DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status
The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114
A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 11 March 2026 has been entered.
Response to Amendment
The Amendment filed 11 March 2026 has been entered. Claims 1, 2, 6, 10, 12, 14, 16 – 18, 20, 21, 26, 27, 29 – 31, and 33 remain pending in the application. Claims 37 – 39 are new claims commensurate in scope with claim 1 and therefore are under consideration.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102
The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1, 2, 6, 10, 12, 14, 16 – 18, 20, 21, 26, 29 – 31, and 37 – 39 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Flanagan (US 3,266,113 A).
Regarding claim 1, Flanagan discloses interlocking metasurfaces, comprising a first metasurface having a first array of mechanically interlocking surface features adapted to mate with a second metasurface having a second array of mechanically interlocking surface features (“complementary pairs of interengaging unitary articles each having a functional surface comprising a two-dimensional array (field)” of “elements”: e.g. Fig. 1 – 14; Col. 1, l. 61, to Col. 13, l. 39), wherein:
the first metasurface is monolithically integrated (“elements” on “integral base”: e.g. Col. 6, ll. 67 – 68) with a first rigid object (e.g. Col. 1, ll. 61 – 66); and
the second metasurface is monolithically integrated (“elements” on “integral base”: e.g. Col. 6, ll. 67 – 68) with a second rigid object (e.g. Col. 1, ll. 61 – 66).
Regarding claim 2, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses at least one of the first or second array of mechanically interlocking surface features comprises interlocking T-shaped features on a supporting surface (e.g. Fig. 10a; Col. 10, ll. 50 – 51).
Regarding claim 6, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses at least one of the first or second array of the mechanically interlocking surface features comprises arrow-like features protruding off of a supporting surface (e.g. Fig. 10; Col. 10, ll. 47 – 50).
Regarding claim 10, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses the mechanically interlocking surface features of the first metasurface create an interlocking action with the mechanically interlocking surface features of the second metasurface and wherein the interlocking action comprises, e.g., a snap-fit interlock (“pressing”: e.g. Col. 2, ll. 15 – 17; Col. 7, ll. 30 – 34; Col. 12, ll. 66 – 72).
Regarding claim 12, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses the mechanically interlocking surface features of the first and second metasurfaces comprise two or more different materials (“filled” polymers, where the filler is a different material to the polymer: e.g. Col. 12, ll. 35 – 42).
Regarding claim 14, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses the first metasurface provides engagement with the second metasurface in a first direction and provides disengagement in a second direction that is colinear with the first direction (e.g. Col. 3, ll. 22 – 25).
Regarding claim 16, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses the first metasurface provides engagement with the second metasurface along a complex multi-directional path (e.g. Col. 4, l. 74, to Col. 5, l. 8; Col. 9, ll. 20 – 27).
Regarding claim 17, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses the first metasurface provides engagement with the second metasurface along a curved path (e.g. Col. 4, l. 74, to Col. 5, l. 8; Col. 9, ll. 20 – 27).
Regarding claim 18, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses the first and second metasurfaces are planar (“flat”: e.g. Fig. 1 – 14; Col. 3, ll. 41 – 45).
Regarding claim 20, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses at least one of the first or second metasurfaces is permanently deformed upon engagement of the metasurfaces (partial recovery rather than complete recovery occurs in some instances: e.g. Col. 2, ll. 44 – 52).
Regarding claim 21, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses at least one of the first or second arrays of mechanically interlocking surface features is not geometrically isotropic in a plane of the first or second metasurface (e.g. Fig. 14; Col. 12, ll. 11 – 34).
Regarding claim 26, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses a spacing of the mechanically interlocking surface features of at least one of the first or second arrays is not uniform so as to provide engagement of the first and second metasurfaces with a specific relative orientation (e.g. Col. 12, ll. 5 – 34).
Regarding claim 29, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses the mechanically interlocking surface features of at least one of the first or second metasurfaces comprise two or more different types of surface features (e.g. Col. 4, ll. 12 – 21).
Regarding claim 30, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses the mechanically interlocking surface features of at least one of the first or second metasurfaces are varied in size and/or shape across the metasurface (e.g. Col. 4, ll. 12 – 21).
