DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
2. A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 04/15/2026 has been entered.
Response to Arguments
3. Applicant’s arguments with respect to amended claim 1 have been considered but are moot in view of new grounds of rejection based on a new reference Hao ("A Trusted Device Management Method Based On De-centralized Network", CN 106911513 A, pub. date 2017-06-30).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112
4. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
5. Claims 1-3 and 37-40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention. The claimed limitations “a Core Network node that provides a subscription identifier for the device to a Device Management node with management responsibility for the device” and “wherein the Verification node receives a Device Management key associated with a manager of the device” in claim 1 do not clearly define the meaning of the underlined limitations. The first underlined limitation discusses a node with responsibility for the device and the second underlined limitation relates to a specific personnel. It is not clear whether a key will be used to identify a privilege of “the manager” who is a human or will be used to identify “the device”. In claim 37, “a signature” is disclosed, but it’s not clear who provides the “signature”. Appropriate corrections are required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
6. In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis (i.e., changing from AIA to pre-AIA ) for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
7. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
8. Claims 1-3 and 40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over S3-180769 (" SUCI and LI - Verification hash Integrated in 5G AKA", 3GPP TSG SA WG3 (Security) Meeting #90Bis 26 February - 2 March 2018, San Diego (US), pub. date 26 February 2018) in view of Jerichow (US 2019/0149521 A1), and further in view of Hao ("A Trusted Device Management Method Based On De-centralized Network", CN 106911513 A, pub. date 2017-06-30).
Regarding claim 1, S3-180769 teaches a system for managing a communication network subscription identifier associated with a device, the system comprising (Fig. 6.1.2-1, managing SUCI (~communication network subscription identifier associated with UE (~device))):
a Core Network node that provides a subscription identifier for the device to a Device Management node with management responsibility for the device (Fig. 6.1.2-1, SEAF (~Core Network node) provides SUCI (~subscription identifier for the device) to AUSF (~Device Management node));
a Verification node that receives from the Device Management node the subscription identifier (Fig. 6.1.2-1, UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) configured to receive from AUSF (~Device Management node) the SUCI (~subscription identifier)) and a characteristic of the device (Fig. 6.1.2-1, UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) receives from AUSF (~Device Management node) a characteristic of the device (~SUPI (~subscription permanent identifier) or UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) receives from AUSF (~Device Management node) a characteristic of the device (~SUPI (~subscription permanent identifier) contained in the subscription identifier (~SUCI) - see par. 27 of applicant’s published disclosure defining SUPI as characteristic of a device); par. 27 of Applicant’s published disclosure states, “Two categories of device characteristic are proposed in the present disclosure: behavioural characteristics and permanent identities (~SUPI), and
binds the subscription identifier to the characteristic such that the subscription identifier is uniquely associated with the characteristic (SUCI (~subscription identifier) is bound to SUPI (~characteristic) since the SUCI (~subscription identifier) contains the SUPI (~characteristic) in an encrypted form; sect. 6.1.3.2, “If SUCI (~subscription identifier) is used, the UDM/ARPF does this by first extracting (or de-concealing) the SUPI (~characteristic) and R from the SUCI (~subscription identifier)”, wherein the SUCI (~subscription identifier) is bounded to the SUPI (~characteristic); Sect. 6.1.2, “UE has input SUPI and R into the SUCI generation”) is transmitted from SEAF (~Core Network node) to AUSF (~Device Management node) and from AUSF (~Device Management node) to UDM/ARPF (~Verification node). SUCI and SUPI are binded when UDM/ARPF successfully decrypts (~de-conceals) the SUCI to reveal the original SUPI (~Sect. 6.1.2, “UDM/SIDF shall be invoked if a SUCI is received. SIDF (~Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function), as offered as a service by UDM, shall de-conceal SUCI to gain SUPI and R, both input parameters of SUCI generation”). The successful decryption and verification process in the UDM/ARPF effectively binds the temporary, concealed SUCI to the permanent SUPI in the network's internal database. The network then uses this mapping to manage the subscriber's session and issues a temporary identifier, the 5G Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity (5G-GUTI), for all subsequent communications; sect. 6.1.3.2 of S3-180769 states, “If SUCI was provided in the Auth-info Req message, the UDM/ARPF generates a verification hash VH* from SUCI, SUPI, and R as input parameters, the latter two are retrieved from SUCI”, wherein SUCI is binded with SUPI)) and stores the bound subscription identifier and characteristic in a memory (SUCI (~bound subscription identifier) and SUPI (~characteristic) is stored in UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) since UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) need to have stored SUCI (~bound subscription identifier) and SUPI (~characteristic) to generate a verification hash VH* from SUCI (~bound subscription identifier) and SUPI (~characteristic) as input parameters (see S3-180769 sect. 6.1.3.2); sect. 6.1.3.2 of S3-180769 states, “If SUCI was provided in the Auth-info Req message, the UDM/ARPF generates a verification hash VH* from SUCI, SUPI, and R as input parameters, the latter two are retrieved from SUCI”, wherein SUCI is binded with SUPI; and the SUCI and the SUPI are stored in UDM/ARPF for it to generate the verification hash VH* from SUCI and SUPI as input parameters); and
a Network Access node that obtains the subscription identifier from the device (Fig. 6.1.2-1, SEAF obtains SUCI (~subscription identifier) from UE (~device) via a base station (~network access node) and thus, the base station (~network access node) obtains the SUCI (subscription identifier) from the UE (~device));
wherein the Verification node, Network Access node, and Core Network node verify that the device from which the Network Access node obtained the subscription identifier is in possession of the characteristic that is bound to the subscription identifier (Fig. 6.1.3.2-1, UDM/ARPF (~Verification node), a base station (~Network Access node) and SEAF (~Core Network node) cooperates to verify that UE (~device) from which a base station (~Network Access node) obtained SUCI (~subscription identifier) is in possession of the characteristic (~SUPI) that is bound to the subscription identifier (~SUCI); VH and VH’ are compared to verify that SUPI (~characteristic that is bound to the SUCI (~subscription identifier)) is the same as the SUPI (~characteristic that is in the possession of the UE (~device); sect. 6.1.3.2, “SEAF … calculate a VH' = hash(SUCI, SUPI, R) itself, and compare the outcome with VH as received from UE. If there is a mismatch between the reported VH (~cryptographic calculation) from UE and the VH’ calculation (~cryptographic calculation) by the serving network, the SEAF shall reject the UE. NOTE1: The verification hash VH for SUPI identity proof was introduced for the attacking scenario, that UE works as specified and has no functional additions while the HPLMN UDM may be assumed to be cheating. Thus, the underlying assumption of the verification hash solution is that the UE is not cheating or cooperating in cheating with the UDM. Without this assumption, any proprietary application layer scheme between the UE and the UDM, with the aim of lying to the AMF/SEAF about the true SUPI, could be realized, even without SUPI concealment. This would have been possible in EPS already. If the verification hash comparison and the authentication was successful, the SUPI is stored by the SEAF”).
To further clarify that the gNB (~Network Access node) is present for communications between the UE (~device) and the SEAF (~Core Network node), Jerichow is combined with S3-180769 wherein Jerichow teaches a gNB (~Network Access node) present as an intermediary between a UE (~device) and a SEAF (Fig. 1, gNB 104 (~Network Access node) is an intermediary node between UE (~device) 102 and SEAF (~Core Network node) 106).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teaching of Jerichow with the teaching of S3-180769 in order to provide an initial point of connection for the UE to the core network via a radio interface that allows the UE to connect to the core network by transmitting and receiving data such as authentication requests and responses between the UE and the core network.
The combination does not explicitly teach wherein the Verification node receives a Device Management key associated with a manager of the device.
However, Hao teaches wherein a Verification node receives a Device Management key associated with a manager of a device (pg. 4, par. 4, “management information M encrypted with Ks to obtain EKs (M), the Ks with public key of target node to obtain EPubD (Ks), then structure (source address, target address DD, EPubD (Ks), EKs (M)) of the unsigned message. then source node to a data node or management information base after the message signature using the public key PubD of the himself/herself; when the full data node receives the management information, the management information to be verified”).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teaching of Hao with the teaching of S3-180769 as modified by Jerichow in order to securely authenticate a device, verify its compliance, and prove its authorization to access restricted networks or applications.
