DETAILED ACTION
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
This action is in response to the claims/remarks filed 6/10/2026. Claims 1-3, 5-13, 15-22, 24, and 25 are pending. Claims 1 (a method), 10 (a method), and 20 (a machine) are independent.
Response to Arguments
The 112(b) rejections are withdrawn due to amendments and arguments filed 6/10/2026.
Applicant's arguments filed 6/10/2026 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
On page 9 of the remarks, Applicant states: “The Katar reference relates to an EVSE authentication procedure, but does not teach or suggest at least cross-certification involving subordinate CAs under a different root CA.”
As noted in the Office Action mailed 3/10/2026 on page 6, lines 23-26, and page 8, lines 21-22, neither Katar nor Vaidya discloses a cross certificate for a subordinate CA. The Burr reference was cited for the concept of cross-certifying subordinate CAs, as shown in § 4 and Figure 4, showing cross certifying subordinate CAs.
Vaida discloses cross certification between different root CAs, see Vaidya p. 1575. Therefore, the combination of Katar in view of Vaidya and Burr discloses cross certification of a subordinate CA (Burr) that involves different root CAs (Vaidya).
Although Applicant places emphasis in the arguments (page 10) regarding root CAs and subordinate CAs; examiner respectfully submits that this distinction is misplaced. Certificates, by design, share a common structure and method of validation. Changing existing certificate infrastructure to accommodate multiple root CAs with a cross certificate changes neither the certificates themselves nor their manner of use. Rather, the only modification is a business decision on which CAs are authorized to issue certificates for other entities (including subordinate CAs). Vaidya and Burr discloses these business decisions and such can be easily implemented using existing certificate handling techniques.
Thus, the combination of Katar in view of Vaidya and Burr would render the claimed cross certification of subordinate CAs under different root CAs obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-3, 5-6, 8-13, 15-16, 18-22, and 24-25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Katar et al. (U.S. 2015/0189581 A1), hereinafter “Katar”, in view of Vaidya et al. (“Multi-domain Public Key Infrastructure for vehicle-to-Grid Network”, 2015, IEEE), hereinafter “Vaidya”, and Burr et al. “A Proposed Federal PKI Using X.509 V3 Certificates” (published 1996).
Referring to claims 1, 20:
Katar teaches:
A method of validating electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) (see Katar, fig. 6; [0024] ‘After the matched charging station 106 (e.g., an authentication unit of the matched charging station 106) successfully authenticates and authorizes the electric vehicle 102, the electric vehicle 102 can receive electric power from the matched charging station 106 ...’) performed by an electric vehicle (EV) to be supplied with electric power from the EVSE and trusting a second root CA, the method comprising (see Katar [0045] ‘the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the electric vehicle 102.’; [0032] ‘The public key certificate associated with the electric vehicle 102 may be signed by a certificate authority (CA) authorized to issue electric vehicle certificates. The public key certificate associated with the electric vehicle 102 may have one or more attributes that identify the certificate
holder (i.e., the electric vehicle 102) as a legitimate electric vehicle. Furthermore,
the certificate authority that signed the electric vehicle's certificate may be
authorized to vouch for the electric vehicle's identity .... ‘; [0033] ‘The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110.’), the method comprising:
transmitting, by the EV, a certificate-related request to the EVSE (see Katar, [0019] ‘the association unit 112 of the electric vehicle 102 transmits a request ... to establish a communication line with one of the charging stations 106, 1 08, and 110’)
associated with a charge point operator (CPO) having established a trust relationship with a first root certificate authority (CA), (“The public key certificate associated with the electric vehicle 102 may be signed by a certificate authority (CA) authorized to issue electric vehicle certificates.” Katar ¶ 32. Validated in Katar ¶ 45) wherein the EV is configured to verify certificates (“the electric vehicle 102 (e.g., the association unit 112) may also receive security information (e.g., public key certificates) associated with each of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110. All public key certificates received by the electric vehicle 102 can be validated (e.g., in accordance with Section 9 of ZigBee-11185r05) before associating the public key with the identity and attributes of the certificate.” Katar ¶ 33)
based on a second root CA certificate that has been issued and signed by a second root CA different from the first root CA; (“The public key certificate associated with the charging station 106 may be signed by a CA authorized to issue charging station certificates.” Katar ¶ 46)
receiving, from the EVSE, a certificate chain of the EVSE including a cross certificate attached certificate list [i.e. the certificate chain ], and CRLs. The public key certificate associated with the charging station 106 may be signed by a CA authorized to issue charging station certificates…’); and
verifying the certificate chain based on … root CA certificate that has been issued and signed by the second root CA (see Katar, [0033] ‘the electric vehicle 102 can verify the attributes indicated in the public key certificate to validate the charging station 106 that transmitted the public key certificate. The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110 ....... After the security information is exchanged, subsequent messages transmitted from the electric vehicle 102 to the charging stations 106, 108, and 110 may be signed and/or encrypted ... ‘).
