, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, describes commercial or legal interactions but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it falls within the “Certain Methods of Organizing Activity” grouping of abstract ideas.
Dependent claim(s) 12-17 are directed to the following:
Claim(s) 12:
“…in which the orders in the set of pending orders are sent to the venue.”
Claim(s) 13:
“selecting a first broker dealer, from available trusted broker dealers, for the first order;”
“selecting a second broker dealer, from available trusted broker dealers, for the second order;”
“in which the first order, in the set of pending orders, is sent to the first broker dealer for execution at the venue, and the second order, in the set of pending orders, is sent to the second broker dealer for execution at the venue.”
Claim(s) 14:
“…in which the first broker dealer utilizes the matched key to determine the scheduled cross time and the cross venue identifier for the first order, and in which the second broker dealer utilizes the matched key to determine the scheduled cross time and the cross venue identifier for the second order.”
Claim(s) 15:
“…in which the orders in the set of pending orders are sent for execution at the scheduled cross time.”
Claim(s) 16:
“…in which the orders in the set of pending orders are sent for execution a specified amount of latency mitigation time before the scheduled cross time.”
Claim(s) 17:
“determining that the first order was partially filled;”
“updating the first order by modifying the first order data structure to reflect the remaining quantity to be filled;”
“determining a second scheduled cross time, from the set of cross times for the security identifier, for the updated first order;”
“determining a second cross venue identifier, from the set of cross venue identifiers for the security identifier, that corresponds to the second scheduled cross time;”
“adding the modified first order data structure for the updated first order to a second set of pending orders for the security specified by the security identifier for execution at the second scheduled cross time at the venue specified by the second cross venue identifier;”
“sending,…, orders in the second set of pending orders for the security specified by the security identifier for execution at the venue specified by the second cross venue identifier.”
These processes are similar to the abstract idea noted in the independent claims because they further the limitations of the independent claim which are directed to certain methods of organizing human activity which include commercial and legal interactions such as marketing or sales activities or behaviors. Accordingly, these claim elements do not serve to confer subject matter eligibility to the claims since they are directed to abstract ideas.
Dependent claim(s) 2-11 include the following limitations which are not directed to any additional abstract ideas and are also not directed to any additional non-abstract claim elements:
Claim 2:
“…in which the matched key is generated using a set of client keys that includes a client key from the first counterparty and the second counterparty.”
Claim 3:
“…in which the matched key is an individual key for the security identifier.”
Claim 4:
“…in which the matched key is a derived key for the security identifier generated based on a master matched key utilized for a specified duration.”
Claim 5:
“…in which the derived key is converted into the initializer value using a concatenation method.”
Claim 6:
“…in which the derived key is converted into the initializer value using a modulo sum method.”
Claim 7:
“…in which the initializer value is an integer value.”
Claim 8:
“…in which the cross times are generated to provide one cross time per minute.”
Claim 9:
“…in which the cross times are generated using exponential distribution between time.”
Claim 10:
“…in which the set of cross times for the security identifier is ordered in ascending order, and in which the scheduled cross time is the next available cross time, from the set of cross times for the security identifier, at the time of obtaining the first order.”
Claim 11:
“…in which the venue is one of a stock exchange, a dark pool.”
Rather, these claims offer further descriptive limitations of elements found in the independent claims and addressed above – such as by describing the nature and content of the data that is received/sent. While these descriptive elements may provide further helpful context for the claimed invention these elements do not serve to confer subject matter eligibility to the invention since their individual and combined significance is still not heavier than the abstract concepts at the core of the claimed invention. Step 2A prong 2 and Step 2B for these limitations therefore are the same as for the independent claims.
Accordingly, the claims recite an abstract idea.
Step 2A Prong 2 of the 101 Analysis:
This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. In particular, the independent claim(s) recite the following additional elements:
Claim 1:
“at least one memory;”
“a component collection stored in the at least one memory;”
“any of at least one processor disposed in communication with the at least one memory, the any of at least one processor executing processor-executable instructions from the component collection, storage of the component collection structured with processor-executable instructions comprising:”
Claims 1 and 18-20:
“set,…, a random generator seed of a random number generator to the initializer value;”
Claim(s) 18:
“A secret key-based counterparty matching processor-readable, non-transient medium, the medium storing a component collection, storage of the component collection structured with processor-executable instructions comprising:
Claim(s) 19:
“means to store a component collection” (Examiner notes to see the claim interpretation section).
“means to process processor-executable instructions from the component collection, storage of the component collection structured with processor-executable instructions including:”
Claim(s) 20:
“…including processing processor-executable instructions via any of at least one processor from a component collection stored in at least one memory, storage of the component collection structured with processor-executable instructions, comprising:…”
The computer components (memory/storage (also means to store), processor (also means to process), component collection) are recited at a high level of generality (i.e. as a generic processor, generic storage, and generic component software program instructions) such that it amounts to no more than mere instructions to implement the judicial exception on a computer. These element(s) in combination do not add anything that is not already pre-sent when the steps are considered separately. Simply implementing an abstract idea on a computer is not indicative of integration into a practical application (See MPEP § 2106.05(f).)