Regarding claim 31, although Flanagan is not explicit as to at least one of the first or second metasurfaces being fabricated using an additive manufacturing process, the examiner notes this limitation makes claim 31 a product-by-process claim.
“[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process.” In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See MPEP § 2113, I.
Since no parameters of the process are defined for the additive manufacturing process recited in claim 31, the process is not considered to further limit the features of the first and second metasurfaces beyond those required of claim 1. Accordingly, a prima facie case of anticipation exists with respect to claim 31 in light of Flanagan’s disclosure of the features of claim 1 discussed previously.
Regarding claim 37, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses the mechanically interlocking surface features of the first or second metasurfaces comprise a polymer (e.g. Col. 12, ll. 35 – 42).
Regarding claim 38, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses the mechanically interlocking surface features of the first or second metasurfaces comprise a ceramic (e.g. Col. 12, ll. 35 – 36, 47 – 48).
Regarding claim 39, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses the mechanically interlocking surface features of the first or second metasurfaces comprise a metal (e.g. Col. 12, ll. 35 – 36, 43 – 46).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows:
Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claim 27 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Flanagan as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Murasaki (US 2002/0069495 A1).
Regarding claim 27, although Flanagan is not explicit as to the interlocking metasurfaces further comprising a locking pin to prevent disengagement of the engaged first and second metasurfaces, this feature would have been obvious in view of Murasaki.
Murasaki provides locking pins between interlocking surface features in order to prevent horizontal displacement of the interlocking surfaces, and thus help maintain engagement (“fitting projections” 4 between “engaging elements” 3: e.g. Fig. 1 – 24; ¶¶ [0009] – [0095]).
Accordingly, it would have been obvious to provide Flanagan’s interlocking metasurfaces with a locking pin to prevent disengagement of the engaged first and second metasurfaces as Murasaki suggests, the motivation being to further prevent accidental disassembly.
Claim 33 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Flanagan as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Parellada (US 6,248,678 B1).
Regarding claim 33, in addition to the limitations of claim 1, Flanagan discloses an interlocking action of the first and second metasurfaces is provided by dimensional tolerances of the mechanically interlocking surface features (“snug”: e.g. Col. 11, l. 75, to Col. 12, l. 4).
Although Berger is not explicit as to an interlocking action of the first and second metasurfaces being further provided by a surface roughness of the mechanically interlocking surface features, this feature would have been obvious in view of Parellada.
Parellada discloses surface roughness is provided with the surface features to provide an interlocking action which helps prevent inadvertent disassembly (e.g. Fig. 3B; Col. 2, ll. 6 – 49; Col. 2, l. 66, to Col. 3, l. 4; Col. 4, ll. 50 – 67).
Accordingly, it would have been obvious to provide Flanagan’s interlocking metasurfaces with a surface roughness that provides an interlocking action as Parellada suggests, the motivation being to further prevent inadvertent/accidental disassembly.
Response to Arguments
Applicant’s arguments, see pp. 5 – 9, filed 11 March 2026, with respect to the rejections of claims 1, 2, 6, 8 – 10, 12, 14, 16 – 18, 20, 21, 23, 26 – 31, and 33 under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) or 35 U.S.C. 103, as appropriate, have been fully considered and are persuasive. Therefore, the rejection has been withdrawn. However, upon further consideration, a new ground(s) of rejection is made in view of Flanagan.
Applicant asserts patentability over Berger (US 5,119,531 A) as the sole or primary reference in the Berger discloses a “supple” tape and therefore cannot meet the claim requirements of “rigid” as specified in claim 1. Applicant also asserts Berger fails to mention monolithic integration of the metasurfaces with rigid objects as required of claim 1.
Flanagan is disclosed to rectify both of these issues. Notably, Flanagan discloses forming metasurfaces on a “rigid base” (e.g. Col. 1, ll. 65 – 66) and in particular mentions “integral” construction (e.g. Col. 5, ll. 67 – 68), specifying methods for providing a monolithic arrangement (e.g. Col. 11, ll. 11 – 18).
Accordingly, new grounds of rejection are presented in view of Flanagan.
Conclusion
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ETHAN A UTT whose telephone number is (571)270-0356. The examiner can normally be reached Monday through Friday, 7:30 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. Central.
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/ETHAN A. UTT/Examiner, Art Unit 1783
/MARIA V EWALD/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 1783
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