DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Drawings
The drawings were received on 27 August 2025. These drawings are acceptable.
Claim Interpretation
Attention is directed to MPEP 904.01 [R-08.2012].
The breadth of the claims in the application should always be carefully noted; that is, the examiner should be fully aware of what the claims do not call for, as well as what they do require. During patent examination, the claims are given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 44 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See MPEP § 2111 - § 2116.01 for case law pertinent to claim analysis.
It is noted with particularity that narrowing limitations found in the specification cannot be inferred in the claims where the elements not set forth in the claims are linchpin of patentability. In re Philips Industries v. State Stove & Mfg. Co, Inc., 186 USPQ 458 (CA6 1975). While the claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification, it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into the claims. On the contrary, claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow. See Ex parte Oetiker, 23 USPQ2d 1641 (BPAI, 1992). In added support of this position, attention is directed to MPEP 2111 [R-11.2013], where, citing In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969), is stated:
The court explained that “reading a claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from ‘reading limitations of the specification into a claim,’ to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the claim.” The court found that applicant was advocating the latter, i.e., the impermissible importation of subject matter from the specification into the claim.
Additionally, attention is directed to MPEP 2111.01 [R-07.2022], wherein is stated:
II. IT IS IMPROPER TO IMPORT CLAIM LIMITATIONS FROM THE SPECIFICATION
“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875, 69 USPQ2d 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2111.02 II [R-07.2022]. As stated herein:
II. PREAMBLE STATEMENTS RECITING PURPOSE OR INTENDED USE
PNG
media_image1.png
18
19
media_image1.png
Greyscale
The claim preamble must be read in the context of the entire claim. The determination of whether preamble recitations are structural limitations or mere statements of purpose or use "can be resolved only on review of the entirety of the [record] to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim" as drafted without importing "'extraneous' limitations from the specification." Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at 1257, 9 USPQ2d at 1966. If the body of a claim fully and intrinsically sets forth all of the limitations of the claimed invention, and the preamble merely states, for example, the purpose or intended use of the invention, rather than any distinct definition of any of the claimed invention’s limitations, then the preamble is not considered a limitation and is of no significance to claim construction. Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 2020 USPQ2d 10701 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (The court found that the preamble in one patent’s claim is limiting but is not in a related patent); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478, 42 USPQ2d 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation")… (Emphasis added)
Attention is directed to MPEP 2111 [R-10.2019]. As stated therein:
During patent examination, the pending claims must be "given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification." The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) expressly recognized that the USPTO employs the "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard:
The Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") determines the scope of claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction "in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art." In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364[, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1830] (Fed. Cir. 2004). Indeed, the rules of the PTO require that application claims must "conform to the invention as set forth in the remainder of the specification and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear support or antecedent basis in the description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the description." 37 CFR 1.75(d)(1). (Emphasis added).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, (b) / Second Paragraph
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Standard for Definiteness.
Attention is directed to MPEP 2171 [R-11.2013]:
Two separate requirements are set forth in 35 U.S.C. 112(b) and pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, namely that:
(A) the claims must set forth the subject matter that the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention; and
(B) the claims must particularly point out and distinctly define the metes and bounds of the subject matter to be protected by the patent grant.
The first requirement is a subjective one because it is dependent on what the inventor or a joint inventor for a patent regards as his or her invention. Note that although pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, uses the phrase "which applicant regards as his invention," pre-AIA 37 CFR 1.41(a) provides that a patent is applied for in the name or names of the actual inventor or inventors.
The second requirement is an objective one because it is not dependent on the views of the inventor or any particular individual, but is evaluated in the context of whether the claim is definite — i.e., whether the scope of the claim is clear to a hypothetical person possessing the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art.
Attention is directed to MPEP 2173.02 I [R-07.2022]:
During prosecution, applicant has an opportunity and a duty to amend ambiguous claims to clearly and precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention. The claim places the public on notice of the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston Assoc. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052, 62 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). As the Federal Circuit stated in Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1654, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008):
“We note that the patent drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent claims, and it is highly desirable that patent examiners demand that applicants do so in appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during prosecution rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation.”
***
During examination, after applying the broadest reasonable interpretation to the claim, if the metes and bounds of the claimed invention are not clear, the claim is indefinite and should be rejected. Packard, 751 F.3d at 1310 (“[W]hen the USPTO has initially issued a well-grounded rejection that identifies ways in which language in a claim is ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention, and thereafter the applicant fails to provide a satisfactory response, the USPTO can properly reject the claim as failing to meet the statutory requirements of § 112(b).”); Zletz, 893 F.2d at 322, 13 USPQ2d at 1322.
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2173.02 III B, which states in part:
To comply with 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, applicants are required to make the terms that are used to define the invention clear and precise, so that the metes and bounds of the subject matter that will be protected by the patent grant can be ascertained. See MPEP § 2173.05(a), subsection I. It is important that a person of ordinary skill in the art be able to interpret the metes and bounds of the claims so as to understand how to avoid infringement of the patent that ultimately issues from the application being examined. See MPEP § 2173.02, subsection II (citing Morton Int ’l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see also Halliburton Energy Servs., 514 F.3d at 1249, 85 USPQ2d at 1658 (“Otherwise, competitors cannot avoid infringement, defeating the public notice function of patent claims.”). Examiners should bear in mind that “[a]n essential purpose of patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the administrative process.” Zletz, 893 F.2d at 322, 13 USPQ2d at 1322 [Fed. Cir. 1989]. (Emphasis added)
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2173.04 [R-10.2019], which states in part:
A broad claim is not indefinite merely because it encompasses a wide scope of subject matter provided the scope is clearly defined. But a claim is indefinite when the boundaries of the protected subject matter are not clearly delineated and the scope is unclear. For example, a genus claim that covers multiple species is broad, but is not indefinite because of its breadth, which is otherwise clear. But a genus claim that could be interpreted in such a way that it is not clear which species are covered would be indefinite (e.g., because there is more than one reasonable interpretation of what species are included in the claim). (Emphasis added)
Holding and Rationale
Claims 1-36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claims 1 and 19, the only independent claims pending, are indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of “sensing probes”, “analyte” and “beads”. Claims 2-18, which depend from claim 1; and claims 20-36, which depend from claim 19, fail to overcome this issue and are similarly rejected.
Claims 2, 3, 5, 20, 21, and 23 re indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of an “oligonucleotide”. A review of the disclosure fails to find where applicant has provided a closed definition for the term “oligonucleotide,” and a review of the art finds that there is not a single art-accepted definition. In support of this position, it is noted that Merriam-Webster.com (“Oligonucleotide definition,” Merriam-Webster.com; accessed 08-23-2017) provides the following exemplary definition:
[A] short nucleic-acid chain usually consisting of up to approximately 20 nucleotides. (Emphasis added)
US 2019/0002971 A1 (Koslover et al.), paragraph [0084], teaches:
In some embodiments, binding moieties comprise an oligonucleotide or analog thereof having a length in the range of from 6 to 60 nucleotides.