Katar suggests the cross-certificate, and the subordinate certificate authority (see Katar, [0045] ‘the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the electric vehicle 102.’; [0032] ‘The public key certificate associated with the electric vehicle 102 may be signed by a certificate authority (CA) authorized to issue electric vehicle certificates. The public key certificate associated with the electric vehicle 102 may have one or more attributes that identify the certificate holder (i.e., the electric vehicle 102) as a legitimate electric vehicle. Furthermore, the certificate authority that signed the electric vehicle's certificate may be authorized to vouch for the electric vehicle's identity .... ‘; [0033] ‘The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110.’).
However, Katar does not disclose:
Cross certified by the second root CA for a first subordinate CA under the first root CA,
the cross certificate cross certified by the second root CA and the second
Vaidya discloses:
A method of validating an electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) associated with a charge point operator (CPO) having established a trust relationship with a first root certificate authority (CA), performed by an electric vehicle (EV) to be supplied with electric power from the EVSE and trusting a second root CA, the method comprising: (see Vaidya Fig. 2 showing elements of a vehicle charging network and certificate chain thereof. “Each OEM possesses OEM root certificate that is not derived from V2G root certificate.” Vaidya p. 1574)
Transmitting, by the EV, a certificate-related request to the EVSE; (“Basically V2G system describes a system in which EVs can communicate with the utility and other service providers for various purposes. V2G network, which embraces several stakeholders including charging facility, energy provider, and clearinghouse, would be a key factor to the wide-spread commercialization of EVs as well as to eh extensive deployment of Smart grid technology.
To facilitate secure communication in V2G network, use of a Public key infrastructure (PKI) is indispensable that allows authentication, data integrity, and confidentiality [4, 5].” Vaidya p. 1572.
“The CA for the EMSP will issue contract certificates to EV for plug-and-charge operation in V2G infrastructure. …. Finally, the end entity can use public verification key of the root CA to authenticate any other entity in the V2G network.” Vaidya p. 1574.)
associated with a charge point operator (CPO) having established a trust relationship with a first root certificate authority (CA), wherein the EV is configured to verify certificates based on a second root CA certificate that has been issued and signed by a second root CA different from the first root CA; (See Vaidya Fig. 2)
receiving, from the EVSE, (“the end entity can use public verification key of the root CA to authenticate any other entity in the V2G network.” Vaidya p. 1574.) a certificate chain of the EVSE including a cross certificate cross certified by the second root CA
(“This issue can be addressed by implementing P2P and bridge PKI models, which tend to create a global trust PKI. In [9], P2P PKI model having peer CAs with bidirectional trust relationships is highlighted,” Vaidya p. 1574. “implicit cross-certificates are issued between two CAs” Vaidya p. 1575)
(“to keep smaller length of certificate chains, the path length constraint of PKI certificate tree is limited to three;” Vaidya p. 1574)
Verifying the certificate chain based on the cross certificate cross certified by the second root CA and the second root CA certificate that has been issued and signed by the second root CA (“he end entity can use public verification key of the root CA to authenticate any other entity in the V2G network.” Vaidya p. 1574 “Having certification path processing, in which a “chain of certificates” or a certification path between the target certificate and an established trust anchor is established, every certificate within that path is verified. The validation time determines the time for which certificate validation is performed.” Vaidya p. 1577. “Mainly the proposed P2P PKI model can have up to four phases: a) generating self-certified root certificate;” Vaidya p. 1575)
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to apply the teaching of Vaidya into the system of Katar to use the cross-certificate, and the subordinate certificate authority. Katar teaches "the electric vehicle 102 can verify the attributes indicated in the public key certificate to validate the charging station 106 that transmitted the public key certificate. The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110.” (see Katar, [0033]). Therefore, Vaidya’s teaching could enhance the system of Katar, because Vaidya discloses “The hierarchical cross-certification model defines trust relationships between CAs inside the same administrative domain, which is the most typical PKI architecture.” (see Vaidya, p. 1573, III ‘Public Key Infrastructure in V2G Network’, 3rd par.)