Regarding claim 2, S3-180769 in view of Jerichow, and further in view of Hao teaches the system as claimed in claim 1,
wherein the Verification node, Network Access node, and Core Network node verify that the device from which the Network Access node obtained the subscription identifier is in possession of the characteristic that is bound to the subscription identifier (S3-180769 Fig. 6.1.3.2-1, UDM/ARPF (~Verification node), a base station (~Network Access node) and SEAF (~Core Network node) cooperates to verify that UE (~device) from which a base station (~Network Access node) obtained SUCI (~subscription identifier) is in possession of the characteristic (~SUPI) that is bound to the subscription identifier (~SUCI); VH and VH’ are compared to verify that SUPI (~characteristic that is bound to the SUCI (~subscription identifier)) is the same as the SUPI (~characteristic that is in the possession of the UE (~device); sect. 6.1.3.2, “SEAF … calculate a VH' = hash(SUCI, SUPI, R) itself, and compare the outcome with VH as received from UE. If there is a mismatch between the reported VH (~cryptographic calculation) from UE and the VH’ calculation (~cryptographic calculation) by the serving network, the SEAF shall reject the UE. NOTE1: The verification hash VH for SUPI identity proof was introduced for the attacking scenario, that UE works as specified and has no functional additions while the HPLMN UDM may be assumed to be cheating. Thus, the underlying assumption of the verification hash solution is that the UE is not cheating or cooperating in cheating with the UDM. Without this assumption, any proprietary application layer scheme between the UE and the UDM, with the aim of lying to the AMF/SEAF about the true SUPI, could be realized, even without SUPI concealment. This would have been possible in EPS already. If the verification hash comparison and the authentication was successful, the SUPI is stored by the SEAF”) by performing at least one of:
obtaining an observed characteristic of the device and comparing the observed characteristic to the characteristic that is bound to the subscription identifier; or
performing a cryptographic calculation using the characteristic that is bound to the subscription identifier (S3-180769 Fig. 6.1.3.2-1 sect. 6.1.3.2, “14. If the authentication was successful, the SEAF does know the SUPI, shall calculate a VH' = hash(SUCI (~subscription identifier), SUPI (~characteristic that is bound to the SUCI (~subscription identifier)), R)”), causing the device to perform a corresponding cryptographic calculation using a characteristic in its possession (sect. 6.1.3.2, “and compare the outcome with VH as received from UE … The verification hash VH for SUPI (~characteristic) identity proof (in its possession) was introduced for the attacking scenario, that UE works as specified and has no functional additions while the HPLMN UDM may be assumed to be cheating”), and
using the results of the cryptographic calculations to verify that the characteristic that is bound to the subscription identifier is the same as the characteristic that is in the possession of the device (S3-180769 VH (~cryptographic calculation) and VH’ (~cryptographic calculation) are compared to verify that SUPI (~characteristic that is bound to the SUCI (~subscription identifier)) is the same as the SUPI (~characteristic that is in the possession of the UE (~device); Fig. 6.1.3.2-1 sect. 6.1.3.2, “14. If the authentication was successful, the SEAF does know the SUPI, shall calculate a VH' = hash(SUCI, SUPI, R) (~performing a cryptographic calculation using the characteristic (~SUPI) that is bound to the subscription identifier (~SUCI)) itself, and compare the outcome with VH as received from UE. If there is a mismatch between the reported VH from UE and the VH’ calculation by the serving network, the SEAF shall reject the UE”).
To further clarify that the gNB (~Network Access node) is present for communications between the UE (~device) and the SEAF (~Core Network node), Jerichow is combined with S3-180769 wherein Jerichow further teaches a gNB (~Network Access node) present as an intermediary between a UE (~device) and a SEAF (Fig. 1, gNB 104 (~Network Access node) is an intermediary node between UE (~device) 102 and SEAF (~Core Network node) 106).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teaching of Jerichow with the teaching of S3-180769 as modified by Jerichow and Hao in order to provide an initial point of connection for the UE to the core network via a radio interface that allows the UE to connect to the core network by transmitting and receiving data such as authentication requests and responses between the UE and the core network.