The setting step(s) are recited at a high-level of generality (i.e., as generally setting a seed) such that they amounts to no more than mere data gathering or outputting which is adding insignificant extra-solution activity. These element(s) in combination do not add anything that is not already pre-sent when the steps are considered separately. Simply adding insignificant extra-solution activity is not indicative of integration into a practical application (See MPEP § 2106.05(g).)
The dependent claims contain no additional elements.
Accordingly, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.
The claims are directed to an abstract idea.
Step 2B of the 101 Analysis:
The computer components mentioned above are disclosed in applicant’s specification. The processor is described (See paragraph [0162] of the specification) as: The CPU may be a microprocessor such as: AMD's Athlon®, Duron® and/or Opteron®; Apple's® A series of processors (e.g., A5, A6, A7, A8, etc.); ARM's® application, embedded and secure processors; IBM® and/or Motorola's DragonBall® and PowerPC®; IBM's® and Sony's® Cell processor; Intel's® 80X86 series (e.g., 80386, 80486), Pentium®, Celeron®, Core (2) Duo®, i series (e.g., i3, i5, i7, etc.), Itanium®, Xeon®, and/or XScale®; Motorola's® 680X0 series (e.g., 68020, 68030, 68040, etc.); and/or the like processor(s). The memory is described (See paragraph [0161]) as: “…a memory 1929 (e.g., a read only memory (ROM) 1906, a random access memory (RAM) 1905, etc.)” The component collection mentioned above is disclosed in applicant’s specification. The component collection is described (See at least paragraph [0175]) as: “The memory 1929 may contain a collection of program and/or database components and/or data such as, but not limited to: operating system component(s) 1915(operating system); information server component(s) 1916(information server); user interface component(s) 1917(user interface); Web browser component(s) 1918(Web browser); database(s) 1919;mail server component(s) 1921;mail client component(s) 1922;cryptographic server component(s) 1920 (cryptographic server); the SKCME component(s) 1935; and/or the like (i.e., collectively a component collection).” Therefore applicant’s own specification supports these components are generic computer components.
The component collection mentioned above is/are disclosed in applicant' s specification as being a collection of program and/or database components and/or data that are unconventional (See paragraph [0175] of the specification). Examiner notes that basic computer functions such as receiving or transmitting data over a network, performing repetitive calculations, electronic recordkeeping, storing and retrieving information in memory, electronically scanning or extracting data from a physical document, and a Web browser’s back and forward button functionality were recognized by the courts as computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g. at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. See MPEP 2106.05(d)(II). If applicant asserts that the collection of components comprise a particular machine it is then important to note that a general purpose computer that applies a judicial exception, such as an abstract idea, by use of conventional computer functions does not qualify as a particular machine. If the applicant asserts that the claim recites significantly more because the generic computer is 'specially programmed' or is a 'particular machine' the examiner should look at whether the added elements provide significantly more than the judicial exception. See MPEP § 2106.05(b)(I).
The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional elements identified in Step 2A Prong 2 amount to no more than mere instructions to implement the judicial exception on a computer or no more than mere data gathering or data outputting which only adds insignificant extra solution activity to the judicial exception. These element(s) in combination do not add anything that is not already pre-sent when the steps are considered separately. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity cannot provide an inventive concept when the activities are well-understood routine and conventional. The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well-understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner:
(for setting a seed of a random number generator) Performing repetitive calculations, (See MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)).
The claims are not patent eligible.
Prior Art
A prior art search was performed but Examiner has determined that the claims would be non-obvious over the cited prior art. What follows is a discussion of the closest prior art Examiner could find.
Barnet-lamb et al. (WO 2014/210311 A1) as both the closest reference and the closest foreign reference examiner could find discloses executing trade orders by applying random time delays and generating a queue using said time delays.
Asharov et al. (US 2021/0174441 A1) discloses matching clients using shared random numbers.
Walden et al. (US 2020/0104854 A1) discloses matching orders using private and public keys.
Wilkins et al. (US 10,552,829 B2) discloses matching encrypted orders based on their assigned priority.
Massacci et al. (US 2019/0244290 A1) discloses the usage of random number generators to generate private parameters.
Gastineau et al. (US 7,496,531 B1) discloses using numbers drawn randomly from a probability distribution in order to publish net asset value proxies.
Taylor et al. (US 10,037,568 B2) discloses matching buyers to sellers using instrument keys and seeding validation checks.
Camenisch et al. (US 2009/0313172 A1) discloses matching buyers and sellers in anonymous electronic markets.
Carlone (“High Frequency Trading An Analysis Regarding Volatility And Liquidity Starting From A Base Case Of Algorithms And A Dedicated Software Architecture”) as the closest NPL examiner could find discloses a reference architecture for high frequency trading application.
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
Basu et al. (WO 2024/108046 A1) discloses hiding data when performing matching of transactions in order to preserve data privacy.
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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/A.H./Examiner, Art Unit 3691
/ABHISHEK VYAS/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3691