US 2009/0011943 A1 (Drmanac et al.), at paragraph [0116], teaches:
The length of capture oligonucleotides may vary widely, In one aspect, capture oligonucleotides and their complements in a bridging oligonucleotide have lengths in the range of from 10 to 100 nucleotides; and more preferably, in the range of from 10 to 40 nucleotides. (Emphasis added)
In comparison, US Patent 6,444,661 B1 (Barton et al.), column 6, first paragraph, states:
The probe oligonucleotide can be as short as about 8-10 bases, up to a length of several thousand bases: the probe can be as long or longer than the target polynucleotide. (Emphasis added)
“Oligonucleotide”, Wikipedia.com (accessed February 17, 2019) teaches:
A less than 100% yield of each synthetic step and the occurrence of side reactions set practical limits of the efficiency of the process so that the maximum length of synthetic oligonucleotides hardly exceeds 200 nucleotide residues. (Emphasis added)
When as here it is evident that there is not a single art-accepted meaning for the term, a question as to the metes and bounds of the claim(s) exist.
Claims 4 and 22 are indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of “a nucleotide analyte”.
Claims 6 and 24 are indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of “a DNA analyte”.
Claims 7 and 25 are indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of “an RNA analyte”.
Claims 8, 12, 26, and 29 are indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of “a non-nucleotide analyte”.
Claims 9 and 27 are indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of “a protein”.
Claims 10 and 28 are indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of “a metabolite”.
Claims 11 and 29 are indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of “an antibody”. As presently worded, it is unclear as to what source(s), type(s), portion(s), if any, are encompassed by the claims. As noted in US 6,300,093 B1 (Kindsvogel et al.) at column 22, last paragraph:
Antibodies of the present invention may be produced by immunizing an animal, a wide variety of warm-blooded animals such as horses, cows, goats, sheep, dogs, chickens, rabbits, mice, and rats can be used, with a recombinant or synthetic islet cell antigen polypeptide or a selected portion thereof (e.g., a peptide).
Attention is also directed to US 2003/0092624 A1 (Wang et al.). As disclosed at paragraph [0194]:
[0194] According to yet an additional aspect of the present invention there is provided an antibody, either polyclonal or monoclonal antibody, recognizing at least one epitope of the polypeptide described herein. The present invention can utilize serum immunoglobulins, polyclonal antibodies or fragments thereof, (i.e., immunoreactive derivative of an antibody), or monoclonal antibodies or fragments thereof. Monoclonal antibodies or purified fragments of the monoclonal antibodies having at least a portion of an antigen binding region, including, such as, Fv, F(ab1)2, Fab fragments (Harlow and Lane, 1988 Antibody, Cold Spring Harbor), single chain antibodies (U.S. Pat. No. 4,946,778), chimeric or humanized antibodies and complementarily determining regions (CDR)… Antibodies of the IgG class are made up of four polypeptide chains linked together by disulfide bonds. The four chains of intact IgG molecules are two identical heavy chains referred to as H-chains and two identical light chains referred to as L-chains. Additional classes includes IgD, IgE, IgA, IgM and related proteins. (Emphasis added)
Attention is also directed to US 2013/0338038 A1 (DuBridge et al.), which teaches the following at paragraph [0061]:
[0061] Examples of suitable sources for immunoglobulin genes include, but are not limited to, humans, primates, rodents (e.g., rat, mouse, hamster, guinea pig, etc.), non-rodents such as sheep, donkey, goat, horse, cow, pig, chicken, llama, camel, dog, cat, rabbit, fish, and birds. In addition to immunoglobulins obtained from various organisms, variant forms of known antibodies can be used, including humanized, chimeric, and monoclonal antibodies. Further, the immunoglobulin molecules or antibodies of the invention can be of any type (e.g., IgG, IgE, IgM, IgD, IgA, and IgY), class (e.g., IgG1, IgG2, IgG3, IgG4, IgA1, and IgA2), or subclass of immunoglobulin molecule. (Emphasis added)
Claims 12 and 30 are indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of “an aptamer”.
A review of the disclosure fails to find a closed definition as to just how long and short the aptamer can be. A review of the disclosure fails to find a closed definition as to just how long and short the aptamer can be. A review of the prior art also fails to find a single definition for the term. In support of this position attention is directed to US 2003/0027286 A1 (Haselbeck et al.), at paragraph [0331], teaches:
[0331] In general, the aspects of the invention that employ aptamer technology concern the use of the fusion promoters described herein to drive expression of aptamers of varying lengths and compositions. A minimum of approximately 6 nucleotides, preferably 10, and more preferably 14 or 15 nucleotides, may be necessary to effect specific binding to some target molecules. Thus, in some embodiments, fusion promoters of the invention are linked to oligonucleotides encoding aptamers that are 6, 10, 14, or 15 nucleotides in length. (Emphasis added)
US 2002/0068295 A1 (Madou et al.), at paragraph [0040], teaches:
Aptamers can range from between 8 to 120 or more nucleotides in length. (Emphasis added)
US 2002/0115629 A1 (Ramachandra), at paragraph [0016], teaches:
[0016] An aptamer will typically be between about 10 and about 300 nucleotides in length. (Emphasis added)
US 2003/0229021 A1 (Krah, III et al.), at paragraph [0114], teach:
An aptamer can be, for example, 10, 20, 50, 100, 150, 200, 300, 400, or 500 nucleotides in length. (Emphasis added)
The term “plurality” in claim 19 is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite. The term “plurality” is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention. Claims 20-36, which depend from claim 19, fail to overcome this issue and are similarly rejected.
Response to traversal
Applicant’s representative, at pages 8-10 of the response of 16 July 2025, hereinafter the response, traverses the rejection of claims under 35 USC 112(b).
At page 8 of the response said representative asserts:
A skilled artisan would readily understand the metes and bounds of the term "oligonucleotide" in the context of the descriptions and working examples provided in the specification. Applicant also points out that the terms "nucleotide" and "polynucleotide" are both explicitly defined in para. [0105] and [0106] of the specification. (Emphasis added)
This argument has been fully considered and has not been found persuasive. Attention is directed to MPEP 2145 I [R-01.2024].
An argument by the applicant is not evidence unless it is an admission, in which case, an examiner may use the admission in making a rejection. See MPEP § 2129 and § 2144.03 for a discussion of admissions as prior art.
Arguments presented by applicant cannot take the place of evidence in the record. See In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705, 222 USPQ 191, 196 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602, 145 USPQ 716, 718 (CCPA 1965); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("An assertion of what seems to follow from common experience is just attorney argument and not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness."). See MPEP § 716.01(c) for examples of applicant statements which are not evidence and which must be supported by an appropriate affidavit or declaration.
A review of the response fails to find where any affidavit or declaration has been provided.
It is further noted that the issue at hand is not directed to the terms “nucleotide” or “polynucleotide”. Rather, the issue is what constitutes the metes and bounds of an “oligonucleotide”. In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the rejection is maintained.