Regarding claim 3, S3-180769 in view of Jerichow, and further in view of Hao teaches the system as claimed in claim 2,
wherein the Verification node, Network Access node, and Core Network node perform a cryptographic calculation using the characteristic that is bound to the subscription identifier (S3-180769 Fig. 6.1.3.2-1, UDM/ARPF (~Verification node), base station (~network access node) and SEAF (~Core Network node) are configured to perform a cryptographic calculation (~ VH, VH’) using the characteristic (~SUPI) that is bound to the subscription identifier (~SUCI); sect. 6.1.3.2, “VH' = hash(SUCI (~subscription identifier), SUPI (~characteristic that is bound to the SUCI (~subscription identifier)), R)”),
cause the device to perform a corresponding cryptographic calculation using a characteristic in its possession (S3-180769 sect. 6.1.3.2, “and compare the outcome with VH as received from UE … The verification hash VH for SUPI (~characteristic) identity proof (in its possession) was introduced for the attacking scenario, that UE works as specified and has no functional additions while the HPLMN UDM may be assumed to be cheating”), and
use the results of the cryptographic calculations to verify that the characteristic that is bound to the subscription identifier is the same as the characteristic that is in the possession of the device during a network authentication procedure for the device (S3-180769 VH and VH’ are compared to verify that SUPI (~characteristic that is bound to the SUCI (~subscription identifier)) is the same as the SUPI (~characteristic that is in the possession of the UE (~device) during a network authentication procedure for the device; sect. 6.1.3.2, “SEAF … calculate a VH' = hash(SUCI, SUPI, R) itself, and compare the outcome with VH as received from UE. If there is a mismatch between the reported VH (~cryptographic calculation) from UE and the VH’ calculation (~cryptographic calculation) by the serving network, the SEAF shall reject the UE. NOTE1: The verification hash VH for SUPI identity proof was introduced for the attacking scenario, that UE works as specified and has no functional additions while the HPLMN UDM may be assumed to be cheating. Thus, the underlying assumption of the verification hash solution is that the UE is not cheating or cooperating in cheating with the UDM. Without this assumption, any proprietary application layer scheme between the UE and the UDM, with the aim of lying to the AMF/SEAF about the true SUPI, could be realized, even without SUPI concealment. This would have been possible in EPS already. If the verification hash comparison and the authentication was successful, the SUPI is stored by the SEAF”).
To further clarify that the gNB (~Network Access node) is present for communications between the UE (~device) and the SEAF (~Core Network node), Jerichow is combined with S3-180769 wherein Jerichow further teaches a gNB (~Network Access node) present as an intermediary between a UE (~device) and a SEAF (Fig. 1, gNB 104 (~Network Access node) is an intermediary node between UE (~device) 102 and SEAF (~Core Network node) 106).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teaching of Jerichow with the teaching of S3-180769 as modified by Jerichow and Hao in order to provide an initial point of connection for the UE to the core network via a radio interface that allows the UE to connect to the core network by transmitting and receiving data such as authentication requests and responses between the UE and the core network.
Regarding claim 40. S3-180769 in view of Jerichow, and further in view of Hao teaches the system as claimed in claim 1,
wherein the characteristic of the device received from the Device Management node (S3-180769 Fig. 6.1.2-1, UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) receives from AUSF (~Device Management node) a characteristic of the device (~SUPI (~subscription permanent identifier) or UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) receives from AUSF (~Device Management node) a characteristic of the device (~SUPI (~subscription permanent identifier) contained in the subscription identifier (~SUCI) - see par. 27 of applicant’s published disclosure defining SUPI as characteristic of a device); par. 27 of Applicant’s published disclosure states, “Two categories of device characteristic are proposed in the present disclosure: behavioural characteristics and permanent identities (~SUPI) comprises at least one of:
a behavioural characteristic; or component elements of a permanent device identity (S3-180769 Fig. 6.1.2-1, UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) receives from AUSF (~Device Management node) a characteristic of the device (~SUPI (~subscription permanent identifier comprises component elements of a permanent device identity) or UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) receives from AUSF (~Device Management node) a characteristic of the device (~SUPI (~subscription permanent identifier) contained in the subscription identifier (~SUCI) - see par. 27 of applicant’s published disclosure defining SUPI as characteristic of a device); par. 27 of Applicant’s published disclosure states, “Two categories of device characteristic are proposed in the present disclosure: behavioural characteristics and permanent identities (~SUPI).
9. Claim 37 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over S3-180769 in view of Jerichow, further in view of Hao, and further in view of Kim ("Method for Protecting Data Encrypted by Home Network Key in Wireless Communication System and Device Therefor", WO 2019088599 A1, pub. date 2019-05-09).
Regarding claim 37, S3-180769 in view of Jerichow, and further in view of Hao teaches the system as claimed in claim 1,
wherein the Verification node further performs: checking with the received subscription identifier (S3-180769 Fig. 6.1.2-1, UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) configured to receive from AUSF (~Device Management node) the SUCI (~subscription identifier)) and characteristic of the device (Fig. 6.1.2-1, UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) receives from AUSF (~Device Management node) a characteristic of the device (~SUPI (~subscription permanent identifier) or UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) receives from AUSF (~Device Management node) a characteristic of the device (~SUPI (~subscription permanent identifier) contained in the subscription identifier (~SUCI) - see par. 27 of applicant’s published disclosure defining SUPI as characteristic of a device); par. 27 of Applicant’s published disclosure states, “Two categories of device characteristic are proposed in the present disclosure: behavioural characteristics and permanent identities (~SUPI).