Because Vaida discloses (“implicit cross-certificates are issued between two CAs” Vaidya p. 1575) Katar in view of Vaidya does not explicitly disclose:
a first subordinate CA under the first root CA,
Burr discloses:
a first subordinate CA under the first root CA,
(Burr discloses a plurality of cross-certifications between subordinate CAs: “Federal CAs may cross-certify each other along paths that do not parallel the hierarchy. OptionalcrossCertificatePairs are shown in Figure 4 as gray double-headed arrows…. Because of the hierarchical cross-certificates, a certification path is guaranteed to exist from her own CA, through the root CA, to every Federal certificate, but there may also be much shorter paths.” Burr § 4)
Burr also discloses a path limit: (“number of CAs that may follow in cert. path; 0 indicates that CA may only issue end-entity certs.” Burr Table 1, page 2.)
A person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention would have combined Katar in view of Vaida with Burr by utilizing cross-certification between subordinate CAs (Burr) in addition to, or instead of, cross-certification between root-CAs (Vaida). It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Katar in view of Vaida with Burr in order to guarantee a validation path from the CA of the validator (EV) to the root CA of the EVSE while potentially providing a ‘much shorter path’, Burr § 4. Thereby, allowing validation between domains and providing acceleration thereof by shortening paths.
Referring to claim 10:
Katar teaches:
A power transfer method performed by an electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), the power transfer method comprising (see Katar, [0024] ‘After the matched charging station 106 (e.g., an authentication unit of the matched charging station 106) successfully authenticates and authorizes the electric vehicle 102, the electric vehicle 102 can receive electric power from the matched charging station 106 ...’; [0045] ‘the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the electric vehicle 102.’; [0032] ‘The public key certificate associated with the electric vehicle 102 may be signed by a certificate authority (CA) authorized to issue electric vehicle certificates. The public key certificate associated with the electric vehicle 102 may have one or more attributes that identify the certificate holder (i.e., the electric vehicle 102) as a legitimate electric vehicle. Furthermore, the certificate authority that signed the electric vehicle's certificate may be authorized to vouch for the electric vehicle's identity .... ‘):
Receiving, by the EVSE associated with a charge point operator (CPO) having established a trust relationship with a first root certificate authority (CA), (“The public key certificate associated with the charging station 106 may be signed by a CA authorized to issue charging station certificates.” Katar ¶ 46) a charging request from an electric vehicle (EV) configured to verify certificates based on a second root CA certificate that has been issued and signed by a second root CA (the EV is not a component of the claimed EVSE of claim 10. Any configuration of external elements of the EVSE, the electric vehicle, is non-limiting intended use)
(see Katar, [0033] ‘the electric vehicle 102 can verify the attributes indicated in the public key certificate to validate the charging station 106 that transmitted the public key certificate. The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110 ....... After the security information is exchanged, subsequent messages transmitted from the electric vehicle 102 to the charging stations 106, 108, and 110 may be signed and/or encrypted ... ‘)
providing a certificate chain including a cross certificate
receiving a verification result for the certificate chain from the EV when the EV verified the certificate chain based on root CA certificate that has been issued and signed by the second root CA (see Katar, [0033] ‘the electric vehicle 102 can verify the attributes indicated in the public key certificate to validate the charging station 106 that transmitted the public key certificate. The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110 ....... After the security information is exchanged, subsequent messages transmitted from the electric vehicle 102 to the charging stations 106, 108, and 110 may be signed and/or encrypted ... ‘); and
supplying electric power to the EV depending on the verification result (see Katar, [0024] ‘After the matched charging station 106 (e.g., an authentication unit of the matched charging station 106) successfully authenticates and authorizes the electric vehicle 102, the electric vehicle 102 can receive electric power from the matched charging station 106 ...’).