At page 9 of the response said representative asserts:
Claims 4 and 22; Claims 6 and 24; Claims 7 and 25; Claims 8, 12, 26, and 29; Claims 10 and 28
These claims are rejected as allegedly being indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of "a nucleotide analyte", "a DNA analyte", "an RNA analyte", "a non- nucleotide analyte", "a protein", or "a metabolite". Applicant traverses for the following reasons. Reiterating the arguments above, Applicant submits that the claimed multiomic detection method is applicable to a wide variety of nucleotide analytes, such as DNA and RNA analytes, and non-nucleotide analytes such as proteins and metabolites, all of which are explicitly defined and exemplified in para. [0102] and [0128]. The description of the claimed method without limitations or stipulations on the analyte is sufficient to allow a skilled person to readily understand the claim language. (Emphasis added)
The above identified arguments have been considered and have not been found persuasive. While attention has been directed to paragraphs [0102] and [0128] of the disclosure, such teachings have not been found to resolve the issue. It is noted with particularity that narrowing limitations found in the specification cannot be inferred in the claims where the elements not set forth in the claims are linchpin of patentability. In re Philips Industries v. State Stove & Mfg. Co, Inc., 186 USPQ 458 (CA6 1975). While the claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification, it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into the claims. On the contrary, claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow. See Ex parte Oetiker, 23 USPQ2d 1641 (BPAI, 1992). In added support of this position, attention is directed to MPEP 2111 [R-11.2013], where, citing In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969), is stated:
The court explained that “reading a claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from ‘reading limitations of the specification into a claim,’ to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the claim.” The court found that applicant was advocating the latter, i.e., the impermissible importation of subject matter from the specification into the claim.
Additionally, attention is directed to MPEP 2111.01 [R-07.2022], wherein is stated:
II. IT IS IMPROPER TO IMPORT CLAIM LIMITATIONS FROM THE SPECIFICATION
“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875, 69 USPQ2d 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the rejection is maintained.
Applicant’s representative, at page 9, bridging to page 10 of the response, asserts:
Claims 11 and 29; Claims 12 and 30
Claims 11 and 29 are rejected as allegedly being indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of "an antibody". Claims 12 and 30 are rejected as allegedly being indefinite with respect to what constitutes the metes and bounds of "an aptamer". Applicant traverses for the following reasons. The terms "antibody" and "aptamer" are both terms of art readily apparent to one of ordinary skill in the field. A skilled artisan would thus understand the metes and bounds of the terms "antibody" and "aptamer" in the context of the present application and further in light of the descriptions provided in para. [0178]-[0182] and [0186]. Furthermore, the claimed method is applicable to many different antibodies/aptamers and the description of the method without particular mention of either is sufficient to allow a skilled person to readily understand the claim language. (Emphasis added)
This argument has been fully considered and has not been found persuasive. Attention is directed to MPEP 2145 I [R-01.2024].
An argument by the applicant is not evidence unless it is an admission, in which case, an examiner may use the admission in making a rejection. See MPEP § 2129 and § 2144.03 for a discussion of admissions as prior art.
Arguments presented by applicant cannot take the place of evidence in the record. See In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705, 222 USPQ 191, 196 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602, 145 USPQ 716, 718 (CCPA 1965); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("An assertion of what seems to follow from common experience is just attorney argument and not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness."). See MPEP § 716.01(c) for examples of applicant statements which are not evidence and which must be supported by an appropriate affidavit or declaration.
A review of the response fails to find where any affidavit or declaration has been provided.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the rejection is maintained.
At page 10 of the response said representative asserts:
Claim 19
Claim 19 is rejected as allegedly being indefinite with respect to the term "plurality", which is not defined by the claim, and the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requite degree. Applicant traverses for the following reasons. MPEP 2111.01 [R-01.2024] states: Under a broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI), words of the claim must be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with the specification. The plain mcaning of the term means the ordinary and customary meaning given to the term by those of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time. The Examiner's allegation that "one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention" has no basis. The plain meaning of the term "plurality" simply means the state of being plural, i.e., more than one. Furthermore, there is no language in the specification or claims that is inconsistent with this definition; thus Applicant submits that the term "plurality" does not render the claim indefinite. (Emphasis added)
The above argument has been considered and has not been found persuasive for while a definition of “more than one” could be applied, it is unclear as to what constitutes the upper limit of just how many “more” of the “plurality of different analytes” are encompassed by the claim.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the rejection is maintained.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, Enablement
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Claims 1-36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention.
As set forth in Cephalon Inc. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc. 105 USPQ2d 1817, 1821 (CAFC, 2013):
To satisfy section 112 of the 1952 Patent Act, the specification must enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶1. This requirement is met when at the time of filing the application one skilled in the art, having read the specification, could practice the invention without “undue experimentation.” In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 [8 USPQ2d 1400] (Fed. Cir. 1988). Whether undue experimentation is required “is not a single, simple factual determination, but rather is a conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations.” ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 [94 USPQ2d 1823] (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Wands, 858 F.2d at 737).
The following factors may be considered when determining if a disclosure requires undue experimentation:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.
Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (“Wands factors”); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1372 [52 USPQ2d 1129] (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The Wands factors, when applied from the proper temporal perspective … are a useful methodology for determining enablement….”). These factors while illustrative are not mandatory. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1371. What is relevant depends on the facts, and although experimentation must not be undue, a reasonable amount of routine experimentation required to practice a claimed invention does not violate the enablement requirement. Id. The burden of proof here is on Watson to show that the Khankari patents are invalid for lack of enablement by clear and convincing evidence. See Auto. Tech. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1281 [84 USPQ2d 1109] (Fed. Cir. 2007).
As set forth in the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision in Amgen Inc., et al. v. Sanofi et al. 598 U.S. ___ (2023):
Our decisions in Morse, Incandescent Lamp, and Holland Furniture reinforce the simple
statutory command. If a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines,
manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. In other words, the specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by its claims. The more one claims, the more one must enable. See §112(a); see also Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 419 (1908) (“[T]he claims measure the invention.”).
***
To be fair, Amgen does not dispute this much. It freely admits that it seeks to claim for
itself an entire universe of antibodies. Still, it says, its broad claims are enabled because scientists can make and use every undisclosed but functional antibody if they simply follow the company’s “roadmap” or its proposal for “conservative substitution.” We cannot agree. These two approaches amount to little more than two research assignments… Whether methods like a “roadmap” or “conservative substitution” might suffice to enable other claims in other patents—perhaps because, as this Court suggested in Incandescent Lamp, the inventor identifies a quality common to every functional embodiment, supra, at 13—they do not here. They leave a scientist about where Sawyer and Man left Edison: forced to engage in “painstaking experimentation” to see what works. 159 U. S., at 475. That is not enablement. More nearly, it is “a hunting license.” Brenner v. Manson, 383 U. S. 519, 536 (1966).