The combination S3-180769 in view of Jerichow does not explicitly teach that checking with the received subscription identifier is checking a signature using the Device Management key.
However, Hao further teaches checking a signature using a Device Management key (pg. 4, pars. 4-5, “management information M encrypted with Ks to obtain EKs (M), the Ks with public key of target node to obtain EPubD (Ks), then structure (source address, target address DD, EPubD (Ks), EKs (M)) of the unsigned message. then source node to a data node or management information base after the message signature using the public key PubD of the himself/herself; when the full data node receives the management information, the management information to be verified (~verification requires signature checking), the verification through the management information continuously transmitted on the network, EKs (M) refers to the management information M using session key Ks to encrypt ... Hash value based on management information of the last management information block and the block, calculating the Hash value of the management information block”).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teaching of Hao with the teaching of S3-18079 as modified by Jerichow and Hao in order to verify a device's hardware identity and integrity, validating that the hardware is trusted, uncompromised, and officially enrolled, preventing rogue devices from accessing corporate networks or sensitive resources.
The combination does not explicitly teach that the signature is included with the received subscription identifier.
However, Kim teaches signature is included with a subscription identifier (pg. 3, par. 5, “deriving a signature result by signing the network identifier to which the network node belongs based on the HPrvK, and transmitting the signature result”; pg. 3, par. 7, “signature result may be derived by signing the SUCI, the network identifier to which the network node belongs”).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teaching of Kim with the teaching of S3-180769 as modified by Jerichow and Hao in order to mathematically confirm that the message data and identifiers were not tampered with or corrupted during transit.
10. Claim 38 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over S3-180769 in view of Jerichow, further in view of Hao, and further in view of Yu ("A Verifying Method And System Based On Heterogeneous Network", CN101242404B, pub. date 2011-05-25).
Regarding claim 38, S3-180769 in view of Jerichow, and further in view of Hao teaches the system as claimed in claim 1,
wherein the Verification node (S3-180769 sect. 6.1.3.2, “2. The UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) shall then return the 5G HE AV and VH* to the AUSF (~Core Network node) in an authentication information response (Auth Info-Resp)”) further performs:
sending, to a Core Network node, an identification of the Verification node (S3-180769 sect. 6.1.3.2, “2. The UDM/ARPF (~Verification node) shall then return (~sending) the 5G HE AV and VH* to the AUSF (~Core Network node) in an authentication information response (Auth Info-Resp)”, wherein 5G HE AV comprises the specific cryptographic elements for identifying and authenticating the UDM/ARPF (~Verification node)).
The combination does not explicitly teach wherein the identification comprises a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of the Verification node.
However, Yu teaches wherein an identification comprises a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of a node ([0061], “uniform resource identifier of the notification server”; [0064], “the login server and notification server can also be implemented on the same server”).
It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the teaching of Yu with the teaching of S3-180769 as modified by Jerichow and Hao in order to provide a standardized naming convention, allowing different systems, networks, and APIs to securely communicate and identify the verification node without compatibility issues as well as ensuring the identity of the verification node is globally unique, eliminating ambiguity when multiple nodes or identity providers interact.
Allowable Subject Matter
11. Claim 39 is objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. The closest prior arts found is Tang ("Wireless Communication Method, Network Device and Terminal Device", CA 3065119 A1, pub. date 2019-08-15) disclosing a subscription identifier binding policy and Gateva (7,672,317 B2) disclosing a service identifier binding policy. However, the prior arts do not teach wherein the Verification node further performs: receiving, from a Core Network node, a subscription identifier binding policy and a subscription identifier to which the policy applies; and on receipt from the Device Management node of the subscription identifier and device characteristic: checking whether a subscription identifier binding policy that applies to the subscription identifier received from the Device Management node has been received; and if such a subscription identifier binding policy has been received, checking whether binding of the subscription identifier received from the Device Management node to the characteristic received from the Device Management node is consistent with the subscription identifier binding policy as stated in claim 39.
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ALEXANDER YI whose telephone number is (571)270-7696. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Friday from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm.
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/ALEXANDER YI/
Examiner, Art Unit 2643
/JINSONG HU/ Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2643
Prosecution Insights