Katar suggests the cross-certificate, and the subordinate certificate authority (see Katar, [0045] ‘the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the electric vehicle 102.’; [0032] ‘The public key certificate associated with the electric vehicle 102 may be signed by a certificate authority (CA) authorized to issue electric vehicle certificates. The public key certificate associated with the electric vehicle 102 may have one or more attributes that identify the certificate holder (i.e., the electric vehicle 102) as a legitimate electric vehicle. Furthermore, the certificate authority that signed the electric vehicle's certificate may be authorized to vouch for the electric vehicle's identity .... ‘; [0033] ‘The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110.’). However, Katar does not disclose the term cross-certificate, and the term subordinate certificate authority.
However, Katar does not disclose:
Cross certified by the second root CA for a first subordinate CA under the first root CA,
the cross certificate cross certified by the second root CA
Vaidya discloses the cross-certificate, and the subordinate certificate authority (see Vaidya, p.1573, III ‘Public Key Infrastructure in V2G Network’, 3rd par. ‘The hierarchical cross-certification model defines trust relationships between CAs inside the same administrative domain, which is the most typical PKI architecture... And below the root CA, one or more levels of intermediate or subordinate CAs are subsisted …’, 4th par. ‘… In such cross-certifications, root CAs from different PKI domains certify each other, so that any end entities can establish trustworthy paths to the end-entity certificates in remote PKI domains [8].’).
In addition, Vaidya further discloses the certificate chain (see Vaidya, p. 1573, section ‘B. V2G PKI’, 5th par. ‘certificate chain’).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to apply the teaching of Vaidya into the system of Katar to use the cross-certificate, and the subordinate certificate authority. Katar teaches "the electric vehicle 102 can verify the attributes indicated in the public key certificate to validate the charging station 106 that transmitted the public key certificate. The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110.” (see Katar, [0033]). Therefore, Vaidyia’s teaching could enhance the system of Katar, because Vaidya discloses “The hierarchical cross-certification model defines trust relationships between CAs inside the same administrative domain, which is the most typical PKI architecture.” (see Vaidya, p. 1573, III ‘Public Key Infrastructure in V2G Network’, 3rd par.)
Because Vaida discloses (“implicit cross-certificates are issued between two CAs” Vaidya p. 1575) Katar in view of Vaidya does not explicitly disclose:
a first subordinate CA under the first root CA,
Burr discloses:
a first subordinate CA under the first root CA,
(Burr discloses a plurality of cross-certifications between subordinate CAs: “Federal CAs may cross-certify each other along paths that do not parallel the hierarchy. OptionalcrossCertificatePairs are shown in Figure 4 as gray double-headed arrows…. Because of the hierarchical cross-certificates, a certification path is guaranteed to exist from her own CA, through the root CA, to every Federal certificate, but there may also be much shorter paths.” Burr § 4)
Burr also discloses a path limit: (“number of CAs that may follow in cert. path; 0 indicates that CA may only issue end-entity certs.” Burr Table 1, page 2.)
A person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention would have combined Katar in view of Vaida with Burr by utilizing cross-certification between subordinate CAs (Burr) in addition to, or instead of, cross-certification between root-CAs (Vaida). It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine Katar in view of Vaida with Burr in order to guarantee a validation path from the CA of the validator (EV) to the root CA of the EVSE while potentially providing a ‘much shorter path’, Burr § 4. Thereby, allowing validation between domains and providing acceleration thereof by shortening paths.