The nature of the invention, The state of the prior art & The breadth of the claims
Claims 1 and 19 are the only independent claims pending. Claims 1, 4-13, and 19 are deemed to be representative and, for convenience, are reproduced below.
PNG
media_image2.png
350
484
media_image2.png
Greyscale
PNG
media_image3.png
384
520
media_image3.png
Greyscale
PNG
media_image4.png
250
510
media_image4.png
Greyscale
PNG
media_image5.png
228
518
media_image5.png
Greyscale
As is evidenced above, the claims are to a method and related system for the detection of any analyte found on, in, or produced by any organism, including metabolites. Said method and related system also encompass the simultaneous detection of any number of analytes, including “a plurality of nucleotide analytes and a plurality of non-nucleotide analytes” (claims 13 and 31).
Attention is directed to the following publications which teach of the enormity of the genera of virus, plants, insects, bacteria, mammals, and species encompassed by the subfamily Murinae as the detection of any and all genes from all members of the various genera are encompassed by the instant claims.
“Viruses” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
An enormous variety of genomic structures can be seen among viral species; as a group, they contain more structural genomic diversity than plants, animals, archaea, or bacteria. There are millions of different types of viruses, although fewer than 7,000 types have been described in detail. (Emphasis added)
“How many species of bacteria are there” (wisegeek.com; accessed 21 January 2014) teaches:
Currently, estimates of the total number of species of bacteria range from about 10 million to a billion, but these estimates are tentative, and may be off by many orders of magnitude. By comparison, there are probably between 10 and 30 million species of animals, the vast majority of them insects. The number of scientifically recognized species of animals is about 1,250,000. There are almost 300,000 recognized species of plants.
“Fungi,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
As of 2020, around 148,000 species of fungi have been described by taxonomists,[6] but the global biodiversity of the fungus kingdom is not fully understood.[48] A 2017 estimate suggests there may be between 2.2 and 3.8 million species.[5]
“Insect”, (Wikipedia.com; accessed 09/10/2020) teaches:
Insects are the most diverse group of animals; they include more than a million described species and represent more than half of all known living organisms. The total number of extant species is estimated at between six and ten million; potentially over 90% of the animal life forms on Earth are insects.
“Plant,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
There are about 380,000 known species of plants, of which the majority, some 260,000, produce seeds.
“Mammal,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
According to Mammal Species of the World, which is updated through periodic editions, 5,416 species were identified in 2006. These were grouped into 1,229 genera, 153 families and 29 orders.[5]
“Murinae,” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 10 June 2024) teaches:
The Old World rats and mice, part of the subfamily Murinae in the family Muridae, comprise at least 519 species. Members of this subfamily are called murines. In terms of species richness, this subfamily is larger than all mammal families except the Cricetidae and Muridae, and is larger than all mammal orders except the bats and the remainder of the rodents.
“Fish,” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
Fish are abundant in most bodies of water. They can be found in nearly all aquatic environments, from high mountain streams (e.g., char and gudgeon) to the abyssal and even hadal depths of the deepest oceans (e.g., cush-eels and snailfish), although no species has yet been documented in the deepest 25% of the ocean.[4] At 34,300 described species, fish exhibit greater species diversity than any other group of vertebrates.[5]
“Archaea,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
The classification of archaea into species is also controversial. Ernst Mayr defined a species as a group of interbreeding organisms which are reproductively isolated, but this is of no help since archaea only reproduce asexually.[37]
Archaea show high levels of horizontal gene transfer between lineages. Some researchers suggest that individuals can be grouped into species-like populations given highly similar genomes and infrequent gene transfer to/from cells with less-related genomes, as in the genus Ferroplasma.[38] On the other hand, studies in Halorubrum found significant genetic transfer to/from less-related populations, limiting the criterion's applicability. Some researchers question whether such species designations have practical meaning.[40]
Current knowledge on genetic diversity is fragmentary, so the total number of species cannot be estimated with any accuracy.[22] (Emphasis added)
“Algae,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 03-04-2016) teaches:
The most recent estimate suggests 72,500 algal species worldwide.
“Protozoa,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 05-11-2016), teaches:
The classification of protozoa has been and remains a problematic area of taxonomy. Where they are available, DNA sequences are used as the basis for classification; however, for the majority of described protozoa, such material is not available. (Emphasis added)
Attention is also directed to “Eukaryotic Genome Complexity” (Pray, Nature Education, 1(1):36, 2008, pages 1-4.). As seen therein, a table of estimated protein encoding genes in different genomes is provided.
PNG
media_image6.png
403
540
media_image6.png
Greyscale
In addition to the above, it is noted that there is no requirement that certain analytes not be assessed simultaneously. Likewise, the claimed method and system place no limit on the combination of analyte and antibodies or aptamers used. For example, the claimed method and sensor fairly encompass detection of DNA and RNA simultaneously with immunoassay for DNase, RNase, and protease. Given such, it stands to reason that the enzymes DNase and RNase would destroy the DNA and RNA analytes, as well as any aptamer present and the protease of protease would degrade/destroy any protein target as degrade/destroy any antibodies used. Such effects would, in short, render the claimed method and system inoperable.
As presently worded, the claimed method and system would have sensing probes mix with a sample suspected of comprising multiple analytes of interest. The claims do not require that any unbound sensing probe or bead be removed prior to “identifying”. With all beads added are still present, and one is to conclude that the analyte is present by “using at least the cods of those beads”, it stands to reason that if all beads and their “different codes” are still present, one would not know which signals, if any, are the result of a sensing probe” binding to the analyte.
The quantity of experimentation necessary
The quantity of experimentation necessary is great, on the order of many man-years, and then with little if any reasonable expectation of successfully enabling the full scope of the claims. In support of this position, it is noted that the art suggests that there are millions of species of viruses and fungi that are yet to be identified and characterized. Assuming, arguendo, that one were to identify a new virus or fungus every day, 365 days a year, and to also determine in the same day the nucleotide sequence of the genome of said organism, and additionally, identify probes and primers that would be useful in the identification of a target sequence found in said new organism wherein said target sequence has utility under 35 USC 101, it would take approximately 2739 years to sequence even 1 million viruses or fungi. Clearly, such an effort to enable the full scope of that claimed would constitute undue experimentation. In support of this position attention is directed to Cephalon, 1823:
Permissible experimentation is, nevertheless, not without bounds. This court has held that experimentation was unreasonable, for example, where it was found that eighteen months to two years’ work was required to practice the patented invention. See, e.g., White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 791 [218 USPQ 961] (Fed. Cir. 1983). Likewise, we have held that the amount of experimentation would be undue where: (1) the specification lacks guidance by teaching away from the subject matter that was eventually claimed; and (2) there is evidence of the patentee's own failures to make and use the later claimed invention at the time of the application. See, e.g., AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 [68 USPQ2d 1280] (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Alternatively, even if the claimed method system were limited to the detection of known organisms, the selection of probes and primers would also constitute undue experimentation. In support of this position, it is noted that if one were to utilize a probe or primer that was but 20 nucleotides long, and to then substitute each of the positions with the four common dNTPs, there are some 420, or 1.099 x 1012 different sequences to screen/evaluate. In support of the position that to screen such a number of candidate molecules would constitute undue experimentation, attention is directed to Wyeth v. Abbott Laboratories 107 USPQ2d 1273, 1276 (Fed. Cir. June 2013):
The remaining question is whether having to synthesize and screen each of at least tens of thousands of candidate compounds constitutes undue experimentation. We hold that it does. Undue experimentation is a matter of degree. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 [70 USPQ2d 1321] (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). Even “a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible,” as long as it is “merely routine” or the specification “provides a reasonable amount of guidance” regarding the direction of experimentation. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360-61 [47 USPQ2d 1705] (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). Yet, routine experimentation is “not without bounds.” Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1339 [105 USPQ2d 1817] (Fed. Cir. 2013). (Emphasis added)
Our cases have described limits on permissible experimentation in the context of enablement. For example, in ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, LLC, we affirmed a judgment of nonenablement where the specification provided “only a starting point, a direction for further research.” 603 F.3d 935, 941 [94 USPQ2d 1823] (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). We concluded that one of ordinary skill “would have been required to engage in an iterative, trial-and-error process to practice the claimed invention even with the help of the … specification.” Id. at 943. In Cephalon, although we ultimately reversed a finding of nonenablement, we noted that the defendant had not established that required experimentation “would be excessive, e.g., that it would involve testing for an unreasonable length of time.” 707 F.3d at 1339 (citing White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 791 [218 USPQ 961] (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Finally, in In re Vaeck, we affirmed the PTO's nonenablement rejection of claims reciting heterologous gene expression in as many as 150 genera of cyanobacteria. 947 F.2d 488, 495-96 [20 USPQ2d 1438] (Fed. Cir. 1991). The specification disclosed only nine genera, despite cyanobacteria being a “diverse and relatively poorly understood group of microorganisms,” with unpredictable heterologous gene expression. Id. at 496. (Emphasis added)
Here, the specification similarly discloses only a starting point for further iterative research in an unpredictable and poorly understood field. Synthesizing candidate compounds derived from sirolimus could, itself, require a complicated and lengthy series of experiments in synthetic organic chemistry. Even putting the challenges of synthesis aside, one of ordinary skill would need to assay each of at least tens of thousands of candidates. Wyeth's expert conceded that it would take technicians weeks to complete each of these assays. The specification offers no guidance or predictions about particular substitutions that might preserve the immunosuppressive and antirestenotic effects observed in sirolimus. The resulting need to engage in a systematic screening process for each of the many rapamycin candidate compounds is excessive experimentation. We thus hold that there is no genuine dispute that practicing the full scope of the claims, measured at the filing date, required undue experimentation. (Emphasis added)
The amount of direction or guidance presented,
The amount of guidance provided is limited, generally prophetic, and not commensurate with the scope of the claims.
The disclosure has been found to comprise a Sequence Listing. Said Sequence Listing has been found to comprise a total of 8 DNA sequences, which range from 36 to88 nucleotides, and all of which are identified as being “Artificial”.
The disclosure has not been found to disclose the nucleotide sequence for any organism, much less that which has utility under 35 USC 101. Likewise, the disclosure has not been found to provide any amino acid sequence for any protein, much less identify epitopes of proteins.
The disclosure has not been found to provide any aptamer or antibody of any type, from any source, that can bind to any metabolite, be it within the fluid of a cell or a gas produced, be it produced by a plant or an animal.
The nucleotide sequences of DNA and RNA analytes, as well as the amino acid sequence and tertiary structure (epitopes) of proteins are deemed to constitute essential material.1
The presence or absence of working examples
The disclosure has not been found to comprise any examples.
The predictability or unpredictability of the art
As noted in In re Fisher 166 USPQ 18 (CCPA, 1970):
In cases involving predictable factors, such as that, once imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws. In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity, the scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved.
Attention is also directed to Wyeth v. Abbott Laboratories 107 USPQ2d 1273 (Fed. Cir. June 2013):
The remaining question is whether having to synthesize and screen each of at least tens of thousands of candidate compounds constitutes undue experimentation. We hold that it does. Undue experimentation is a matter of degree. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 [70 USPQ2d 1321] (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). Even “a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible,” as long as it is “merely routine” or the specification “provides a reasonable amount of guidance” regarding the direction of experimentation. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360-61 [47 USPQ2d 1705] (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). Yet, routine experimentation is “not without bounds.” Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1339 [105 USPQ2d 1817] (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Our cases have described limits on permissible experimentation in the context of enablement. For example, in ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, LLC, we affirmed a judgment of nonenablement where the specification provided “only a starting point, a direction for further research.” 603 F.3d 935, 941 [94 USPQ2d 1823] (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). We concluded that one of ordinary skill “would have been required to engage in an iterative, trial-and-error process to practice the claimed invention even with the help of the … specification.” Id. at 943. In Cephalon, although we ultimately reversed a finding of nonenablement, we noted that the defendant had not established that required experimentation “would be excessive, e.g., that it would involve testing for an unreasonable length of time.” 707 F.3d at 1339 (citing White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 791 [218 USPQ 961] (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Finally, in In re Vaeck, we affirmed the PTO's nonenablement rejection of claims reciting heterologous gene expression in as many as 150 genera of cyanobacteria. 947 F.2d 488, 495-96 [20 USPQ2d 1438] (Fed. Cir. 1991). The specification disclosed only nine genera, despite cyanobacteria being a “diverse and relatively poorly understood group of microorganisms,” with unpredictable heterologous gene expression. Id. at 496.
Here, the specification similarly discloses only a starting point for further iterative research in an unpredictable and poorly understood field. Synthesizing candidate compounds derived from sirolimus could, itself, require a complicated and lengthy series of experiments in synthetic organic chemistry. Even putting the challenges of synthesis aside, one of ordinary skill would need to assay each of at least tens of thousands of candidates. Wyeth's expert conceded that it would take technicians weeks to complete each of these assays. The specification offers no guidance or predictions about particular substitutions that might preserve the immunosuppressive and antirestenotic effects observed in sirolimus. The resulting need to engage in a systematic screening process for each of the many rapamycin candidate compounds is excessive experimentation. We thus hold that there is no genuine dispute that practicing the full scope of the claims, measured at the filing date, required undue experimentation.
In view of the breadth of scope clamed, the limited guidance provided, the unpredictable nature of the art to which the claimed invention is directed, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the claims are deemed to be non-enabled by the disclosure.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 1-36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement.
Response to traversal
Applicant’s representative, at pages 10-14 of the response, traverses the rejection of claims under 35 USC 112(a) for not satisfying the enablement requirement.
At page 12 of the response said representative asserts:
The specification repeatedly and consistently teaches that the claimed method encompasses detecting analytes using sensing probes which are specific to those analytes, enabling them to be captured and detected via bead-based assay. Nowhere in the present application is it suggested that the method is suitable for sequencing of the genome of a previously unknown virus or fungus. The Examiner's interpretation of the claim scope is not the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification. (Emphasis in original)
The above argument has been considered and has not been found persuasive. For convenience, claims 5-8 are reproduced below.