Referring to claims 2, 21:
Katar and Vaidya further disclose:
wherein the last certificate in the certificate chain is a cross certificate issued by the second V2G root CA (see Vaidya, p. 1573, III ‘Public Key Infrastructure in V2G Network’, 3rd par. ‘The hierarchical cross-certification model defines trust relationships between CAs inside the same administrative domain, which is the most typical PKI architecture.’).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to apply the teaching of Vaidya into the system of Katar to use the cross-certificate. Katar teaches "the electric vehicle 102 can verify the attributes indicated in the public key certificate to validate the charging station 106 that transmitted the public key certificate. The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110.” (see Katar, [0033]). Therefore, Vaidya’s teaching could enhance the system of Katar, because Vaidya discloses “The hierarchical cross-certification model defines trust relationships between CAs inside the same administrative domain, which is the most typical PKI architecture.” (see Vaidya, p. 1573, III ‘Public Key Infrastructure in V2G Network’, 3rd par.)
Referring to claims 3, 13, 22:
Katar and Vaidya further disclose:
wherein a public key in the cross certificate coincides with a public key corresponding to a private key used to issue the last certificate excluding the cross certificate in the certificate chain (see Katar, [0091] ‘…attached certificate list [i.e. the certificate chain ], and CRLs ....’. And, Vaidya, p. 1573, section ‘B. V2G PKI’, 2nd par. ‘private/public keys’).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to apply the teaching of Vaidya into the system of Katar to use private/public keys. Katar teaches "the electric vehicle 102 can verify the attributes indicated in the public key certificate to validate the charging station 106 that transmitted the public key certificate. The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110.” (see Katar, [0033]). Therefore, Vaidya’s teaching could enhance the system of Katar, because Vaidya discloses “V2G PKI is built on X.509 standard to provide appropriate management of X.509 certificates and corresponding private/public keys [10].” (see Vaidya, p. 1573, section ‘B. V2G PKI’, 2nd par.)
Referring to claims 5, 15, 24:
Katar and Vaidya further disclose:
wherein the second V2G root CA directly issues the cross certificate for the subordinate certificate authority (see Katar, [0032] ‘a certificate authority (CA) authorized to issue electric vehicle certificates.’).
Referring to claims 6, 16. 25:
Katar and Vaidya further disclose:
wherein the second V2G root CA issues the cross certificate for the subordinate certificate authority via a cross certification intermediating device (see Katar, [0032] ‘a certificate authority (CA)’; [0025] ‘a network device’).
Referring to claims 8, 18:
Katar and Vaidya further disclose:
wherein a public key and an identification (ID) in a certificate issued by the first V2G root CA are signed by using a private key corresponding to the cross certificate (see Katar, [0032] ‘a certificate authority (CA)’ ‘identify the certificate holder’. And, Vaidya, p. 1573, section ‘B. V2G PKI’, 2nd par. ‘private/public keys’).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to apply the teaching of Vaidya into the system of Katar to use private/public keys. Katar teaches "the electric vehicle 102 can verify the attributes indicated in the public key certificate to validate the charging station 106 that transmitted the public key certificate. The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110.” (see Katar, [0033]). Therefore, Vaidya’s teaching could enhance the system of Katar, because Vaidya discloses “V2G PKI is built on X.509 standard to provide appropriate management of X.509 certificates and corresponding private/public keys [10].” (see Vaidya, p. 1573, section ‘B. V2G PKI’, 2nd par.)
Referring to claims 9, 19:
Katar and Vaidya further disclose:
wherein a public key and an identification (ID) in a CPO subordinate CA certificate are signed by using a private key corresponding to the cross certificate (see Katar, [0032] ‘The public key certificate associated with the electric vehicle 102 may have one or more attributes that identify the certificate holder’).