PNG
media_image7.png
258
528
media_image7.png
Greyscale
As evidenced above, the method of claim 5 encompasses any “oligonucleotide sequence specific to hybridize to” any “nucleotide analyte. Claim 6 encompasses any DNA analyte, claim 7 encompasses any RNA analyte, and claim 8 encompasses any “non-nucleotide analyte”. In order to have the proper oligonucleotide (a.k.a., “sensing probe”), one must know the nucleotide sequence of the target analytes, be it DNA or RNA. The claimed method is not limited to those sequences that were known as of the effective filing date, but rather, fairly encompass any nucleotide sequence found in any organism. In order to know the proper nucleotide sequence, one must have determined the nucleotide sequence of the target. Parallel with detecting known sequences, the method arguably encompasses performing sequencing by hybridization as one would be detecting which probe(s) hybridize to which portions of which target molecules. Additionally, attention is directed to page 29, paragraph [0134], of the disclosure. As asserted to therein, one can perform “sequencing by synthesis”.
Applicant’s representative, at page 12, last paragraph, bridging top age 13 of the response, asserts:
Furthermore, the Examiner's assertion that the claimed method encompasses the detection of known organisms is flawed, as the method is directed to the detection of analytes (defined in para. [0101] as "a chemical element that is desired to be detected"), not organisms. Organisms are made up of hundreds or thousands of different chemical compounds, minerals, proteins, fibers, etc., and cannot be reasonably considered an "analyte" as defined in the present application, even if a given organism may in some cases contain one or more analytes. Nor is it suggested anywhere in the present application that every single possible probe and primer be synthesized in order to detect all known organisms, even if it were possible to somehow detect an organism using the claimed method. Again, the Examiner's interpretation of the claim scope is overly broad and not reasonable, particularly in light of the specification.
The above cited argument has been considered and has not been found persuasive. In support of this position attention is directed to page 26, paragraph [0129] of the disclosure wherein is asserted:
In some examples, as many different sensing probes may be provided in the solution as the number of different types of analytes it is desired to detect in that solution. For example, if it is desired to detect 10,000 different types of analytes, then 10,000 different sensing probes that are respectively specific to those analytes may be provided. It will be appreciated that any suitable number of different sensing probes may be provided, e.g., more than 100, more than 1,000, more than 10,000, more than 100,000, or more than 1,000,000. (Emphasis added)
As is evidenced above, in applying the broadest interpretation consistent with the disclosure, the claimed methods do encompass the simultaneous detection of over 1 million different analytes that may be present “in that solution”. A review of the disclosure fails to find where applicant has provided such a combination of antibodies, antibody fragments, aptamers, and oligonucleotide probes for detecting any nucleotide analyte and non-nucleotide analyte as found in any organism. Given such analysis, the rejection is maintained.
At page 13 of the response said representative asserts:
Furthermore, Applicant disagrees that the nucleotide sequences for organisms, amino acids, metabolites, and proteins are needed in order to enable the method. As stated above, the method is applicable to a wide variety of different analytes, and would be readily understood and carried out by a skilled person, without undue experiment and without the need for sequence listings for every potential analyte.
The above argument has been considered and has not been found pesuasive. As noted above, the disclosure has been found to comprise a Sequence Listing. Said Sequence Listing has been found to comprise a total of 8 DNA sequences, which range from 36 to88 nucleotides, and all of which are identified as being “Artificial”.
The disclosure has not been found to disclose the nucleotide sequence for any organism, much less that which has utility under 35 USC 101. Likewise, the disclosure has not been found to provide any amino acid sequence for any protein, much less identify epitopes of proteins.
The disclosure has not been found to provide any aptamer or antibody of any type, from any source, that can bind to any metabolite, be it within the fluid of a cell or a gas produced, be it produced by a plant or an animal.
The nucleotide sequences of DNA and RNA analytes, as well as the amino acid sequence and tertiary structure (epitopes) of proteins are deemed to constitute essential material. Applicant’s nondisclosure of such essential materials has not been found to satisfy the enablement requirements.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the rejections are maintained.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, Written Description
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112(a):
(a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Standard for Written Description.
Attention is directed to MPEP 2163.02 Standard for Determining Compliance With the Written Description Requirement [R-07-2022]:
An objective standard for determining compliance with the written description requirement is, "does the description clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that he or she invented what is claimed." In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Under Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991), to satisfy the written description requirement, an applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention, and that the invention, in that context, is whatever is now claimed. (Emphasis added)
Attention is also set directed to MPEP 2161.01 I [R-07-2022], wherein is stated:
For instance, generic claim language in the original disclosure does not satisfy the written description requirement if it fails to support the scope of the genus claimed. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349-50, 94 USPQ2d at 1171 ("[A]n adequate written description of a claimed genus requires more than a generic statement of an invention’s boundaries.") (citing Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1405-06); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968, 63 USPQ2d 1609, 1616 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that generic claim language appearing in ipsis verbis in the original specification did not satisfy the written description requirement because it failed to support the scope of the genus claimed); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170, 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that "only similar language in the specification or original claims is necessary to satisfy the written description requirement").
As set forth in Fiers v. Revel 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1604-5 (CAFC, January 1993):
We thus determined that, irrespective of the complexity or simplicity of the method of isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like conception of any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other than by its functional utility.
Fiers' attempt to distinguish Amgen therefore is incorrect. We also reject Fiers' argument that the existence of a workable method for preparing a DNA establishes conception of that material. (Emphasis added)
Conception of a substance claimed per se without reference to a process requires conception of its structure, name, formula, or definitive chemical or physical properties...
The difficulty that would arise if we were to hold that a conception occurs when one has only an idea of a compound, defining it by its hoped-for function, is that would-be inventors would file patent applications before they had made their inventions and before they could describe them. That is not consistent with the statute or the policy behind the statute, which is to promote disclosure of inventions.
As set forth in the en banc decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Company, 94 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2010) at 1171:
We held that a sufficient description of a genus instead requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can “visualize or recognize” the members of the genus. Id. at 1568-69. We explained that an adequate written description requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, physical properties, or other properties, of species falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the genus from other materials. Id. at 1568 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 [25 USPQ2d 1601] (Fed. Cir. 1993)). We have also held that functional claim language can meet the written description requirement when the art has established a correlation between structure and function. See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 964 (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001)). But merely drawing a fence around the outer limits of a purported genus is not an adequate substitute for describing a variety of materials constituting the genus and showing that one has invented a genus and not just a species.
***
In Fiers, we rejected the argument that “only similar language in the specification or original claim is necessary to satisfy the written description requirement.” 984 F.2d at 1170 (emphasis added). Rather, we held that original claim language to “a DNA coding for interferon activity” failed to provide an adequate written description as it amounted to no more than a “wish” or “plan” for obtaining the claimed DNA rather than a description of the DNA itself. Id. at 1170-71. That Fiers applied § 112, first paragraph, during an interference is irrelevant for, as we stated above, the statute contains no basis for ignoring the description requirement outside of this context. And again in Enzo we held that generic claim language appearing in ipsis verbis in the original specification does not satisfy the written description requirement if it fails to support the scope of the genus claimed. 323 F.3d at 968. We concluded that “[a] claim does not become more descriptive by its repetition, or its longevity.” Id. at 969.
***
The written description requirement also ensures that when a patent claims a genus by its function or result, the specification recites sufficient materials to accomplish that function—a problem that is particularly acute in the biological arts.
Attention is also directed to MPEP 2163 Guidelines for the Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, “Written Description” Requirement [R-01-2024], at part II ii):
The written description requirement for a claimed genus may be satisfied through sufficient description of a representative number of species by actual reduction to practice (see i)(A) above), reduction to drawings (see i)(B) above), or by disclosure of relevant, identifying characteristics, i.e., structure or other physical and/or chemical properties, by functional characteristics coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or by a combination of such identifying characteristics, sufficient to show the inventor was in possession of the claimed genus (see i)(C) above). See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406. See Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma, Inc., 10 F.4th 1330, 1337, 2021 USPQ2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ( "[T]he written description must lead a person of ordinary skill in the art to understand that the inventor possessed the entire scope of the claimed invention. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353–54 ('[T]he purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor's contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification.' (internal quotation marks omitted).") (Emphasis added)
Attention is also directed to the decision of University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co. (CA FC, July 1997) 43 USPQ2d 1398 wherein is stated:
In claims involving chemical materials, generic formulas usually indicate with specificity what the generic claims encompass. One skilled in the art can distinguish such a formula from others and can identify many of the species that the claims encompass. Accordingly, such a formula is normally an adequate written description of the claimed genus. In claims to genetic material, however, a generic statement such as “vertebrate insulin cDNA” or “mammalian cDNA,” without more, is not an adequate written description of the genus because it does not distinguish the claimed genus from others, except by function. It does not specifically define any of the genes that fall within its definition. It does not define any structural features commonly possessed by members of the genus that distinguish them from others. One skilled in the art therefore cannot, as one can do with a fully described genus, visualize or recognize the identity of the members of the genus. A definition by function, as we have previously indicated, does not suffice to define the genus because it is only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it is See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169-71, 25 USPQ2d at 1605-06 (discussing Amgen). It is only a definition of a useful result rather than a definition of what it achieves as a result. Many such genes may achieve that result. The description requirement of the patent statute requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention. See In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 222 USPQ 369, 372-373 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming rejection because the specification does “little more than outlin[e] goals appellants hope the claimed invention achieves and the problems the invention will hopefully ameliorate.”). Accordingly, naming a type of material generally known to exist, in the absence of knowledge as to what that material consists of, is not a description of that material.
Thus, as we have previously held, a cDNA is not defined or described by the mere name cDNA,” even if accompanied by the name of the protein that it encodes, but requires a kind of specificity usually achieved by means of the recitation of the sequence of nucleotides that make up the cDNA. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171, 25 USPQ2d at 1606.
Acknowledgement is made of the fact that the claims are to a method and not to a product. However, it is well settled that in order to satisfy the written description for a method, one must also disclose the molecules required to perform the method. In support of this position attention is directed to University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 68 USPQ2D 1424 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) at 1433 (affirmed; University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 69 USPQ2d 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2004)):
Plaintiff also argues that the requirements for written descriptions of claims to chemical compounds are irrelevant to this case because the '850 patent does not claim a compound, but a method of treatment by targeting PGHS-2 activity over PGHS-1 activity. Virtually any compound claim could be transformed into a method claim, however, simply by means of wording the claim in terms of a method of using the compound. With respect to the issue before the Court, then, this is little more than a semantic distinction without a difference. The claimed method depends upon finding a compound that selectively inhibits PGHS-2 activity. Without such a compound, it is impossible to practice the claimed method of treatment. It means little to “invent” a method if one does not have possession of a substance that is essential to practicing that method. Without that substance, the claimed invention is more theoretical than real; it is, as defendants argue, akin to “inventing” a cure for cancer by utilizing a substance that attacks and destroys cancer cells while leaving healthy cells alone. Without possession of such a substance, such a “cure” is illusory, and there is no meaningful possession of the method.
***
What the inventors did not do, however, is succeed in taking the last, critical step of actually isolating such a compound, or at least of developing a process through which one skilled in the art would be directly led to such a compound. Absent that step, their discoveries, valuable though they might have been, did not blossom into a full-fledged, complete invention. Scientific discoveries, and theories based on those discoveries, frequently lay the groundwork for later inventions, but that does not make the discoverer the inventor as well.
Attention is also directed to the decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.
(Fed. Cir. 2010) 94 USPQ2d 1161, 1175, which teaches:
In accordance with Rochester, the ?516 patent must adequately describe the claimed methods for reducing NF-?B activity, including adequate description of the molecules that Ariad admits are necessary to perform the methods. (Emphasis added)
Holding and Rationale
Claims 1-36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.
Claims 1 and 19 are the only independent claims pending. Claims 1, 4-13, and 19 are deemed to be representative and, for convenience, are reproduced below.
PNG
media_image2.png
350
484
media_image2.png
Greyscale
PNG
media_image3.png
384
520
media_image3.png
Greyscale
PNG
media_image4.png
250
510
media_image4.png
Greyscale
PNG
media_image5.png
228
518
media_image5.png
Greyscale
As is evidenced above, the claims are to a method and related system for the detection of any analyte found on, in, or produced by any organism, including metabolites. Said method and related system also encompass the simultaneous detection of any number of analytes, including “a plurality of nucleotide analytes and a plurality of non-nucleotide analytes” (claims 13 and 31).
Attention is directed to the following publications which teach of the enormity of the genera of virus, plants, insects, bacteria, mammals, and species encompassed by the subfamily Murinae as the detection of any and all genes from all members of the various genera are encompassed by the instant claims.
“Viruses” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
An enormous variety of genomic structures can be seen among viral species; as a group, they contain more structural genomic diversity than plants, animals, archaea, or bacteria. There are millions of different types of viruses, although fewer than 7,000 types have been described in detail. (Emphasis added)
“How many species of bacteria are there” (wisegeek.com; accessed 21 January 2014) teaches:
Currently, estimates of the total number of species of bacteria range from about 10 million to a billion, but these estimates are tentative, and may be off by many orders of magnitude. By comparison, there are probably between 10 and 30 million species of animals, the vast majority of them insects. The number of scientifically recognized species of animals is about 1,250,000. There are almost 300,000 recognized species of plants.
“Fungi,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
As of 2020, around 148,000 species of fungi have been described by taxonomists,[6] but the global biodiversity of the fungus kingdom is not fully understood.[48] A 2017 estimate suggests there may be between 2.2 and 3.8 million species.[5]
“Insect”, (Wikipedia.com; accessed 09/10/2020) teaches:
Insects are the most diverse group of animals; they include more than a million described species and represent more than half of all known living organisms. The total number of extant species is estimated at between six and ten million; potentially over 90% of the animal life forms on Earth are insects.