Referring to claimd 11-12:
Katar and Vaidya further disclose:
the certificate chain, the cross certificate, the second V2G root CA (see Katar, [0091], ‘ ... attached certificate list [i.e. the certificate chain ], and CRLs ....’. And, see Vaidya, p. 1573, III ‘Public Key Infrastructure in V2G Network’, 3rd par. ‘The hierarchical cross-certification model defines trust relationships between CAs inside the same administrative domain, which is the most typical PKI architecture.’).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to apply the teaching of Vaidya into the system of Katar to use the cross-certificate, the second V2G root CA. Katar teaches "the electric vehicle 102 can verify the attributes indicated in the public key certificate to validate the charging station 106 that transmitted the public key certificate. The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110.” (see Katar, [0033]). Therefore, Vaidyia’s teaching could enhance the system of Katar, because Vaidya discloses “The hierarchical cross-certification model defines trust relationships between CAs inside the same administrative domain, which is the most typical PKI architecture.” (see Vaidya, p. 1573, III ‘Public Key Infrastructure in V2G Network’, 3rd par.)
Claim 7 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Katar et al. (U.S. 2015/0189581 A1), in view of Vaidya et al. (“Multi-domain Public Key Infrastructure for vehicle-to-Grid Network”, 2015, IEEE), Burr et al. “A Proposed Federal PKI Using X.509 V3 Certificates” (published 1996) and Liu et al. (U.S. 2011/0154027 A1), hereinafter “Liu”.
Referring to claim 7:
Katar in view of Vaidya and Burr disclose all the limitations in claims 1 and 2.
They further disclose the expiration of the certificate (see Vaidya, p. 1575, section ‘B. Peer-to-Peer PKI Model for V2G Network’, Table I, ‘SN Certificate Serial Number’, ‘Te Validity period’).
However, they do not disclose the different between the expiration date of one certificate and the expiration date another certificate.
Liu discloses the different between the expiration date of one certificate and the expiration date another certificate (see Liu, [0066] ‘…the first and second digital certificates… The difference between the first expiration date and the second expiration date’)
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to apply the teaching of Liu into the system of Katar to check the expiration date of a digital certificate. Katar teaches "the electric vehicle 102 can verify the attributes indicated in the public key certificate to validate the charging station 106 that transmitted the public key certificate. The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110.” (see Katar, [0033]). Therefore, Liu’s teaching could enhance the system of Katar, because Liu discloses “the user is able to replace the original digital certificates with renewed certificates” (see Liu, [0066])
Claim 17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Katar et al. (U.S. 2015/0189581 A1), in view of Vaidya et al. (“Multi-domain Public Key Infrastructure for vehicle-to-Grid Network”, 2015, IEEE), Burr et al. “A Proposed Federal PKI Using X.509 V3 Certificates” (published 1996) and Bao et al. (“A Threat analysis of the vehicle-to-grid charging protocol ISO 15118”, Computer Science – Research and Development, 33, 3-12 (2018), hereinafter “Bao”.
Referring to claim 17:
Katar in view of Vaidya and Burr disclose all the limitations in claim 10. However, they do not disclose TLS handshake operation, a Serverhello message.
Bao discloses or suggests the TLS handshake operation, a Serverhello message (see Bao, section “5.5.4 Time synchronization”, 1st par. “TLS certificates”).
It would have been obvious to one of the ordinary skill in the art, before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, to apply the teaching of Bao into the system of Katar to use TLS handshake operation, a Serverhello message. Katar teaches "the electric vehicle 102 can verify the attributes indicated in the public key certificate to validate the charging station 106 that transmitted the public key certificate. The electric vehicle 102 can keep track of public keys for the root CAs that are authorized to vouch for the legitimacy of the charging stations 106, 108, and 110.” (see Katar, [0033]). Therefore, Bao’s teaching could enhance the system of Katar, because Bao discloses “The communication session is further secured through the application of Transport Layer Security (TLS) with unilateral authentication, where the EVCC checks the authenticity of the SECC. Authenticity of the EV is guaranteed by a digital signature scheme.” (see Bao, p. 9, 1st par.)
Conclusion
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. See PTO-892, particularly:
Pala, US 12,567,981, discloses authentication using composite keys and signatures.
O’Hare et al., US 12,671,583, discloses file sharing using cross-certified certificates.
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MICHAEL W CHAO whose telephone number is (571)272-5165. The examiner can normally be reached M, W-F 8-5.
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/MICHAEL W CHAO/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2492
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