“Plant,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
There are about 380,000 known species of plants, of which the majority, some 260,000, produce seeds.
“Mammal,” (Wikipedia.com; accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
According to Mammal Species of the World, which is updated through periodic editions, 5,416 species were identified in 2006. These were grouped into 1,229 genera, 153 families and 29 orders.[5]
“Murinae,” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 10 June 2024) teaches:
The Old World rats and mice, part of the subfamily Murinae in the family Muridae, comprise at least 519 species. Members of this subfamily are called murines. In terms of species richness, this subfamily is larger than all mammal families except the Cricetidae and Muridae, and is larger than all mammal orders except the bats and the remainder of the rodents.
“Fish,” (Wikipedia.com, accessed 08 September 2023) teaches:
Fish are abundant in most bodies of water. They can be found in nearly all aquatic environments, from high mountain streams (e.g., char and gudgeon) to the abyssal and even hadal depths of the deepest oceans (e.g., cush-eels and snailfish), although no species has yet been documented in the deepest 25% of the ocean.[4] At 34,300 described species, fish exhibit greater species diversity than any other group of vertebrates.[5]
“Archaea,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 08 September 2023), teaches:
The classification of archaea into species is also controversial. Ernst Mayr defined a species as a group of interbreeding organisms which are reproductively isolated, but this is of no help since archaea only reproduce asexually.[37]
Archaea show high levels of horizontal gene transfer between lineages. Some researchers suggest that individuals can be grouped into species-like populations given highly similar genomes and infrequent gene transfer to/from cells with less-related genomes, as in the genus Ferroplasma.[38] On the other hand, studies in Halorubrum found significant genetic transfer to/from less-related populations, limiting the criterion's applicability. Some researchers question whether such species designations have practical meaning.[40]
Current knowledge on genetic diversity is fragmentary, so the total number of species cannot be estimated with any accuracy.[22] (Emphasis added)
“Algae,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 03-04-2016) teaches:
The most recent estimate suggests 72,500 algal species worldwide.
“Protozoa,” Wikipedia.com (accessed 05-11-2016), teaches:
The classification of protozoa has been and remains a problematic area of taxonomy. Where they are available, DNA sequences are used as the basis for classification; however, for the majority of described protozoa, such material is not available. (Emphasis added)
Attention is also directed to “Eukaryotic Genome Complexity” (Pray, Nature Education, 1(1):36, 2008, pages 1-4.). As seen therein, a table of estimated protein encoding genes in different genomes is provided.
PNG
media_image6.png
403
540
media_image6.png
Greyscale
The disclosure has been found to comprise a Sequence Listing. Said Sequence Listing has been found to comprise a total of 8 DNA sequences, which range from 36 to88 nucleotides, and all of which are identified as being “Artificial”.
The disclosure has not been found to disclose the nucleotide sequence for any organism, much less that which has utility under 35 USC 101. Likewise, the disclosure has not been found to provide any amino acid sequence for any protein, much less identify epitopes of proteins.
The disclosure has not been found to provide any aptamer or antibody of any type, from any source, that can bind to any metabolite, be it within the fluid of a cell or a gas produced, be it produced by a plant or an animal.
The nucleotide sequences of DNA and RNA analytes, as well as the amino acid sequence and tertiary structure (epitopes) of proteins are deemed to constitute essential material for both the claimed method and claimed system. Likewise, the aptamers and antibodies required by claims 11, 12, 29, and 30 are also essential materials and are undisclosed
Applicant’s non-disclosure of such essential material has not been found to reasonably suggest that applicant, as of the effective filing date (10/16/2019) was in possession of the full genus of both the claimed method and system.
In view of the above analysis and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 1-36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Response to traversal
Applicant’s representative, at page 14 of the response, asserts:
As argued above, the Examiner's interpretation of the scope of the claims is overly broad and not the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the repeated and consistent teachings of the specification. Thus, the Examiner is alleging that the Applicant did not have possession of the full scope of an unreasonably broad interpretation of the claims. However, the scope of the claimed method, interpreted correctly in light of the teachings provided in the specification, is focused and well-defined. The description and working examples disclosed in the present application clearly demonstrate that the Applicant was in possession of the full scope of the claimed method and system, interpreted in light of the specification.
Thus Applicant believes the present application meets the written description requirement.
The above argument has been considered and has not been found persuasive towards the withdrawal of the rejection.
As evidenced above, the breadth of the claimed inventions has not been unreasonable. In support of this position attention is again directed to attention is directed to page 26, paragraph [0129] of the disclosure wherein is asserted:
In some examples, as many different sensing probes may be provided in the solution as the number of different types of analytes it is desired to detect in that solution. For example, if it is desired to detect 10,000 different types of analytes, then 10,000 different sensing probes that are respectively specific to those analytes may be provided. It will be appreciated that any suitable number of different sensing probes may be provided, e.g., more than 100, more than 1,000, more than 10,000, more than 100,000, or more than 1,000,000. (Emphasis added)
As evidenced above, in applying the broadest interpretation consistent with the disclosure, the claimed methods do encompass the simultaneous detection of over 1 million different analytes that may be present “in that solution”. A review of the disclosure fails to find where applicant has provided any antibody to any target, much less a combination of antibodies, antibody fragments, aptamers, and oligonucleotide probes for detecting any nucleotide analyte and non-nucleotide analyte as found in any organism. Given such analysis, the rejection is maintained.
Conclusion
Objections and/or rejections which appeared in the prior Office action and which have not been repeated hereinabove have been withdrawn.
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any nonprovisional extension fee (37 CFR 1.17(a)) pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Bradley L. Sisson whose telephone number is (571)272-0751. The examiner can normally be reached Monday to Thursday, from 6:30 AM to 5 PM..
Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.
If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Wu-Cheng Shen can be reached at 571-272-3157. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.
Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/Bradley L. Sisson/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1682
1 Attention is directed to 37 CFR 1.57(d), which sates in part:
(d) "Essential material" may be incorporated by reference, but only by way of an incorporation by reference to a U.S. patent or U.S. patent application publication, which patent or patent application publication does not itself incorporate such essential material by reference. "Essential material" is material that is necessary to:
(1) Provide a written description of the claimed invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out the invention as required by 35 U.S.C. 112(a);
(2) Describe the claimed invention in terms that particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as required by 35 U.S.C. 112(b); or
(3) Describe the structure, material, or acts that correspond to a claimed means or step for performing a specified function as required by 35 U.S.C. 112(f). (Emphasis added)
(e) Other material ("Nonessential material") may be incorporated by reference to U.S. patents, U.S. patent application publications, foreign patents, foreign published applications, prior and concurrently filed commonly owned U.S. applications, or non-patent publications. An incorporation by reference by hyperlink or other form of browser executable code is not permitted.